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This research studies how agrarian accumulation in India has been reconfigured by 
liberalisation of the economy. It does so by focusing on accumulation strategies of 
capitalist farmers in Punjab, India’s archetypal Green Revolution state. 
The research concludes that agrarian accumulation is continuing in Punjab under 
liberalisation, although more precariously than before. State procurement of wheat 
and paddy from Punjab’s wholesale markets continues to be a major factor 
supporting this. Some capitalist farmers have also been able to create new spaces for 
accumulation under the changed circumstances, not least through selective 
engagement with corporates’ strategies. Therefore, I argue that there is no 
overarching agrarian crisis in India. However, at the same time, risks have multiplied 
as various other forms of State support have been reduced – with more reductions in 
the pipeline. Moreover, conditions in the wider economy have made established 
strategies of expanding accumulation or averting risk, as the case may be, by 
investing in land or non-agricultural avenues, both riskier and increasingly less 
accessible to even many capitalist farmers. 
The research also finds that agricultural markets are crucial to the process of agrarian 
accumulation in Punjab. By studying multiple commodities, I show that farmers 
must negotiate different kinds of market structures over a single agricultural year in 
order to accumulate within agriculture. These markets involve different risks and 
carry different kinds of significance for capitalist farmers. An understanding of 
agrarian capitalism in Punjab, therefore, needs to account for its agro-commercial 
actors and processes more than it has so far. Finally, although the focus of this study 
is on capitalist farmers and not the entire spectrum of agrarian classes, the findings 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
In the summer of 2017 farmers from across the states
1
 of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, 
Punjab, Madhya Pradesh and Assam staged protests to solicit support from the State 
towards ameliorating their plight. Farmers’ concerns included ecological distress, 
unprofitable crop prices, rising costs and indebtedness. As both a response to these 
protests and in competition with the current Uttar Pradesh (UP) state government 
that announced a farm loan waiver within a month of its election in March 2017, 
other state governments such as Karnataka, Maharashtra and Punjab also introduced 
loan waiver schemes that are both popular and populist. This hyper-visibility of 
farmers in crisis is not entirely new. Over the past two decades or so, growing 
numbers of farmer suicides in India have been reported in popular media and studied 
by some committed journalists and academics. While it is telling that the political 
class has only been galvanized into some kind of action due to political 
considerations and not by the death of farmers, it is the idea of agrarian crisis itself 
that this research takes as its point of departure. 
Since the early 1990s, i.e. the time when liberalisation was decisively introduced in 
India, agriculture has been neglected within development policy or rather the 
assumptions about agricultural development have changed. The significance of State 
support to agriculture has been replaced by the role of the private sector. Many 
scholars on the Left have argued that the State has set the scene for large 
corporations – domestic and transnational – to dominate Indian agriculture and earn 
profits at the expense of exploited farmers (Patnaik 2011). Declining State support 
has also set into motion other kinds of processes such as revival of the power of the 
informal sources of credit, and reinforced the unviability of the ever-increasing 
numbers of small and marginal holdings (Ramachandran and Rawal 2009). The 
agricultural crisis is also argued to be one of the key reasons for the increasing rural 
to urban migration of members of farming households, despite the lack of secure and 
formal employment. 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis, ‘State’ is used to refer to the abstract government apparatus while ‘state’ or ‘state 
government’ refers to the sub-national administrative unit.  
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While the above is both true and disconcerting, I believe that it is insufficient in 
terms of social science analysis because it assumes farmers to be a unified category 
across space and time. Further, it can lead us towards writing an obituary of ‘the 
agrarian’ without a grounded understanding of the processes underlying agrarian 
change. This perspective is derived from the theoretical framework of critical 
agrarian political economy which is the lens through which this research has been 
conducted. 
Critical agrarian political economy is based on Marxist political economy that 
locates class relations at the centre of social change (Bernstein 2010). Applied to 
agrarian studies, this framework allows us firstly, and most importantly, to view the 
agricultural population as constituted by the distinct classes of labour and capital. 
Although distinct, these classes are also constituted relationally, that is, capital exists 
because of its ability to appropriate surplus produced by labour while labour 
reproduces itself by working for capital. The interests of each class are, therefore, not 
only linked but also often in conflict with each other, and this informs their politics 
as well. This also means that policies and institutions have different implications for 
each class. The approach recognizes that these classes would be constituted 
differently in different socio-historical contexts and that class relations will intersect 
with non-class social identities and broader historical trajectories of development to 
create specific dynamics of agrarian change. Methodologically, this implies the 
significance of rigorous empirical work to delineate the various social actors and 
processes in any region. 
Using this lens, some scholars on the Left have argued that the Indian agrarian crisis 
is not a crisis for everyone in agriculture. It is certainly a crisis for the labouring 
classes and the small and marginal farmers who constitute the majority of the 
agrarian population, but not necessarily for the agrarian capitalists, a category which 
includes large capitalist landlords and capitalist farmers (Lerche 2013). However, no 
study has yet focused on these capitalists and tried to understand agrarian change 
through their accumulation strategies since the 1990s. This research seeks to fill this 
gap by focusing on agrarian accumulation. 
The literature on agrarian transitions informs us that capital accumulation by 
capitalist farmers and landlords is a key driver of agrarian change (Byres 1986). The 
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particular form that this might take in different regions shapes not only rural class 
formation but also the surplus available for investments beyond agriculture. A focus 
on patterns of agrarian accumulation allows us to place such capitalist farmers and 
landlords at the centre of analysis and understand how they are negotiating the 
changes that have occurred under liberalisation and to what effect. 
From the perspective of pro-labour, radical politics, it may be questioned why it is 
necessary to speak of capital and accumulation in a period in history when the scales 
are tilted so heavily against labour and all who are marginalised and oppressed. 
However, analytically and perhaps also politically, it is hardly useful to paint all 
developments in black and white. If we accept that India is a class divided society, it 
is important to understand whether there is a class of agrarian capital that is 
benefitting from liberalisation and if so, in what ways – where the interests of this 
class lie, if they are shifting, if this has implications for how the class itself is 
constituted, and how it is placed vis-à-vis other rural classes. Such an analysis also 
prevents us from making a priori assumptions about the effects of globalisation and 
liberalisation on Indian agriculture and helps us move towards an analysis that can 
account for historical contingencies as well as agency of different farmers. 
I study the process of accumulation in terms of some of the common tropes of the 
crisis’ causes. The first is the rising costs of production and inadequate returns to 
investment. This research will try to understand which liberalisation reforms have 
contributed to this and how they might affect different classes of farmers. This 
impact will also presumably differ by nature of the commodity produced, and this 
forms a crucial axis of analysis in this research. Agrarian labour relations are 
considered a part of this rubric and assessed from the point of view of the capitalist 
farmer, not as a separate area of enquiry. It is taken for granted that value is created 
by labour in the production process and is appropriated by the capitalist. But the 
focus here is on the extent to which farmers succeed in accumulating and continue 
accumulation under liberalisation. This is linked in the literature to a number of other 
aspects and conditions that are also under-researched. 
The second most commonly identified cause of crisis is exploitation by traders and 
corporates. Since India has historically had many regionally powerful trading castes 
and communities, they are often held responsible for exploitation of farmers. 
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Whenever there are sharp hikes in the prices of essential food items combined with 
low farm-level prices for farmers, the role of traders in hoarding and speculation is 
raised. In more recent years as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in food retail has 
become an issue of heated debate, the removal of traders or ‘middlemen’ is argued to 
be crucial to improve ‘efficiency’. Local traders also often work as moneylenders 
who lend to farmers at exploitative rates, argued to be an important factor resulting 
in many farmers’ chronic indebtedness. The role of traders, therefore, is also 
important to study in terms of credit, something endemic among all capitalist 
endeavours. 
Corporate organisations also operate to control upstream or downstream aspects of 
agricultural commodity production. The issues around this are exemplified by highly 
contentious debates around the introduction of genetically modified (GM) seeds in 
agriculture and the exploitative role of companies such as Monsanto in causing 
farmer suicides (Shiva 1992). Contract farming represents another development 
where battle lines are drawn regarding whether or not it is beneficial for farmers. 
Scholars have argued that transnational capital in agriculture has pauperized and 
marginalized farmers not just in India, but the world over (McMichael 2005; Weis 
2007). The realm of the agricultural market is, therefore, absolutely crucial to 
understand how capitalist farmers are accumulating under liberalisation (Harriss-
White 1996, 2008). Thus, this research will study how different kinds of farmers 
relate to different kinds of traders, including corporates. It should be noted that this is 
not a study of traders and markets per se, but of traders in relation to farmers. 
Finally, there is the issue of economic diversification of farming households, widely 
discussed in academic literature (Lerche 2014). In some ways an effect, rather than a 
cause of agrarian crisis, it is nevertheless an important and disputed area of enquiry 
as it is much debated if accumulation by capitalist farmers can lead to overall 
economic development and reinforcement of their dominant class position in 
agrarian and wider society. This discussion can also help us think about the possible 
directions that agrarian change might take in the near future. 
The research focuses on Punjab in north-western India, the quintessential Green 
Revolution state of India to explore these issues. It was home to well-entrenched 
agrarian capital well before liberalisation happened, and therefore it presents a useful 
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case to understand the trajectory of agrarian accumulation in India. It is one of the 
richest states in India in terms of per capita income and is known to have some of the 
country’s most successful and politically powerful capitalist farmers. In this sense, 
Punjab is an extreme case of agrarian accumulation and cannot be considered 
representative of the national situation. Given its agricultural profile, if there is a 
region of the country where accumulation can be expected to be continuing in 
liberalised India, it is Punjab. But, even here, the existing literature tells us that the 
story of agricultural prosperity is limited and fast going bust in the 21
st
 century. The 
tropes that support this narrative are similar to those discussed earlier for the country 
at large. This research will, therefore, explore whether there are any tensions in this 
narrative based on the theoretical perspective outlined earlier, and potentially 
contribute to an extension of the well-known story of agrarian accumulation in 
Punjab beyond the Green Revolution. 
In view of the above discussion, it is now possible to identify the key research 
question: How has agrarian accumulation in Punjab been reconfigured by 
liberalisation of the Indian economy? This will be discussed through the following 
sub-questions: 
i. Is accumulation within agriculture continuing? 
ii. Which liberalisation reforms introduced by the State are having an impact on 
accumulation? 
iii. Which social relations matter for accumulation, and how are they changing 
vis-à-vis liberalisation? 
iv. How are different kinds of capitalist farmers negotiating these changes? 
1.1 Chapters 
The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first details the theoretical debates 
within which this research is set and seeks to contribute to. The literature on 
capitalist farming and farmers in India and Punjab, and to some extent outside of 
India, is then reviewed and empirical gaps are identified. Chapter 2 addresses 
theories and concepts, Chapter 3 issues characterizing Indian agriculture and Chapter 
4 agricultural issues specific to Punjab. 
Part II is on the methodology and experience of fieldwork (Chapter 5). Here, I 
discuss how the research problem was made operational, and the rationale and 
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process of selecting the fieldwork site. A discussion of the research methods used 
and their limits follows. The last part of this chapter reflects on the methodological 
challenges of this research, both in terms of the theoretical framework as well as my 
subjectivity as a researcher. 
Part III discusses the empirical data gathered through fieldwork. Chapter 6 describes 
the field based on older secondary literature and my observations. Chapter 7 analyses 
the agricultural production and marketing patterns in the field area. It is divided into 
four sections, each focusing on a different agricultural commodity. Here I discuss 
aspects of costs and returns to investment, as well as the different kinds of traders, 
including corporates, involved in each commodity. 
The next two chapters are on aspects that fundamentally shape the possibilities of 
accumulation through agriculture. Chapter 8 focuses on land, with a detailed 
discussion of the dynamics of leasing and buying or selling land. It reflects on the 
ways in which land constitutes an asset for different classes of farmers. Chapter 9, on 
credit relations, discusses the main sources of formal and informal credit and 
analyses them in relation to each other. It shows how farmers may or may not be 
caught in cycles of indebtedness. The final chapter of this part, Chapter 10, examines 
farmers’ economic diversification. It describes the strategies of diversification that 
are accessible and attempted by different farmers, linking them to issues of the wider 
economy and attempts a classification of patterns of accumulation. Chapter 11 
summarizes the main findings of this research, relates them to agricultural 
developments beyond the field site and draws out the main theoretical contributions 




Part I: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
Chapter 2.  Key Theoretical Debates 
 
The focus of this research is capital accumulation in agriculture in India and its 
reconfiguration as a result of liberalisation. In the previous chapter, I argued that this 
focus was important in order to understand whether an all-encompassing crisis for all 
agrarian classes in the period of liberalisation really exists, and thereby to explain the 
processes underlying agrarian change. In order to do this, we need to understand the 
nature of capitalist agriculture, the role of markets and traders, and the various 
agricultural and non-agricultural investment strategies of capitalist farmers. 
This research was conducted within the framework of critical agrarian political 
economy, at the core of which lies an understanding of historically developed class 
relations. Based on this, this chapter first surveys the literature for what constitutes 
capitalist agriculture today and how this relates to debates on the nature of agrarian 
transition in the developing world. These debates have been central to the 
understanding of the state of world agriculture in the 21
st
 century. This is followed 
by a discussion of how a capitalist farmer can be defined, and how previous studies 
have identified such farmers and their accumulation patterns both in India and 
abroad. The next part of the chapter focuses on agricultural markets and examines 
the veracity of a common view of traders within political economy, i.e. traders 
constitute a parasitical class that exploits farmers. It also identifies different kinds of 
questions that can be asked of their role and the structure of markets. Given the 
power of corporates in global agricultural markets, the literature on their impact on 
producers is also surveyed. Finally, the chapter raises the issue of how the nature of 
the commodity involved matters in patterns of accumulation by capitalist farmers. 
2.1 Capitalist Agriculture and Agriculturists 
The research problem firstly begs the question of what is meant by capitalist 
agriculture. Here it is useful to refer to the distinction between farming and 
agriculture made by Henry Bernstein. Farming, he argues, is the work on soil that 
farmers have always done. Agriculture, on the other hand, is ‘farming together with 
all those economic interests and their specialized institutions and activities, 
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“upstream” and “downstream” of farming, that affect the activities and reproduction 
of farmers’ (2010, 65). Agriculture emerged as a sector under capitalism due to the 
social division of labour and the emergence of a distinct industrial sector. 
Two things should be noted about this articulation. Firstly, to use Harriss-White’s 
(2016b) comment on another concept (‘filières vivrieres’) studied and applied by 
Bernstein, it allows for an ‘expanded conception of what is agrarian’ (483). It 
includes not only the process of production but also the pre- and post-harvest market 
dynamics and the institutional framework(s) within which these are carried out. 
Market dynamics or the process of exchange or of circulation is often neglected or 
given lesser importance in agrarian studies. This expanded notion of agriculture thus 
creates space for the study of markets and traders of different kinds and at different 
spatial levels as a part of agrarian dynamics. I return to this below. 
The second point is that while it expands the idea of the agrarian, by marking it as a 
distinct sector comparable to industry, it also (perhaps unintentionally) reasserts an 
internal logic of agriculture. This issue gained relevance in view of some aspects of 
the debate between Bernstein and Byres on the contemporary relevance of the 
agrarian question.
2
 Byres (1986, 1996) argues that development of capitalist 
agriculture is central to overall industrial development through capital transfer. 
Bernstein (1996) critiques him for adopting an ‘internal logic’ approach to the 
understanding of the agrarian question, arguing that in the 21
st
 century, ‘generalized 
commodity production’ is widespread and international circuits of capital can now 
be the source of industrial accumulation. In his response, Byres (2003, 2016) does 
not challenge the relevance of the ‘external’ per se, but argues that assuming away 
the significance of agrarian transitions represents a kind of world-historical 
determinism. 
These differences notwithstanding, it is now commonly accepted that the concrete 
empirical investigation of a given context needs to incorporate both the processes 
internal to agriculture and relevant dynamics outside it. This research attempts the 
same. Such an approach can be especially useful in understanding aspects of agrarian 
                                                          
2
 The Bernstein-Byres debate on the agrarian question per se is of limited relevance here since the 




change in a post-transition context in the globalised world-historical moment, but it 
does present methodological challenges: these are discussed in Chapter 5. 
2.1.1 Capitalist Farmers 
Having identified the broad contours of capitalist agriculture and its relevance, we 
need to identify who the capitalist farmer is. The mode of production debate in India 
was one of the key debates that explored this question. Succinctly summarized by 
Alice Thorner in a series of articles in the Economic and Political Weekly (1982a, 
1982b, 1982c), the discussion began with Daniel Thorner’s reference to the 
appearance of ‘gentleman farmers’ in the late 1960s. At the end of a heated debate 
on whether such farmers necessarily represented the emergence of capitalist farmers, 
Utsa Patnaik’s conceptualisation emerged as the most widely accepted. According to 
Patnaik (1971a, 1971b, 1986, 1987), the key features of a capitalist farmer include 
labour exploitation, control over means of production, production for the market and, 
perhaps most importantly, reinvestment of surplus into agriculture in order to expand 
it or ‘the degree of capital intensification’ (Patnaik 1971a, A-126).  
In this context, Patnaik (1972) also makes an important distinction between size – 
owned or operational – and scale, i.e. ‘economic size of the land’ (1613). She argues 
against conflating the two when land-augmenting technologies are being introduced, 
although concedes that they may coincide when techniques become uniform. On this 
basis, Patnaik also strongly criticizes the association of landholding sizes with class 
position (see also Patnaik 1987). 
Byres (1981) makes a similar point when he argues that capital intensification would 
imply that even small landholdings could belong to a rich peasant or capitalist. 
However, in his 1981 study of class formation in the Indian countryside, he used size 
as a proxy for class on the grounds that, at that time, capitalism had not penetrated 
north-west India deeply enough for productivity to be detached from size. More 
recently, based on his research in West Bengal, India, Rakshit (2011) makes a 
similar argument about land sizes but concluded that scale economies overlapped 
significantly with capital intensification in technologically advanced regions and less 
so in backward regions. This indicates that while, in theory, land size and class 




Outside the Indian context, Oya (2004) has analysed differentiation within large- and 
mid-scale farmers in Senegal. He argues that within classes defined by size, different 
trajectories may be identified on the basis of the historically contingent ways in 
which they appropriate surplus and accumulate. Using the criteria of labour relations, 
land use/ownership, degree of capitalisation, education and patterns of surplus use, 
Oya identifies three categories of farmers – non-capitalist, semi-capitalist and 
capitalist. He asserts that this is a preliminary classification for the Senegalese 
context and indicates a ‘continuum of tendencies’ rather than reified categories 
(309). Following on from this, Oya (2007) has drawn on life histories of rural 
capitalists to further tease out the process underpinning rural accumulation in 
Senegal. Classifying apparently homogenous categories of rich/poor/large/small 
farmers in terms of the tendencies or patterns of accumulation trajectories could also 
be particularly useful in studying agrarian change in well-developed agrarian 
capitalist contexts: this study attempts to identify such tendencies. 
Zhang (2015) has combined primarily qualitative data on property relations and 
market participation (in markets for land, labour, product and means of production) 
of farming households in order to arrive at five distinct class positions in rural China 
– capitalist employers, petty bourgeoisie, dual-employment households, wage 
workers and subsistence peasants. Capitalist farmers may be corporate farm 
managers or entrepreneurial farmers who represent small private capital. The latter 
are formally classified as ‘family farms’ but in reality, they are mostly family-owned 
or family-managed rather than family-worked. The emergence of these farmers is 
attributed to access to political resources as well as to the accumulation from below 
due to skill premium. Like Oya (2004), Zhang also argues that he uses the 
classification as a heuristic device to understand the underlying processes of agrarian 
change in rural China. Moreover, commonly studied through quantitative data, his 
use of qualitative data to delineate a differentiated class structure also opens up new 
ways of approaching this subject methodologically. 
2.1.2 Capitalist Farmers in India 
After four decades of the mode of production debate, it is widely agreed that Indian 
agriculture presents a form of capitalist agriculture.
3
 At the same time, it is also 
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 However, different Left parties in India have different understandings of this, with the Communist 
Part of India (Maoist) and Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) arguing that India is still 
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agreed that the nature of this agrarian capitalism varies considerably across different 
regions of the country. In the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, for example, John 
Harriss (1982) argues that class differentiation was underway but constrained by the 
fragmentation of holdings and, more so, by the domination of ‘merchant-usurers’ 
capital’ (294). Athreya et al. (1990) argue, on the other hand, that wet areas of Tamil 
Nadu had more polarized class structures than dry areas.  
Some recent studies have tried to identify the accumulating classes in Indian 
agriculture. Ramachandran (2011) argues that the Indian countryside is dominated 
by landlords and capitalist farmers. These classes own the largest landholdings and 
their members do not participate in any manual agricultural work. The difference 
between the two, however, rests in their origins.
4
 The capitalist farmers are not 
traditional landlords and were most commonly rich peasants or upper-middle peasant 
households. They emerged powerful owing to a relatively more recent history of 
success in agriculture and/or through the re-investment of surpluses made elsewhere. 
Earlier, he noted that they could belong to traditionally dominant castes or be from 
upwardly mobile backward castes (Ramachandran et al 2010). Despite the 
differences in their origins, the economic behaviour of these two groups is identical 
(Lerche 2013). 
Ramachandran et al (2010) state that a class of rich peasants also accumulates. This 
peasantry or ‘petty producers’ includes households whose members perform at least 
some, if not all, of the manual work in agriculture. They divide the peasantry into 
rich, middle and poor peasants. Although they argue that it is difficult empirically to 
draw neat distinctions between the three categories, in their survey of villages in 
Andhra Pradesh (AP), they found that the rich peasants constitute a distinct category 
since they were ‘characterized by substantial accumulation of capital, low labour 
ratios and high incomes’ (30). 
Lerche (2013) also argues that existing empirical studies suggest that peasant petty 
commodity producers (henceforth petty producers) in at least some regions of the 
country are able to accumulate. Notably, his use of the term petty producers differs 
                                                                                                                                                                    
semi-feudal (Lerche 2013). Lerche (ibid.) and Harriss (2013) have argued that aspects of semi-
feudalism (such as landlordism or attached labour relations) have been either transformed or 
subsumed within capitalism.  
4
 Chapter 3 gives a historical overview of the origin of landlords in India.  
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from that of Ramachandran (2011). For the latter, petty producers are simply the 
agriculturists that lie between the landlords and capitalist farmers, and the wage 
workers. Lerche, on the other hand, draws on Bernstein’s (1988) conceptualisation of 
petty commodity production which combines the contradictory class position of both 
capital and labour, making it inherently unstable. In China, Zhang (2015) argues, 
petty producers can reproduce on an expanded basis, contingent on factors such as 
technological improvements and state interventions, and that they are subject to 
tendencies of differentiation. In this research, therefore, I work with the assumption 
that landlords, capitalist farmers who may or may not work on their land, as well as 
some petty producers may be accumulating. Further, it would be reasonable to 
expect competition between them.  
Finally, a discussion of capitalist agriculture would be incomplete without reference 
to the state of labour relations. Labour relations, especially the employment of 
attached labour, have been an important element of debates on agrarian capitalism in 
India. This was also a key aspect of the mode of production debate referred to above. 
While widespread use of free wage labour is considered one of the features of 
capitalist production, it is now widely accepted that sharecropping, certain kinds of 
tenancies and attached labour conditions are also entirely compatible with capitalist 
production: labour relations may outwardly appear to have pre-capitalist features but 
they operate within a capitalist logic of production. However, since it is not a focus 
of this study, labour will be studied only as an element of cost for farmers and as an 
indicator of whether or not farmers do any manual work on their own farms. 
This survey shows that the literature on capitalist farmers in India is rich but 
continues to be limited to the dynamics within agriculture. I explained earlier that 
capitalist agriculture also needs to be understood in relation to forces beyond 
agriculture. Both Zhang (ibid.) and Oya (2004, 2007) have accounted for non-farm 
investments, actors and/or political processes in their analyses of the emergence of 
capitalist farmers and their accumulation strategies and this helps in identifying 
patterns of differentiation within agriculture. Over the last few decades, studies from 
across India have highlighted that capitalist farmers are increasingly diversifying into 
other economic avenues (Chapter 3) and Section 2.2 discusses how agricultural 
markets can impact accumulation strategies of capitalist farmers. The neglect of 
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these aspects in the vast majority of the literature on capitalist farming in India is a 
limitation that this research seeks to address. 
Having established the outline of the analytical framework within which I study 
capitalist agriculture, the chapter now moves on to a relatively less discussed aspect 
of the capitalist agrarian economy but one which is crucial to our research problem. 
2.2 Agricultural Merchants and Markets 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, merchants/traders are often held to be a cause of farmer 
distress. In the current period of liberalisation and agrarian ‘crisis’, this narrative has 
come to the fore yet again. Moreover, as discussed earlier, markets are an integral 
element of agriculture in the contemporary world. One of the key aims of this 
project, therefore, is to explore how these merchants and market processes intersect 
with the process of agrarian accumulation. Within critical political economy, these 
actors and processes are often discussed through the analytical category of 
merchant’s capital, which is where this discussion will begin. 
2.2.1 Merchant’s Capital in Agriculture 
In Volume III of Capital, Marx (1894) argues that, in its stripped-down version, pure 
merchant’s or mercantile capital is capital that is engaged solely in the purchase and 
sale of commodities. It is not just this function that is a mark of merchant’s capital 
but the fact that money is advanced to make more money. Without this, it is simply 
the function of marketing or circulation which may be performed even by the 
producer himself. Marx notes clearly that in its pure form merchant’s capital is 
unproductive, i.e. it ‘does not create either value or surplus-value, at least not 
directly’ (Chapter 16, n.p.). Nevertheless, merchant’s capital is recognized as 
capable of aiding production and the circulation of money as a necessary part of 
social reproduction. 
Banaji (2016) combines these concepts with historical evidence on colonialism and 
agriculture across the world in the 19th and the 20th centuries to argue that 
merchant’s capital cannot be viewed as being limited to the sphere of circulation. 
This is because there are many cases where merchant’s capital has proactively 
shaped the process of production. Banaji also argues that this capital is never found 
in its pure form and makes this an integral part of his analysis. The ‘impurity’ or 
‘hybridity’ of mercantile capital, most commonly occurring with interest-bearing 
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capital and sometimes with land rent or industrial capital, is in fact crucial to his 
argument that it should be considered an integral part of productive processes. He 
describes three different patterns of domination of agriculture by merchant and 
industrial capital (as distinct from standard agrarian capitalism),
5
 namely, produce 
trades, contract farming and vertical integration. Commercial capitalism of the 
produce trades is the subsumption of households within wider circuits of capitals 
through the operation of a ‘‘‘hierarchy of financial and commercial relationships” 
distributed across commodity chains’ (414). This often involved advances across 
different levels and especially at the lowest levels whereby credit was extended to 
producers of commodities (peasant households). Trade in Malwa opium, Chinese tea 
and Senegalese groundnuts are some of the examples he gives. The second pattern is 
contract farming whereby producers are more directly and formally tied to 
commodity production by industrial capital. The third involves ‘tighter forms of 
integration’ (427) and industrialized agriculture, where industrial capital exercises 
total control over the diverse aspects of the production process, as in the rubber 
industry of South-East Asia and the American broiler industry. 
While the latter two are linked to forms of industrial capital, the first is described as 
a distinct form of merchant capitalism whereby commodity chains are structured 
almost entirely through middlemen. But, even in contract farming and vertical 
integration, local mercantile capital/actors may be involved depending on the context 
in question. Therefore, Banaji argues, the polarisation between production and 
exchange is a false one and signals an ahistorical theoretical formalism. 
Harriss-White (1996, 2008) also asserts that merchant’s capital is almost never found 
in its pure form. She argues that the apparent dichotomy between production and 
exchange and the labelling of merchant’s capital and middlemen as ‘unproductive’ is 
unnecessary. For example, she shows that irrigated cotton cultivation expanded in 
the Coimbatore region in Tamil Nadu, India only due to a hierarchy of trading 
relations and credit (1996). She argues that the confusion stems from Marx’s own 
conflation of the abstract category of merchant’s capital with the concrete reality of 
commerce (2008, Appendix 2). She chooses to use the term ‘commercial capital’ in 
her analysis since it is the ‘actually existing counterpart of merchant’s capital’ (337). 
                                                          
5
 This refers to a situation where the capitalist social relations have been established among farmers 
through internal processes. 
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This is different from Banaji’s and, indeed, Marx’s conceptualization of the term; 
while for Banaji, the difference between ‘merchant’s capital’ and ‘commercial 
capital’ is a theoretical one, for Harriss-White it is the difference between theory and 
reality. I would argue that despite having critiqued Marx for conflation (of the 
abstract category of merchant’s capital with the real world of commerce), she herself 
conflates the practical world of commerce with the theoretical category of 
commercial capital, which actually is a much more limited concept than her use of it 
implies. This also explains why she categorizes a whole range of agro-commercial 
classes as ‘rural commercial capital’. This is not merely an issue of semantics but 
one of theoretical clarity. In this research, for the kinds of processes that are 
described above, the term ‘mercantile’ or ‘merchant’s capital’ is used for the 
purposes of theoretical analysis, while agro-commercial classes or class factions is 
used for empirical description. 
Banaji’s work presents the various modalities through which merchant’s capital may 
operate, and how this may be better integrated into Marxist analysis.
6
 This in turn 
raises some important questions for this research. His 2016 article was written with a 
focus on ‘peasants’, i.e. peasant households whose reproduction is subordinated to 
capital and that is secured by capital. But arguably a majority, if not all, of 
developing world farmers have now developed into a class (or classes) of capital and 
classes of labour and combinations thereof (petty commodity producers). In fact, it is 
debateable whether there are any peasant households outside capitalism at all. In the 
21
st
 century, most (possibly all) cases studying merchant’s capital and farming 
involve dealing with the relations between classes of capital, and between capital and 
petty producers. Therefore, the key analytical issue between producers and 
merchants needs to be clearly identified as one of division of profits, and of 
competition between them, and not one of exploitation of non-capital by capital.  
Banaji resolves this well in the case of contract farming. He argues that since there is 
overwhelming evidence that contract farming is usually biased towards capitalist 
farmers, it is better understood as ‘a legal and economic relationship between 
capitals’ (421, emphasis added). However, it is not clear from his work how we can 
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 However, a general issue with this article is that it claims that all kinds of traders, brokers and 




 centuries. It raises the question, beyond the scope 
of my research, of how we can historicize the emergence of these capitalists, and the changes in these 
categories over five centuries. 
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understand the role of mercantile or industrial capital with respect to other patterns 
identified by him if the producers form a class of agrarian capital. I contend that in 
such a context his idea of combined accumulation between different levels of 
merchant’s capital must also be extended to capitalist farmers. In other words, in 
such a situation capitalist farmers have to be included to account for the full extent of 
accumulation within agriculture, rather than taking a ‘peasant-versus-capital’ view. 
Another concern is that Banaji makes reference to studies that focus on a single crop 
or that allow for categorisation as one or another pattern of merchant capitalism. 
However, in India, as in many other countries, many farmers cultivate more than one 
crop annually on a commercial basis: presumably, this means that they are 
participating in different commodity markets. This makes Banaji’s categorisation of 
different patterns of capital’s domination of agriculture appear too simplistic/one-
dimensional. In contemporary times, it might be more useful to understand this as a 
multiplicity of capital, including merchant’s capital, co-existing and/or competing 
under the specific form of capitalism in different regions. Banaji’s argument that 
‘industrial capitalism of the classic type cannot be seen as the sole form and structure 
of capital accumulation’ (424) contributes to this position. However, his 
categorisation has to be expanded to account accurately for the very different 
historical moment of the 21
st
 century. 
2.2.2 The Nature of Agricultural Markets 
Within the political economy tradition, one of the most prominent ways in which 
agricultural markets have been analysed is through the concept of interlinked factor 
markets.
7
 ‘Transactions are interlinked when the contract conditions for one 
exchange (e.g., for labor or output) are established as conditions for access to another 
exchange (e.g., for land or finance)’ (Crow and Murshid 1994, 1012). The debate on 
interlinked markets is dominated by a focus on landlord-tenancy relations rather than 
the trader-producer relations which is the focus of this review. Much of this literature 
is based in the South Asian sub-continent, and forms the basis of the discussion here. 
A key figure in this debate is Bhaduri (1983) who argues that in the years following 
independence India was reeling under ‘forced commerce’ owing to the involuntary 
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 Interlinked transactions are also widely debated in the institutional framework. However, these have 
been adequately critiqued from the political economy tradition (Srivastava 1989b; Harriss-White 
1996) and will not be repeated here. 
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nature of market exchanges by peasants. Small peasants, he argued, were dependent 
on the market for their subsistence but unable to meet their needs through their 
production. This forced them to take consumption loans from merchant-
moneylenders who in turn extracted surplus through interest on the loans and by 
manipulating prices to be as low as possible. This also led to tied transactions in 
other markets such as labour and land. Bhaduri is aware, however, that this is a 
phenomenon limited to the small peasantry and cannot be extended to the rich, large-
landholding peasants. 
Bharadwaj (1985) develops this last line of argument even further when she 
delineated the different ways in which different classes or groups of farmers may be 
integrated into the markets. For example, while the large cultivators set the terms of 
exchange in the market, the smallest have to enter oppressive debt relations for 
consumption needs. Therefore, Bharadwaj argues, exchange relations are firmly 
rooted in production conditions. Similarly, based on their work in Bangladesh, Crow 
and Murshid (1994) also argue that the differences in the prevalence and nature of 
interlinked transactions in backward and advanced agricultural areas of the country 
are rooted in the agrarian structure. In advanced areas, for instance, the accumulation 
by rich farmers severely limited the possibilities of their exploitation by merchants 
through such transactions. 
While Bhaduri’s and Bharadwaj’s work is considered an important starting point in 
the understanding of debt relations and commercialisation of agriculture, subsequent 
scholarship has both critiqued their work and built on it for some significant insights. 
Srivastava (1989a, 1989b) points out that they limit their analyses to the exploitative 
role of interlinked transactions, one that holds back different factor markets from 
complete capitalist development. He argues that in the context of transition, the 
nature of the interlinked transactions is contingent on the changes in ‘the strategies 
of subsistence or accumulation of different classes’ (1989b, 499). Further, the 
function of such a transaction may change radically even when its outward 
appearance remains the same. Although argued in the context of tenancy 
arrangements, this is an important contribution that allows for the possibility of both 
progressive and regressive tendencies in the functioning of these transactions. It also 
compels us to look for the content and context of the transactions rather than a 
single-minded focus on their form. 
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Despite the strengths of Srivastava’s work, his treatment of these transactions lies 
within the economic realm. This limitation is addressed by Hart (1986) who also 
argues from the point of view of labour-tying arrangements. She argues that 
interlinking persists across quite diverse contexts not only due to the compulsions of 
labour management but also those of ‘social control’.
8
 In other words, sometimes 
elites engage in such transactions because they can open up access to wider spheres 
of accumulation. Hart establishes that changes in interlinked relations are rooted not 
only in conditions within agriculture, but also in changing political conditions and 
the tensions and contradictions which the institutional arrangements themselves 
generate (197). She illustrates this by tracing the trajectory of exclusionary 
sharecropping arrangements (kedokan) in Java. She links its uneven fate across Java 
from the 19
th
 century to the 1980s to patterns of labour demand as well as the 
militarisation of the bureaucracy since the late 1960s and the accompanying 
expedition against political organising at the village level. Her explanation of the 
persistence of interlinking bridges the economic and the non-economic spheres and 
she clearly asserts that it is an integral, even necessary, part of capitalism. This 
allows us to expand our analysis of interlinking and understand the various functions 
such a relation could perform for the social groups involved in it. 
There is, however, a deeper issue with looking at markets through the lens of 
interlinking alone. A focus on interlinking undermines the diversity of classes that 
constitute markets in different regions. In other words, if class relations are taken as 
the starting point, along with forms through which dominance over land and other 
capitals is exercised, interlinking would perhaps be a lesser intellectual puzzle. For 
instance, through her long-standing empirical work on markets in South Asia, 
Harriss-White (1996, 2008, 2010) argues that merchants cannot be considered to be a 
single class, but must be recognized as heterogeneous and internally differentiated 
(which we also gain a sense of from Banaji’s work discussed above). Scholars such 
as Bhaduri and Bharadwaj, she points out, conflate all kinds of merchants and 
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moneylenders into a single category (Harriss-White 1996).
9
 Nevertheless, their 
presence has implications for class dynamics and inequalities in any region, owing to 
the simple fact that a large proportion of resources and assets are found to be 
concentrated with them across multiple contexts. She also points to the fact that 
traders maintain their predominance by developing monopoly-like relations and 
strengthening non-capitalist social relations of production. 
The latter point actually signals the part of her work where she argues that market 
relations and dynamics are embedded in ‘social structures of accumulation’, i.e. 
social institutions which regulate the economy. This is evidenced, in India, by the 
predominance of certain castes in certain businesses but also in the manner in which 
they function. Joint families, use of (usually unpaid) female family labour, marital 
alliances and use of caste associations are some of the ‘social’ ways in which this 
class perpetuates itself (Harriss-White 2003). 
Like Hart, Harriss-White is not only able to combine the economic and the non-
economic through such analysis, but also to place politics and the State firmly at the 
centre of understanding the market. She does this, firstly, by arguing that merchants 
have ‘infiltrated state organisations’ (1996, 336). She draws on Kalecki’s (1972) 
conceptualisation of an intermediate regime and extends this to argue that a large 
majority of India is governed by the ‘intermediate classes’, i.e. ‘a ‘loose coalition of 
the small-scale capitalist class, agrarian and local agribusiness elites, and local state 
officials’ (2003, 241). Given the fact that these different social actors and groups 
may not necessarily have the same interests, the usefulness of this concept must be 
questioned, and this is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the 
larger point is compelling, i.e. at a ‘lower level of abstraction’, the boundaries 
between the State and society are extremely porous, the implication being that 
accumulation by private actors (intermediate classes) and the State are interwoven. 
In her empirical work on West Bengal, she has also shown that mercantile interests 
may also be protected by the State’s own interests. The Left government, for 
instance, protected the interests of the agro-commercial classes in paddy/rice at the 
expense of the much poorer petty trading interests because it needed to secure 
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supplies for its Public Distribution System (PDS) requirements (Harriss-White 
2008). 
Throughout her large body of work on this subject, Harriss-White makes the case for 
understanding markets as a system, i.e., while markets are embedded in production 
conditions, they also have a degree of institutional autonomy that determines their 
functioning and that in turn can have an impact on production conditions. She writes: 
…the concentration of control over commercial assets mirrors that 
over crop production. To this extent, the marketing systems are 
embedded in the agrarian social structure. On the other hand, the 
marketing systems are spatially concentrated and specialised in ways 
which bear no relation either to the central place hierarchy or even to 
current local cropping patterns. So they also evince considerable 
institutional autonomy from the current agricultural economy and the 
spatial pattern of service provision (1996, 86, emphasis in original). 
Writing with Ali Jan, she argues that it is only when the market is understood as a 
system in itself that relevant questions about its relational roles, such as extraction 
and exploitation, can be raised (Harriss-White and Ali Jan 2012). 
This overview of the debates on the role of merchant’s capital and commodity 
markets has established some important points for our analysis. Firstly, it has shown 
that the characterisation of merchant’s capital, or of interlinked transactions more 
specifically, as uniformly unproductive and exploitative is inaccurate. There are 
contexts where merchant’s capital can play a productive role through commodity 
exchanges and credit relations, and recognition of this requires careful empirical 
investigation. It is most certainly not a phenomenon limited to pre-capitalist phases. 
Secondly, the class/social position of farmers and traders is pivotal to understanding 
their relations and the transactions between them. These will vary in different 
contexts, including in relation to different commodities (discussed below). Finally, it 
has established that markets have an internal systemic logic, which however, draws 
on local social structures and political conditions. 
2.2.3 Corporate Capital in Agriculture 
So far I have treated the issues as if they take place within a closed national 
economy, without considering global aspects. However, as noted in Chapter 1, the 
liberalisation of the Indian economy and its impact on Indian agriculture are key 
issues for this research. Within this, corporate control of agriculture is a major trope. 
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Nagaraj (2015) argues that a majority of the listed corporate firms in India are 
unproductive or fake, but case material indicates significant corporate presence in 
Indian agriculture under liberalisation (S. Singh 2006; Pritchard and Connell 2011; 
Narayanan 2012; Kumar 2016). Specific details about India's liberalisation are 
discussed in Chapter 3 but here I examine how the impact of agricultural 
transnational corporations (henceforth TNCs) on producers in developing countries 
has been studied in wider literature. These corporates are often argued to control 
agricultural production and to exploit farmers through their control of upstream and 
downstream markets, a narrative that resonates with that on merchants in general. 
Weis (2007) has argued that TNCs are the dominant actors in the global food 
economy. They establish their dominance through mutual trade agreements, 
represented best by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA), and through alliances with trading countries and elites in 
developing countries. National frames of reference, therefore, are useful only to 
understand global production imbalances and not to understand the global food 
economy as a whole. Developing countries are disadvantaged due to manipulation by 
developed countries where these TNCs are predominantly located; this includes, for 
instance, exempting agricultural subsidies by the latter and labelling those extended 
by the former as ‘trade-distorting’, imposing protectionist tariffs on agricultural 
imports from developing countries and so on. In this way, Weis argues, entire 
‘cultures of farming’ of developing countries have been destroyed and farmers are 
treated ‘as recipients (i.e. customers) rather than participants in the process of 
innovation’ (29). 
McMichael (2005, 2014) employs a food regime analysis to make similar 
arguments.
10
 He contends that the period since the 1980s can be characterized as a 
‘corporate food regime’, a vehicle for accumulation by dispossession of peasantries 
across the globe. Like Weis, McMichael also views corporate dominance as 
representing a threat to the ‘cultural survival’ (2005, 278) of peasant populations. He 
also recognizes the WTO’s AoA as a key mechanism of the subjugation of the latter. 
The best response to what McMichael sees as the privatisation of food security as a 
global, corporate relation is the food sovereignty movement. Friedmann (1993) 
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 A food regime is ‘a rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world 
scale’ (Freidmann 1993, 30-31). 
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agrees that the dominance of a corporate agenda in the global agro-food domain has 
been one of the key hallmarks of this period. Elsewhere she argues that corporate 
consolidation has put peasantries everywhere on the back foot (2006). 
J.D. van der Ploeg (2009) terms this corporate-led farming regime an ‘imperial food 
regime’ that engulfs all local, self-governing peasant systems where both consumers 
and domestic producers are subjected to the coercive structures of the ‘market’. 
Farms and factories are, according to him, mere appendages of this agricultural 
‘Empire’. As a response to the ordering imposed by the Empire, the peasantry, 
although not including the entire farming population, is being reconstituted into a 
category that seeks to disengage from large commodity markets. Araghi (2009) 
terms this as ‘enclosure food regime’ in the period of postcolonial neoliberal 
globalism. He sees it as ‘a direct continuation of the liberal imperialism witnessed 
during the nineteenth century’, arguing that this period is marked by dispossession 
and displacement of peasantries across the globe while peasant differentiation can 
only be understood on a global scale rather than at a national level (Akram-Lodhi 
and Kay 2010, 267). 
There are many parallels in the works of the above authors. They provide a useful 
overview of the global conditions framing agriculture, and many of them refer to 
ecological limits to industrialized agriculture as a key feature of the post-1980 world. 
However, they also all eschew class analysis in favour of a populist position. Lerche 
(2013) argues that these authors represent a poststructuralist position whereby all 
classes of farmers have their enemy in corporate entities. Bernstein (2014, 1057), 
while sympathetic to the political project, critiques the food sovereignty position for 
disregarding ‘crucial elements of agrarian political economy’. He argues that in 
identifying ‘peasants’ and ‘peasant community’ as ‘capital’s other’, the movement 
neglects socio-economic analysis of peasants in different locations and historical 
contexts. This neglect, he argues, should also be seen as posing a problem for the 
movement as it brings to the fore issues of social alliances and conflicts. 
I would add that the arguments discussed above do not leave any space for 
alternative forms of engagement by peasants (and different classes of peasants) with 
corporate capital. Peasants are constructed as reeling under constant oppression 
without ever negotiating with corporate entities, and represented as devoid of agency 
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except when they are in rebellion. Although van der Ploeg (2009) mentions a 
multitude of responses of the peasantry, this is inadequate since his understanding of 
the class does not include the entire farming population and is essentialized as averse 
to certain forms of marketing. Jansen (2015), for example, has argued that there are 
limits to the argument about the agro-ecological benefits of small-scale farming and 
presents evidence that smallholders aspire to more integration with larger commodity 
networks. Moreover, since these scholars attribute a diminished significance to the 
national and the local in understanding agrarian dynamics, they are also unable to 
explain how global capitalist processes interact with local political economies, and 
the variegated capitalisms and neoliberalisms that this generates. Weis does mention 
that elites in developing countries benefit from such globalisation but we find out 
little about who these elites are or the ways in which their interests might be aligned 
with those of TNCs. 
Studies on farmers and corporate agribusinesses that are based in specific countries 
and contexts variously signal the exploitation of farmers (Kirsten and Sartorius 2002; 
Murray 2006), the differentiated impact on different classes of farmers (Konings 
1998; Oya 2012) and the diverse ways in which agribusinesses might increase their 
control over the production process (Murray 2006; Gebreeyesus and Sonobe 2012). 
However, given such divergent analyses of concrete cases, it is Oya’s (2007) 
argument in the case of rural accumulation in Senegal that is most useful. He has 
cautioned against ascribing an all-important role to agribusiness in agrarian capitalist 
accumulation. In tracing the individual trajectories of some rural capitalists, he 
points to the variety of ways in which rural capitalists have found ‘new spaces of 
accumulation’ (488) by responding to the historically determined opportunities and 
constraints in the sphere of the economy but also in terms of ‘class, lineage-kinship 
and generational relations’ (459). This approach allows us to view corporates as yet 
another, albeit usually relatively more powerful, actor in the agrarian landscape. 
Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010) argue that neoliberal globalisation has divided 
agriculture globally into two sub-sectors – ‘export-oriented capitalist’ and ‘petty 
commodity producing’ – and that agro-food transnational capital plays an important 
role in capital accumulation and agrarian change in the former. Despite the problems 
with claiming that export-orientation and petty production are mutually exclusive, it 
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is notable that they accept that transnational capital could play a positive role in 
terms of accumulation. 
A final question arises about whether corporate capital can be considered merchant’s 
capital. The existing literature on corporates does not engage with this issue 
explicitly and it is a question that can be resolved only through the empirical analysis 
of their role. 
2.2.4 Agricultural Commodities 
The final part of this section concerns commodities. Studies on agricultural markets 
have to necessarily be focused on certain commodities, in this case, crops. In an 
ethnographic study of food grain markets in Madhya Pradesh, Krishnamurthy (2011) 
focused on wheat and soybeans. Similarly, Harriss-White’s (2008, 2010) work on 
markets in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal has a significant focus on rice, although her 
work on Tamil Nadu (1996) also covers other crops such as cotton, tobacco and 
groundnuts. Studies on markets in Bangladesh have also focused on rice (Crow 
1989; Crow and Murshid 1994). 
The focus on particular commodities in the study of markets is both inevitable and 
useful. Some commodities are so critical to certain economies and processes that 
studying them can give insights in a way that other commodities cannot. At the same 
time, it is necessary to consider whether the commodity has an inherent 
characteristic that shapes the social phenomena in question. The stories told through 
staple and non-staple crops, or subsistence and cash crops are bound to be different. 
For example, Krishnamurthy’s (2012) focus on wheat and Harriss-White’s (2008) on 
paddy/rice, both staples that are widely cultivated, allows them to analyse the State’s 
role in procurement and distribution of food, as well as its political priorities. On the 
other hand, crops meant for export (e.g. rubber) or those that have been introduced 
on a large scale by colonial powers (tea or sugar) can be more indicative of 
international processes impacting on agriculture. Further, studies on GM crops can 
be telling of the ways in which biotechnology and TNCs are changing the contours 
of domestic agriculture. 
The physicality of crops, i.e. their agronomic features, also plays a part in 
determining their social relations of production and exchange. For example, the 
specific irrigation requirements of high-yielding varieties (HYV) of wheat and paddy 
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are crucial to understanding the kind of labour dynamics that are generated (Byres 
1981). Similarly, the perishability of sugarcane and the need for capacity utilization 
of sugar mills has been cited as one of the factors leading to the creation of 
sugarcane cooperatives in western India (Damodaran 2008). Outside the sub-
continent, Selwyn (2007) has argued that the tight production schedule of grapes, a 
key Brazilian agro-export, and the increased demands of buyers have given labour an 




Such studies, focused on one or two crops, are usually rich in either or both 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of their production and exchange. Yet, from the 
point of view of studying accumulation by capitalist farmers, they have a major 
shortcoming. There is an insufficient understanding of other crops the farmers grow 
and which impact on their accumulation. This is especially important as the annual 
cropping cycle involves more than one type of crop in all agrarian regions of India. 
A study of multiple crops can help in understanding their composite effect on 
accumulation and the kind of trade-offs farmers make and why. As Harriss-White 
(1996, 36) has argued, ‘To draw conclusions about market involvement from one 
market alone would be inaccurate and would also miss the point of their 
interdependence’. Olsen’s (1996) study on two villages in Andhra Pradesh in India 
and two crops (paddy and groundnut) exemplifies this. She argues that there were no 
distress sales in paddy by petty producers to merchants and capitalist farmer-
landlords because each group could hedge their risks against and benefit, unevenly, 
from the groundnut market.  
This chapter has outlined the main theoretical debates that this research engages with 
and argued that an analysis of capitalist agriculture in the 21
st
 century requires a 
study of processes that lie beyond the farm. The role of agricultural merchants and 
markets is especially relevant in this context and has been intensely debated within 
the political economy tradition. Corporates are understood to lie within the realm of 
the markets, but it is argued that the way farmers engage with them is under-
                                                          
11
 Beyond studies on agricultural commodity markets, there are a range of crop-specific studies that 
focus on acreage, production levels, profitability, intensity and cropping patterns (Thomas 2011; 
Surjit 2011; Rawal 2013; Nagaraj et al 2013) with the objective to analyze changes in farming 
practices and successes and failures therein. 
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theorized. A longer conclusion links these issues to specific empirical developments 




Chapter 3.  Indian Agriculture: An Empirical Survey 
 
In this chapter, I use the theoretical framework identified thus far to analyse the 
literature and debates on developments in Indian agriculture. Some of the main 
questions that this chapter asks are: What do the patterns of landholdings, and the 
changes therein, indicate about class relations in the countryside? What are the 
patterns of economic diversification among farmers of different castes, classes and 
regions? This chapter also examines in detail issues of economic liberalisation that 
impact agriculture per se. I discuss relevant reforms that affect both the process of 
production and the marketing of agricultural commodities. The final section 
questions the narrative of an overall agrarian crisis in India. 
3.1 Landholding Patterns 
In 2012-13, agriculture contributed 13.68% to India’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), considerably less than industry (27.03%) or services (59.29%) (Niti 
Aayog/Planning Commission 2015). Government data around the same time also 
shows that 48% of the country’s working population is dependent on agriculture 
(National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) 2014a). While the share of the labour force 
in agriculture has been declining (Reddy and Mishra 2009), the figures show that 
agriculture supports a disproportionately large part of the working population. 
Needless to say, in a country as large and diverse as India, there are many regional 
variations in this trend. Moreover, the 70
th
 round of the NSSO survey shows that a 
large part of farming households’ income is now derived from non-agricultural 
sources (Rukmini 2014) (see Section 3.3.2). Nevertheless, the countrywide reality of 
agriculture being a major, if not the main, source of livelihood for most of the rural 
population cannot be denied. At the same time, this study, based as it is within the 
framework of agrarian political economy, recognizes that the agricultural population 
can be disaggregated into different classes and social groups. 
One of the key ways in which the agricultural population is disaggregated is by 
landholdings. The Government of India divides landholding households into five 
size categories: marginal (less than 1 ha.), small (1-2 ha.), semi-medium (2-4 ha.), 
medium (4-10 ha.) and large (over 10 ha.). However, this classification criterion 
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raises its own problems. Firstly, the quality of land across India is so varied that 
uniform size holdings are not equally comparable. For example, government surveys 
on soil and land use show that soil quality differs drastically based on whether the 
terrain is characterized as an alluvial plain, valley plain, hillside slope and so on 
(SLUSI 2016). Moreover, the infrastructure available to develop the land is also 
extremely varied. In 2010-11, the proportion of irrigated area to net sown area was 
45.7%, but this figure fluctuated according to size of landholding, source of 
irrigation and region (Agriculture Census Division 2015): for example, it is around 
26% in Odisha and Chhattisgarh, 38% in AP, 47% in Bihar, 90% in Haryana and 
almost 100% in Punjab.12 
A second important concern relates to the quality of data. Deepak Kumar (2016) 
argues that historically, different regions have had different qualities of land record-
keeping. Moreover, land records under-represent tenancies since most tenancy 
contracts are ‘unregistered oral contracts’ (42). Furthermore, benami holdings 
(property held in another person’s name, usually a family member or even a 
fictitious person) are frequently used in order to avoid legal ceilings on land 
ownership and, by their nature, these are unaccounted for in government data (see 
also Section 3.2). 
Beyond issues of the data itself, there exists the analytical question raised in Chapter 
2 that the size of landholdings may not be representative of either scale or class 
position. This may be because, under capitalist development, land-improvement 
technologies are expected to make size irrelevant in terms of productivity. Some 
scholars have also argued that land size and productivity are inversely related due to 
the efficiency of the household’s family labour (Griffin et al. 2002). Narain (1988) 
also made a case for the inverse relationship in agriculture in India based on survey 
data from 1950-51. This was disputed by Patnaik (1999) citing differences in method 
and data used and she argued that there was no necessary or static correlation 
between land size and productivity.  
However, recent data shows that land size may still matter in understanding class 
positions. Chapter 2 mentioned that Rakshit (2011) has found that land size and class 
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positions overlapped in advanced capitalist regions of West Bengal. On the basis of 
data from the 70
th
 round of NSSO survey, Ranganathan (2013) found that the total 
value per hectare and total returns per hectare are higher for larger landowners. The 
proportion of agricultural income to total income also increased consistently with 
increase in land ownership, from 1% for the smallest landowners to 86% for the 
largest.13 This leads him to suggest that the inverse relationship may no longer hold 
in the Indian context either ‘because of increased efficiency of operations in large 
farms or decreased efficiency of operations in small farms’ (50). Therefore, given 
that Indian agriculture is mostly capitalist, land size may be used as a rough indicator 
of the agrarian position of rural classes. At the same time, for all the reasons 
discussed earlier, we must bear in mind that these are only tendencies in those 
regions whose agriculture is sufficiently capitalized that can be used to further our 
analysis.  
With these caveats in mind, Table 3.1 gives the proportion of different landholding 
categories based on the Agriculture Census 2010-11. It shows that well over 80% of 
landholdings were either small or marginal in 2010-11 and this proportion has 
increased over the last several years. At the same time, large landholdings 
constituted less than 1% and have been in steady decline. Not surprisingly, incomes 
also varied according to landholding. According to NSSO data, the total income of 
large landholding households was twice as much as medium households and eight 
times as much as marginal ones in 2013 (Ranganathan 2013). Kannan (2015) has 
argued that declining farm incomes would matter less to rich farmers since they are 
known to have diversified into other businesses. These data raise questions about the 
viability of small landholdings and the nature of agrarian change underway in the 
country, issues discussed in following sections. 
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Table 3.1: Percentage of different landholding categories in India 
 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11 
Marginal (less than 1 ha.) 61.58 62.88 64.77 67.1 
Small (1-2 ha.) 18.73 18.92 18.52 17.91 
Semi-medium (2-4 ha.) 12.34 11.69 10.93 10.04 
Medium (4-10 ha.) 6.14 5.48 4.93 4.25 
Large (above 10 ha.) 1.22 1.03 0.85 0.7 
   Source: Agriculture Census Division, various years 
It should also be noted that the distribution of these landholdings varies considerably 
across different regions of the country. For example, the proportion of marginal 
holdings varies from 4.29% in Nagaland to 96% in Kerala. Similarly, large holdings 
vary from 0.01% in West Bengal to about 6% in Punjab and Rajasthan and 14% in 
Nagaland (Government of Punjab 2014). Again, variations in income abound. The 
average monthly income per agricultural household in 2012-13 was estimated as Rs 
3558 in Bihar, Rs 7926 in Gujarat and Rs 18,059 in Punjab (Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics 2015). Add to this that these figures are non-comparable 
across regions due to the different constraints within which production is done, these 
aggregate all-India figures are, therefore, merely indicative of broad land ownership 
patterns; any detailed assessment of agrarian change would require close attention to 
specific regions and cases. 
Overall, however, the question that arises here is how did we reach this situation 
historically, and what are the social, economic and political processes that lie behind 
these numbers. We turn our attention now to these questions. 
3.2 A Historical Review 
When the British annexed the erstwhile Bengal Province in the second half of the 
18
th
 century, they embarked on an effort to create ‘progressive’ capitalist farmers 
with the aim of maximizing land revenue. They introduced ‘Permanent Settlement’ 
in 1793 whereby landlords were given permanent and hereditary rights in exchange 
for a fixed sum of money to be paid annually to the British administration. However, 
instead of creating an enterprising class of farmers, the system gave rise to a class of 
absentee landlords that leased their land to multiple sub-feudal lords and tenants 
(Guha 1963; Chaudhari 1975). 
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In other parts of the country, different land settlements were introduced such as 
ryotwari and mahalwari. In the former, revenue assessment was by individual 
cultivator, in the latter by identified estates. While in principle these two settlements 
were better suited to the interests of the cultivators, in practice they often involved 
over-assessment of revenue and led to peasants’ increased indebtedness. Moreover, 
the position of the existing or new landlords, as the case may be, was often 
strengthened (Bandopadhyay 2004). Therefore, the reasons for the halting of 
miniaturisation of landholdings in different regions are likely to be different. The 
diversity of land settlement patterns across India is argued variously as reflecting the 
colonial government’s desire to avoid the drawbacks of Permanent Settlement, or the 
pre-existing agrarian structure in these areas, or reactions to policies from below 
(ibid.; Stokes 1978; Bhattacharya 1992). 
Apart from the sheer size of India, this diverse agrarian history is one of the key 
reasons for the regional disparities in the nature of agrarian capitalism.14 Overall, 
however, it is widely agreed that well over a century of colonial rule left the 
countryside with a powerful and parasitical class of landlords, and widespread 
tenancies and indebtedness among the landless and cultivators. Owing to the mass 
mobilisation of agricultural workers and peasants in the period leading up to 
Independence and the prevailing ideas of modernisation, the independent 
Government of India recognized landlordism as both a political problem and a key 
obstacle to agricultural development. 
Land is a state subject under the Indian Constitution and in the 1950s all state 
governments passed legislation addressing redistributive land reforms, including 
ceilings on landholdings, consolidation of holdings and improvement in terms of 
tenancy. The reforms failed in terms of redistribution to tenants and labourers, 
although they did largely abolish absentee landlordism, despite many landlords 
retaining control over land through benami transactions (Sukumar Das 2000). The 
rich and middle peasantry, on the other hand, benefitted from the reforms and 
consolidated themselves as a class of ‘proto-capitalists’ (Byres 1988). This was not 
an unintended consequence but was built into the reforms as a result of their class 
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 For example, while until recently, the erstwhile Bengal Province (Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and 
West Bengal) had large landlords, tenancy, agricultural stagnation and high levels of poverty (A.N. 
Sharma and Rodgers 2015; Basu 2015), ryotwari areas like Punjab, Haryana and western UP were 
among the earliest Green Revolution successes (Stokes 1978; Byres 1981). 
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struggle (ibid.) and because Congress considered them to be a bulwark against 
political instability (Hasan 1989). 
Consequently, despite land reforms, land ownership has remained extremely skewed 
across the country. According to the Agriculture Census 2010-11, medium and large 
landholdings constituted less than 5% of all landholdings but covered more than 
30% of the total area (admittedly, as the share of large and medium holdings 
declines, the share of land covered by them also declines). But this data does not 
adequately account for different kinds of tenancy arrangements (Mearns 1999; D. 
Kumar 2016). The land reforms, however, did allow some transfer of land to a 
section of rich peasants in some areas, who, over time, emerged as a class of 
capitalist farmers. 
Owing to the commercialization of agriculture under colonial rule, farming in the 
Indian sub-continent had already transformed to agriculture (à la Bernstein) by the 
time of Independence. In the early post-Independence years the government was 
faced with the mammoth challenge of feeding the country’s over 350 million people. 
Production initially increased through expansion of the area under cultivation (Nath 
1969; Narain 1977), but by end of the 1950s agricultural growth rates had slowed 
and this became a serious concern for the food requirements of the population and 
overall economic development.15 By the early 1960s, large quantities of food were 
being imported from the USA under its PL-480 food aid programme. 
The government launched the Intensive Agricultural Development Programme 
(IADP) from 1961 to 1963 across 15 districts. Following its success, the Intensive 
Agricultural Area Programme (IAAP) was launched in 1965 to cover 114 districts 
(Frankel 1971; Aggarwal 1973). It is the IAAP which lies at the core of what is 
understood as the Green Revolution. It was a programme to increase food 
production, with the aim of achieving national food self-sufficiency by introducing 
HYV seeds, necessary crop chemicals and controlled irrigation facilities. With 
support from the central government, some states (e.g. Punjab, Haryana, AP and 
Tamil Nadu) were better able to develop rural infrastructure, credit facilities and 
extension services that supported this new mode of agricultural production.  
                                                          
15
 Frankel (1971) has argued that in the early post-Independence years, land reform was preferred 
over agricultural intensification to increase agricultural productivity. However, this policy was revised 
due to the failure of the reforms. 
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The HYV varieties of wheat and paddy, the two crops promoted under the IAAP, 
required a whole range of biochemical (seeds and crop chemicals) and mechanical 
inputs (tube wells for irrigation, tractors and threshers) to achieve the potential 
yields. This immediately placed regions that had limited irrigation facilities and 
farmers with fewer resources to invest in agriculture at a disadvantage. It has been 
argued that the Green Revolution was guided by a ‘betting on the strong’ policy 
whereby areas where the rich peasant class was dominant were given a preference 
(Frankel 1971; Byres 1981). Byres (1981) has also argued that, contrary to some 
economists’ opinions, biochemical inputs alone are not scale neutral and it was a 
combination of controlled irrigation, HYV seeds and crop chemicals that proved the 
most profitable. 
In a kind of ‘capitalism from below’ (Byres 1986, 1988), the Green Revolution 
created a class of capitalist farmers who engaged in heavily capitalized farming on 
their own lands for profit. Such capitalization was easier for farmers with larger 
landholdings than those with small and marginal holdings, and many among the 
latter ended up landless. So, on one hand, the Green Revolution made the country 
food self-sufficient, while on the other, it increased class differentiation in the 
countryside. 
Another related aspect of the Green Revolution was the reformation of the marketing 
system that ensured that farmers received a remunerative price for their produce. 
Building on the efforts towards public food procurement for redistribution initiated 
in the aftermath of the Bengal Famine, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) was set 
up in the mid-1960s with the purpose of procuring food grains, mainly wheat and 
paddy, from grain surplus areas to redistribute to grain deficit ones through the 
PDS.16 Alongside, an entire marketing infrastructure inclusive of wholesale markets 
or mandis and state-level procurement agencies was created. Perhaps most 
importantly, this was complemented by a remunerative Minimum Support Price 
(MSP) for both wheat and paddy, although it was not effectively administered 
everywhere (FCI 2015). 
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 The FCI also procured food grains through partial intervention in the markets in the form of ‘levy’ 
(e.g. B. Harriss 1977).  
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Mooij (1998) argued that the objective of ensuring a fair price for farmers was only 
integrated into the country’s redistributive food policy in the mid-1960s. However, 
over the years, the system has been more beneficial for the farmers in a few states 
who benefit from the high MSP on wheat and paddy than for the country’s large 
swathes of food-insecure people. The State’s policy on price support for farmers has 
been especially significant for Punjab (see Chapter 4). The government also 
introduced a model agricultural market regulation law in the early 1960s, but it took 
many years for most states to adopt it (Acharya 2015).  
3.3 Recent Trends 
Over the past few decades, there have been important developments in Indian 
agriculture with respect to land dynamics and patterns of accumulation that warrant 
closer scrutiny. 
3.3.1 Land Dynamics 
Several scholars have pointed out that there have been important changes in 
contractual relations in land in the past few decades. Using NSSO data, it has been 
argued that since the 1980s, the area under tenancy has increased while the number 
of tenant holdings has declined (Srivastava 2000; Ramakumar 2000).17 The share of 
land leased-out by marginal and small landowning households increased from 
32.44% in 1991-92 to 47.73% in 2002-03 (H.R. Sharma 2010). According to the 70
th
 
round of NSSO survey, the increase in the cost of land-leasing was especially 
marked for the medium and large landholding households across both the rabi 
(winter/spring) and kharif (summer/monsoon) seasons. Moreover, the proportion of 
medium households leasing-in land increased from 12.99% in 2002-03 to 25.01% in 
2012-13; for large households, the increase was from 14.49% to 28.36%. These 
increases were much larger than those in smaller landholding households 
(Ranganathan 2013).18 
These facts are indicative of a growth in ‘reverse tenancy’. Reverse tenancy is the 
phenomenon whereby small farmers lease their land out to larger farmers. Again, 
there are wide regional variations in this trend. The north-western states of Punjab 
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 It has also been argued that tenancy is widely under-reported since tenancy legislations in most 
states are quite restrictive, and most tenancy on the ground is actually illegal. 
18
 The same report also notes that the returns to investments on leased-in land are 30-35% lower than 
for households that do not lease-in any land – primarily due to the lease rent. 
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and Haryana are argued to represent these trends more strongly than others 
(Srivastava 1989a; Ramakumar 2000). Nevertheless, that there is a strong tendency 
towards this indicates that not only are small and marginal farmers being pushed out 
of agriculture, but medium or large landowning households are finding it worthwhile 
to expand their operational holdings. 
Alongside the trend towards reverse tenancy, the traditional form of land-leasing, 
‘big lessor, small lessee’ (Srivastava 1989a, 352) continues to be prevalent. In other 
words, it continues to be the case that landless, small and marginal households rely 
on forms of tenancy for their subsistence. In 2002-03, the percentage share of leased-
in land by such households was as high as 71% of the total (H.R. Sharma 2010). 
Another observation from the NSSO data is that entirely owned self-cultivated 
holdings have been steadily increasing since the 1970s (ibid.). This is an aspect 
scarcely analysed, and could be indicative (at least in part) of either the limited 
availability of profitable opportunities outside agriculture or the possibility of 
earning a decent return from agriculture (dependent on landholding size and crops 
grown). 
For our purpose, it should be noted that these trends represent different patterns of 
accumulation by capitalist landlords/farmers across India. In fact, a debate on 
landlordism took place based precisely on the above trends and data. Vijay argued 
that between 1991-92 and 2002-03, there was a decline in cultivating households, 
stagnation in agricultural labouring households and an increase in non-cultivating 
peasant households (NCPH). The NCPH, he argued, represent 'new landlords' who 
are accumulating by becoming suppliers of land in the land-lease market and 
transferring their agricultural surplus to the non-agricultural sector (Vijay 2012). 
This position has been criticized for neglecting the land size class differentiation 
within the NCPH and instead it has been argued that the rise of NCPH represents a 
squeezing out of marginal sectors (B. Reddy and Shaw 2012). This debate suggests 
that there is a dynamic labour and land-lease market through which large and 
medium farmers might be profiting, and careful contextual analysis is required to 
understand the processes underlying them. 
47 
 
3.3.2 Economic Diversification 
Another trend with respect to agrarian accumulation that raises many important 
issues for this research is that of diversification of investment by capitalist farmers. 
Admittedly, non-farm income is the principal source of income for only 4.7% of all 
farm households and, at a countrywide level, income from non-farm businesses has 
fallen by approximately 2% and average returns to investment are very low 
(Ranganathan 2013). Ranganathan, therefore, argues that investment in non-farm 
businesses happens largely as a last resort and not because it is more remunerative. 
However, this is a contention not always borne out by more context-specific, 
qualitative case studies as we will see below. 
In any case, it is commonly accepted that 'pluriactivity' or 'straddling' is now a 
widespread practice across all farm households, including among capitalist farmers; 
in other words, capitalist farming is now as much about surpluses from within 
agriculture as from outside it. Harriss-White and Janakarajan (1997) argue that 
‘diversification (within and outside agriculture) is a close associate of contemporary 
agrarian differentiation’ (1476) and acts as a security for the most well-resourced 
farmers. The changing character of capitalist farmers and rural India more generally 
is also reflected in the gradually expanding literature on the rural-urban continuum 
(Jodhka 2014b; Gupta 2015; Harriss-White 2016a). An understanding of 
diversification among the dominant agrarian classes is important because even 
though in India, and especially in Punjab, agriculture may be imagined to be the 
dominant way of life, it is neither the reality nor aspiration (Jodhka 2006). 
Several case studies indicate that as large capitalist farmers reached the limits of 
investments in agriculture, many diversified into agro-commercial and agro-
industrial businesses.19 This has been evidenced since the 1980s in states such as 
Tamil Nadu, AP, Karnataka, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Punjab (Rutten 1995; 
Damodaran 2008; Harriss-White 2010; Lerche 2014), although some agrarian castes 
have been diversifying into non-farm businesses since the early 20
th
 century 
(Damodaran 2008). However, in the 21
st
 century, some kind of diversification has 
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 A somewhat parallel argument in the labour market came from Vaidyanathan (1986) who argues 
that the non-agricultural sector employs surplus labour from agriculture to some extent. There are 
several other studies that reflect on diversification in rural India based on occupational and social 
mobility, focusing on marginalized socio-economic sections more than the elite (Djurfelt et al. 2008; 
A.B. Reddy and Swaminathan 2014). Nevertheless, it should be noted that they assert better chances 
of mobility by large farmers and landlords.  
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become common across agrarian groups everywhere. Lerche (2014) has argued that 
large capitalist farmers across India have been expanding accumulation outside 
agriculture through transfer of surplus to trading (and occasionally industry), 
investments in education to obtain government jobs, lucrative outmigration and 
political influence. 
In the post-Green Revolution period, the wealthy landowners in coastal AP, 
especially those belonging to the Kamma caste, invested in trading of agricultural 
commodities, distributorships of fertilizers, seeds and other crop chemicals, transport 
firms, cotton ginning and sugar milling. In fact, it has been argued that a new 
business community comprising the rural elite was formed in the region in the 1980s 
(Upadhya 1988a, 1988b). Similarly, large capitalist farmers in Gujarat invested in 
the tobacco trade, potato trading, cold stores and a handful of construction related 
industries, i.e. cement, pipe and tile (Rutten 1995). Heyer (2016) has argued that 
Gounder caste agriculturists in the Coimbatore region of Tamil Nadu started 
diversifying into petty trade in the 1980s. By the turn of the 21
st
 century, rural 
industrialization in the area allowed them to further diversify and consolidate in 
various kinds of trading and industrial activity (see also Chari 2000). These 
investments were financed through agricultural surpluses and sale of land. Harriss-
White (2010, 2016) argues that the dominant agrarian caste in Arni in Tamil Nadu 
started investing in trade following the rich dividends that it reaped through the 
Green Revolution, and even came to dominate agro-commerce. By the 1990s, 
however, agriculture’s importance as a source of capital for trading and industrial 
ventures was declining. 
With respect to political influence, Jeffrey (2003) argues that the large Jat 
(henceforth Jat) farmers of western UP continue to reproduce and expand their 
power through links with the local police and infiltration into local government 
bodies through bribery. Pattenden (2011) argues that fiscal decentralization has 
opened up opportunities for large, wealthy farmers in rural Karnataka to accumulate 
and continue their domination over less well-off members of the dominant class and 
the labouring class through ‘gatekeeping’. This is done both through earning a fee 
for arranging different kinds of public works and through exercising personal 
influence on the distribution of public resources. Martin (2015) makes a similar 
argument for rural Punjab whereby the dominant Jat farmers are able to exercise 
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control over Scheduled Castes (SC) or Dalits and expand the basis for their 
accumulation by controlling political institutions and public resources. 
A common feature across all these cases, and across small and large landowners, is 
the investment of surplus into the education of their sons and daughters. While 
education of sons is done with the aim of creating new sources of income, those of 
daughters is often done with the aim of finding a suitable match and sometimes one 
that furthers the economic prospects of the family (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Heyer 2016). 
This is indicative of aspirations of socio-economic mobility where agriculture alone 
is deemed to have limited potential. However, the gap between education and a 
realization of such mobility can be quite marked and conditioned by the socio-
economic background of the students. Ghuman et al. (2006) have argued that the 
poor quality of public higher education in Punjab and its continuing privatisation 
(leading to higher costs) reduces access to educational opportunities for students 
belonging to weaker social groups. 
When combined with substantial capital and access to social networks, however, 
education can reap rich dividends. Rich Jat farmers in UP are able to arrange 
lucrative jobs or migration opportunities for their urban-educated sons (Jeffery 2003; 
Jeffrey et al. 2008; Lerche 2014). Some may even stay unemployed well into their 
30s and negotiate ‘educated un/under employment’ through continued investment in 
education (Jeffrey et al. 2008).20 Sons of smaller Gounder farmers in Tamil Nadu, on 
the other hand, are under pressure to take up low-level administrative or engineering 
jobs, not least in order to cover the expenses incurred for their education (Heyer 
2016). 
Education, and subsequently jobs or businesses based in urban areas, also cause out-
village migration. The way these migrants relate to land in the village is contingent 
on many factors. The literature indicates that it is common for households that 
diversify, including those who migrate, to invest in or maintain ties with the land. 
Upadhya (1988a) suggests that diversification may be undertaken as ‘a protection 
against the risks of pure cultivation’ (1376). In such situations, the likelihood that 
profits earned from other businesses would be re-invested in agriculture is much 
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 In the event that they failed to gain employment despite education, they would still strive to 
maintain an educated cultural lifestyle which is considered a mark of progression. Sometimes these 
young men would cultivate a disconsolate, ‘time-pass’ culture (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Jeffrey 2010). 
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greater. In Gujarat, the entry of capitalist farmers into the potato trade and storage 
business was prompted by the shift in the cropping pattern from tobacco to potatoes 
as the main cash crop; this provided them with better access to information on 
production innovations, thereby allowing them to make higher profits through potato 
production (Rutten 1995). 
However, even when migrants are not re-investing in the expansion of landholdings 
or in agriculture, they may still choose to maintain their landholding in the village. 
To this end, they could either lease it to or leave it in the custodianship of a family 
member or other trusted person in the village (Upadhya 1988b; Rutten 1995; 
Harriss-White et al. 2009). Djurfelt et al. (2008) suggest that in Tamil Nadu 
diversification has been a result of households trying to avoid the fragmentation of 
landholdings between multiple sons and settling all but one son in other occupations. 
At the same time, sale of land could also be the source of capital for investing in 
other businesses or occupations (Upadhya 1988b; Heyer 2016).21 Thus, land 
dynamics within agriculture and within a village are closely linked to the strategies 
of those who are leaving it. 
Upadhya (1988a) makes an important point in this context; she argues that one 
should be careful about assuming a linear relationship between agricultural surplus 
and investment in non-agricultural businesses. While she accepts that large 
cultivators accumulated significant capital to invest in non-farm businesses, she also 
points out that: 
In several cases, rural traders and businessmen purchased land with 
business profits; in others, small farmers were able to increase their 
landholdings only after making money in business. Even for the 
richest families in each village, the initial leap in prosperity came not 
from agriculture but from business… These cases seem to disprove 
the hypothesis that economic diversification is an outcome of the 
increased profitability of agriculture (i.e. the surplus that large owners 
have accumulated seeks an outlet in non-agricultural business 
enterprises). (ibid., 1380-1381) 
It should also be noted that attempts at diversification may fail, resulting in 
households incurring large debts (Heyer 2016). At the same time, small landowners 
may diversify because of their inability to earn adequate returns from agriculture. In 
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light of the above evidence, attempts at diversification also need to be analysed in 
relation to many other factors that determine their success or failure and impacts on 
households and the region’s development trajectory. From the point of view of the 
agrarian question debate discussed in Section 2.1, Lerche (2013) has argued that the 
agrarian transition in India has been bypassed, i.e. agrarian capitalists are 
accumulating both within and outside agriculture, but not in a way that is supporting 
industrialisation.22 
Finally, caste and community networks are crucial to the patterns of agrarian 
accumulation by farmers. Damodaran (2008), for example, combines the nature of 
caste relations with the political economy conditions in different regions to describe 
the emergence of various dominant business communities. Apart from the traditional 
trading groups who have transformed into successful industrial capitalists, he also 
discusses business communities who have successfully built a diverse economic 
profile on the back of rich agrarian surpluses, such as the Kammas of AP, Gounders 
of Tamil Nadu, Patidars of Gujarat and Marathas of Maharashtra. Damodaran 
argues that caste and kinship networks are especially important in establishing and 
expanding businesses since they aid in mobilizing capital and contacts, both crucial 
for business, and reduce the possibility of breach of contracts.
 23 He goes on to argue 
that large businessmen transacting with those outside of the community is not a sign 
of the absence of community support but rather of a strong business-minded 
community that is able to produce such entrepreneurs. 
At the same time, it is not just the internal dynamics of a caste but how it is placed in 
relation to other castes in the region that matters to the development of its business 
profile. So, while in Tamil Nadu dominant agricultural castes have been able to 
create a space in certain trades and industries, in states like Punjab they have not 
been able to do so due to the power and near-monopoly of the trading castes 
(Damodaran 2008; Lerche 2014).  
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 In his seminal study, Chandrasekhar (1993) also cautions against perceiving occupational mobility 
as a sign of agricultural dynamism.  
23
 A similar role is played by ethnicity in regions such as Arunachal Pradesh (Harriss-White et al. 
2009; Mishra 2015). 
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The foregoing discussion shows that capitalist farmers have individual strategies for 
accumulation, but they may also accumulate through collective strategies, especially 
when leveraging their caste-community networks.  
3.3.3 A Composite Rural Capitalist Class? 
Some authors argue that capitalist farmers develop interests that combine with those 
of small-scale industrialists to constitute a composite rural elite. This is a line of 
argument that needs to be closely investigated since the relations between capitalist 
farmers and traders are a core element of this research. 
As mentioned earlier, Harriss-White (2003, 241)24 argues that a ‘loose coalition of 
the small-scale capitalist class, agrarian and local agribusiness elites, and local state 
officials’ constitute ‘intermediate classes’ in the Indian social formation.25 She 
argues that pre-liberalisation India was an intermediate regime that was driven by, 
and worked in, the interests of these intermediate classes; certain kinds of macro-
economic conditions, especially the economic stagnation in the 1980s, benefitted the 
intermediate classes. Similarly, Rutten (1995) argues that large farmer-traders in 
Gujarat have merged with small-scale industrialists to form a class of ‘rural capitalist 
entrepreneurs’. He prefers to characterize them as ‘rural’ over ‘agrarian’ in order to 
capture the fact that they look beyond the local agrarian base to expand accumulation 
but are never fully integrated in a wider regional setting. Such concepts are quite 
useful to bring attention to the local power relations that shape the nature of agrarian 
capitalism. Rutten also focuses on their common socio-cultural traits and economic 
limitations. 
These concepts are especially useful in understanding how the politics of these 
classes helps consolidate them, as both authors explain in their work. In particular, 
common interests can enable them to develop class alliances. Balagopal (1987), for 
instance, argues that the wealthy, landed peasantry that leads the farmers movement 
never turns its ire against exploitative traders because some among them have 
diversified into this profession and together, as the ‘provincial propertied class’, they 
have developed common interests. 
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 Elsewhere, she has used the concept of ‘micro conglomerate capital’ to describe the multiple 
modalities – ‘rent, interest, manufacturing and trade’ that drive accumulation in local agro-capitalism 




However, these classes have distinct and different relations to means of production 
and therefore, different material interests. When these interests overlap, as when 
farmers become traders, they need to be understood in relation to each other but they 
also need to be understood separately when they are unrelated to each other or in 
conflict in different contexts. Harriss-White (2003) too recognizes the possibility of 
conflict within the intermediate classes.26 
Nevertheless, Harriss-White’s juxtaposition of the intermediate classes with 
international capital under liberalisation is particularly useful. She argues that the 
former proved resilient until the turn of century due to the ‘politics of markets’ (50). 
Politics of markets refers to mechanisms and structures through which the 
intermediate classes maintain their dominance. This includes four key elements: a) 
non-competition within marketing systems, created through capital and social entry 
barriers; b) defending themselves against bigger capital by creating market niches or 
by ‘super-exploiting labour’ (52); c) opportunistic use of party politics to their ends; 
and, d) ensuring that social rules and networks, especially within the family and 
community, form the basis of market operations.  
But over a decade later, the tension between local and international capital needs to 
be discussed further. This research study explores elements of such politics to 
examine the relation between these capitals. There is some evidence that they may 
not always be antagonistic: in a debate on Indian capitalism, for instance, Baviskar 
and Sundar (2008) write that ‘flexible production connects multinational firms to 
domestic production’ and note that ‘the moneylender also doubles up as the fertiliser 
and seed agent’ (88).  
The argument about the alignment of agrarian capitalists with other economic groups 
also raises the issue of differences within the capitalist farmer class. In Chapter 2, we 
observed that both in Senegal and China overall patterns of accumulation 
(determined, for instance, by the source of capital and/or the nature of investments) 
are important in classifying different kinds of farmers, and even capitalist farmers. 
Given the extent of economic diversification in the Indian countryside, drawing out 
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 Another issue is how the intermediate classes are placed in relation to the big business class in the 
wider political economy (see Chibber 2003 for a discussion on the latter’s power). This is of less 




broad patterns of accumulation by capitalist farmers in India would illuminate the 
nature of agrarian change. 
Damodaran (2008, 315) identifies three different paths to industrial accumulation by 
castes and communities in India, i.e. transitions through the bazaar, the office and the 
field. This analysis indicates both the variety of diversification patterns and the 
salience of the local political economy in understanding why specific patterns have 
emerged.27 
In that vein, Rutten (1995) argues that the difference in terms of economic 
diversification is the chief factor differentiating wealthy farmers who merge with a 
class of rural capitalist entrepreneurs from other agrarian classes.28 Moreover, when 
some families move out of agriculture, other upwardly mobile ones might move in to 
occupy the newly-vacated space (Upadhya 1988a; Djurfelt et al. 2008).29 Indeed, 
small and medium landowners are less able to invest in non-agricultural avenues that 
would allow them to accumulate or facilitate their upward mobility: lower amounts 
of working capital and relatively restricted access to social networks mean their 
investments tend to be less lucrative.30 Pattenden (2011), for instance, points out that 
gatekeeping does not afford the same benefits to gatekeepers from less wealthy 
farming and poorer labouring households in Karnataka’s villages as to those from 
wealthier, landed households and this reinforces the patterns of social differentiation. 
The various case studies cited above indicate that when such landowners are 
successful, it is often through success in education or support from better-off kin. 
At the macro level, Ranganathan (2013) points out that non-farm business 
contributed 10% and wages 63% of the total income of the smallest landholders. The 
corresponding figures for the largest landholders are 4% and 3%.
 
While the 
percentage contribution of non-farm business to total income of the smallest 
landholders was much higher than for the largest, in absolute terms the average 
income for large households from non-farm business is roughly four times that 
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 Lerche (2014) has built on this typology to develop some aspects of the regional patterns of 
agrarian accumulation. 
28
 Harriss-White (2010) also writes that by the 21
st
 century, the gap between the agro-commercial 
classes and the producers who cultivate paddy for the former’s businesses had increased considerably. 
29
 Djurfelt et al. (2008) argue that the movement of large landowners out of agriculture has 
strengthened middle farmers, who they describe as ‘family farmers’. 
30
 Upadhya (1988a) argues that until the 1980s at least, the preferred investment option for smaller 
landowners was land. 
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earned by marginal and small landowners. This indicates that the large households 
have access to non-farm businesses that have a higher income potential. Moreover, 
large households are not reliant on wage labour and, as mentioned earlier, derive a 
large part of their income from farming itself. The most common non-farm 
businesses are wholesale and retail trade, followed by transportation and storage; the 
most common source of wage income is agricultural, followed by construction work. 
This section argued that the position of the agricultural household, caste and kinship 
relations, the nature of State structures, and wider economic conditions are crucial to 
economic diversification by farmers. The next section focuses on the impact of 
macro-economic change in the form of liberalisation of agriculture and agricultural 
producers in India. 
3.4 Liberalisation of Agriculture 
The liberalisation of the Indian economy31 has generated a debate in recent years on 
whether there is an overall agrarian crisis in the Indian countryside. Those in favour 
of this position appear to suggest that agrarian accumulation has largely ceased. This 
section first discusses the nature of liberalisation and then examines the case for a 
crisis. 
3.4.1 State vs. Market? 
After Independence, India established a developmental state guided by Nehru’s 
‘socialistic’ vision, his belief in Soviet-style planning and in development as 
industrialisation (Chibber 2003; Frankel 2005). However, the Indian state was never 
hostile to private capital, even though it was constrained by numerous regulations. 
Starting in the 1980s, but more decisively in the 1990s, the economy was liberalised, 
the plethora of regulations done away with in favour of the rule of the market, and 
space was created for the growth of the private sector across various economic 
sectors. Previously, it had been assumed that State intervention was necessary to 
meet economic development and social welfare objectives, but now the State came 
to be seen as patently inefficient and the private sector as the agent of development. 
While once private interests sought to be disciplined, bolstering of these interests 
became both morally and politically acceptable in this new phase. Moreover, these 
changes clearly worked in the interest of the socio-economic elite (Corbridge and 
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 Note that liberalisation and neoliberalism are used interchangeably here. 
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Harriss 2000; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2002). While deregulation and privatisation 
were introduced in varying degrees from the 1980s, the push in 1991 also allowed 
for an unprecedented entry of foreign capital and emphasis on exports (Frankel 
2005). Moreover, crony capitalism, i.e. the benefitting of a minority of capitalists 
with strong personal and financial links to the political elite, rose to new heights as 
part of the process of deregulation (Jenkins 1999; Mazumdar 2008). 
However, it can be problematic to make neat distinctions between the period before 
and after the 1990s in terms of dominance of the State and the market, respectively. 
For example, the redistributive agenda was attacked decisively by the early 1960s by 
all kinds of oppositional groups, both within and outside Nehru’s Congress (Frankel 
2005, 203) and any disciplinary role of the Planning Commission was effectively 
over by the late 1960s (Chibber 2003).  
This also applies to the agricultural sector. While the Green Revolution is commonly 
understood to be a State-led programme of agricultural transformation, it actually 
unfolded through the participation of various kinds of private (local, national and 
international) capital and international agencies. The production and distribution of 
technologies such as fertilizers, crop chemicals, tractors and irrigation equipment 
involved considerable private investment (B. Harriss 1981; R. Kumar 2016). Harriss-
White (2003) also argues that intermediate classes managed to wrest control of the 
spaces which the formal State apparatus was unable or unwilling to regulate.  
As a project under construction, ‘an open-ended process’ (Jenkins 1999, 1), 
liberalisation embodies elements of both continuity and change. How, when and why 
these contradictory elements play out can be instructive about the nature and impact 
of liberalisation on agriculture. Towards this, the next section discusses the relevant 
policies in which liberalisation of the agricultural sector is manifested, something 
rarely addressed in the majority of the literature on agrarian ‘crisis’.  
3.4.2 The Reforms: Nature and Impact 
I begin with a discussion of production-related reforms, although that is not 
necessarily the chronological order in which reforms were introduced. The optimism 
of the Green Revolution resulted in agriculture no longer being a priority policy for 
the government in the 1990s (Reddy and Mishra 2009). There was a decline in 
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public investment in agriculture from the 1980s till the early 2000s32 and it was only 
the accompanying decline in agricultural growth that forced the government to 
reverse this trend to some extent (Ramachandran and Rawal 2009; Chand and 
Parappuruthu 2012). 
At the macro level, however, liberalisation and especially India’s joining of the 
WTO in 1995 created pressure to reduce the country’s fiscal deficit by reducing 
various kinds of public expenditure, especially ‘market-distorting’ subsidies.33 The 
(neoliberal) common sense is that subsidies, especially input subsidies, take already 
scarce resources away from investments that would increase the productive capacity 
of the sector as a whole (A. Sharma and Gulati 1995). In 1992, the prices of 
phosphate and potash fertilizers were decontrolled, resulting in price increases and 
by 2015, prices of all fertilizers, except urea, had followed suit (FAO 2005; 
Damodaran 2015). There were also changes in the framework of subsidized 
agricultural credit in the 1990s (Ramachandran and Rawal 2009), an issue I revisit 
below. 
Subsidies for electricity in agriculture, on the other hand, have existed since the peak 
of the Green Revolution in the form of flat-rate tariffs or free electricity. Given their 
potential as a political tool, many state governments such as Punjab and AP 
continued them even under liberalisation. However, there is also a trend of re-
metering agricultural electricity supply in some states (e.g. West Bengal) (Gulati and 
Narayanan 2000; Dubash and Rajan 2001; Reddy and Mishra 2009). 
On the output side, the MSP increased more in the 1990s than in the 1980s, as a 
result of which the food subsidy paid by the government also increased (Chand 
2005; Mukherjee 2015).34 Chand argues that the government procurement and 
payment of MSP should be replaced by ‘deficiency price payments’ whereby the 
government would only pay farmers the difference between the price received and 
the MSP (when the former is lower). This would reduce the fiscal burden on the 
government and enable better market integration of farmers (Mukherjee 2015). 
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 Annual growth rates of public investment during 1974-80, 1981-90 and 1991-2003 were 12.83%, -
3.48% and 0.05%, respectively (Chand 2009). 
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 The 2015 negotiations in Nairobi led to an agreement wherein developing countries, including 
India, have to remove agricultural export subsidies by 2018, while developed countries have 
considerable flexibility in the same (EPW Editorial 2016). 
34
 It should be noted that food subsidies build up not only through the MSP, but also through the 
volume of subsidized food and its distribution costs (Swaminathan 1999). 
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However, others argue that costs calculated by the Commission for Agricultural 
Costs and Prices (CACP), which form the basis of the MSP, are grossly 
underestimated (Swaminathan and Rawal 2015). The MS Swaminathan Committee 
Report on Farmers, 2006 also argued that the MSP needs to be increased from its 
existing level and extended to more crops and regions to secure the interests of 
farmers (Press Trust of India (PTI) 2013; Dutta 2017). But while the level of MSP 
may be debated, the fact remains that it is only implemented in some parts of the 
country, namely, Punjab, Haryana, western UP and AP, and then only for paddy and 
wheat (Deshpande 2003; Ali et al. 2012). Other regions and crops receive prices 
which are often lower than the MSP or are quite volatile.35 The debates and 
realpolitik around individual subsidies notwithstanding, it is widely agreed that the 
decline in agricultural subsidies of different kinds has resulted in an increase in input 
costs for farmers and squeezed their profit margins. Moreover, market integration, 
the panacea suggested by pro-liberalisation scholars, can have differentiated impact 
on different rural classes (Section 2.2). 
Another important assumption in agricultural policy under liberalisation is that the 
progress of the agricultural sector lay in ‘getting prices right’ (Sen 1992; Reddy and 
Mishra 2009). Trade liberalisation is crucial to achieve this. Accordingly, India, like 
many other developing countries, prioritized exports as the way forward in 
agricultural development in the early 1990s. Over the years, the central government 
removed restrictions on agricultural exports and barriers to the import of agricultural 
commodities, including staples like wheat and rice. Chand (2004) argues that 
agricultural trade (exports and imports) as a percentage of agricultural GDP 
increased from 4.95% in 1990-91 to 9.71% in 2001-02. This resulted in increased 
price volatility of crops and increased farmers’ vulnerability (Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh 2002; Ramachandran and Rawal 2009; Reddy and Mishra 2009). 
Commercial, especially export, crops are incentivized by the government but a 
slump in world prices can have disastrous effects, as in the case of rubber and pepper 
in Kerala and ginger in Karnataka (Jeromi 2007; Münster 2015). 
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As mentioned earlier, privatisation has been an important pillar of liberalisation. I 
now discuss how this has been attempted in some of the most relevant aspects of 
agriculture. 
We start with land. While land reforms had effectively fallen off the policy agenda 
by the 1980s (Patnaik 1986), there has been a complete reversal on land reform 
policy under liberalisation. Some states, such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, 
Karnataka and Maharashtra, have relaxed ceilings on landholdings and introduced 
provisions to enable corporate firms to lease-in government wastelands, while others, 
for example, Punjab, are in the process of doing so.36 This is supported and promoted 
by agribusiness firms, political parties and farmers’ organisations representing large 
farmers (S. Singh 2006). Even without the laws, corporates resort to manipulation 
and deceit to establish control over land for agriculture (Jenkins 1999; Ghosh 2003). 
In recent years, ‘land grabs’ have been at the centre of struggles around development 
both in India and across the developing world. However, Levien (2015) has argued 
that land grabs in India are almost always for non-agricultural processes and any 
impact on agrarian change is incidental at most. 
Another controversial area of reform concerns seeds. Starting with the National Seed 
Development Policy of 1988, the Government of India has undertaken multiple 
policy and legislative measures which expand the scope of private domestic and 
transnational capital in seeds. While the new policies give TNCs access to Indian 
markets by partnering with domestic companies and importing foreign seeds, they 
have also allowed domestic seed companies to export to the expanding Asian and 
African markets. Simultaneously, the public sector in seeds has declined and now 
limited itself to high-volume, low-value crops such as paddy, finger millet and 
groundnuts. Further reforms are being proposed which, according to some scholars, 
will cause a major infringement of the seed sovereignty of the farmers, as they would 
not be able to register their own seeds and would have weak remedial options vis-à-
vis seed companies (Shiva 1992; Shiva and Crompton 1998; GRAIN 2005). 
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An important area of dispute within this is the commercial use of GM crops; 
currently Bt cotton is the only one legally permitted. Shiva (2004) has described GM 
seeds as ‘terminator seeds’, as they are engineered to be sterile, thus perpetuating 
farmers’ dependence on the corporates that produce them. She goes on to argue that 
these seeds are more susceptible to pests, cause losses to farmers and may be 
responsible for suicides. Glover (2010) has argued that pro-GM scholarship glosses 
over evidence that shows that the adoption by and impact on farmers, especially 
smallholders, is not unequivocal but shaped by socio-economic differences and 
institutional conditions. 
Such arguments, however, are undermined by evidence that farmers, including 
smaller farmers, in some parts of India are actively using and promoting these seeds. 
These studies recognize that such farmers could be at greater risk if institutional 
support is not extended to them but argue that since farmers use them as one of many 
different seeds as a way of managing risk, the step forward lies not in blanket 
opposition but appropriate regulation (Herring 2007; Roy et al. 2007). The strength 
of these arguments lies in their assertion that farmers actively participate in shaping 
the terms of farming, rather than portraying them as passive and ‘supine’ (Herring 
2007, 130).37 
Yet another crucial area for agriculture where privatisation has been introduced is 
credit. As a part of its financial reforms, the Government of India began advocating a 
market-oriented and profit-driven banking system. This marked a reversal of its 
policy of ‘social and development banking’, which was instituted to give priority to 
areas and social groups that had inadequate access to banking services 
(Ramachandran and Rawal 2009; Ramachandran 2011). Consequently, in the 1990s 
there was a decline in the number of rural branches of commercial banks and in the 
growth of credit flow to agriculture. The credit flow was apparently revived in the 
late 1990s (Chand and Parappurathu 2012). However, studies have shown that this 
revival was a result of a gross distortion of what constitutes agricultural credit – it 
rested fundamentally on an expansion of the definition of agriculture for credit 
purposes to include credit to different types of corporate agribusinesses. A 
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 The benefits of transgenic seeds for farmers notwithstanding, there is a consensus that large 
corporates are poised to benefit more than small firms through their spread since the latter do not have 
comparable resources to invest in such technology (Shiva and Crompton 1998; Herring 2007). 
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significant increase in credit limits and the urbanisation of agricultural credit further 
indicate the shift away from the conventional understanding of direct agricultural 
credit, i.e. as credit to farmers, to credit to large capitalists and large agribusiness 
firms (Ramakumar and Chavan 2007, 2014). Rice mills in Punjab, for example, are 
argued to have easier access to credit under liberalisation, allowing for increased 
investments (Kaur et al. 2007). The reforms also allowed private (including foreign) 
banks to operate on almost the same conditions as the public sector, but their 
performance with respect to priority sector lending, especially agriculture, has been 
poor (Chandrasekhar and Ray 2005). 
The nostalgia for the period of nationalized and ‘social and development’ banking is 
somewhat misplaced given that even then there was a considerable difference 
between large and small farmers’ access to formal credit (see Frankel 1971). 
However, there has certainly been a further decline in the availability of formal 
credit to the disadvantaged sections of rural society such as the Dalits and small and 
marginal farmers (Shah 2008; Chavan 2010; Ramakumar and Chavan 2011). 
Moreover, regional rural banks, largely government-owned, have not been allowed 
to recruit new officers since the 1990s. Cooperative banks which continue to have a 
wide, if ineffective, reach even today have also suffered due to the application of 
market-led assessment norms to them and the unwillingness and inability of central 
and state governments to infuse capital in them. The rural economy has thus been 
almost systematically credit-starved (Sen 2005; Swaminathan and Rawal 2015). 
Therefore, the importance of informal sources of credit has been reinforced in this 
period (Shah 2008; Ramakumar and Chavan 2011). AP, Punjab, Bihar, Assam and 
Rajasthan are said to have the highest levels of non-institutional credit (NCEUS 
2008; Ramachandran et al. 2010). There is little information in this literature on how 
these reforms shape specific complexes of credit relations on the ground, but it does 
provide a framework within which micro-level changes in credit relations may be 
understood. 
Finally, we turn to reforms related to agricultural markets. The focus in these 
reforms has also been on increasing the presence of the private sector and on 
removing ‘exploitative’ intermediaries, especially commission agents. The central 
government passed the Model APMC Act in 2003 and, following its lead, many 
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states amended their APMC Acts resulting in the opening up of new procurement 
channels for farmers’ produce, e.g. private procurement yards, direct sales, open 
markets, public auctions, farmers markets, contract farming etc.38 The state 
governments which have promoted direct marketing by establishing farmers markets 
are Punjab (Apni Mandi), Odisha (Krushak Mandis), AP (Rythu Bazars) and Tamil 
Nadu (Uzhavar Sandies) (Agriculture Division 2011; Krishnamurthy 2011; 
Chengappa 2012). Despite these efforts, it is widely known that commission agents 
and moneylenders continue to be important actors in agricultural markets, even 
though their role has been transformed (Krishnamurthy 2011; Singh and Dhaliwal 
2011). At the same time, private agribusinesses are creating new kinds of 
intermediaries (Narayanan 2012; R. Kumar 2016). Further studies are required to 
investigate if and how efforts to reform the markets have impacted long-standing 
players. 
Here it should also be noted that the Shanta Kumar Committee Report of 2015 
recommended a reform of the FCI. It advocates FCI’s ‘unbundling’ into its various 
core functions: procurement, transportation and storage, and distribution. The report 
also recommends that the private sector should be made major stakeholders in these 
functions, and public-private competition encouraged. A crucial recommendation is 
that the FCI should withdraw from all procurement operations in states such as 
Punjab, Haryana, AP, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Odisha where it has been 
procuring efficiently for the past several decades. Instead, it should shift operations 
elsewhere (e.g. Bihar, Assam, eastern UP and Jharkhand) and develop procurement 
capacities there (FCI 2015). Given the centrality of the FCI to the food grain market 
across the country, this is bound to have a significant impact if implemented. 
Responding to such suggestions in the 1990s, Swaminathan (1999) argued that the 
FCI is not necessarily less efficient than private traders in procuring food grains from 
farmers.39
 
A strong case is also being made by transnational capital to allow FDI into retailing 
and processing of food items, with the claim that this will be more rewarding for 
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 In 2017, the central government decided to reform the Model Act and to withdraw contract farming 
from it since the 2003 Act did not have the desired impact. Contract farming is to have a separate 
Model Act (Y.S. Sharma 2016; Mukherjee 2017). 
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 Elsewhere, Swaminathan (1996, 2000) argues that reduction in consumer food subsidies under 
liberalisation would severely affect food security.  
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producers and consumers. This, however, has been vociferously opposed by 
domestic traders who feel threatened by the possibility of more powerful 
international capital outcompeting them (H.S. Singh 2012; The Hindu 2012) and 
reminds us of the discussion on intermediate classes in Section 3.1. 
Futures trading is another area of reform in agricultural markets. There are 5 national 
and 16 regional commodity exchanges trading in over 90 agricultural commodities. 
The spot exchange markets in India are National Spot Exchange Limited, National 
Commodity and Derivatives Exchange (NCDEX) spot and Reliance Spot Exchange 
(Elumalai et al. 2009; Jairath 2009; Agriculture Division 2011). The government 
revived futures trading in 2003 by expanding the permitted list of commodities. In 
2007, it stayed futures trading in rice, wheat and some pulses, possibly because it 
was perceived as a major cause of price volatility, although the stay on wheat was 
lifted in 2009 (Elumalai et al. 2009; N.P. Singh et al. 2009).40  
Having surveyed the nature of the reforms, the following section discusses whether 
and to what extent they have caused an agrarian crisis. 
3.4.3 Debating the Crisis 
Chapter 1 stated that the dominant view on the Left in India is that liberalisation has 
caused a general agrarian crisis. The agricultural growth rate has declined in the 
period of liberalisation, from 3.08% in the 1980s to 2.57% between 1992-93 and 
2005-06. Moreover, for the first time in twenty years the population growth rate 
exceeded that of food production (Reddy and Mishra 2009). It has been argued that 
the decline in public investment in agriculture, subsidies and credit combined with 
exposure to the volatile international market led to this crisis. 
There is no denying that these factors have made the agricultural population more 
vulnerable. However, based on more recent figures, it is now widely accepted that 
while there was a severe crisis in agriculture from 1997-98 to 2002-03 when its 
average annual growth rate was 0.5%, agricultural growth has since picked up 
considerably, averaging around 2.9% from 2003-04 to 2011-12. Further, a region-
wise disaggregation of growth rates shows that even in the former period there was 
no country-wide crisis (Bhalla and Singh 2009; Ramachandran 2011; Chand and 
Parappurathu 2012; Lerche 2013). Although growth rates have fluctuated 
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 See Ghosh (2009) for the relation between financialisation and the food crises of 2007-08 and 2010. 
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considerably since that period,41 it is clear that liberalisation has not led to a blanket 
crisis in the growth of agriculture. 
The argument about crisis, however, goes beyond growth rates and deals with the 
forces and processes underlying liberalisation. Patnaik (2006, 2011) argues that the 
principal contradiction faced by India today is that between neoliberalism and the 
working masses. She equates neoliberalism with colonialism and imperialism and 
calls it ‘the re-emergence of finance’ (Patnaik 2006, emphasis added).42 She argues 
that like colonial policies, neoliberalism is further deepening the international 
division of labour in agriculture wherein developing countries produce export crops 
for advanced countries at the expense of their own staple food crops, thus creating 
food insecurity and transferring global price volatility to its own farmers. This has 
caused an overall crisis in agriculture in the global South since the mid-1990s. She 
goes as far as to say that the ‘earlier phase of capitalist development in agriculture 
[in India]...has virtually ended’ (ibid., n.p.) and that ‘India is back to the per capita 
output level of the first plan period 1950-55’ (Patnaik 2011, 34). This, according to 
her, is evidenced by the large number of farmer suicides and the decline in the 
average consumption of cereals. 
Elements of Patnaik’s argument can also be observed in the work of other scholars. 
Rakshit (2011) argued that all the classes of farmers in his study areas in West 
Bengal were being exploited by ‘outside traders’ and others representing 
transnational capital. Basole and Basu (2011) have argued that integration of the 
Indian economy with the global system has encouraged the growth of the petty 
commodity production-led informal sector and this has slowed the process of class 
differentiation. 
From the framework of political economy, there are two problems with this 
argument: firstly, the treatment of all agriculturalists as a mass of ‘peasants’ or even 
when that is not the case, the idea that liberalisation is being experienced in the same 
way by everyone; secondly, the portrayal of agrarian capitalism in India as passive, 
i.e. not accounting for the response of different classes to a changed policy context. 
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 The agricultural growth rate was 1.6% in 2012-13, 4.7% in 2013-14 and 1.1% in 2014-15 
(Rajakumar and Shetty 2015). These figures may not be strictly comparable to the average growth 
years given earlier. 
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 This view resonates with that of Araghi discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Admittedly, this is a broad-brush representation of this position. Reddy and Mishra 
(2009) and M.S. Swaminathan (2008), for instance, recognize that there are different 
kinds of farmers and small and marginal farmers are worse off than others, but that 
does not prevent them from arguing that the crisis extends to the agricultural sector 
as a whole. 
These tensions are better resolved in the other, less dominant and more recently 
developed, view on the Left which argues that the crisis is limited to small and 
marginal landholders and labourers. Based on macro-level statistics as well as 
empirical work, these scholars have argued that class differentiation is continuing in 
the Indian countryside. Though it is not leading to a classic agrarian transition, there 
are ex-landlords and large capitalist farmers who continue to appropriate surplus 
value and invest in agricultural and non-agricultural avenues (Ramachandran 2011; 
Lerche 2013).43 
Some studies use macro data to engage with debates around agrarian class dynamics 
in contemporary India, the obvious shortcoming being the neglect of context specific 
insights. Nevertheless, a study of the spread of tractor use is instructive. It shows that 
the growth rates of tractor sales corresponded with the growth rates of the 
agricultural sectors, reflecting capital accumulation. Notably, it also showed that 
most of this growth happened in regions other than the Green Revolution areas of 
north India (Anupam Sarkar 2013). 
Studies centred on different regions and processes address the questions of 
accumulation and/or differentiation more directly. Village studies in AP and 
Rajasthan, for instance, show that the agricultural elite make substantial, and 
substantially higher, profits on major crops compared to the rest of the peasantry, 
pointing clearly to accumulation and differentiation (Ramachandran et al. 2010; 
Swaminathan and Rawal 2015). In West Bengal, Rakshit (2011) finds a higher 
concentration of assets and better technological adaptation and agricultural yields 
among what he terms landlords and rich peasants compared to agrarian classes lower 
down the hierarchy. In Bihar, capital accumulation is limited both in scale and to the 
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fairly small proportion of large peasants and landlords, but the economy is dynamic 
enough to have moved quite decisively away from semi-feudalism (Rodgers et al. 
2013). A crop-focused study showed that ginger farming in Karnataka by farmers 
from Kerala has led to increasing polarisation between highly successful 
accumulators and others on the brink of ruin (Münster 2015). 
Studies on new agricultural procurement initiatives such as contract farming and 
supermarket retail show that they benefit large farmers more than smaller ones (S. 
Singh 2006; Pritchard and Connell 2011; Swain 2011; Narayanan 2012).44 It would 
be reasonable to assume, therefore, that in areas where these initiatives are 
widespread, there would be implications for class dynamics. Of course, these studies 
also argue that the corporates involved are invariably more powerful in these 
arrangements. For example, many retail companies routinely deal with individual 
growers, make no commitment to buy produce from farmers and purchase only ‘A 
Grade’ produce (Pritchard et al. 2010; Agriculture Division 2011). In contract 
farming, although companies make a prior commitment to purchase the produce at a 
certain price, they may reject it on quality grounds, causing severe losses for farmers 
(S. Singh 2006). Alternatively, they may micro-control the production process, 
leaving little for the farmers to do (Narayanan 2012). 
Another important point arising from these studies is that the idea of ‘the corporate’ 
needs to be unpacked. They can be multi-national or domestic. They could work 
independently or as ‘limbs of conglomerates’ (ibid., 89). They could be working 
upstream or downstream, new to dealing in the particular commodity or experienced. 
This is significant since this would have an impact on how these firms engage with 
the farmers with respect to their strategies and constraints. For example, Narayanan 
(ibid.) points out that marigold-crushing firms gave bonuses to farmers who 
delivered larger quantities of marigolds to prevent supplies entering the open market. 
Thus, the nature of competition that exists in the market for a specific commodity 
affects the forms of engagement between the firm and the farmer. In other words, as 
Harriss-White has argued, the fact that markets constitute a system with some 
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than rich farmers from ITC-ABD, the corporate purchasing the crop, as productivity depended more 
on environmental than socio-economic factors. 
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internal dynamics has a bearing on how they impact agriculture and agriculturists 
(Chapter 2). 
Our discussion shows that there is not enough evidence to argue that liberalisation 
has led to an overall agrarian crisis in India. While some classes are definitely under 
stress, the sector continues to be dynamic and one that allows for accumulation by 
capitalist farmers. However, context-specific studies are few and far between and 
often generalisations about farmers and the agricultural sector are made to suffice. 
There are even fewer studies which discuss the response of different farmers through 
a lens beyond suicides and social movements, i.e. in the more mundane aspects of 
crop choices, accessing credit, negotiating with traders, etc. Here, too, the focus is 
rarely on accumulators and their strategies. This research aims to contribute to filling 





Chapter 4.  Agrarian Capitalism in Punjab 
 
The previous chapter outlined the broad contours of Indian agriculture. It drew out 
the differences between farmers on the basis of land ownership and operational 
holdings, as well as patterns of economic diversification. I also discussed what kinds 
of changes the liberalisation of Indian agriculture entails and the existing evidence of 
their impact on agricultural producers. 
In this chapter, I focus on the state of Punjab where fieldwork for this research was 
conducted. I first discuss the long history, from the colonial period to the Green 
Revolution, through which it has become the most agriculturally developed state in 
India. The chapter then moves on to discuss the major issues that have emerged since 
the 1980s (i.e. in the post Green-Revolution period), including the unviability of 
smallholdings and the exploitative role of the commission agent or kacha arhtia 
(henceforth arhtia). Finally, I reflect on the issue of agrarian crisis in Punjab. The last 
section of this chapter is a combined conclusion for Part I of the thesis. 
4.1 A Political Introduction 
Punjab Province under colonial rule was a large region including present day Punjab, 
Haryana, Delhi, parts of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab state in Pakistan. This 
research is limited to the state of Punjab in India as it exists today. However, it is 
useful to understand some aspects of the history of the larger Punjabi region. 
Punjab was ruled by Maharaja Ranjit Singh from 1801 to 1839. After his death, the 
kingdom quickly succumbed to colonial aggression and was annexed as a province 
of British India in 1849. British governance here was guided by the fact that it was a 
frontier province and did not join the 1857 rebellion. This, and the fact that the 
British now had a few decades of experience governing the sub-continent, enabled 
them to cultivate Punjab as a loyalist state by engaging the population in military 
service and through agricultural development. 
The Punjabis, especially the Jats (the dominant pastoralists and peasants in the 
region), were considered one of the ‘martial races’. Moreover, their geographical 
proximity to the border of British India meant that they did not need to be paid the 
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extra ‘frontier allowance’ when serving in the army. By the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, Punjabi soldiers formed a large majority of the British Army in India 
(Talbot 2007). 
The other pillar of colonial governance in Punjab was agricultural development, 
discussed in detail below. The British transformed the largely pastoral, semi-arid 
region of pre-division Punjab into a ‘model agricultural province’ from the 1860s. 
Their most well-known initiative is the building of canal colonies, starting in 1886, 
in what was west Punjab, now in Pakistan. They constructed perennial canals in the 
erstwhile pastoral highlands west of the River Sutlej and settled farmers from the 
eastern side in the villages (‘colonies’) built along the canal. 
The construction of canal colonies was framed within the discourse of order and ‘the 
embodiment of science, modernity, and progress’ (5), a vision that was not fully 
realized (Bhattacharya 2012). The government sought to create an ordered and law-
abiding occupant population in these colonies. To this end, at least some of the plots 
were reserved for military personnel and contractors, thereby combining its aims of 
military loyalty and ‘development’ (ibid.; R. Kaur 2008). Partition in 1947 led to the 
reverse migration of a large majority of the Sikh farmers in the canal colonies back 
to east Punjab on the Indian side of the border. The much larger landholdings of the 
canal colonies remained in Pakistan while the Indian Punjab faced a ‘land crunch’ 
and could allot only much smaller plots to refugees/returnees (R. Kaur 2008). 
In 1966, the erstwhile Punjab state in India was divided into Punjabi-speaking 
Punjab and Hindi-speaking Haryana with some hilly regions being merged with the 
state of Himachal Pradesh. This was done on the back of the Punjabi Suba 
movement which started in the 1950s, as part of which Sikhs were mobilized in large 
numbers. It was only after this division that Sikhs became the majority in Punjab, 
although by a small margin (Telford 1992). 
Perhaps the most important milestone in this trajectory was the period of Sikh 
militancy and State repression from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. A longer 
history of centre-state relations and politics within the Sikh community created and 
fed into the turbulence of this period. Interestingly, many scholars have argued that 
the wave of militancy drew on a mass base of youth from middle and poor farming 
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households that emerged as a result of the Green Revolution (ibid.; Shiva 1991; B.P. 
Singh 2010). 
The political crisis of this period was resolved through the 1997 state elections when 
the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) came to power. Jodhka (2005) argues that it was 
only in the late 1990s that the political leaders of the region felt confident enough to 
re-assert region-specific demands politically since militancy had strong secessionist 
tendencies. Since then the state has been stable politically, although some of the 
issues of the period have begun to resurface.
45
 
4.2 The State of Agriculture 
Present day Punjab constitutes less than 2% of the land mass of India and only a 
marginally higher proportion of its population (27.7 million; 2.3%). Across a total of 
22 districts, around 62% of the population is rural. Geographically, Punjab, for the 
most part, consists of three alluvial plains: Majha or the Upper-Bari Doab (the region 
above the River Beas); Bist Doab (between Beas and Sutlej); and Malwa (everything 
below Sultej). In the north-east, a substantial part is composed of the Shivalik 
HillsMajha and Bist Doab have many seasonal streams, fertile clay loamy soils, 
continental climate (cold winters and hot summers), are densely populated and 
support intensive agricultural practices. Malwa, on the other hand, is hot, arid and 
relatively more sparsely populated. An extensive canal system and fertile soil allows 
for intensive agriculture in the eastern parts, but in the south-west agriculture is 
extensive or moderately intensive (Department of Land Resources n.d.; Planning 
Commission 2004).; Planning Commission 2004). 
The Jats, mostly Sikh, are the dominant agricultural caste in the state and are argued 
to be the most politically powerful community. The Hindu mercantile castes or 
Mahajans such as the Banias, Khatris and Aroras are the historically dominant 
communities in the region in trade and moneylending (Damodaran 2008). According 
to the 2011 Census, Sikhs (including Jats and Dalits) constitute 57.69% of the total 
population while Hindus (Mahajans and other castes) constitute 38.49%. Dalits 
constitute almost 32% of the total population, the largest proportion of any state 
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(Government of Punjab 2015). Other Backward Castes comprise approximately 20-
25% of the total population.
46
 
In 2014-15, agriculture and allied sectors contributed 26.68% of the state’s GDP 
(Table 4.1). As the table shows, this share has been declining steadily over the years. 
In 2009-10, 44.2% of the total population engaged in agriculture, lower than most 
states but significantly higher than Kerala. By contrast, only around 12% of the 
population is engaged in industry, close to the national average but somewhat lower 
than, for example, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Haryana (Lerche 2014). Together, 
these figures indicate that although a structural transformation has taken place in 
Punjab which is more advanced than that of many other regions, agriculture 
continues to be a core sector in terms of contribution to GDP and employment. 
Industry has not developed as much as might have been expected within classical 
interpretations of the agrarian question (Byres 1996; Lerche 2013).
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Table 4.1: Percentage share of agriculture and allied sectors in the GDP of Punjab for 
select years 
Year 2003-04 2008-09 2009-2010 2012-13 2014-15 
% share 36.40 33.16 30.60 26.72 26.68 
             Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, various years 
Pritam Singh (2009) has argued that the nature of India’s federalism and the central 
government’s twin goals of achieving food self-sufficiency and reducing inter-
regional disparities have been responsible for placing Punjab on an agriculture-
dependent path of development. While agriculture and industry are both formally 
state subjects under the Indian Constitution, the central government retains the right 
to intervene based on ‘national interest’. Therefore, while Punjab was supported with 
respect to agricultural development, it was deprived of central public sector 
investment in industry. 
As in the rest of India, the service sector has grown substantially and constituted 
48.8% of the state economy in 2012-13 (Planning Commission 2014). While this is 
less than the India-wide proportion of around 58%, it serves to dispel the popular 
myth of the dominance of agriculture in Punjab’s economy. Inderjeet Singh (2016) 
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 This is also an assumption of mainstream economic dual sector theories, such as the Lewis model. 
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points out, however, that this growth is uneven and that the service sector has weak 
linkages with agriculture.  
Despite some constraints on all-encompassing development of the state’s economy, 
Punjab is the richest state agriculturally and in 2012-13 had the highest average 
monthly income and consumption expenditure per agricultural household (Table 
4.2).
48
 Punjab also had the second highest (after Kerala and before Haryana) rural 
monthly per capita consumer expenditure in the country; other states had distinctly 
lower figures (NSSO 2014b). 
Table 4.2: Average monthly income and consumption expenditure per agricultural 
household in 2012-13 (Rs) 
 Punjab India 
Income 18059 6426 
Consumption expenditure 13311 6223 
     Source: NSSO 2014b 
Kannan (2015) argues that Punjab has been the exception to the trend of falling farm 
income levels under liberalisation. On the basis of data from National Accounts 
Statistics and the Cost of Cultivation of Principal Crops in India, he estimates 
income from a set of major crops across the states of Karnataka, Maharashtra, 
Punjab and West Bengal. He estimates that in Punjab, average farm business income 
per hectare has increased from Rs 12,559 during 1981-82 to 1990-91 to Rs 20,247 
during 2001-02 to 2007-08. Over the same period, income per hectare for paddy 
increased from Rs 15,653 to Rs 25,842 and for wheat from Rs 10,454 to Rs 16,959. 
Data from the NSSO 70
th
 round also shows that the returns per hectare to investment 
are highest in Punjab compared to all other states both for rabi (winter) (Rs 82,271) 
and kharif (summer) (Rs 114,597) crops (Ranganathan 2013). 
However, these figures mask the distress that does exist in the agricultural sector of 
Punjab. This distress lies not in the sector as a whole but amongst the smaller 
farmers and the landless. Before discussing this, the following sections trace the 
trajectory of agrarian development in the state from the colonial period onwards and 
with reference to relevant historical and contemporary debates. 
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4.2.1 A Historical Overview 
As mentioned above, Punjab was placed on a distinct trajectory of agricultural 
development in the colonial period. The canal colonies saw a significant increase in 
agricultural output in the 1880s onwards, but this growth had plateaued by the 1920s 
(possibly due to the spread of genetically homogeneous wheat and cotton amongst 
the colonies from the 1900s to the 1930s), leaving them comparable to other 
prosperous areas of the province. Moreover, small farmers in the latter performed 
better than the large ones in the canal colonies due to availability of family and other 
labour to work on the farms (Bhattacharya 2012). South-eastern Punjab (present day 
Haryana) was less prosperous since it was arid. There is, however, a 
historiographical debate about whether or not the colonial legacy better prepared the 
region for the capitalist development that followed. 
Mukherjee (2005) argues that, as in other parts of the country, colonialism inflicted 
structural constraints on Punjab’s agriculture. Colonial rule saw the 
commercialization of both land and revenue in the province, but farmers, especially 
smallholders, suffered a crushing tax burden. Therefore, agrarian capitalism emerged 
in the state after Independence as a break in history. Bhattacharya (1983, 1985), on 
the other hand, argues that by the early 20
th
 century, a section of rich peasantry was 
able to contribute to the expansion of productive forces in agriculture and therefore 
an expansion of agrarian capital, especially in central Punjab. By the 20
th
 century, 
these peasants also dominated the land mortgage market as mortgagees and 
cultivated the land directly. He also argues that the leasing-in and leasing-out of land 
by small and large landholders was guided by different concerns and constraints. 
This debate is particularly interesting for understanding the emergence of agrarian 
capitalism in Punjab, but it lies beyond the scope of this research. There is, however, 
a related discussion on indebtedness and the role of moneylenders that is relevant to 
this research and discussed below. 
By the 1880s, the indebtedness of Punjab’s farmers had been recognized as a major 
problem. The non-agricultural or merchant moneylenders (sahukars or Mahajans,) 
were identified as the culprits: it was argued that peasants had to part with their land 
due to their inability to service their debts. The Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 
was enacted to prevent this land from passing on to the sahukars and to protect the 
zimidars or farmers. However, despite the Act, farmers’ indebtedness continued to 
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expand in subsequent years. Darling (1925) argues that the Act was successful in 
checking rising indebtedness only temporarily and that the small farmer could escape 
indebtedness either through exceptional frugality or through another source of 
income (e.g. military service, migration etc.). He added that both the distress of the 
small farmers and the conspicuous consumption of the well-off farmers contributed 
to the volume of indebtedness.  
Mridula Mukherjee (2005) argues that this can be explained by the fact that the 
decline of the sahukars was accompanied by a rise in agricultural moneylenders in 
the advanced areas. The latter were able to mobilize capital for moneylending not 
only through agriculture but also other sources such as migration and military 
service. Land mortgages were the dominant mode of extending credit and meant 
effective control over the land. Agricultural moneylenders were interested in land in 
the advanced areas because they could further benefit financially by leasing it out. In 
backward areas, the sahukars remained dominant and engaged in usury as the 
agricultural moneylenders were not interested in investing in land with little value. 
Like Mukherjee, Bhattacharya (1985) argues that the sahukars’ control over the 
marketing process had reduced. But unlike her, he explains this not through the rise 
of agricultural moneylenders but through the emergence of alternative modes of 
marketing. Rich peasants were able to maintain stocks and sell directly in wholesale 
markets as the nature of the credit arrangement did not require them to repay the loan 
in crops. Consequently, their participation in the credit market and relations with 
farmers became markedly different to those of smaller, poorer peasants. Some credit 
advanced to farmers, for example, effectively became forward purchases – meant 
only for ensuring supplies, not for regulating prices. This resonates with arguments 
by Bharadwaj and others (Section 2.2) that market relations are often rooted in 
production structures. Moreover, although Bhattacharya also agrees with the 
emergence of agricultural moneylenders, he argues that they used mortgages as a 
way to expand self-cultivation rather than for usury alone; in other words, mortgages 
were a form of land-leasing for these moneylenders. 
It is notable that irrespective of which version of history one accepts, it is evident 
that sahukars were unable to prevent rich peasants from accumulating. The rise of 
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the agricultural moneylenders, rent-seeking or self-cultivating, stands testimony to 
this, as do the changes in the modes of marketing by the rich peasants. 
As elsewhere in the country, after Independence Punjab underwent a series of land 
reforms which created conditions conducive to the emergence of capitalist farmers. 
Several clauses in the reform legislation and manipulation of the same by 
landowners allowed them to evict tenants, leading to large-scale evictions that 
continued from the mid-1950s to the early years of the Green Revolution. According 
to one account, 500,000 tenants had been evicted by 1962 alone and only 36,000 
were resettled (Gill and Ghuman 2001).
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The ceiling on individual land ownership was established in 1972: the limit was set 
at 7 ha. (17.3 acres) for irrigated land with two crops, 11 ha. (27 acres) for irrigated 
land with one crop, and 20.5 ha. (50.5 acres) for ‘dry’ land (Government of Punjab 
1973).
50
 As in other parts of the country, these ceilings were commonly evaded (Iyer 
2001). A few years ago, some farmers’ unions in the state asked for the first 
category’s land ceiling to be increased to 10 ha. (25 acres) and it was subsequently 
revised to 8.2 ha. (20.5 acres) (Randhawa 2013).
51
 In addition to the above, 
compulsory consolidation of landholdings incentivised farmers to make fixed capital 
investments in land. Consolidation was initiated in the pre-Independence era but 
started in earnest from the 1950s and continued until the 1980s (Gill and Ghuman 
2001). 
Given the nature of landholdings in the state and colonial legacies in the form of an 
incipient rich peasantry and commercialized agriculture, Punjab emerged as an 
important cornerstone of the ‘betting on the strong’ policy that framed the Green 
Revolution. It was one of the first states to be included in the 1961-63 IADP 
mentioned earlier and then in the IAAP (Frankel 1971). Apart from the general 
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acres (Jigeesh 2013).  
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characteristics of the programme, Punjab benefited from a proactive state 
government and the targeted research of the Punjab Agriculture University (PAU) 




To give a sense of just how successful this programme was in Punjab, the total 
output of wheat increased by nearly 200% from 1960-61 to 1970-71, and by 600% to 
1990-91. The total output of paddy, an improved variety of which was introduced in 
the mid-late 1970s, grew by around 28 times between 1960-61 and 1990-91 (figures 
derived from Kalkat 2008). Mann (2017) notes that while wheat’s share of total 
cropped area in the state stabilized at 49% in the 1970s, the area under paddy 
reached its peak of 40.76% in 2014-15 by displacing other crops – various pulses, 
oilseeds and coarse cereals.
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An inordinately large proportion of Punjab’s rice is allocated to the central pool of 
food grains before being channelled to the PDS of different states. In the early 1980s, 
Punjab’s contribution to the central pool holdings stood at 45.3% of the rice total and 
an enormous 73% of wheat. Since then its percentages have declined due to stagnant 
yields and increasing contributions by other states, but it stood at a substantial 25.1% 
and 33.6%, respectively, in 2012-13 (Government of Punjab 2014). 
4.2.2 Emergence of Agrarian Capitalism 
For Punjab, the Green Revolution was also nothing short of a revolution in another 
sense, i.e. it decisively ushered the state into agrarian capitalism, a kind of 
‘capitalism from below’ (Byres 1986). The state saw the emergence of capitalist 
farmers for whom farming transformed into a commercial enterprise. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is widely agreed that the medium and large farmers at the time reaped 
greater benefits from the Green Revolution since they had the resources to invest in 
the biochemical and mechanical inputs HYV seeds required. 
Small and marginal farmers were unable to reap equal benefits, and in some cases 
their conditions worsened in absolute terms (Frankel 1971). These farmers could 
only make investments if they took out loans (from cooperatives, commercial banks 
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 Aggarwal (1973) suggests that the state government was compelled to have a policy bias towards 
farmers due to their political power. 
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 The total cropped area here is the cropped area under the state’s 17 major crops that constituted 
90% of the actual cropped area in 2014-15 (Mann 2017). 
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or informal sources), which implied that part of their income would be spent in debt-
servicing. This trapped them in a cycle of indebtedness from which only a lucky few 
escaped. Some of this small and poor peasantry became part of the landless labour 
force in rural areas that included landless labourers, evicted tenants and erstwhile 
sharecroppers. 
The increase in cropping intensity and tight crop rotation increased the demand for 
labour and its real wages, although relative inequality increased. This gain lasted a 
few years until the farmers actively challenged it by increasingly mechanising farm 
operations. Byres (1981) argued that farmers would be willing to pay this ‘political 
price’ to maintain a certain level of profitability even if mechanisation was not by 
itself necessary to increase output. In fact, Agarwal (1983) argued that tractors have 
a neutral effect on output, but mechanisation led to a reduction in the labour time 
needed in farming. At the same time, Green Revolution technology led to an increase 
in permanent/attached labour compared to the earlier period, though the terms of 
attachment changed from jajmani (patronage) to more formal contractual relations 
(Byres 1981; Judge 2001). Over time, migrant labour from states such as Bihar and 
UP came to dominate both casual and attached labour in the state because they were 
cheaper and the local labour, most of whom were Dalits in the villages, increasingly 
avoided farm work (Judge 2001; Jodhka 2002).
54
 Outside agriculture, Dalits are 
known to be employed as labourers in construction and transport, although in the 
Doaba region they have had exceptional success in leather trading (Planning 
Commission 2004; Ram 2004). 
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 So stark and rapid were these processes of commercialization and differentiation that some opined 
that the Green Revolution would become the basis of the Red Revolution in Punjab (Frankel 1971; 
Aggarwal 1973; Byres 1981). 
78 
 
Table 4.3: Percentage of households leasing-in land in Punjab 
 2002-03 2012-13 
Marginal (less than 1 ha.) 25.69 26.73 
Small (1-2 ha.) 17.17 28.56 
Semi-medium (2-4 ha.) 30.25 29.96 
Medium (4-10 ha.) 38.68 58.07 
Large (above 10 ha.) 46.23 69.74 
Total 14.76 22.55 
              Source: Ranganathan 2013 
The structural reasons for the Green Revolution technology’s differentiated benefits 
for large and small farmers in its early years also led to the emergence of reverse 
tenancy as a prominent trend in the state by the 1980s. This gained ascendancy in 
Punjab because ‘optimum utilisation of mechanical inputs and associated economies 
of large-scale farming’ (Brar and Gill 2001, 220) created a demand for land by the 
former while the increasing inability of smaller farmers to afford the requisite 
expenditure on capitalized, commercialized farm operations created the supply of 
land. Table 4.3 shows that while the proportion of households leasing-in land has 
increased by a small margin for small and marginal farmers, it has increased by 50% 
among both the medium and large households.
55
 However, in the neighbouring state 
of Haryana, Jodhka (2014a) argues that despite a trend towards reverse tenancy, land 
has continued to be leased-in by small farmers who want to supplement their income 
and/or who are in some ways enterprising and with some risk-taking capacity. 
Whether this also holds for Punjab needs to be studied empirically. 
4.2.3 Post-Green Revolution 
As mentioned above, the pressures of highly capitalised agriculture squeezed small 
and marginal farmers out of agriculture. Table 4.4 gives the distribution of 
operational holdings in Punjab in 2011: the numbers reflect the concentration of 
landholdings among semi-medium to large farmers. This is completely opposite to 
the trend in the rest of India where marginal and small farmers dominate the 
distribution of operational holdings. Further, while elsewhere in the country, the 
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 Vijay (2012) has shown that in 2002 NCPH in Punjab, i.e. households in the rural sector that own 
land but do not cultivate it, constituted 44% all non-cultivating households in rural areas but only 8% 
of land. This indicates that a large proportion of these NCPH are small landholders. 
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share of marginal landholders has been rising steadily, in Punjab this share has 
decreased marginally. Given that above it has been argued that small and marginal 
farmers were squeezed out, the relatively marginal decline in the percentage of 
marginal and small landholdings could be explained, speculatively, through the 
overall decline in the number of landholdings and fragmentation of holdings among 
sons of the same household. Therefore, these broad trends in land distribution reflect 
many of the problems being experienced by small landholding households in the 
state, discussed below.  
Table 4.4: Percentage share of operational holding categories in Punjab 
 Punjab India 
 1995-96 2010-11 1995-96 2010-11 




























  Source: Agriculture Census, various years 
  Note: absolute number of holdings in brackets 
The heady growth of the first decade of the Green Revolution had subsided by the 
end of the 1980s. Table 4.5 gives the decadal growth rates of agriculture in Punjab 
from 1970 to 2000; it reveals a sharp decline in the 1990s, even falling below the 
national average. The average annual growth rate between 2007-08 and 2013-14 was 
1.3% p.a.
56
 The productivity levels of wheat and paddy, Punjab’s chief crops, also 
stagnated. The compound growth rate of wheat yields declined only marginally 
between 1970-80 and 1990-2000 – from 2.3% to 2.06% – but the decline was drastic 
in the case of paddy – from 5.5% to 0.08% (Chand 2008). K. Singh (2009) argues 
that between 2000-01 and 2005-06 the operational costs of cultivating paddy and 
wheat increased by over 50%, while over the same period paddy yields increased by 
only 12% and those of wheat decreased by 8%. 
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 This figure is derived from the Central Statistics Office (n.d.). It should be taken as suggestive and 
not necessarily comparable with those in Table 4.5 since the prices against which they have been 
calculated could be different. 
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Table 4.5: Decadal growth rates in agriculture in Punjab and India 
 1970-71 to 1979-80 1980-81 to 1989-90 1999-91 to 1999-2000 
Punjab 4.03 5.33 2.34 
India 1.77 3.26 3.33 
       Source: Chand 2008 
The increase in operational costs is a result at least in part of the increased costs of 
agricultural inputs under liberalisation (discussed earlier). The countrywide increase 
in costs of fertilizers such as di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) and chemicals such as 
weedicides has adversely impacted farmers in Punjab as well (ibid.). But in Punjab, 
high costs of mechanisation have also played a role. 
Despite having only around 3% of the net sown area of the country, Punjab has 25% 
of India’s tractor population (Kalkat 2008). The tractor intensity per 1000 ha. of net 
sown area was found to be over 70 for Punjab compared to a mere 17 for India 
overall (Lerche 2014). Chand (2008) argues that following the initial years of the 
Green Revolution, tractors and other machinery were developed that were suitable 
for smaller plots of land, allowing for the diffusion of mechanisation across 
smallholdings. The emergence of second-hand tractor markets in the 1990s ‘where 
farmers often sold recently purchased tractors to meet their family needs’ has thus 
been argued to indicate the unviability of tractor purchases by small farms (Kalkat 
2008, 70; S.S. Singh 2010). At the same time, many small farmers have to hire in 
machinery, accounting for over 60% of their operational machine expenses, while 
the same figure for large farms stands at less than 30% (K. Singh 2009). 
Moreover, farmers’ irrigation costs have also increased; even though the Punjab 
government introduced a 100% electricity subsidy for agricultural irrigation in 1997 
at the point of use, it very shortly afterwards began to ration the supply of electricity 
in the peak paddy sowing season – when irrigation requirements are at their highest. 
Consequently farmers have to pay to operate tube wells through diesel pump sets 
(Anindita Sarkar and Das 2014).
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 The subsidy is, of course, still beneficial for farmers as they had begun making large investments in 




As a result of the above, profit levels have declined. Wheat profitability has been 
argued to have declined by 15% from 1999-2000 to 2003-04 (K. Singh 2009), 
although we know from Kannan (2015) that the profit levels are still much higher 
than in other states. Gill (2009) has calculated that the MSP in the 1980s and 1990s 
represented a decline in returns to production of wheat and paddy in real terms. 
Leaders of farmers’ unions such as the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) routinely 
target the central government for not setting the MSP high enough for farmers to 
receive adequate remuneration (PTI 2013; The Tribune 2016). 
Another dimension of the agricultural crisis in Punjab is ecological: the wheat-paddy 
rotation has caused severe nutrient imbalances and deficiency in the soil (Sidhu et al. 
2008; Kalkat 2008). Several scholars have pointed out that the continuous cropping 
rotation of wheat and paddy has caused severe deterioration of the resource base 
supporting agriculture. The widespread cultivation of paddy in particular has led to 
an alarming depletion of groundwater resources since paddy is a water-intensive 
crop and Punjab is a semi-arid region (Sidhu et al. 2008). Apart from issues of 
sustainability, this has economic implications for farmers. Depleting groundwater 
levels force farmers to make continued capital investment in deepening tube wells 
and, as per an estimate in 2002, the cost of this has been increasing by 7.2% p.a. (K. 
Singh 2009). 
In terms of social relations, it is the relation between the farmer and the trader-
moneylender, now in the form of the commission agent or the arhtia that has again 
emerged as the trope to explain the crisis for Punjab’s farmers. Indeed, arhtias 
control 36% of the total agricultural credit market in the state (S. Singh and Bhogal 
2015). This is the focus of the next section. 
Here, let us note that indebtedness is also caused by loans taken from institutional or 
formal sources. Commercial banks and Primary Agricultural Cooperative Societies 
(PACS) in the state have been the farmers’ key sources of institutional credit, with 
interest rates varying according to the purpose of the loan. The amount of 
outstanding credit advanced from these sources has been increasing continuously, 
from 19% of the Net State Domestic Product in 1996-97 to 38% in 2005-06 (K. 
Singh 2009), yet is still not sufficient to meet farmers’ demands. Moreover, banks 
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and PACS continue to be biased against small and marginal farmers, who are 
therefore more vulnerable to non-institutional or informal sources. 
Based on NSSO data from 2011, Table 4.6 shows the proportion of households 
across different size-classes with outstanding loans. It does not, however, give the 
extent of the debt relative to income nor does it categorize the purpose of the loan or 
its source. This implies that we cannot use these figures to estimate the relative 
access to or impact of formal and informal sources of credit for different groups of 
farmers. 
Nevertheless, some broad patterns can be observed. Indebtedness among marginal 
and small farmers in Punjab is lower than but largely comparable to the all-India 
average, and is significant enough to warrant concern. The figures for semi-medium, 
medium and large classes are, however, higher than the all-India average, and 
considerably so for the latter two categories. In the absence of information on the 
purpose of the loans, the source or the terms of repayment, it is difficult to interpret 
these figures accurately. Nevertheless, one could expect them to be at least partly 
reflective of the high levels of capital intensification in Punjab’s agriculture. 
Table 4.6: Percentage of households with loans outstanding in Punjab and India across 
different landholding classes 
 Punjab India 
Marginal 46.2 63.6 
Small 15.9 18.4 
Semi-medium 17.9 12.0 
Medium 17.6 5.40 
Large 2.40 0.60 
  Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics 2015 
The above discussion establishes that there is a serious ‘viability crisis’ (Gill 2010) 
among Punjab’s small agricultural households. Many studies have found that such 
households wish to leave agriculture – and many have already left, a process termed 
‘depeasantisation’: small and marginal holdings declined by 200,000 over the 1990s 
(K. Singh et al. 2009; S. Singh 2012; S. Singh and Bhogal 2014). Simultaneously, 
there has been a spate of farmer suicides in the state, especially by small farmers. A 
2005 Government of Punjab study reported that 2,116 farmers committed suicide 
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between the late 1980s and 2005 (K. Singh 2009; A. Gill 2009). These same studies 
have also stressed the role of the arhtias in the distress of small and marginal 
households (ibid.; Dandekar and Bhattacharya 2017). We now turn our attention to 
this. 
4.2.4 Indebtedness to Arhtias 
In view of the rich historical debate on the role of trader-moneylenders discussed 
earlier, it is notable that in the decades following Independence, the literature on 
them suddenly dried up. This can be explained perhaps by the preoccupation of 
scholarship with the almost revolutionary agrarian transformation of the region due 
to land reforms and the Green Revolution. However, there is some indication that 
informal credit continued to be required by farmers across classes due to the 
increased costs of capitalized agriculture even in the heyday of the Green 
Revolution. Satish (2006), for example, argues that commercial banks and 
cooperative societies’ share of total credit advanced to farmers increased in the 
1970s. Yet, even in 1971-72 informal credit formed well over 50% of the total debt 
of cultivating households, around 12% of which came from ‘traders and commission 
agents’ and just under 6% came from ‘professional moneylenders’ (2755), which he 
leaves unexplained. Trader-moneylenders, therefore, continued to be important in the 
agrarian landscape, even if not the most important credit source.  
In the 1970s, market towns were studied from the point of view of town planning 
and urban development. We know from this literature that regulated markets were 
created in the late 19
th
 to early 20
th
 century by the colonial authorities and one of 
their avowed aims was to prevent the exploitation of farmers by traders and 
moneylenders. The first Punjab APMC Act was passed in 1939. Even in the early 
1960s Punjab had one of the largest numbers of regulated markets, a feature it shared 
with other major cotton producing states (NCAER 1965). We also know that in 
Punjab, market towns were springing up in large numbers from the late 1960s 
onwards in order to cope with the increased production of food grains. These towns 
were located close to or along railway tracks and highways, although not always 
evenly in all areas (A.J. Singh 1972; Kahlon and Kehal 1972). B. Harriss (1974) also 
writes that before 1967 (i.e. pre-MSP), there was a significant difference between 
market prices in larger centres and those in smaller, more remote areas. Further, she 
informs us that there was limited competition between arhtias in mandis. Despite the 
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above, it is difficult to find much detailed reference to the operations of arhtias or 
moneylenders in these market towns, or the nature of credit relations between them 
and producers for this period. It was not until the 1980s that in-depth scholarship on 
the role of arhtias in Punjab’s agrarian economy appeared. 
Studies on traders and arhtias in Punjab in the last two decades or so clearly indicate 
that it is only since the 1980s that Jat farmers have started diversifying into the arht 
(commission agent) business. The corollary to this is that when the arht business 
formally began in the 1960s under the Punjab APMC Act of 1961, it was the non-
agricultural moneylenders, the erstwhile sahukars, who monopolized this business. 
This raises the question of why the agriculturalists who were prominent as 
moneylenders in the late colonial period did not obtain any space in this new 
business. While there are no indications of this in the literature surveyed, it can be 
tentatively argued that it was a historical moment whereby the erstwhile sahukars 
were able to re-assert their control over the commodity and credit markets. 
Under the APMC Act, the arhtias are responsible for the sale of farmers’ produce in 
return for a commission. They are responsible not only for selling the crop to the 
buyer, but also for coordinating loading, unloading, weighing, measuring, cleaning 
and packing of agricultural produce for which they are also paid ‘market charges’, 
partly from the farmer/seller and partly from the buyer (Government of Punjab 1961, 
1962). Different sources indicate that there are over 20,000 arhtias in Punjab 
involved in cereals alone, with around 200-300 in each mandi, and roughly 45,000 
overall (Damodaran 2000; PTI 2010; Chand 2012). 
So powerful is the collective of arhtias in the state that it has been able to negotiate 
higher rates of commission for itself over the years: for food grains, it increased from 
1.5% in 1990 to 2.5% in 1998. Moreover, while many states have changed their 
APMC Acts considerably, some argue that the reason Punjab’s Act has been 
amended only marginally so far is the pressure from the arhtias (Damodaran 2000). 
Some argue that the commission and market charges add up to an amount entirely 
undeserved for the actual work done by the arhtias. Moreover, the arhtias pay the 
farmers for the produce only after they have been paid by the buyer, which makes 
farmers vulnerable. They also often do not follow their legal obligation to issue 
farmers with J-forms, the official record of the amount due to the farmer from the 
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buyer, and so they are also able to manipulate the amount of money they pass on (S. 
Singh and Bhogal 2015). However, arhtias also function as unregistered 
moneylenders to farmers. The arhtia lends money to farmers, especially small 
farmers, for both production and consumption expenses. He does so on the terms that 
the farmer will repay this amount at harvest time by selling the crop at his shop. This 
represents a form of interlinked transaction discussed in detail in Section 2.2.2. 
According to Gill (2004), arhtias charge between 24-36% interest p.a.; S. Singh and 
Dhaliwal (2011) report a figure of 18-24% p.a. Both estimates are significantly 
higher than interest rates charged by formal sources. This, more than anything else 
the arhtia does, is considered a major cause of farmers’ distress. Unlike Crow and 
Murshid’s (1994) finding in Bangladesh, there is no study for Punjab that shows that 
interest rates differ by the farmer’s class position. However, A. Gill (2004) argues 
that ‘the rate of interest charged declined (although slightly) as the amount of loan 
borrowed increased’ (3747) across all categories of landownership and this prompted 
farmers to borrow more, pushing them into severe indebtedness. S. Singh and 
Bhogal (2015) also argue that the ‘dominant and exploitative’ (62) role of the arhtia 
vis-à-vis Punjab’s agriculturists is due to the fact that farmers also buy agricultural 
inputs and domestic supplies from shops ‘connected’ to the arhtias.
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In order to curb this all-encompassing power of the arhtias, in 2009 the government 
introduced a provision that farmers were free to sell their produce not only through 
the arhtia, but also directly to the FCI or to any other buyer. However, this has been a 
complete failure so far since the choice is a non-existent one for farmers who need 
credit and are dependent on the arhtia for the same (Damodaran and Srivats 2004; S. 
Singh and Dhaliwal 2011). 
While the above is the standard and dominant narrative for the intractability of the 
arhtias’ power over farmers, a close reading of the literature also throws up other 
insights that prompt a closer investigation of the nature of farmer-arhtia relations in 
the state. S. Singh and Dhaliwal (2011), for example, mention that some large 
farmers are able to negotiate a part of the commission received by the arhtia from the 
government. This indicates that different classes of farmers participate in the market 
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 It is not clear from the text though if ‘connected’ means that arhtias also derive a profit from the 
same. If ‘connected’ simply means ‘by reference’, then it is not good enough evidence because all 
businesses work through references. 
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on different terms, as discussed earlier. While S. Singh and Bhogal (2015) focus all 
their attention on the arhtias’ credit, their own data shows that institutional sources 
account for over 50% of credit taken across different classes of farmers. 
Finally, an important observation was made by Bell and Srinivasan (1989) in their 
comparative study on interlinked transactions in Punjab, AP and Bihar. They argue 
that credit-tenancy transactions need to be differentiated from credit-marketing ones. 
To quote them at length: 
… the emphasis on credit-tenancy interlinkages in the theoretical 
literature is misplaced. In the principal-agent models of that literature, 
only output is risky, and all decisions are made before the state of 
nature is revealed. In the case of a loan tied to the marketing of output, 
however, price risk cannot be ignored. Moreover, the farmer learns the 
size of the crop before its price — unless he has sold the crop forward. 
This structure of uncertainty yields several options. It is not 
uncommon for standing crops to be sold in advance of the harvest, so 
that all subsequent risks are borne by the trader. Far more frequently, 
however, farmers decide when to sell after the harvest is in. In this 
case, commission events will often provide storage facilities to those 
of their clients who have rejected current offers and expect to do better 
by waiting. Commission agent and client both share in price risk in 
this arrangement. The analysis of these contractual possibilities calls 
for a more complicated and subtle intertemporal structure than that 
employed in the extant theoretical literature on interlinking. (82-83) 
In other words, both arhtia and farmer have to bear a price risk contingent on both 
the volume of the produce and market prices at the time of harvest. This, according 
to the authors, creates diverse possibilities for the terms of the credit relation 
between the farmer and the trader or commission agent. So while Punjab has been 
provocatively termed the ‘loan bowl’ of India (Gill 2009), it appears that the terms of 
these loans are different for different classes of farmers. This resonates with the 
differentiated credit relations described by Bhattacharya (1983) in the colonial period 
(discussed above). 
Moreover, much of the foregoing literature on Punjab, as well as other states, has 
focused on food grains. Yet, markets for other crops exist and need to explored, not 
least to understand how their market structures impact the profitability of non-
wheat/paddy crops for farmers. In the case of cotton, for example, S. Singh and 
Dhaliwal (2011) show that in the absence of an effective MSP, cotton farmers are 
severely exploited by the arhtias. Brar and Gill (2001) have written about the ‘potato 
87 
 
kings’ (very large resource-rich farmers-cum-traders), who dominate the seed potato 
market in the Doaba region of Punjab. Sidhu et al. (2010) discuss different modes of 
marketing by onion and cauliflower farmers, albeit from the perspective of ‘market 
efficiency’. 
Before moving on to the final section, I would also like to highlight that even though 
there has been a burgeoning literature on arhtias in Punjab, capitalism in the state 
continues to be understood in terms of the farm alone without integrating the role of 
agro-commercial classes. The latter are still implicitly assumed to be external to 
agrarian capitalism. But given how integral arhtias are to agriculture in the state, this 
is a major shortcoming in the analysis. 
4.2.5 Beyond Crisis? 
Despite the larger narrative of crisis, there are some signs of dynamism in the 
economy. The previous section showed that large farmers have greater autonomy 
from the arhtias than small farmers. There is also growing evidence of diversification 
among farmers: their entry into the commission agent business has already been 
mentioned. Farmers from Punjab have also made land purchases in other states and 
even in other countries such as Ethiopia, Ukraine and Georgia, although not always 
successfully (Lerche 2014; Chaba 2015a; Kaushal 2015).  
In Chapter 4, it was mentioned that diversification by Jat farmers was constrained by 
the power of the mercantile castes. Arvinder Singh (2006) argues that this was 
caused by the ‘peculiarly “communal” organisation’ (204) of Punjab’s economy 
where the Sikh Jat farmers dominated the rural areas and the Hindu Mahajans the 
urban. However, Damodaran (2008) argues that such a constraint is prevalent across 
the entire ‘Jatland’ which includes Punjab and Haryana. The same pattern is 
replicated, or even worse, where the Jats are Hindu. Therefore A. Singh’s argument 
about the role of religion is overstated at best. 
 
S. Singh (2005) has researched contract farming of crops such as potatoes, tomatoes 
and chillies by large companies including PepsiCo, HLL, Nijjer Agro and Markfed. 
Singh shows how the large, diversified farmers fare better in these contracts than 
smaller ones. There is also evidence of large, ‘progressive’ farmers who have 
diversified into high-value vegetables using certified production technology (Sidhu 
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et al. 2010; S. Kaur 2011). These represent relatively under-researched markets and 
spaces of accumulation for capitalist farmers. 
An earlier section noted that Jat farmers continue to accumulate through political 
manoeuvring (Martin 2015). In fact, large farmers in Punjab are the leaders of most 
of the farmers’ unions in the state, many of them factions of the BKU. Until the 
1980s, the unions had a wider developmental agenda which included issues of 
corruption, ecological degradation and experiments with agro-processing through 
farmer cooperatives, in addition to the dominant agenda of input and output prices 
and procurement of paddy and wheat from the mandis. By the 1990s, the BKU had 
limited its concern to prices and procurement. In fact, the power of the large and 
middle farmers has been argued to be crucial to ensuring an increase in the MSP 
even under liberalisation (Kaur et al. 2007). The unions rarely take issues of 
indebtedness among farmers seriously, something that would benefit small and 
marginal farmers considerably (Gill 2010). On the contrary, as mentioned above, 
farmers’ unions have succeeded in getting land ceilings relaxed, a clear indication of 
their class interests. Collective action is, therefore, instrumental for successful 
accumulation by capitalist farmers.  
The evidence presented above, although patchy, indicates that large farmers are 
exercising various options towards an expanded basis of accumulation. That they are 
also politically consolidated is bound to feed into this process. So while there is very 
real distress in the countryside, especially for small and marginal farmers and the 
landless, one is forced to consider whether it is the same for capitalist farmers. There 
is a huge gap in the literature in terms of understanding the process of accumulation 
in Punjab’s countryside and this research aims to fill this gap. How changes under 
liberalisation feed into this process is especially pertinent. 
4.3 Conclusion to Part I 
This part of the thesis explored various empirical and theoretical dimensions of 
studying agrarian accumulation. It established that capitalist agriculture in the 21
st
 
century includes not only the activities and relations on the farm but also a wide set 
of important activities upstream and downstream. In other words, production is also 
shaped by relations of exchange and processes of circulation outside the farm. It 
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therefore becomes necessary to study both farmers and traders of various kinds in 
order to understand agrarian accumulation. 
The case studied in this research, Punjab, is without doubt the scene of capitalist 
agriculture. The analytical framework, therefore, is developed in relation to this 
context. Liberalisation, on the other hand, is viewed here as a different phase and 
paradigm of development rather than, as is often the case, a proxy for increased 
corporate control alone. Therefore, in this study liberalisation is evaluated in terms of 
its impact on the wider socio-economic ecosystem that shapes agricultural 
production and marketing. 
I have argued that there is evidence to suggest that capitalist farmers in India are not 
in crisis and that they continue to accumulate. The discussion on tenancy and reverse 
tenancy indicates that land continues to be an important factor in generating profits 
in agriculture, especially, but not only, in the case of Punjab. However, it is not self-
evident if this is simply an issue of scale or relates to other factors such as cropping 
profile, nature of markets, levels of mechanisation, etc. 
There is also a need to further investigate how accumulation within agriculture links 
to accumulation outside of it. I have established that non-farm diversification is 
linked in complex, non-linear ways to agriculture. In other words, in this research, 
there is no assumption about diversification being a consequence of either the 
channelling of surplus profits or a sign of distress. So, while the focus of this study is 
on accumulation within agriculture, patterns of diversification need to be accounted 
for. 
I have also argued that agrarian accumulation is shaped by the terms of engagement 
of farmers with traders. One should be wary of applying the term ‘merchant’s 
capital’ to any market-linked activity and assuming that the role of such capital will 
be unproductive and exploitative. The role of traders and moneylenders has to be 
examined empirically and situated within the wider class structure of a given society, 
while their compulsions independent of agriculture also need to be factored in. 
Evidence from different regions, including Punjab, and across different historical 
periods indicates that merchant-moneylenders cannot always prevent rich farmers 
from accumulating. Interlinked transactions, a dominant theme in the literature, are 
also similarly understood in socially contingent ways. In the case of Punjab, these 
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questions should be raised not only with respect to the engagement of farmers with 
arhtias but also with other kinds of agro-commercial classes. 
Further, in view of the overwhelming focus on credit advanced by arhtias, it should 
be recognized that formal sources of credit continue to be important, albeit in 
different ways in the post-liberalisation era compared to the heyday of the Green 
Revolution. Given the significance of credit for capital-intensive agriculture, it is 
important that the ground realities of credit systems and networks are examined. 
In the post-liberalisation context, there is a need to evaluate the role of corporate 
agribusinesses as well. But here too, as in the case of traders, their role has been 
examined in context-specific ways. While not discounting the evident structural 
power of corporate capital – domestic and transnational, the question of whether 
corporate presence has been oppressive for all farmers, especially capitalist farmers, 
or an opportunity for agrarian capital is seen as an empirical one. Assuming 
otherwise undermines the agency of the farmers in shaping the conditions of their 
livelihood.  
I have argued that the interplay between farmers, traders and corporate capital is 
likely to be shaped by the class position of the farmers and the structure and politics 
of the market, as well as the nature of the commodity. The social value of a 
commodity and its agronomic features are often crucial to the relations that develop 
around its production and exchange. This is not to fetishize the commodity but to 
view it as one of many angles through which the question of accumulation can be 
understood. In this context, most farmers in Punjab engage in multi-cropping and 
therefore, a better understanding of accumulation strategies requires an 
understanding of how they negotiate relations around different crops. 
A study of the interaction between these three internally differentiated social actors, 
i.e. farmers, traders and corporate capital, would also facilitate an understanding of 
the forces that constitute and shape agrarian capitalism in India today. It raises the 
issue of whether farmers and traders comprise a combined rural dominant class and 
forces us to think about the ways in which their interests may converge and diverge. 
It also raises the important question of tensions between local and corporate capital, 
i.e. whether they are in conflict or cooperating, and if so, how. In general, it needs to 
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be recognized that agrarian capital, merchant’s capital and corporate capital co-exist 
and the nature of their interaction is socially and historically contingent.  
The role of the State is, needless to say, another important axis of analysis. The 
policies and priorities of the colonial and the post-colonial State have been 
foundational for the emergence of Punjab as India’s most developed agricultural 
state. If and how this role has changed in the period of liberalisation is crucial to 
understanding the conditions that frame agrarian accumulation and in anticipating 
the trajectory of agrarian change in the state. At the same time, it has been pointed 
out that working through a State-market dichotomy is not useful; the State often 
frames the conditions of the market and may be invested in it in various ways.  
Finally, it has been argued that the view of a generalized agrarian crisis needs to be 
challenged. Agrarian distress exists, but it exists disproportionately among the small 
and marginal farmers, and landless workers. This does not mean that capitalist 
farmers are not challenged by the new conditions under liberalisation that they need 
to negotiate in order to thrive. However, there is rarely any empirical and class-based 
analytical investigation of how they do so and to what effect. This then is 




Part II Research Methodology 
Chapter 5.  Methodology: Approach and Challenges 
 
Part I of the thesis set the agenda and the theoretical contours of this research. I 
argued that understanding agrarian accumulation requires that historical and region-
specific aspects be taken into account. Liberalisation, too, needs to be evaluated, 
both in terms of its constituent elements as well as its overarching logic (even though 
this may never be fully consistent). Part II moves on to a discussion of the 
methodological design involved in studying these different elements and the 
complex interactions between them. The first section discusses the methodological 
approach of this research, including selection of the field site and methods used. The 
second discusses the fieldwork experiences and challenges. 
5.1 Fieldwork Methodology 
5.1.1 Putting the Problem into Practice 
The main research question for this study is: How has agrarian accumulation in 
Punjab been reconfigured by liberalisation of the Indian economy? The research 
aims to understand whether and if so, to what extent liberalisation has altered the 
patterns of agrarian accumulation in Punjab. The corollary, of course, is that there 
could be processes giving shape to accumulation patterns that are unrelated to 
liberalisation, and these would be included in the final analysis of the research 
problem. This is, then, an explanatory study (Sumner and Tribe 2008, 103) which 
asks how liberalisation is causing accumulation to change (but does not explain 
neoliberalism per se). Framing the question in this way allows us to be open to the 
possibility that accumulation may or may not be continuing (even though the 
literature indicates the former) and to explore why patterns of accumulation may be 
changing in particular ways. 
Towards putting this question into practice, this research has disaggregated specific 
lines of enquiry represented by its four sub-questions: 
i. Is accumulation within agriculture continuing? 
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Answering this question requires evidence on whether agricultural profits can still be 
made, by evaluating costs and returns. Information on whether farmers are investing 
in expansion within agriculture and/or outside it would also be instructive. The 
question also involves studying factors that might be undermining such profits and 
investments. 
ii. Which liberalisation reforms introduced by the State are having an impact on 
accumulation? 
The discussion so far has shown that relevant reforms include those around land and 
credit, allowances for corporate involvement in aspects of agricultural production 
and marketing, and aspects of the overall policy priorities of the economy, such as 
export-orientation and declining State support. The objective is not simply to 
identify which reforms matter, but also to understand whether and how these 
different reforms manifest in the field. This implies partly looking for evidence of 
these reforms in the field but also being alert to other aspects that may not be 
included in the literature surveyed. 
iii. Which social relations matter for accumulation, and how are they changing 
vis-à-vis liberalisation? 
The research relies on a political economy framework and sees accumulation as a 
relational process. The crucial relations being studied are those between farmers and 
traders. These are researched across commodities and multiple levels of the market 
structure. Other social relations, such as labour relations and relations between 
different kinds of farmers, are not the focus but are explored in some detail where 
relevant. Overall, this requires mapping of the realms of production and of 
marketing, and some understanding of how these relations have evolved over time. 
iv. How are different kinds of capitalist farmers negotiating these changes? 
This question is about exploring how capitalist farmers are negotiating the new 
forces and processes at play in pursuit of continued accumulation. Studying this 
involves recognition of two issues: firstly, the reforms’ interaction with the existing 
local political economy; and secondly, different classes of farmers and kinds of 
capitalist farmers would negotiate this situation differently. The research identifies 
different kinds of capitalist farmers, on the basis of landholdings, crops produced, 
and diversification portfolio. Further, it acknowledges that strategies of accumulation 
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can be both individual and collective. However, I have mainly studied individual 
trajectories of economic performance. Collective action is described when it has 
appeared in the empirical data but has not been studied systematically.  
Having identified the key elements of this research problem in terms of empirical 
investigation, the following section describes the study’s methodological approach. 
5.1.2 Methodological Approach 
This research assumes that ‘reality’ is objective and independent of the researcher, 
but the researcher’s perceptions of it are subjective and contingent (Sumner and 
Tribe 2008; Bryman 2016). This then raises the question of epistemology, i.e. how 
can this reality be known? 
As a researcher, I recognize that in some ways, what we try to know through social 
research is what we already know. Most researchers approach the field with some 
assumptions about the problem at hand, irrespective of whether it is in the form of a 
hypothesis or not. These assumptions are informed by the theoretical framework 
adopted. At the same time, the assumptions need not be deterministic. Drawing on 
Burawoy’s conceptualisation of ‘reflexive science’, I believe that prior assumptions 
are, and need to be, in constant ‘dialogue’ (1998, 16) with both the participants and, 
more broadly, the field location where the research is being conducted. I work with 
Burawoy’s assertion that when social reality is understood as defined both 
contextually and through relations of power, reflexive science is the paradigm better 
suited to ‘highlighting the ethnographic worlds of the local’ (ibid., 30). 
Research Design 
The research is designed as a case study.59 The understanding of a case study is 
inspired by the following definition: ‘a case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2008, 
19). It is, therefore, well-suited to studying contemporary events and explanatory 
questions, the use of different kinds of evidence together and the use of theory for 
developing the research design (Yin 2008). 
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 Yin (2008) describes case study as a research method while others (e.g. Bryman (2016)) describe it 
as a research design. I have chosen the latter since it better captures the research’s overall framework.  
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A common criticism of case studies is that the findings are not generalizable. 
However, while case study analysis may not be ‘statistically generalizable’, i.e. 
extendable to the entire population, it is amenable to ‘analytic generalization’, i.e. ‘in 
which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the 
empirical results of the case study’ (ibid., 38). Case study analysis contributes to the 
theoretical problematic set up by the research, in this case the pattern of agrarian 
accumulation under a changed development context. The analytical value of such a 
case study can also be gauged through the lens of what Burawoy terms the 
‘integrative or vertical approach’ (1998, 19). This means that the case can be 
compared with other similar ones to draw conclusions about the wider, ‘extralocal’ 
social forces.60 
Finally, we come to the question of disciplinary constitution of this research. 
Development Studies in general involves a cross-disciplinary approach to the study 
of specific issues, and there are many ways in which different disciplines may be 
combined (Sumner and Tribe 2008). This research is ‘problem oriented’ (ibid., 66) 
and does not consciously seek to engage with issues of cross-disciplinarity. Guided 
by the theoretical framework of critical agrarian political economy, it draws on 
studies conducted within diverse disciplines and methodological approaches to 
analyse the research problem. However, it does not attempt to resolve the conflictual 
methodological assumptions they might bring. 
5.1.3 Identifying the Fieldwork Site 
In a case study, a crucial element is to identify the unit of analysis. As Section 5.1 
explains, this research project deliberately sought out different kinds of economic 
actors as well as spheres and processes of economic activity. It required 
simultaneous mapping of the farm and field, among other spaces, and sought to 
uncover relations at multiple spatial levels. This meant that both villages and market 
towns be included in the field site. However, it was not self-evident how best that 
could be done. 
Previous studies that explored issues of rural accumulation or market dynamics have 
also included both farms and markets in their analysis but have tended to privilege 
the latter. For instance, Krishnamurthy (2011) wrote an ethnography of a single 
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mandi, while Harriss-White (1996, 2008) and Crow (1989) focused on market 
relations and networks. On the other hand, studies on agriculturalists (e.g. 
Ramachandran et al. 2010; Münster 2015) have focused on farm and village level 
dynamics to the neglect of the sphere of exchange, as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
challenge for this research was to keep the farmers in focus while also studying the 
relations between them and traders. The following sections describe how I resolved 
this. 
Here it should also be noted that the significance of State-led procurement of food 
grains in Punjab meant that I would also need to study the State. Scholars such as 
Mooij (1999) and Sud (2012) have studied explicitly the nature of the State at the 
national or sub-national levels or the politics of policy-making. I have studied it 
peripherally, as a ‘black box’ (Mooij 1999, 323) and to the extent that its policies 
and officials impacted accumulation strategies. This was considered adequate as this 
research was concerned with how policies served (or not) the interest of agrarian 
capital, and not with how the policies were formed. That well-off farmers have 
political weight is taken for granted based on the literature (Section 4.2.5). However, 
this means that that this research is limited in its analysis of the State in agriculture.  
Preliminary Selection 
Since this project studies 
accumulation in a context of well-
developed capitalist agriculture, I 
decided to focus on the most 
capitalized pocket of the state of 
Punjab. To that end, I ranked all the 
districts in the state on pattern of 
landholdings, average yields for 
paddy, wheat and some other major 
crops, cropping intensity, irrigation 
and mechanisation using data 
obtained from government sources 
(Appendix I). I prioritised rankings 
on yield, mechanisation and cropping  




intensity over those on landholding pattern in selecting potential sites, but the 
selection coincided with districts that had a relatively high proportion of large and 
medium landholdings. Since data is available for 20-22 districts for each indicator, 
high ranking was determined as ranked 1 to 8 as this would capture roughly the top 
third in any category. 
Most of the districts in the northern part of the state (Majha and Bist Doab regions) 
were ranked relatively average or low in terms of these criteria and, therefore, were 
not considered as potential fieldwork locations. In the Malwa region, districts in the 
south-west (pre-division Firozpur, Muktsar and Bhatinda) had the highest proportion 
of large and medium operational landholdings in the entire state. However, these 
districts displayed relatively average or low yields, levels of mechanisation and 
cropping intensity and so were also deemed as not being amongst the most 
capitalized in agricultural terms. Six districts have relatively high rankings in all or 
most of these criteria: Moga, Sangrur, Barnala, Ludhiana, Patiala and Fatehgarh 
Sahib (Table 5.1). Interestingly, all these districts form a contiguous pocket of land 
in the central and south-east part of Punjab (Figure 5.1).61 


























Moga 31.01 193 4360 5460 97 100 
Sangrur 30.11 198 4335 5494 94 100 
Ludhiana 42.23 199 4257 5375 96 100 
Barnala 42.7 210 4374 5346 71 100 
Patiala 38.33 197 3861 5472 89 99.9 
Fatehgarh 
Sahib 
38.85 183 4234 5285 109 100 
Source: Government of Punjab 2012b 
Scoping 
I then undertook a scoping exercise of potential fieldwork locations. On this basis, 
the most relevant location was selected as the fieldwork site. 
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In the absence of secondary information on different locations, I selected three 
locations based on discussions with academics, journalists and agribusiness 
professionals working on Punjab and based in Chandigarh and Delhi. These three 
locations were: Moga in Moga district, Khanna in Ludhiana district and Dhuri in 
Sangrur district. I spent four to five days visiting each, meeting farmers and traders 
to discuss broad issues around farming, mandis and agriculture-related industries in 
the local town and villages and any major economic, social and political changes in 
the recent past. 
While these locations had many common features, they were also unique in 
important ways in the context of my research. Each of them had mandis which were 
among the largest centres of wheat and paddy arrival in the state.62 Land rates were 
said to be on the higher side within the state, though in Dhuri it was lower than in 
Moga and Khanna. The latter two also had a more vibrant agro-industrial and crop 
profile than Dhuri. Since the focus of this research is capital and its strategies for 
accumulation, it was important to choose a location that was economically as robust 
as possible. On this basis, Khanna was chosen: it was the most economically vibrant 
and had the widest range of crops and industries marking its terrain. As a fieldwork 
site, it was found to be the ‘critical case’, i.e. ‘the site that would yield the most 
information [for the research problem] and have the greatest impact on the 
development of knowledge’ (Patton 2001, 236-237). It was also convenient 
logistically; of the three scoping locations, I found it relatively easier to arrange 
accommodation, find an interpreter and travel in the area around Khanna. 
The Field and the Case 
The ‘Khanna area’ is both my field and my case. It is the field where I conducted an 
intensive case study of my research problem, i.e. exploring the interface of agrarian 
accumulation and liberalisation. Bryman (2016) writes that location may or may not 
be of analytical significance in a case study. In the case of this research, the 
significance of the location revealed itself during the scoping exercise, as seen 
above. The case for this project, therefore, has been defined both geographically and 
analytically, and in some ways, emerged through the process of fieldwork itself. 
Before starting fieldwork, the plan was that the final fieldwork site would include 
                                                          
62
 Crop arrival refers to the amount of a given crop that is available for sale in a mandi. 
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one or two villages connected to one mandi and any other related market spaces or 
towns. These boundaries had to be redefined in significant ways in the course of 
fieldwork, especially in the way the villages were incorporated in the study. 
The first few months were spent mapping issues around farming and agricultural 
trading in the area. Firstly, it emerged that there were two mandis in Khanna itself – 
one for food grains (grain mandi) and one for fruit and vegetables (sabzi mandi). 
However, it seemed that their significance for farmers in the area differed; the former 
was more important and this meant that I engaged with the traders in the grain mandi 
more and in different ways compared with those in the sabzi mandi (discussed 
below). There were many other units, such as mills of different kinds and cold stores, 
in the area that could also be understood as market spaces, or at least important 
nodes of the market networks. However, these were geographically distant from the 
mandis and also quite dispersed. In the case of both food grains and, more so, 
vegetables, many such relevant market spaces were located outside the Khanna area, 
sometimes as far as Ludhiana, Jalandhar, Chandigarh and even Delhi. Interviewees 
were sought across different spaces and locations both within the Khanna area and 
outside. 
In the first few months, I interviewed farmers in over a dozen villages around 
Khanna town in order to select one or two for a village-based study of farming and 
farmers. However, I had difficulty gaining suitable access and support in all of them, 
especially in terms of residence (discussed below). At the same time, through 
mapping done over several weeks, it emerged that varying crop cycles are an 
important marker of the different accumulation strategies of capitalist farmers. 
Different pockets of villages around Khanna had slightly varied cropping patterns of 
around four to five different types. Choosing one or two villages for in-depth study 
would have meant that I would study only some cropping patterns and not others. 
Instead, I decided to focus on large capitalist farmers in four different villages in 
these different pockets so that I could capture the dynamics of production and 
marketing for four major crops, namely, wheat, paddy, potato and cauliflower.  
These crops were chosen because they were the most widely grown in the area, 
allowing for the possibility of capturing both the general picture of agrarian 
accumulation and the diversity within it. At the same time, choosing four different 
100 
 
villages enabled me to study the multiple accumulation strategies in the area in a 
relatively more comprehensive manner. These strategies, however, precluded a 
thorough study of other aspects, such as village dynamics and petty producers. It also 
means that I have less in-depth material about the full trading chain of each crop.  
By doing this, I was able to survey in some detail a much larger canvas and paint a 
complex picture of the different kinds of agricultural activities of different farmers. 
The trade-off was that village-based accumulation strategies were harder to capture – 
for example, the use of village-level politics for advancing economic interests. But 
since the diversity within accumulation strategies was a key issue for the project, this 
seemed to be the most effective choice. Ultimately, the core of my field and my case 
emerged as the market spaces in Khanna and farmers in four surrounding villages. 
The case was, therefore, an amalgamation of different actors, spaces, networks and 
processes of analytical interest. Figure 5.2 shows the various locations where some 
fieldwork was conducted and Figure 5.3 shows the core fieldwork site.
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Figure 5.2: Map of fieldwork locations (Khanna marked as the main point) 
 
 




5.1.4 Methods of Data Collection 
This research used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, although 
the former was predominant. Whilst acknowledging the debate about whether and 
how ‘mixed methods’ can be used, I used these two methods together on ‘technical’ 
grounds (Bryman 2012), i.e. as useful tools to get a more comprehensive 
understanding of the subject of study. 
Use of qualitative methods over several months was deemed necessary in order to 
capture the changing dynamics associated with the seasonality of agricultural 
production and exchange, and issues of power, history, and agency. In the case of 
traders, qualitative interaction was important to get an understanding of both 
‘publicly acknowledged principles of operation’ and ‘unacknowledged practice’ in 
agricultural markets (Crow 1989, 200). At the same time, quantitative data was 
important, both for an overall profile of the households and for certain aspects of 
production and exchange. 
Semi-structured interviews were the most widely used method during fieldwork. 
Interviews were treated as ‘sites of knowledge construction’ (Mason 2002, 202), i.e. 
spaces where ideas about the relevant issues took form through a dialogue between 
the researcher and the interviewee. Such interviews were conducted with different 
kinds of traders, farmers, government employees, agribusiness firm employees and 
journalists. The nature of the questions and content of the interviews varied 
considerably, not only by respondent but also according to the stage of fieldwork and 
nature of data sought at the time. Some lead questions tailored around specific 
phenomena and personal life and work experiences were used to streamline the 
interviews while also allowing respondents to share their experiences and 
understanding of those themes. Different kinds of interviewees were asked about 
each other in order to get varying perspectives on the same issue, and assess the 
reliability/congruity of their views. 
The respondents were not only quite diverse but also geographically dispersed and 
difficult to meet. Nevertheless, some key respondents were cultivated among the 
farmers, traders and government employees with whom I conducted multiple 
interviews. Multiple interviews were more common with farmers and traders in the 
grain market than with any other kind of trader. A major reason was that traders in 
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the grain mandi were more crucial to the central issues of this research. The sabzi 
mandi was not as nodal to the farmers who cultivated vegetables in the area as the 
grain mandi was for farmers who cultivated grains. Moreover, some trading firms 
(e.g. rice mills, feed mills, cold stores, and various agribusiness companies) were not 
based in mandis, but had to be sought out elsewhere, whether in Khanna or different 
villages or cities. Consequently, often I could only conduct one long interview that 
needed to be focused and carefully planned, with its attendant pros and cons. 
I also conducted work history interviews with over a dozen key respondents among 
traders in the grain markets. These interviews tried to capture the kind of work done 
by men in the family at least two generations before the respondent and, depending 
on the age of the respondent, at least one generation after. The purpose of this was to 
establish the kind of change in accumulation strategies of traders across generations, 
and gain a sense of the constraints and opportunities they had experienced. While the 
responses were uneven, this was helpful in understanding the way the market was 
structured independently of farming, which could then be used to frame the ways in 
which market processes influenced (or not) accumulation within agriculture. 
Household surveys were conducted with farmers in the four villages chosen for this 
purpose. The pre-fieldwork designed survey questionnaire was revised based on 
information gathered through the first four months of mapping. The revised 
questionnaire was used with two farmers and further minor amendments were then 
made. The sample of 93 farmers was constructed purposively and through 
snowballing. Table 3.2 records the number of farmers included in the survey across 
different villages. While the sample is not representative of villages as a whole or all 
farmers within these villages, it is certainly so of the large farmers in these villages. 
The survey recorded age, work and education details of household members; land 
owned and operated upon; cropping patterns, details on cost, yield and prices of 
different crops; labour employed and terms of employment; non-agricultural income 
sources; recent major expenses and credit sources (Appendix II). Time and situation 
permitting, I asked follow-up questions based on the information given or any other 
relevant issue that, in my assessment, the respondent could tell me more about. 
A major challenge in conducting the survey was that many farmers were not sure 
about how much they were spending on different crops per acre and some simply 
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asked me to write what other respondents before them had said. As a result, I have 
used the figures given by a few farmers (cross-checked for variations) as 
representative for everyone. Moreover, even farmers who gave figures of costs and 
average yield per acre gave a range or averages. This was partly because they did not 
want to divulge exact information and partly because they felt that it would not be 
useful – every year something leads to a fall or rise in costs, for example, late rainfall 
for paddy, shortage of urea for the rabi crop, fluctuation in diesel prices, labour 
shortages, etc. Therefore, the analysis in subsequent chapters depends on such 
estimates of costs and yield per acre. In the case of crop prices, paddy and wheat 
have an MSP; for all other crops, prices fluctuate widely. Here again, I have relied 
on a range reported by and cross-checked with different respondents (farmers, 
traders and others). This means that the cost figures must be taken as approximate.  
This is then a survey method of estimating costs rather than a cost accounting 
method. The latter would have required estimating costs before sowing and at 
regular intervals (Surjit 2017) which was not feasible within the broader research 
design. The survey method certainly involves problems of recall and therefore, 
estimating average costs across many farmers was found to be a suitable strategy. 
Despite these rough figures, the breakdown of costs is important because it allows us 
to identify the cost- and labour-intensive components, and makes clear the various 
aspects of production side that need to be managed by the farmer to earn a profit. 
However, these average estimates have not been calibrated against the class position 
of the farmers, and this is a limitation. The literature indicates that small farmers 
have higher per unit costs than larger farmers, especially due to hiring costs of land 
or machines (Ramachandran et al. 2010; K. Singh 2009). 
The estimates are also not directly comparable with the CACP estimates for a few 
reasons. Firstly, they do not neatly follow the CACP’s break-up of input costs even 
for its most basic cost estimate, Cost A1 which is ‘all actual expenses in cash and 
kind incurred in production by owner’(CACP 2014) without including rents, interest 
and imputed costs. Secondly, I have not included imputed costs of owned land or 
family labour in the estimates. Imputed costs can be useful for macro-level 
comparisons. However, scholars have pointed to the problems in using and 
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estimating such costs (Surjit 2017; Ramachandran et al. 2010).64 Additionally, such 
costs may also be less relevant in particular contexts. In this case, family labour was 
more akin to managerial work than labouring work. Further, these farmers were 
unlikely to undertake labouring work elsewhere were they not involved in 
agriculture, so the opportunity cost argument underlying the concept of imputed cost 
for farmers’ work in agriculture is less relevant. For land, the alternatives would be 
either to sell it or lease it out. The decision on whether to do this is calibrated against 
whether non-agricultural investments or jobs would be more rewarding than tilling 
one’s own land, or if younger male household members are unwilling to work in 
agriculture. The answer to this is not self-evident (discussed in Chapters 8 and 10). It 
should also be noted that CACP estimates costs per hectare while my estimates are 
per acre as that is the unit used by farmers locally.  
Beyond the above, there is no reason to expect that my calculations are especially 
skewed. The purpose of calculating approximate costs was to contribute to an 
understanding of general processes that lie behind strategies of agrarian 
accumulation, not to arrive at exact numbers. 
Finally, it should be noted that the survey did not explore the role of women in the 
household’s accumulation strategies and almost all respondents were male heads of 
households. This is among the limitations of this study, not least in view of the 
research done by scholars such as Harriss-White (2003) on this.  
Through all the above, non-participant unstructured observations were also 
recorded. I have borrowed this term from Bryman (2012, 273) to refer to observation 
of people, places and situations without immersing myself in the social setting. I 
observed procurement operations, lean seasons and relevant political demonstrations 
in the mandi. In villages, notes were made on the spatial organisation of the village, 
house and living standards of farmers, and the activities observed on the farms that I 
visited. Finally, I also sought any relevant secondary documents that could 
complement the information I was gathering through the aforementioned methods, 
such as government records and reports, as well as Punjabi newspapers that reported 
extensively on local issues. 
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profitability for farmers in AP, although the Indian Left supports the inclusion of imputed costs in the 
calculation of MSP in principle (see Ramakumar 2018).  
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In the next section I reflect on the experience of doing fieldwork, both in terms of 
putting the research problem into practice and my subjectivity. 
5.2 Reflections on Fieldwork Experience 
‘High-quality DS [Development Studies] research is usually concerned with levels of 
probability rather than of certainty, which requires subjectivity-awareness and 
control rather than absolute objectivity, and for approximate truth rather [than] 
absolute ‘closure’’ (Sumner and Tribe 2008, 70-71). This statement highlights the 
necessarily tentative nature of social research and thereby forces us to consider the 
challenges and limits of each research. I have divided these reflections on challenges 
and experiences into three: translating theory to fieldwork; researcher’s subjectivity; 
and the ethics of research and representation. 
5.2.1 From Theory to the Field 
This chapter began with a deconstruction of the research problem and the different 
lines of enquiry within it. However, it did not make explicit the methodological 
challenges in putting into practice the theoretical framework outlined in Part I, which 
is the purpose of this section. 
Studying Agriculture à la Bernstein 
One of the key theoretical pillars of this research is that agriculture includes 
activities and actors upstream and downstream of production. This implies, as 
mentioned earlier, that both farms and markets had to be studied. However, given 
that farms can be extremely diverse and markets immensely complex, there was a 
challenge in defining the boundaries of fieldwork. The fact that this research 
explicitly seeks to show diversity within patterns of agrarian accumulation 
compounds this challenge. This approach precluded certain research strategies. For 
example, ethnographies of different economic spaces are not feasible in such a study 
and arguably that would have been a different research project. Similarly, since I 
chose to study multiple commodities, it was not feasible to study the full commodity 
chain of each. As a result, I mapped the broad patterns of production and exchange 
but followed them in detail only when it seemed that they would have a direct 
bearing on farmers, the focus of this research. Further, as discussed above, there 
were issues around building rapport and arranging meetings with different kinds of 
traders due to geographical dispersion. 
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Many of my respondents – farmers and traders – were extremely mobile; a farmer, 
for example, might be in his village, in Khanna or in another city, all on business of 
one kind or another. One exception apart, I was unable to accompany my 
respondents across different locations both due to the way the research was designed 
and the absence of such a rapport. In such a situation, for both locations I visited, and 
those that I could not, the crucial issue was to understand what kind of economic 
significance these places held in the trading networks I was studying, and their 
relation to relevant processes located in Khanna. In the case of some respondents, it 
was also important to reflect on the social and political importance of the different 
locations they were travelling to. Interviews with key respondents were also crucial 
in providing insights into some of these issues. 
The challenge of being constantly between different locations was negotiated partly 
by following the local news. As much small town economy in Punjab revolves 
around agriculture-related activities, local editions of Punjabi newspapers commonly 
reported on these issues. I often found out about important developments through 
them and then followed up with different respondents. 
In moving between different locations, a choice was also made regarding the use of 
an interpreter. Initially, I struggled to understand the Punjabi spoken in the villages, 
and employed an interpreter, a young, married Dalit woman and former social 
worker. Even when I no longer needed her translation skills, I needed the company 
on my visits to the villages for greater social acceptability. However, I did not 
employ her for my visits to traders. Since they are city-based, most of them spoke 
some Hindi – my native language – and I had a basic knowledge of Punjabi. I 
decided, therefore, that I could do without the intermediation that the use of an 
interpreter inevitably brings. 
Studying the multiple dimensions of contemporary capitalist agriculture requires the 
researcher to move constantly between places and issues, and therefore, necessarily 
between different research strategies. The predicament is perhaps best represented in 
the words of Mooij (1999, 337-38) writing in the context of her research on state 
intervention in agricultural markets in India. I quote her at some length here due to 
its resonance with my fieldwork experience: 
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…it is not easy to classify the fieldwork methodology. Perhaps the 
best way is to describe it as a combination of the intensive method of 
the anthropologist and the rapid rural appraisal as practised by some 
students of development…However, where an anthropologist is 
interested in the whole life-world of the other, I had a very specific, 
restricted topic in mind, which, moreover, brought me to many 
different settings, and different locations… Different methodologies 
are combined; it all depends on what you want to know and the 
possibilities you have. However, where the rapid rural appraisal is 
very rapid and geared towards intervention, I tried to get deeper into 
the matter. 
Defining Accumulation and Accumulators 
The second major challenge lay in applying the concept of accumulation itself. 
Accumulation refers to the appropriation of surplus value from the labour process 
and the expansion of capital through continuous re-investment. It is, therefore, 
necessarily a relational process. In Part II I discussed the various aspects that 
determine accumulation. However, methodologically, how can we determine that 
accumulation is happening? Based on the review of the long-standing literature on 
Punjab’s agrarian capitalism, this research accepted that where labour is being 
employed for agricultural work, irrespective of the terms and conditions, surplus 
appropriation by farmers would be taking place and the relations are capitalist. To be 
sure, data on the terms and conditions of employment of agricultural labour across 
various commodities was collected. But the extent of appropriation it implies has not 
been quantified, nor has the nature of labour relations been examined through 
interaction with labourers. 
Expansion of capital, on the other hand, has been studied indirectly through an 
understanding of agricultural profits, non-agricultural diversification and investment 
in machinery. Through the surveys and interviews with farmers, I drew estimates of 
per acre profits from the different commodities included in this study. This, along 
with the information on the operational landholdings, indebtedness and nature of 
non-agricultural diversification, if any, of the household was brought together for a 
sense of the broad patterns of accumulation, i.e. to establish what kind of strategies 
seem to lead to accumulation and what makes them possible. It could perhaps be 
argued that the occurrence of ‘accumulation’ should have been established at the 
household level. However, given the constraints of time and resources, this would 
have had to be a heavily quantitative exercise at the expense of an understanding of 
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processual and contextual issues. I did not make this trade-off as the latter are crucial 
to establishing the causalities that this research sought to identify.  
It should be added that my focus is on capital accumulation through exploitation of 
labour and productive investment within agriculture by farmers. Accumulation may 
also take place through unproductive channels such as rent, interest and speculative 
activity. While it is valuable to study these, within the limits of doctoral research, I 
have focused on capital accumulation from agriculture by those who are engaged in 
farming (and not all landowners) as it is a central aspect of agrarian change. 
Ramachandran et al. (2010) also argue that data collection on these income sources 
is often subject to ‘concealment and misreporting’ (72) and do not study these. 
Within a capitalist economy, accumulation may also be driven by relative profit in 
other sectors. But this would require a deeper analysis of the economy as a whole 
which is beyond the scope of this research. A wide range of, albeit not all, non-
agricultural income sources are discussed qualitatively in Chapter 10 to highlight the 
possibilities of diversification. 
The approach taken here, however, does not eliminate the need to identify who the 
accumulators are, i.e. it is necessary to identify different classes of farmers for this 
research. But identifying different classes or seeking patterns of class differentiation 
can itself be the objective of a dissertation. Differentiation is, of course, closely 
linked to the process of accumulation, but the two are also, in an abstract sense, 
distinct. I chose to focus on the latter in this research and this raised the issue of 
identifying the strategies of capitalist farmers without first systematically identifying 
who these farmers are. It was unavoidable that these categories would have to be 
consolidated through the process of fieldwork for the core research problem. 
Through the mapping processes, it emerged that land was a crucial determining 
factor in the apparent prosperity of some farmers. In interviews, 10 acres was often 
pitched as the dividing line between those who were agriculturally prosperous and 
those who struggled. Part I argued that land size cannot be the defining element of 
scale or class position, yet some studies have shown that there is a positive 
correlation between operational landholding and capital intensification (Section 3.1). 
Patnaik (1972) also argues that when techniques of cultivation become uniform, size 
may be a close approximate of scale. In my field area, I found such uniformity to a 
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great extent (Section 10.7), perhaps because this is a context well beyond the 
moment of transition.   
Therefore, with an awareness of both the theoretical clarity and the empirical 
ambiguity about this, I proceeded with using 10 acres as an ad hoc basis for 
identifying large capitalist farmers in the farmer household survey, while also 
creating a smaller sample of households with lower operational landholdings. This 
allowed for a perspective on a whole cross-section of landed households and the 
possibility of comparing attributes across them. At the same time, care was taken to 
include questions on levels of mechanisation, labour use and non-farm 
diversification in order to reflect on class attributes beyond land (in the manner of 
Oya (2004), but much less systematically). 
Households with less than 10 acres of land were not, however, treated as a single 
category. Households with less than 5 acres were found to be considerably different 
to others in terms of their choice of commodity mix, ownership of machines, credit 
and nature of diversification and they were generally more impoverished. 
Nevertheless, as they are integrated into commodity relations, they have been 
categorized as ‘petty producers’ (Bernstein 1988; Lerche 2013). Those with holdings 
between 5 and 10 acres lay somewhere in between but appeared to have more 
resources than petty producers and were more able and willing to take risks, albeit on 
more uncertain terms than large capitalists. I categorized them as ‘small capitalist’ 
farmers.  
To further clarify, I view petty producers and capitalist farmers (small and large) as 
separate classes. This distinction rests on the fact that the latter are less likely to 
perform manual labour and make capital investments within agriculture (Section 
10.7). A further distinction has been made between small and large capitalists in 
order to highlight the significance of scale economies for possibilities of agrarian 
accumulation.  
Table 5.2 gives the survey sample disaggregated by these categories.65 Needless to 
say, each category has both exceptional and extreme cases. However, these 
                                                          
65
 These categories happened to correspond to the government’s size classes for cultivating 
households. Petty producers correspond to small and marginal households; small capitalists to semi-
medium households; and large capitalist to medium and large households. 
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categories work as heuristic devices that help us decipher patterns and processes of 
agrarian accumulation. It should also be noted that since operational holdings could 
change annually (see Chapter 8), any effort towards establishing patterns of class 
differentiation in this region that involves land as a criterion can only be tentative 
unless a longitudinal perspective is integrated into it. 
Comparing the survey sample in Table 5.2 with the distribution of households across 
different landholding groups in Punjab in Table 4.4, it is obvious that this sample is 
not representative of all landholding households in the state. The sample was created 
purposively and through snowballing in order to have a greater proportion of large 
capitalist farmers, a relatively under-researched group within Punjab’s agriculture. 
Therefore, as stated earlier, this research can make claims about large capitalists with 
greater certainty than about households in other categories. At the same time, I had 
tried to create a larger sample for petty producers than what is presented here. But I 
was repeatedly told that there are very few ‘very small farmers’ (petty producers) in 
these villages. Whether this was indeed the case, I have not been able to verify. 
However, if so, it could be a reflection of the tendency towards reverse tenancy 
noted in Chapters 3 and 4. Section 2.1.2 argued that some petty producers may also 
be accumulating and a large sample of petty producers would have been instructive 
in this regard.  
Table 5.2: Farmer household survey sample 
 No. of Households % 
Land leased-out 5 5.4 
Petty producers (under 5 acres/2.02 ha.) 16 17.2 
Small capitalist (5 – 9.9 acres/2.02 – 4 ha.) 13 14 
Large capitalist (10 acres/4.01 ha. or more) 59 63.4 
Total 93 100 
 
5.2.2 Researcher’s Subjectivity 
The fieldwork possibilities were also shaped, and adversely impacted, by my 
gendered, racialized and caste-laden subjectivity. The mandi in Punjab is an 
overwhelmingly masculine space, as is that of agricultural operations and related 
decision-making. All my key respondents, farmers and traders, were male. It was not 
possible to do fieldwork at ‘unsafe’ hours and I was constantly reminded by people 
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of the same. Traders, for example, often sat together in the evenings, meeting over 
alcohol and food, a space I could not access. Often farmers would leave as soon as 
the survey was completed and make way for the women of the household to entertain 
me. As a result, other than with the key respondents, interactions with farmers were 
sometimes too time-bound and forced me to constantly think on my feet in order to 
make the interactions as useful as possible. 
Gender was also one of the reasons why the way the household survey was 
conducted was altered. Even though I met many sympathetic and resourceful 
farmers, nobody was willing to arrange for me to stay in their village. I was told 
repeatedly, ‘mahaul kharaab hai’ (the times are bad), the implied meaning of which 
was times are unsafe for women. But it was also the case that nobody wanted to 
vouch for a young, unmarried, Indian woman whose work was to roam around 
public spaces – anathema to a patriarchal and parochial ‘village society’, if I may. 
Farmers were also reluctant to personally introduce me to others. I was repeatedly 
given mobile numbers to contact and was told to use their name as reference. It was 
challenging to arrange meetings in this way since most farmers were wary of trusting 
a stranger on the phone. 
Many appointments with traders also had to be made in the same way. Perhaps this 
can be thought of as a modality of doing fieldwork with elites, in this case, the rural 
elite. It was less of a problem with arhtias in the grain mandi since they have open 
offices that I could use to meet respondents once I had been introduced, either 
personally or by giving someone’s reference over the phone. Since I spent more time 
in the grain mandi, I also gained greater visibility and acceptability there. 
Harriss-White (1999, 349) has written that cultivating trust among elite respondents 
can be an issue for any researcher owing to the ‘widespread legitimacy of 
commercial suspicion’. Indeed, even after many months of my research, I was often 
suspected of being a journalist, an intelligence agent or a tax inspector, and few 
readily accepted that I studied at a university in London. In fact, it was because of 
these trust issues that at no stage of the research were any interviews recorded. 
‘Field workers need to be particularly sensitive to their own gender, with its 
implications both for where they cannot safely tread without offence, and also for 
where they can exploit it to gain access and information’ (Robson 1999, 295). 
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Indeed, while my gender was a constraint in many ways, it also worked to my 
advantage. Once the ice was broken with traders and farmers, many respondents 
were eager to help me as some of them came to think of me as a kind of helpless 
young girl (‘bechaari’) trying to complete a degree. Some also compared me to their 
own young daughters who were studying either locally or in nearby cities. That I 
spoke fluent English and was city-bred and educated was also a source of some 
curiosity. My life and education, especially in ‘the West’, was a common topic of 
conversation with respondents, and sometimes enabled me to gain their trust. Such 
conversations were also revealing in terms of respondents’ values and aspirations. 
Finally, as an Indian researcher, subjectivity can never be complete without 
addressing the issue of caste. My caste was commonly brought up by traders but 
very rarely by farmers. I was often asked whether I was ‘high’ or ‘low’ caste. Since I 
belong to an upper caste community in Bihar which vaguely parallels the mercantile 
castes of Punjab, they found it easier to approve of me. Overall, while there were 
elements of my subjectivity as a researcher that worked against me, as usually 
happens, there were others that presented opportunities I could use to further my 
investigation. 
5.2.3 Ethics of Research and Representation 
Breman (1985) and Cramer et al. (2016) write about the complex politics of research 
on labour in developing country contexts. This research is different since it focuses 
on and, in fact, privileges accumulation in its narratives of agrarian change. This 
raises some important ethical and political issues. 
Firstly, it could be said that such a project risks neglecting the voices of agrarian 
distress in developing an understanding of agrarian change. However, far from being 
a blind spot, it is a requirement of the research problem as defined to place greater 
emphasis on narratives of accumulation. My contention is that in doing so, it can 
create an understanding of the axes of social and economic power that, while 
allowing for accumulation, simultaneously disempower the classes suffering distress. 
Therefore, such a focus allows us to nuance the understanding of crisis beyond 
sweeping explanations of neoliberalism and corporatisation. 
The second issue is raised by the fact of researching the rich and the prosperous. 
How can the researcher act towards and represent with integrity respondents who 
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are, by the terms of the theoretical framework, ‘exploiters’? Can the researcher 
‘speak with’ the respondents, as Sumner and Tribe (2008, 45) suggest? I believe that 
I acted ethically towards my respondents. Names of farmers and traders, their firms, 
and their villages have been anonymised. Names of agribusiness companies have 
been left unchanged since most of their strategies are common knowledge in the 
field. During the process of fieldwork, the points of view of all respondents were 
taken seriously, including the challenges they faced in their work, and were cross-
checked with other respondents in the same group (farmer, trader, and agribusiness) 
and with each other. Similarly, their responses and points of views have been 
received and represented as class interests rather than personal views; however, that 
such class analysis itself might implicate them in certain kinds of social processes is 
unavoidable. Overall, the research does not claim to ‘‘know’ what is ‘good’’ (ibid., 
44) for the context under study; it simply analyses issues of structure and agency in 
the processes of agrarian change in the region within a certain historical framework. 
5.3 Anticipating the Evidence 
This chapter outlined the key methodological assumptions of this research, the 
considerations in designing the research as a case study, and the challenges 
experienced in conducting the fieldwork. The following chapters present the 
empirical evidence gathered. 
The chapters on different commodities focus on both production and marketing. 
Production covers capital intensity, labour process, costs of production, and any 
changes in these in recent years. But since less is known about how production and 
market interact, the discussion on market and traders for each commodity will be 
more in-depth. These chapters will show that potato and cauliflower are potentially 
more profitable than paddy and wheat. However, the latter are crucial to 
accumulation because of the guaranteed MSP provided by the State, although there 
are strains this system is experiencing under liberalisation. This kind of support also 
makes these crops financially safer for farmers across classes. Potato and 
cauliflower, on the other hand, are much riskier as they are more cost-intensive, their 
markets are extremely complex and their prices volatile. The production of these 
crops is, therefore, specific to capitalist farmers, especially large capitalists. Notably, 
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the expansion of these crops as a basis for accumulation in the fieldwork area is 
clearly linked to changes in the economy as a result of liberalisation. 
Chapter 8 shows that the dynamics around land-leasing are crucial to accumulation. 
Land-leasing allows for expansion of the scale of production which is likely to 
facilitate higher profits. On the other hand, lease rates can be prohibitively high and 
create cycles of indebtedness. Land can also be an asset in terms of sale and 
purchase, but this is linked to developments in the wider economy and can only be 
used profitably by some of the larger capitalist farmers. 
In Chapter 9, formal and informal credit relations are shown to add another layer in 
determining the possibilities of accumulation through negotiation of production, 
marketing and land relations. Arhtias are the main source of informal credit, with 
their power based on both inadequate formal credit and guaranteed State 
procurement of wheat and paddy from the mandis. Smaller farmers are more 
vulnerable to them than larger capitalists. Moreover, the reconfiguration of formal 
agricultural credit under liberalisation has actually created some space for the latter 
to function independently of the arhtias. 
Finally, I will discuss the strategies used by different farmers to have a source of 
income beyond farming. Agricultural businesses were found to be easier to diversify 
into than non-agricultural ones. Education afforded some opportunities for obtaining 
public or private jobs. Overall, however, success was uneven and many attempts at 
diversification failed. This is an important reason for aspiration to migrate abroad, 
although success in this also requires finances and networks. Significantly, the 




Part III: Empirical Data 
Chapter 6.  Khanna: An Introduction 
 
Part III presents the empirical data gathered as part of the research. This chapter 
gives an overview of the field site, i.e. Khanna and the villages around it, drawing on 
secondary sources and my observations. It paints a broad picture of the socio-
economic, spatial and political canvas of this area against which the specific 
processes of agrarian accumulation are analysed. 
6.1 Khanna Town 
Khanna is located near the south-eastern border of Ludhiana district. It covers an 
area of 32km
2
 and has a population of around 130,000. It is the headquarters of one 
of the six tehsils or blocks in Ludhiana district (Ludhiana District Administration 
n.d.). 
Its strategic location makes it an important economic centre – it is located on 
National Highway (NH) 1 and is also connected by rail. Khanna is only 45km from 
Ludhiana, the industrial centre of Punjab, and just over 65km from the state capital 
of Chandigarh. It has connecting roads to other smaller but important towns in the 
area, namely, Samrala, Doraha, Sahnewal (Ludhiana district), Amloh, Sirhind, 
Mandi Gobindgarh (Fatehgarh Sahib district) and Malerkotla (Sangrur district). 
The town was created as a sarai or resting place on the Grand Trunk Road by the 
ruler Sher Shah Suri in the mid-16
th
 century and was governed as part of the Mughal 
Empire until its decline in the late 17
th
 century. Subsequently, it was ruled by Sikh 
jathedars or military commanders until the mid-19
th
 century. In 1850, Khanna and 
its surrounding areas lapsed to British rule when the last ruler, Daya Kaur, died 
heirless. In 1868, Khanna was a small settlement with a population of 3,408 (Punjab 
Urban Development Authority (PUDA) 2011). Table 6.1 gives some of the main 
landmarks in Khanna’s history. 
When I first visited Khanna, I noticed that the NH1 that cuts across the town was 
bustling with vehicular traffic, markets, and people on foot, although there is no 
infrastructure for walking. Despite the traffic, there is not a single functional traffic 
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light in the entire town. Overall, it seemed much busier than both the other towns I 
had previously visited and those that I visited after. Despite this, it was compact and 
intimate in a way only small towns are. 
Table 6.1: Landmarks in the development of Khanna town 
Landmark Year 
Railway line (Ludhiana to Khanna) 1870 
Grain market 1906 
Khanna as sub-tehsil headquarter in Tehsil Samrala 1947 
Electricity 1955 
Electric grid 1976 
Water supply network 1978 
Sewerage network 1980-83 
Telephone network 1984 
    Source: PUDA 2011 
A tea vendor, a migrant from Odisha, who I visited frequently, once praised Khanna 
by saying, ‘Khanna is neither a city, nor is it a village’. This statement captures the 
predicament of the town well. On the one hand, there are city-like qualities, markets 
bigger than the closest towns, industries, government and private schools and 
colleges, and even modern housing complexes and shopping malls have emerged in 
recent years. Khanna is often described by those in smaller neighbouring towns such 
as Amloh, Doraha and Samrala as a ‘bada shahr’ (big city). On the other hand, only 
3-4km in any direction from the centre of the town will see you in a village, and the 
town and village(s) seem to flow into each other quite seamlessly. Yet, this fluidity 
itself gives a unique character to Khanna (and others like it). As an intermediate 
town, Khanna represents both what has been achieved and what is still aspired to in 
terms of ideals of well-being and development.66 
6.2 History of Agriculture in Khanna 
When approaching Khanna from Ludhiana, the grain mandi appears on the left and it 
is hard to miss given its sheer expanse, only a part of which is visible from the 
highway. Like the rest of the state, the town is surrounded by vast stretches of lush 
fields throughout the year. A historical understanding of this area in particular is 
                                                          
66
 The proliferation of small towns in India has been described in recent scholarship as ‘subaltern 
urbanisation’ (Denis et al 2012; Harriss-White 2016a). 
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available through population studies done on Khanna and the surrounding areas. The 
Khanna Study was conducted between 1953 and 1960, with a brief follow-up study 
in 1969 (Wyon and Gordon 1971). Mamdani (1972) and Nag and Kak (1984) both 
conducted further demographic studies in one of the villages (Manupur) included in 
The Khanna Study. Historical information on agricultural markets in Khanna has 
been drawn primarily from two sources, Cummings Jr. (1968) and B. Harriss (1974). 
Between 1954 and 1960, agriculture and village-based residence characterized the 
socio-economic landscape in the area. One of my elderly farmer respondents 
reminisced, ‘Earlier, only groundnuts were sold. We were only able to grow enough 
wheat for our family’s use. Those were very difficult days.’ Single-room mud houses 
were common in the villages at this time and agricultural land was irrigated using the 
old leather-bucket system (Mamdani 1972, 57) or Persian wheels driven by draught 
animals. Women were confined to managing the household, male children were 
preferred and caste-based occupations were adhered to. ‘Many exchanges of services 
between persons of different castes were characteristically hereditary and without 
cash payment’ (Wyon and Gordon 1971, 102). This is presumably a reference to 
attached labour conditions, among other kinds of caste-based exploitation. 
At the same time, ‘at the time of study a considerable traffic existed between village 
and local market towns. Appreciable numbers of men had acquired experience with 
the outside world through residence in cities or by military service’ (ibid., 100). In 
fact, military service was found to be equally common among all caste groups in the 
villages. Education has also been argued to be a stimulant for emigration, although 
this was a predominantly male phenomenon. Even in 1956, each of the eleven 
villages included in the study had at least one school. Women migrated mainly for 
marriage or as dependents. 
In the brief re-study in 1969, the most striking change was found in the village 
economy. This is unsurprising since these were the early years of the Green 
Revolution. Here it is worth quoting the authors at some length to give a sense of the 
sea change that took place. 
Between 1960 and 1969 the land area cultivated in the study villages 
remained virtually constant. Acreage sown to wheat more than 
doubled, however, and to maize almost as much. The smaller crops of 
sugar cane and peanuts increased, while cultivation of cotton 
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decreased and that of lentils (gram) virtually disappeared. Fodder 
crops and fallow land decreased sharply, presumably a consequence of 
the growing replacement of draft animals by motor tractors, of 
increased irrigation from tube wells, and the use of chemical 
fertilizers. Sandy tracts, formerly suited only as grazing land in winter 
and for peanut cultivation in summer, now produced wheat in addition 
to peanuts. Thanks to mechanized ploughing, land used for cotton was 
cleared during September and October in time to sow wheat. (ibid., 
304) 
Of Manupur village, Mamdani (1972, 61) wrote: 
Most of the wells that had been used to draw drinking or cleaning 
water fell into disuse; instead, every house began to have its own hand 
waterpump. By 1970, there was not one farmer who did not use 
chemical fertilizers. Animal manure was now used only as a 
supplement. Farmers who had for many years used a handcutter to 
make fodder for cattle now found it desirable to save both their time 
and labor by investing in a mechanical chaffcutter. 
As prices of some crops increased, land prices followed: ‘By 1969 the price of land 
had increased four times, from about 1000 rupees per acre in 1960. Top quality land 
in ideal locations brought 20,000 rupees per acre at the time of the survey’ (Wyon 
and Gordon 1971, 305). In Manupur in 1970, ‘the cheapest land in the village was 
3,500 rupees per acre’ (Mamdani 1972, 80). At the same time, land in UP cost as 
little as Rs 800 per acre; this, and limited capital and family labour, led many small 
farmers from Manupur to move to UP. Small farmers who did not have enough sons 
old enough to help on the farm also often leased-out their land. 
Wyon and Gordon argued that by 1960, farmers were already doing more managerial 
work on their farms than labour, although this might have been truer of larger 
farmers than smaller ones, and Mamdani’s study indicates the same. Share-cropping 
and the jajmani system were in decline, while the demand for labour had increased 
(Wyon and Gordon 1971). However, Mamdani (1972) argued that in Manupur, it 
was only in the labour-intensive seasons of farming that there was a shortage of 
labour. At other times, the predominantly SC labouring class of the village was 
underemployed. 
It is well known that farmers, especially large farmers, benefitted considerably from 
the Green Revolution. In the Khanna area, ‘the income of landholders had increased 
four times between 1960 and 1969’ (Wyon and Gordon 1971, 306). There was an 
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increase in domestic possessions such as domestic water pumps, bicycles, radios and 
sewing machines among the farming families and to a lesser extent, among the 
labouring families. ‘An improved standard of living, the augmented social status 
arising from more expensive marriage functions, and comfortable housing stand out 
as central aspirations’ (ibid., 309). Mamdani (1972) argued that 17 acres was the 
minimum landholding required by a farming household to succeed decisively in the 
enterprise. In Manupur, the average landholding among the 14 households that had 
17 or more acres was 26.3 acres. For medium landholding farmers, he argued that 
farmers needed large families to augment farm labour to be profitable. In other 
words, except for the wealthiest and largest-landed households, large families were 
required to succeed in farming. However, evidence suggests that by the 1980s this 
assessment was no longer valid. 
Nag and Kak (1984) reported that Jat farmers now used a combination of 
mechanisation and migrant labour for agriculture. While school-going children 
helped with some farm and livestock-related work, many activities that children had 
previously engaged in disappeared or became redundant under the new pattern of 
agriculture; e.g. disappearance of grazing, use of chemicals for killing weeds rather 
than manual weeding, and the widespread cultivation of paddy which was argued by 
the authors to be less labour-intensive than cotton or maize.67 As adults, sons were 
considered less reliable as a source of old-age support than when Mamdani did his 
study. The authors also found a clear aspiration among parents of all castes for their 
children to be educated. 
On mechanisation, they wrote: 
Only 6.6 percent of Manupur farmers owned tractors in 1970… Farm 
incomes, however, have increased so rapidly since 1970 and the 
tractor has become such an important implement that at the time of 
our visit, despite a steep rise in tractor prices, about 39 percent of 
farmers owned a tractor; a few even owned two… The main reasons 
why many more farmers owning medium-sized plots could own 
tractors in 1982 are that the income of all farmers increased 
considerably since 1970 and so did the number of credit facilities. The 
use of tractors is no longer confined to their owners. Unforeseen by 
Mamdani in 1970, a number of farmers with small and medium-sized 
holdings in Manupur rent tractors from their owners, often for less 
than it would cost to maintain bullocks. (ibid., 672-673) 
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 Other sources indicate that paddy is more labour-intensive than maize (FICCI and KPMG 2015).  
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On credit, Mamdani (1972) argued that the Brahmin moneylenders constituted the 
most powerful class in the village until institutional credit became available to 
farmers due to the credit arrangements of the Green Revolution period. Brahmins 
became marginal to the dynamic agricultural economy of the 1960s and 1970s. In 
other words, institutional credit freed farmers from material and thereby social 
domination by the moneylenders. However, he did not account for the Mahajan 
trader-moneylenders discussed in Chapter 4. As I argued earlier, existing narratives 
of either the complete removal of moneylenders or their blanket exploitation in the 
wake of the Green Revolution are incomplete. 
6.2.1 Khanna and its Agricultural Markets 
In 1970, Khanna had an estimated population of around 20,000 (Mamdani 1972). 
Based on a study in 1963-64, Cummings Jr. wrote, ‘It [Khanna] ranks as one of the 
largest arrivals markets (35,000 tons of wheat in 1962-63). Over 90 percent of this 
wheat is shipped out to other markets’ (1968, 688). These other markets included 
Ludhiana, Abohar, Patiala, Barnala Patiala (within Punjab), Karnal (erstwhile 
Punjab, now Haryana), Agra, Hapur (UP) and Delhi. B. Harriss (1974) adds 
Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Bengaluru to this list. 
Cummings Jr. found that 40-50% of the wheat produced in the Khanna area was 
marketed and brought to the wholesale wheat markets by the farmers themselves. 
Wheat started arriving in the wholesale markets by late April, peaking in May and 
June, and ending in August/September. ‘Rail dispatches indicate that shipments go 
from Khanna to practically every state in India. Stocks in the hands of traders from 
the previous year appear to be completely gone by the time the following harvest is 
marketed’ (689). 
Why the MSP introduced in the 1960s proved to be a game-changer not only for the 
fortunes of the farmers in this area but Punjab more generally can be explained if one 
considers the nature of purely private trade that existed in the period before. On 
prices, Cummings Jr. wrote: 
…there is considerable random variability in day-to-day and week-to-
week price changes. For example, during the six years for which data 
were available, changes in modal prices from one Friday to the next 
exceeded Re. 1.00 per quintal almost one-third of the time. This 
variability is greatest during the winter, when small arrivals and insect 
infestation reduce the quotable volumes to very small amounts. … 
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The lowest seasonal wheat prices occur during the peak marketing 
months of May and June. Prices hold fairly steady through September 
and then rise through January or February.’ (ibid., 688-690) 
While the author does not provide any data on prices, it can be speculated that 
farmers would have experienced extreme volatility in the prices obtained and smaller 
farmers would have been more affected by this. 
At the time of his study, there were 90-100 arhtias in the market and 8-10 pucca 
arhtias. Pucca arhtias differ from arhtias in that they do not mediate between the 
farmer and the buyer, but make purchases on their own behalf or on behalf of other 
persons/firms in exchange for a commission. Cummings Jr. argued that finance was 
less of an entry barrier into the latter than skills of the trade. However, unlike the 
dominance of the arhtias that we observe in wheat markets today, at that time they 
seem to have been dominated by the pucca arhtia. Cummings Jr. described their 
activities: 
The resident trader’s [pucca arhtia] first preference is to purchase 
wheat on commission for nonresident buyers. The resident trader 
spends up to two months during the preharvest period soliciting 
purchase orders from markets in other states… Orders are telegraphed 
or mailed to Khanna and are filled if they are competitive; if not, the 
bidder is advised to resubmit his order at a higher price… 
The resident trader also purchases some wheat on his own account for 
three primary reasons: (a) To provide for local consumption in 
Khanna, an assured market of 5 to 10 percent of total arrivals. (b) To 
hold against future needs… (c) To sell on consignment in Delhi or 
other nearby consuming centers. 
For the immediate postharvest period, the resident trader has reliable 
information both for his local market area and for the rest of India on 
(a) wheat production and (b) market arrivals during the current 
period… The resident trader is less certain of projecting the supply 
and demand conditions for the winter months. (ibid., 690-691) 
In the late 1960s, new wheat collection centres were built by the State in order to 
cope with the increased production resulting from the Green Revolution’s success; 
29 new markets, 76 sub-yards and 47 village procurement centres were established 
across the state. B. Harriss (1974, 63) reported, ‘Khanna, for example, has five sub-
centres dealing with 20 per cent of the primary wholesale transactions of the 
tributary area, although all the produce finds its way to Khanna for immediate export 
or for storage there’. During this time, the flourishing mandi was the core around 
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which other retail and service industries (e.g. shops selling daily provisions, 
construction materials and electrical items) expanded (ibid.; Andrade and Johnson 
1972). 
Despite the all-important role played by the pucca arhtias until the early 1960s, with 
the advent of the new mandis, they seemed to have disappeared from the market 
within a matter of years: in 1968, there were no pucca arhtias for wheat in the 
Khanna mandi (B. Harriss 1974). This raises two important issues. First, how did the 
erstwhile pucca arhtias adapt to such a radical change in the trading pattern? This is 
an interesting but particular historical question that this research is not equipped to 
answer. Secondly, this development points to the issue of what drives changes in 
market systems and determines the kinds of traders that exist and dominate. The 
same Punjab APMC Act 1961 was applicable when Cummings Jr. and B. Harriss 
conducted their studies, but the pattern of the trade in Khanna was completely 
different. The role of the State seems to be a crucial element in this case as the State 
took the place of the pucca arhtias in procuring, storing and transporting grain.68 
6.3 Present Agro-Commercial Landscape 
We now move from a historical survey of the field area to a more contemporary one, 
drawing on my fieldwork. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Khanna has two agricultural 
wholesale markets – a grain mandi and a sabzi mandi. The mandis are described in 
detail below. In addition to the mandis, the town also has a vibrant agro-industrial 
scene with, as shown in Figure 6.1 (p. 131), an industrial centre (‘Focal Point’) in the 
south-east of the town. There are also agro-industrial units in some of the 
surrounding villages, on what was previously farm land. The major agro-industrial 
units include 55 rice mills,69 8 flour mills,70 43 feed mills,71 4 solvex plants,72 2 cold 
stores73 and a number of agricultural machinery manufacturing units. 
According to mill owners, in the 1980s Khanna was the biggest centre for feed mills 
in north India. Now, however, such centres have emerged in Rajasthan as well. The 
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 However, this cannot be the only reason as in the same year B. Harriss (1974) also reports that 
Bhatinda had a glut of pucca arhtias and Adampur and Mansa of arhtias. 
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 Procurement agency list of operational rice mills in the area in 2014-15. 
70




 Interview with broker-cum-mill owner; it is not certain whether this figure is for the Khanna 
administrative area per se. 
73
 http://agmarknet.gov.in/MarketProfile/displayformdetails.aspx (profile updated 6 Sep, 2016). 
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first feed mill in Khanna started in the early 1980s, nine more followed by the end of 
the decade. The town continues to host some large cattle and poultry feed mills, 
including those belonging to major brands like Godrej and Verka. A major private 
sugar mill is located on one of the town’s arterial roads although it falls within the 
administrative area of the neighbouring district, Fatehgarh Sahib. One of Punjab’s 
major private dairy brands, Super, has a mill in Khanna. Punjab Markfed, one of 
Asia’s largest cooperative federations, has its oil industry in the town since 1971. 
6.3.1 The Mandis 
Grain Mandi 
The grain mandi that exists today is actually the ‘new’ grain mandi. The original 
mandi was established in 1906 in the erstwhile village of Khanna Kalan and in what 
is now the centre of the town. At the time, many Mahajans based in villages opened 
shops in the market independently or in partnership, buying wheat, cotton and 
groundnuts from the villages to trade in the market. In 1966, the mandi was relocated 
to the present location as the space was grossly inadequate for the increased grain 
arrivals following the success of the Green Revolution programmes. The government 
was selling the arhtia shops in the new mandi in 1967-68 for Rs 5,000 each, which 
prompted many of the existing traders in the original mandi and other traders, 
shopkeepers and moneylenders in villages to move to the present mandi. 
At the time of fieldwork, the mandi had four sub-yards in villages in the Khanna area 
for the collection of paddy and wheat during the harvest season. Figure 6.2 (p. 132) 
shows the broad spatial organisation of the main grain mandi in Khanna. The offices 
of the Market Committee as well as those of other state level procurement agencies 
(discussed in Chapter 7) are located in this mandi. The office of the FCI is across the 
road from the mandi. There were 253 shops in the mandi affiliated to the Arhtia 
Association of Khanna, which in turn is affiliated to the Punjab Arhtia Association. 
The association represents both arhtias and pucca arhtias, so while the overwhelming 
majority of its 253 members are arhtias, not all are. The mandi also has shops of 
grain brokers. Some firms had a portfolio combining two or more of these activities. 
Arhtias in the grain mandi are both Mahajan and Jat Sikh. All the trading firms in the 
mandi belong to traders from Khanna or nearby villages and towns. Among those 
who operate from Khanna, I have interacted with owners and/or employees of 16 
arht firms, 4 rice mills, 2 flour mills, 2 brokers, 2 solvex plants and 1 feed mill.  
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Given the importance of Khanna as a grain market, the mandi is extremely busy 
during the harvest seasons of paddy (late September to mid-December) and wheat 
(April). During this time, arhtias work long hours and the mandis are thronged with 
farmers, state officials and mill representatives while its internal roads are jammed 
by trucks and tractor-trolleys carrying grain in or out of the mandi. Even though 
auction yards have been depicted at specific places on the map, in reality auctions 
take place in any open empty space and arhtias’ offices are packed with farmers 
waiting for their grain to be cleaned, dried or auctioned. On the other hand, during 
the lean seasons (for example between January and March), the mandi appears 
abandoned; there is very little grain of any kind present and it is in this emptiness 
that one realizes its expanse. Arhtias come to their office late in the day, if at all, and 
time is spent visiting each other in their shops. 
One aspect that remains constant throughout the year, however, is visits by farmers 
who come to the arhtias for credit. As mentioned in Chapter 4, arhtias in the grain 
market are the chief source of informal credit for farmers and their offices are 
organized accordingly. Most are divided into outer and inner sections. The outer part 
is usually quite plain, with cotton mattresses and a floor-level desk where most of the 
monetary transactions between farmers and arhtias (or their accountants) take place. 
Some shops may also have a regular desk and chair in this part for the accountant to 
work at; there may also be some plastic chairs for farmers to sit on. The inner parts 
of these shops are more akin to proper offices, with large desks and chairs, air 
conditioning and a television. Some arhtias would spend a substantial amount of 
time in the outer part of their shop, interacting with farmers and other traders who 
might be visiting them, but others would spend more time in their inner office. The 
latter was more common when the arhtia also had other parallel businesses, such as 
rice mills, to deal with and therefore, had less time to deal with individual farmers, 
but it could also be simply due to personal preferences. 
Sabzi Mandi 
Technically, the sabzi mandi is a sub-yard of the main Khanna mandi (where grain is 
traded) and has a small Market Committee office (Figure 6.3, p. 133). However, so 
different are the dynamics of this space that it qualifies as an independent system. 
Until the mid-1980s, trade in the sabzi mandi was mainly in fruit; as fruit is not 
grown locally in Khanna, it used to come then, as it does now, mainly pre-ordered 
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from Delhi by the arhtias. It was only in mid-1980s that farmers in the area started 
growing vegetables and bringing them to the mandi. There are roughly 50 arhtias in 
this mandi and they have a separate association from the grain mandi arhtias. 
Approximately 60% of the arhtias deal only in vegetables while the rest deal in fruit. 
Only one or two agents in the mandi deal in both as they rely on different kinds of 
trading networks for sale. The fruit trade is mainly channelled through Delhi, 
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir while in the vegetable trade a lot of work is 
done locally or through other mandis within Punjab such as Ludhiana, Chandigarh or 
Jalandhar. In Khanna sabzi mandi, I have interacted with 4 arhtias. I have also 
interacted with 3 cold store owners serving farmers in the area, although their stores 
are not listed under the Khanna Market Committee.   
The arhtias in the sabzi mandi usually sell to smaller retailers/petty vendors 
(rediwallahs) on credit, and the debt is repaid by these vendors on the third or fourth 
day. Once the produce auction is over, the mandi is lined with these smaller vendors. 
It is said that sometimes these vendors, who are mostly from Bihar and UP, do not 
repay the debt before returning to their village, and in this way money is lost. One 
must appreciate what this says about the position of the Khanna sabzi mandi vis-à-
vis others. It is smaller than those in Ludhiana, Jalandhar and Chandigarh because 
the population it caters to is much smaller. Unlike grains which can be stored before 
processing, fruit and vegetables are meant for daily consumption; population size, 
therefore, regulates the size of the mandi and the scale of operations taking place. 
Storage, and indeed hoarding, takes place but not all fruit and vegetables can be 
stored away like onions and potatoes. In fact, this is also why many farmers insist 
that potato farming is not the same as vegetable farming. In bigger mandis, the 
arhtias sell to intermediary traders who then sell to these petty vendors. As one 
Market Committee official said, ‘the arhtias in Khanna mandi are like retailers and 
the ones in Ludhiana mandi are like wholesalers’. He added that the best quality 
products were not available in smaller mandis such as Khanna. 
The arhtias take 5% commission on fruit and vegetable sales and the market fee is 
4%. The revenue from market fees in Khanna has been increasing steadily for the 
past 15 years or so. However, the sense is that this will not continue for much longer 
as new sabzi mandis have been built in nearby cities, diverting product which 
previously came to Khanna mandi. Moreover, the neighbouring town of Mandi 
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Gobindgarh, the Steel Town or Loha Mandi of India, has suffered major losses due 
to what is described as faulty industrial policy by the state government and so 
demand has fallen as people’s purchasing power has declined. Furthermore, the fact 
that large quantities of cauliflower and potatoes are purchased directly from farmers 
by traders from other states means that the market fee is charged at the destination 
mandi and not at the local mandi. 
With respect to social composition, it is notable that the arthias in the sabzi mandi 
are not the Mahajan arhtias of the grain mandi. Apart from a handful of Jat arhtias 
dealing in vegetables and a few Bihari arhtias dealing in fruit, the sabzi mandi arhtias 
are what are popularly known as ‘Bahawalpurias’, i.e. they belong to the erstwhile 
princely state of Bahawalpur which is now in Pakistan. These Hindu traders, mostly 
belonging to the Arora caste, migrated during and after Partition. The Model Towns 
in various cities of Punjab, as well as in other states, were made for the resettlement 
of these and other refugees/returnees. Having lost much of their property and capital 
in Pakistan, many members of this community became petty fruit/vegetable vendors 
as this did not require much initial investment; gradually some of them became 
successful enough to become arhtias. The other major business in which they are 
involved in Khanna is the scrap business. Due to the difference in their language and 
customs, the ‘Bahawalpurias’ are looked down on by the local Mahajans and Jats 
alike as uncultured, filthy and qualifying as neither Hindu, Muslim nor Sikh. Perhaps 
because of envy, they are said to have made a lot of money through deceptive trade 
practices; however, they are also recognized as immensely hard-working and 
enterprising. 
The nature of work in the two mandis is very different. While the grain mandi 
business is seasonal, in the sabzi mandi it takes place throughout the year. The work 
in the latter is also more arduous. A vegetable arhtia said, ‘I wake up at 2.45am and I 
am in the mandi at 5am. The arhtias in the grain mandi must be waking up at 9am. 
What do they do? They are free.’ Auctions take place in the sabzi mandi daily from 
5am to 9am while, even in the peak of the procurement seasons, auctions and sales in 
the grain mandi never start before 9am. Fruit and vegetables are also more 
vulnerable to deterioration and rotting than grains, and they require more attention in 
terms of handling. As a Market Committee official said, ‘Zameen aasmaan ka farq 
hai. Yeh daily ka kaam hai; yeh gande kapde waala kaam hai; woh chitte kapde 
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waale kaam hai’ (They are worlds apart. This work happens daily; this work dirties 
your clothes; that work can be done with clean clothes). Another important 
difference is that the arhtias in the sabzi mandi rarely, if ever, give credit to farmers. 
This is linked to the nature of trade in these vegetables, discussed in later chapters. 
6.3.2 The Villages 
In my fieldwork I found that while some villages (‘pind’) were very old, with all the 
Jats belonging to the same gotra (clan), others had been re-organized or established 
in the wake of Partition. I have not followed these histories, but some general 
observations about villages can be made. In the pre-Green Revolution era, there was 
a clear distinction between villages in terms of residential (abadi) and non-
residential areas, with all the houses being concentrated in the former even though 
Dalit houses were at the margins (Wyon and Gordon 1971; Jodhka 2002). However, 
over the years this distinction has become less clear. Many Jat farmers have built 
houses in the middle of their farms, while other castes are interspersed throughout 
the core residential area. All villages have a Panchayat Office, dairies, small 
convenience shops, schools (sometimes including private schools) and many also 
have a credit cooperative society. Given that the rural population of Punjab is 
predominantly Sikh, all villages have a gurdwara. In some villages (including a 
couple of the survey villages), Dalits have built their own gurdwara as a symbol of 
caste assertion.74 
All the houses in the village are pucca (solid and substantial) and furnished with 
modern amenities including refrigerators and TVs. This is true of both Jat 
households and those of other castes, although Jats can afford more and qualitatively 
better ones. Villages are well connected by roads and many by local, private buses 
and tempos or three-wheelers. It is common across castes to have a motorbike, 
although more so among Jats who also often own car(s). Most villagers go to 
Khanna or other similar small towns to make significant household purchases. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the household survey villages were selected such that 
they represented some of the major crops and cropping patterns in the area. Table 6.2 
lists these cropping cycles. The four survey villages are described below (see Figure 
5.3): 
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 See Jodhka (2002) and Ram (2004). 
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1. Ladmajri: 20-25km from Khanna, which is the nodal mandi for the farmers 
even though the village is in a different block. Paddy and wheat are the main 
crops in the village; only a few farmers cultivate any other crop. 
2. Rattankalan: 15km from Khanna, administratively within Khanna block. No 
one kind of cropping pattern is dominant in this village, although certain 
types of marketing for some crops take precedence. 
3. Uchakhurd: 6km from the centre of Khanna town and adjoining the Khanna-
Malerkotla road. Cauliflower dominates the agriculture of this village. 
4. Paunpura: 8km from the centre of Khanna town and adjoining the Khanna-
Samrala road. Like Ladmajri, although administratively in a different block, 
Khanna is the main mandi for the farmers. It is among the many villages that 
constitute the potato belt in the area. 
 
Table 6.2: Major cropping cycles in the survey villages 
Crop 
Cycle 
June Year 1 <---------------------------------------------> May Year 2 
1 Paddy Wheat 
2 Paddy Potato Wheat 
3 Paddy Potato Maize 
4 Paddy Potato Sunflower 
5 Paddy Potato Okra 
6 Paddy Wheat Okra 
7 Paddy Cauliflower Cauliflower 
8 Cauliflower Cauliflower Wheat 
9 Cauliflower Cauliflower Cauliflower 
10 Cauliflower Wheat 
           Source: Own fieldwork 2014-15 
It is difficult to determine why different villages have different cropping patterns 
even though they are only a few kilometres apart. Respondents insist that villages 
develop their own ‘rivaaz’ or accepted practices over time. This begs the question of 
why these practices develop. Some possible factors shaping particular patterns of 
cultivation could be distance from the mandi, distance from major cities like 
Ludhiana, and enterprise of individual farmers in villages, all of which will appear in 
discussion at various points in the subsequent chapters. 
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This chapter has set the empirical context for the findings of this study. The 
following chapters explore the key dimensions of agrarian accumulation as I defined 








Figure 6.2: Grain Mandi, Khanna (not to scale) 
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Figure 6.3: Sabzi Mandi, Khanna (not to scale) 
134 
Chapter 7.  Farms and Markets 
 
Through the foregoing discussion we have established that production and marketing 
are the main sites where accumulation through agriculture takes place. For the 
individual farmer, his landholding and the multiple markets he sells the commodities 
in constitute these sites. At the same time, each commodity requires certain types of 
investment owing to its physicality. Each commodity also has a market with its own 
internal dynamic. Accumulation can, therefore, take place when farmers can 
effectively negotiate their own resource constraints within wider structures of 
commodity production and trade.  
Towards explaining this, this chapter is divided into four sections, one each on 
paddy, wheat, potato and cauliflower, the main crops cultivated in the field area. 
Each section discusses the production process, costs and profits for the crop, as well 
as the structure of its markets and associated farmer-trader relations. The chapter 
ends by reflecting on cross-cutting themes relevant for understanding agrarian 
accumulation that emerge through the discussion of different crop dynamics.  
7.1 Paddy 
As discussed in Chapter 4, paddy cultivation was initiated in Punjab in the early 
1970s as a part of the Green Revolution. Paddy is said to have arrived in Khanna 
mandi for the first time in 1974 and government procurement of paddy is said to 
have started in 1976. From then on, the volume has increased continuously. As in the 
rest of the state, paddy emerged as a main cash crop for farmers in the villages 
around Khanna. Paddy was widely grown in almost every village that I visited and 
its life cycle in terms of production and sale constitutes an important part of the year 
for the state, agriculturally and in terms of its wider economy. Yet, the literature 
review showed that the continuous and widespread cultivation of paddy over the past 
few decades has led to declining yields and environmental problems. This section 
sets out the various aspects of production and marketing of the paddy crop in 
Khanna, with a view to bringing to light the ways in which paddy as a commodity 
facilitates accumulation in agriculture. 
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7.1.1 Paddy Production 
There are broadly two types of paddy grown in Punjab – parmal and basmati. 
Parmal are non-aromatic paddy varieties and are purchased by the government. The 
most popular varieties with farmers are Pusa 44, PR 121 and PR 122 as they give the 
highest yields of approximately 30-35 quintals per acre. Over the past several 
decades, the seed varieties for this type of paddy have been primarily developed and 
promoted by the Punjab Agricultural University (PAU). 
Basmati is the aromatic variety sold in the domestic premium and export markets. It 
has only been grown in Khanna in the last decade, i.e. in the period of liberalisation. 
This was made possible by the development of the seed Pusa 1121 by the Indian 
Agricultural Research Institute in 2005, and the fact that exporters found a market 
for the same in the Middle East. More recently, in 2014, Pusa 1509, a higher-
yielding and longer-grained variety was created. Most paddy varieties, including 
Pusa 1121, take around 140 days to mature from nursery-sowing to harvest. The 
maturation period of 1509 is much shorter at 115-120 days. This was considered 
beneficial for farmers as it would allow them to save on irrigation and chemicals 
costs, and especially suited those who cultivate potato (see Section 7.3); however, as 
we will see below, this is only partly true. In the 2014 kharif season basmati was 
grown more widely in the Khanna area than ever before, although still in quantities 
far smaller than parmal. Table 7.1 gives the figures for parmal and basmati crop 
arrival in Khanna mandi in recent years. 
Table 7.1: Percentage of parmal and basmati paddy arrival in the Khanna Market 
Committee (figures in quintals in brackets) 
     Source: Market Committee Office, Khanna 2014-15 
The traditional basmati varieties were originally cultivated in the north-western parts 
of the state in Amritsar and Tarn Taran, Karnal in Haryana, Dehradun in 
Uttarakhand, the Tarai regions of UP and parts of Pakistan. These varieties are 
extremely fragrant but low-yielding. The technological innovations in seeds allowed 
the evolved varieties to retain the prized characteristics of basmati – elongation, 
Type of paddy 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
Parmal 93.6 (2,350,580) 90.4 (2,170,006) 82.7 (2,396,950) 
Basmati 6.4 (160,973) 9.6 (229,373) 17.3 (503,119) 
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aroma and ease of cooking – with attributes such as higher yields and reduced 
discolouration. 
Production Process 
Until recently, farmers in the state used to start transplanting parmal in late May and 
sowed basmati varieties in late June to mid-July. However, in 2009 the state 
government banned transplanting paddy before 10
th
 June in an effort to more closely 
synchronize the transplantation with the monsoon season – thus reducing pressure on 
groundwater resources. The power supply is switched on by the state government on 
this date, although occasionally the date is not strictly adhered to. 
Both kinds of paddy seeds are obtained by the farmers either directly from PAU or 
from government-licensed seed farms and retailers; the paddy seed market has no 
major corporate seed player. Seed retailers usually sell the seeds produced by the 
seed farms for a commission. Sometimes farmers produce their own seeds but being 
hybrids, they lose their potency after one or two seasons. As a result, farmers are 
compelled to purchase new seeds every other year. In fact, agro-input dealers said 
that the big farmers, the more ‘business-minded’ ones, usually purchase fresh seed 
every year to get higher yields. These dealers, based in the villages and in Khanna 
town, are also the chief source of crop chemicals, i.e. fertilizers, pesticides and 
fungicides, for farmers. 
A crucial element for paddy cultivation is irrigation. Once transplanted, paddy 
seedlings need to be in standing water almost consistently for proper growth. As 
discussed earlier, farmers are critically dependent on groundwater for irrigation of 
this crop and use submersible tube wells, colloquially referred to as ‘motor’, to 
extract the water. The Punjab government claims to provide free electricity for 
agricultural purposes for eight hours each day during the peak irrigation periods. But 
farmers unanimously claimed that this was not the case in practice and electricity 
was only available for three to four hours, even at times of peak requirement. 
Therefore, farmers are forced to invest in generators – and the diesel to run them – to 
operate their pumps. This increases their overall costs to such a degree that a few 
farmers even claimed that they would be better off paying for the electricity. It is not 
surprising, then, that the central government’s deregulation of diesel prices in 2014 
which was accompanied by a slump in oil prices came as a huge relief to the farmers, 
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although if and when prices increase again, costs are likely to follow. Again, the 
larger farmers were the ones who had the wherewithal to invest in diesel generators, 
while the small/petty producers claimed the irregularity in electricity supply meant 
they often had to compromise on irrigation – leading to lower yields and less 
income. 
Paddy transplantation is extremely labour-intensive and done almost entirely by 
male migrant labour from Bihar. Agricultural labour gangs, known locally as ‘labour 
parties’, of approximately six to ten men work on paddy fields at the rate of Rs 2,000 
per acre. These gangs are led by a ‘chaudhari’ who is responsible for establishing 
deals with the farmers and bringing enough workers with him for the purpose. 
Usually, every village has around twenty such labour gangs, each working for 
several farmers. The sequence in which the fields are worked naturally depends on 
the sequence in which land is prepared and seedlings are ready. However, labour is 
far from abundant in Khanna and there are other ways in which farmers can assure 
timely transplantation. The labour gangs need immediate cash for their daily 
expenses and farmers who are able to give such advances can get their work 
prioritized. Similarly, the gangs need space to put up their tents and the farmers on 
whose fields they do so have more leverage to get work done by the workers. Again, 
it is the larger, wealthier farmers who are able to extend credit or offer space for the 
gangs to camp. 
After transplantation, the crop has to be maintained through timely sprays of 
chemicals and flooding of the fields. In the case of large farmers, this is often done 
by sanjhis or naukars (attached farm labourers). They could be local Dalit men or 
male migrants from elsewhere. When they are migrants, they are provided with 
accommodation in the farmer’s fields, in the tube well room (‘motor te’). When they 
are local villagers, they could be living either on the farmers’ fields or in their own 
house. The survey found that large farmers primarily growing more than ten acres of 
paddy and wheat almost always employ one or two naukars (Table 7.5) who are paid 
between Rs 4,000 and Rs 9,000 per month on six or twelve month contracts. During 
their period of employment, they are at the beck and call of the farmer. The majority 
of large farmers do not do crop maintenance themselves, even when their holding is 
larger than can be managed by one or two naukars; they prefer to employ labourers 
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(mostly local Dalit men) on a daily basis when needed, In this sense, these capitalist 
farmers function like farm managers.75 
Parmal harvesting, which starts in late September, is done almost entirely by 
combine harvesters. Combines cost around Rs 1,500,000 and usually no more than 
four or five farmers in a village can afford one. All other farmers hire the combines 
to harvest their crop. Fewer farmers use combines for harvesting basmati since it 
causes more grain breakage which leads to a lower price in the market. Harvesting of 
basmati varieties is usually done manually, by labour gangs, a much more expensive 
process than mechanical harvesting. Thus, farmers contend that even though basmati 
is argued to be a more economical crop with its shorter growth cycle and associated 
lower chemicals and irrigation expenses, once labour costs are taken into account 
there is very little difference between the two. It should also be noted that the now 
almost ubiquitous use of combines to harvest parmal has had important 
consequences for market processes (see below). 
After harvesting, farmers burn the paraali (crop stubble). The state government has 
banned the burning of the paraali because it causes a clear and severe deterioration 
of air quality across the state (and beyond) and adversely impacts soil quality. 
Farmers, however, said that any other alternative would delay the schedule for their 
next crop, which they simply could not afford. This is a clear instance of the 
compulsions of time for accumulation within agrarian capitalism creating its own 
ecological crisis.76 
Costs/Profits 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the estimates for costs are approximate. Almost all my 
key farmer-respondents estimated the average cost of producing parmal as Rs 
10,000-Rs 15,000 per acre. Table 7.2 gives a detailed estimate of the production and 
marketing costs for parmal paddy. A couple of farmers stated it can be as high as Rs 
35,000 per acre if the electricity supply and the monsoon are both poor. A prominent 
BKU leader argued that the cost is Rs 70,000 per acre and shared a copy of a letter 
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 It could be asked whether naukars are better off than daily labourers, or how much individual 
labourers make as part of labour gangs. However, answering these questions would require a 
systematic study of labour which is beyond the scope of this research. 
76
 The situation resonates with Bhattacharya’s observation that ‘When the logic of capital gets 
naturalized, seasonalities in general appear intolerable, discontinuities cause worry’ (Bhattacharya 
2012, 7). 
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he had written to the central government to this effect. However, upon cross-
checking the costs listed in the document with other farmers, this figure was found to 
be grossly exaggerated. Therefore, I assume that the average costs are Rs 12,000 per 
acre.77 The yield of government quality paddy is about 30 quintals per acre. The 
MSP for 2014-15, when this fieldwork was conducted, was Rs 1,400 per quintal.78 
Using these figures, the profit on one acre of paddy comes to Rs 30,000. This would 
typically account for half or one-third the year’s income from that acre, depending 
on the cropping cycle followed. 
Table 7.2: Costs of production and marketing of paddy per acre 
Item Cost (Rs) 
Cost of diesel for preparation of land (bahai) (done using tractor) 1,000 
Labour: transplanting paddy 2,000 
Fertilizers 1,000 
Crop chemicals* applied before the seeds sprout 500 
Crop chemicals applied after seeds sprout 700 
Pesticide spray 700 
Labour: spraying chemicals 2,000 
Diesel for irrigation in case of low rainfall or less electricity 2,000 
Harvesting (rent of combine harvester) 2,000 
Total production cost 11,900 
Costs to farmer in the mandi (cleaning and drying of paddy) at 
Rs 5.38 per 37.5kg bag 
430 
Total costs for paddy 12,330 
         Source: Own fieldwork 2014-15 
         *Includes pesticides and weedicides  
 
Several farmers insisted that growing only wheat and paddy is not remunerative – or 
at least not as remunerative as it used to be, a reflection of increasing costs under 
liberalisation (income figures in conjunction with other factors are discussed in 
Chapter 8). However, given the effective administration of the MSP in the state, 
there continues to be a reasonable profit per acre in growing parmal. Nevertheless, 
most farmer leaders argue that the government must increase the MSP substantially. 
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 This is higher than CACP A1 costs of paddy for 2011-12 (Rs 9,038 per acre) (CACP 2014). Thus 
my findings corroborate other studies (Ramachandran et al. 2010; National Commission on Farmers 
2006) and claims of farmers’ unions that the CACP underestimates costs incurred by farmers. 
78
 I found that paddy is sometimes bought by private buyers for Rs 20-50 below MSP, but officially 
recorded as having been bought at the MSP. 
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This was a major election promise of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) in the national 
elections of 2014: however, after coming to power, the party has fallen shy of 
implementing the promise and increased the MSP by a mere Rs 50, i.e. from Rs 
1,350 per quintal in 2013-14 to Rs 1,400 in 2014-15. The returns from basmati are 
more volatile, as will be seen below. 
7.1.2 Paddy Markets 
Paddy: Government Procurement 
a. In the Mandi: 
Parmal is also referred to as ‘government quality’ paddy because the government 
purchases all the parmal arriving in Punjab’s mandis. All farmers who grow wheat 
and paddy have fixed commission agents or arhtias in the grain market. These arhtias 
are fixed because usually they are the source of credit for these farmers; repayment 
is through the sale of the crop at the arhtia’s shop. The arhtia gets a commission of 
2.5% from the buyer, in this case the State, on all food grains sold from his shop. 
Credit relations are discussed further in Chapter 9. 
Paddy is procured by five state agencies: Pungrain (part of the Department of Food 
and Civil Supplies, Punjab); Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Limited (locally 
called Agro); Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (Warehouse); Markfed; and, 
Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited (Punsup). Of these, Pungrain is the 
nodal state level agency and, among other things, it is responsible for deciding the 
quantity of food grain to be procured by each agency. The FCI also procures paddy 
directly, but in much smaller quantities than the state agencies. Significantly, the 
state agencies make all procurement on behalf of the FCI. This has implications for 
the manner in which procurement is carried out at the field level (see below). Paddy 
needs to be processed – shelled and cleaned – to be converted into rice. Ultimately, 
the FCI stores the rice which it then re-distributes nationally through the PDS. This 
need for processing brings rice mills or ‘shellers’, as they are also known, into the 
picture. The individual milling capacity of the 55 rice mills in Khanna ranges from 
one to five tonnes per hour. Figure 7.1 shows the key agents of the parmal market. 
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Figure 7.1: Key agents in parmal market 
While the FCI procures the paddy from the mandi and stores it in its own facilities, 
the state agencies have no storage capacity of their own. This, I argue, explains to a 
great extent the way in which the actual paddy procurement process differs from that 
stated in the rules. The process through which the rice mills process paddy and 
deliver rice to the FCI is called ‘custom milling’ and the central government 
publishes updated schedules and rules each year. Since the state agencies have no 
storage capacity of their own, they store the paddy they purchase with the rice mills. 
Once the rice mills have the paddy at their mill, they are legally bound to deliver 
67% rice from the paddy to the FCI. Moreover, the delivered rice needs to meet 
certain quality specifications, otherwise it is rejected. These specifications include a 
maximum of 14% moisture, 3% broken grain, 3% damaged grain and 3% 
discoloured grain. 
The rice has to be delivered to the FCI by a set deadline, either in March or June. 
Several arhtias and mill owners argued that the FCI has become much more stringent 
over the years about the rice meeting the quality standards. On the other hand, the 
state agencies are under political pressure to buy every grain of parmal produced by 
the farmers. The combination of these issues forms the basis of the power of the rice 
mills in the procurement process. The main issue is that they are indispensable in 
terms of their processing function and work between the state and the central 
government, using the constraints of the former and being constrained by the latter. 
The actual rule is that when a mound (dheri) of parmal is to be sold, a quality 
inspector from the state agency has to inspect it and ascertain if it can be sold on the 
same day or needs to be dried further. What really happens is that the inspector 
merely records the sale in the Auction Register without actually doing an inspection. 
The decision on purchases is actually taken by representatives of the shellers, their 
foremen. Officials from state agencies visit the mandi at designated auction hours 
but only to record purchases; the foremen are the ones examining the quality of the 
paddy, speaking to the arhtia and deciding whether or not to buy. As one agency 
inspector said, ‘The foremen of shellers come and inspect the paddy. They are 
experts. They can tell just by feeling and weighing the paddy by hand what the 
Farmers → Arhtias → State Level Agency → Rice Mill → FCI 
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moisture of the paddy is, the weight of the rice, and so on’. If, for example, the 
paddy moisture content is too high (the permitted percentage at the time of 
procurement is 17% although mills will sometimes accept up to 20%), then the mills 
can refuse to purchase the paddy that day and ask the arhtias to dry it further. They 
can also flatly refuse to buy it. 
Further, some arhtias and government staff claim that Pungrain’s allotment of which 
agency buys from which arhtia shop is done row-wise, according to the amount of 
crop arrival at any shop and each rice mill’s capacity. However, the allocation can 
also be done on different grounds, i.e.  based on existing business or informal 
relations between the arhtia and mill owners. As one arhtia said, ‘if we have an 
established relationship with a rice mill owner or we have invested in it (‘humnein 
usmein hissa daal diya’) or they have become an honoured relation (‘lihaazi’), then 
the sheller can be changed. An application has to be made to the Market Committee 
for that’. Mill owners who also have arhtia shops lift the crop from their own shop, 
irrespective of the row their shop falls in. Similarly, arhtia shops can be allocated to 
mills if the arhtias and mill owners have ‘good relations’, as everyone likes to say. 
At least in one case I know of, the daughter of the arhtia and the son of the rice mill 
owner are married.  
When this is the case, mills are more likely to accept below par paddy from the 
arhtia’s shop more easily. Varun Seth, a key Mahajan arhtia-respondent said: 
The last shop [in this row] is Punsup’s; the next shop is closed – they 
have a branch elsewhere. Ours is Markfed, the next shop does not 
work from here, the next is something else… Actually, this system 
works without any government interference. We have an agreement 
with the rice sheller; whether it is a moist mound [of paddy] or a dry 
mound, I can get any kind of crop lifted by the sheller. After all, the 
government does not have to lift the crop; the sheller has to do that. 
The quality of the paddy is a problem especially in relation to its moisture levels, 
which in turn is linked to the shift from manual harvesting to mechanical. The 
former took a few days to be completed so the crop was adequately dried by the time 
it reached the mandi. However, since combines complete harvesting more quickly, 
often within a day, the moisture in the paddy when it reaches the mandi is almost 
never below 19% and this often becomes a point of contention between the farmer, 
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arhtia and mill owner. The following incident narrated by Jaspal Singh, another key 
arhtia-respondent (Jat), is telling: 
In the next shop, one of his farmers, a small farmer, he got very moist 
paddy. In the village, the combine-owners just say that we will cut this 
one’s paddy, then that one’s, then come to your fields. It was late by 
the time they cut it. The small farmers get scared and give in but the 
big farmers can refuse and say ‘No, we won’t get it cut from you 
today’. But one has to pay the price of mistakes. The crop was cut 
wrongly, when it was too wet. When the labourers wanted to open the 
bags so that it could get some ventilation, the farmer refused…The 
sheller refused to pick it up because the moisture content was 22-23%. 
If the sheller or the arhtia says to keep this paddy for two days, then it 
is best to do so. Nirap Singh cut paddy in his field and got two trolleys 
to our shop yesterday. The paddy was perfectly ripe and the sheller 
saw it and said to bag it straightaway. The formal auction for it will 
happen today. 
This reveals the kind of everyday issues that emerge in the mandi due to moisture 
levels at the time of procurement.  Moreover, Nirap Singh, the farmer mentioned by 
this arhtia who brought in the perfect crop, is a wealthy and powerful farmer in his 
village. This quote then also brings into sharp relief the subtle, ‘everyday’ aspects of 
production that disadvantage small farmers vis-à-vis larger, richer ones.  
There is further evidence of the informal arrangements that exist between arhtias and 
rice mills. During fieldwork, paddy procurement by state agencies was to start on 1
st
 
October but the arhtias went on strike. The central government had suddenly 
declared that every jute bag (bardana) had to be filled with 40kg of paddy instead of 
35kg but the arhtias claimed that the bags were not big enough and the order made 
no sense. The matter was resolved after ten days and the amount of paddy per bag 
reduced to 37.5kg. However, during the strike, three or four arhtias told me that they 
were already sending the paddy that was coming in to the mills on kachi (informal) 
receipts, the mills were accepting it and that once the government started its 
procurement, they would write appropriately dated formal receipts. The arhtias claim 
they had no choice because otherwise, with the amount of paddy coming in every 
day, there would be no space in the mandi to store it. Indeed, between the beginning 
of October and end of November, the arrivals at Khanna mandi are in such large 
quantities that the arhtias struggle to manage it within their phads (allocated spaces). 
During the peak procurement season, I occasionally witnessed arhtias argue with 
each other over this space. 
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Once the crop is approved for purchase, it is cleaned, packed in jute bags and 
transported to the mills. In further evidence of the limited formal role of the state 
agencies in this, an inspector stated: 
Previously, when the filling was done, an agency person would be 
sitting there to write the gate pass and then a Market Committee 
person would be at the gate to check. But they don’t check anymore; 
everyone knows that the bags will be correct. This is because the 
arhtia will not send more bags than he has to and the sheller will not 
take less than he is supposed to get. If more bags were loaded at the 
mandi than are unloaded at the mill, it is the responsibility of the 
transporter. 
In terms of the procurement process, an important distinction emerged between 
arhtias and an arhtia-cum-rice mill owners. While the former are dependent on the 
agencies and the rice mills they are linked to for the procurement of paddy from their 
shops, the arhtia-cum-rice mill owners are able to conduct the procurement swiftly 
even when the paddy does not meet the moisture specifications because they have 
storage space for drying in the mill. The arhtia-cum-mill owners, therefore, are better 
placed to capture more business in the mandi. However, the expansion of business in 
the mandi is not that straightforward and in any case, no more than 15-20% of 
arhtias are arhtia-cum-mill owners. Arhtias confessed that sometimes farmers 
complained when the paddy at other shops was lifted first but they were helpless in 
this regard. An arhtia-cum-mill owner, on the other hand, admitted: 
It is beneficial for the farmers to be attached to us because 
whatever crop they bring to us, the agency need not be involved – 
in the sense of when it will come for auction, etc. Whether they 
bring the paddy at night or during the day, we get it lifted. We also 
get it dried since we have space. It is not according to the rules, but 
this is what happens. 
In this context, maintaining good relations with rice mills is a necessary trick of the 
trade for those who are only arhtias. In the words of one of my key respondents: 
On the record, arhtias and shellers have no relations. The arhtia has 
a relation with the inspector. He tells the arhtia which sheller to 
send the stock to. But off the record, there is a direct relationship 
between arhtia and sheller. The government only writes the 
information about who and how much. 
The above discussion indicates the fact that social networks are crucial for 
procurement operations to run smoothly.  
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b. The Business of Milling: 
As mentioned above, mills have to produce and submit 67% rice, to quality 
specifications, from the paddy that they receive through the procurement process. If 
the paddy does not yield 67% rice, they have to buy in rice privately from elsewhere 
to make up the specified amount. The mills also have to make private purchases to 
meet the allowances for imperfect grain mentioned earlier because the relatively 
poor quality of paddy received from the mandis results in higher proportion of 
imperfect grain than permissible. Mills are constrained by this but also benefit from 
the fact that they are allowed to keep and trade the 33% by-products from processing 
paddy. 
Several respondents – arhtias, mill owners and state agency officials – argue that the 
rice yield from paddy has declined over the years from approximately 70% to 62-
64%. Yet, the FCI makes no concession in this regard and follows what is 
considered to be an outdated system. Any deficit from the required 67% is made up 
by mill owners purchasing cheaper and somewhat poorer quality rice, usually from 
Bihar but also from UP, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. This is done through 
traders and brokers. Not many like to talk about this rice as it is brought into the state 
illegally. Therefore, there is private trade in rice but not in parmal paddy that is sold 
by local farmers. Purchase of rice from other states adds to the mills’ regular 
expenses on machinery and labour, as well as the large bribes they invariably have to 
pay to the FCI during the submission of the rice. This is one of the reasons why mill 
owners sometimes refuse or delay the procurement of halki (light), i.e. low-yield, 
rice. 
Similarly, the problems with moisture levels stem from similar constraints. Higher 
moisture content implies that the mills have to incur higher labour expenses in 
drying out the paddy. While the maximum moisture level at the time of the 
procurement is 17%, it is 14% in the rice delivered by the mills to the FCI. Rice with 
a 15% moisture level may be accepted against a ‘value cut’, i.e. a cut in the milling 
charges paid to the shellers. Just before the procurement season started in October 
2014, the central government suspended this provision. The mills went on strike and 
forced the government to reverse its order. So, even when farmers insist that their 
paddy is of good quality, mills may refuse or delay purchases from the mandi on 
these grounds, leading to harassment and occasionally prices lower than the MSP. 
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The large capitalist farmers get the best quality paddy to the mandi and their crop is 
lifted with the least amount of hassle. 
In 2010, the rice mills also forced the government to withdraw the newly introduced 
paddy seed variety PAU-201 from the market, arguing that it had a higher 
percentage of discolouration and broken grains. This, they argued, added to their 
costs. Farmers, on the other hand, complained that this variety had higher yields and 
that the government had buckled under pressure from the rice mill owners. This 
variety was also argued to be shorter duration and less water-intensive (Seth 2010). 
This reveals the power of the rice mills but it also says something about the FCI and 
the central government. There is both evidence and consensus at the field level that 
amending specifications in the custom milling process would benefit both farmers 
and mills to adopt such varieties. However, there is no indication that this will 
happen. In fact, the government wants to withdraw the FCI from procurement in 
Punjab entirely according to the Shanta Kumar Committee Report 2015. 
Until fairly recently (traders put this date variously between ten to almost twenty 
years ago), ‘levy’ was quite prevalent in Punjab. Levy was another route through 
which the FCI procured rice. As per the Punjab Rice Procurement (Levy) Order 
1983, levy in licensed mills is the percentage of rice that the mill is legally obliged to 
sell to the government at a price determined by the government. Under this system, 
the rice mills would purchase paddy from the mandi with their own resources and 
sell 75% of the processed rice from this to the FCI; they were free to sell the 
remaining rice as they deemed fit. Sans the legal terminology, levy basically allowed 
for private trade in rice, which custom milling does not allow. 
I was unable to find out the exact timeline of the changes vis-à-vis levy rice in 
Punjab or the ways in which the procurement process under levy at the field level 
was different. However, the custom milling policies from a few years ago reflect the 
reduced importance of levy rice, as they made the latter contingent on completing 
custom milling. In fact, Punjab (and Haryana) abolished levy rice in 2013, followed 
by the rest of the country in 2015 (Das 2015). It was argued that the removal of levy 
would compel states to strengthen their procurement systems and ensure that farmers 
are not exploited by rice mills. However, in Punjab, the MSP has always been 
effectively administered. What, then, can explain this shift away from levy rice? 
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Most of my respondents argued that it happened because profits in levy or private 
trade of rice began to decline, and the mills themselves were not keen on continuing. 
They argue that this decline coincided with the increase in paddy production in other 
states (such as West Bengal and Chhattisgarh) and decline in the demand for parmal 
paddy produced in Punjab.79 It is even argued that without custom milling of the kind 
that exists today, paddy produced in Punjab would have no buyers, even within the 
state. 
One mill owner argued that the disadvantage of custom milling is that the mill can 
only be run for some months, implying underutilised mill capacity and I witnessed 
mill owners asking Pungrain officials to allocate greater amounts of paddy to them at 
the beginning of the procurement season. However, most of the mill owners I met 
agreed that the system is quite beneficial to them because they do not have to pay for 
the paddy, and can make money on the by-products. In late October 2014, well after 
the start of the official paddy procurement season, and with very little discussion, the 
central government declared that the milling charges, which had been Rs 15 per 
quintal of rice for the previous 20-30 years, were reduced to Rs 10. However, there 
was no resistance from the mills. The reasoning behind this was that the sale of the 
33% by-products was seemingly enough for mills to cover their costs as well as 
make a profit. In fact, if one considers that the mills do not pay for the raw material, 
i.e. paddy, under custom milling, their profit from the sale of by-products is 
effectively pure profit.80 
The by-products are the rice bran or polish, the broken rice or nakku, and husk. Bran 
is sold to solvent industries which extract oil from it and pay the mills according to 
its oil content. These industries also produce de-oiled cakes which are sold to 
different feed mills. The broken rice is sold to alcohol distilleries. Husk is sold to 
any industry that is willing to buy it to burn it as fuel, for example brick kilns, tyre 
factories, furnaces, etc. 
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 This corroborates the argument made by Chand (2008) that since the late 1980s/early 1990s Punjab 
has been producing rice (and wheat) in surplus much greater than the deficit at the national level. 
80
 Mill owners argue that in addition to operational costs that are compensated by the FCI, they have 
to pay many bribes (documented by Kaur et al. (2007)). But at least in some cases, these bribes are for 
violating the rules so presumably it is more economical for them to pay bribes than follow the rule. 
Sometimes, the bribes are extracted by government officials in which case refusal to pay would 
impact the mill adversely. 
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One arhtia contemptuously and perhaps enviously exclaimed that running a rice mill 
for government milling requires no entrepreneurial skills whatsoever precisely 
because they do not have to invest their own money in the business. Obviously, this 
cannot be entirely true and some mills incur losses. One of my respondents, Ashok 
Bahl, explained how they incurred large losses in 2009-10 in the rice mill he co-
owned and operated at the time due to excessive breakage in the paddy variety and 
some mismanagement on their part. The president of one of the rice millers 
associations of Punjab, based in Jalandhar district, argued that more mills incur 
losses than is evident. However, these losses were not studied systematically in this 
research. Kaur et al. (2007) have noted that while some mills have zero net earnings, 
most earn above a million annually. I contend that the fact that mill owners are 
exempt from investment in raw material is the reason the industry has continued to 
attract new entrants over the years. It is also one of the most sought after avenues for 
diversification among arhtias. 
c. Delayed Payments: 
On 18
th
 October, 2014, three weeks into the official procurement season, came news 
that the FCI had stopped procurement payments to the state agencies. Under the 
existing arrangements, the state agencies receive handling charges from the FCI, 
which they then use to pay the arhtias. The state government was unable to 
ameliorate the situation, being in a financial crisis of its own. In this context, it is 
understandable why the stopping of payment became such a big issue in the mandi. 
Arhtias pay their labourers and farmers only after they have been paid by the 
agencies. With no central funding, the state agencies could not pay the arhtias and so 
the farmers and labourers went unpaid, creating a crisis of payments in the mandi. 
One arhtia said that the children of two of his farmer-clients were getting married the 
next month and they needed the money from the crop. I witnessed farmers asking 
arhtias for money and being refused at multiple shops since the payments had not 
arrived. Some arhtias dipped into their own coffers to pay at least some of the 
farmers’ expenses, but not everyone was as ‘generous’. 
The problem happened ostensibly because the centre claimed that it had already paid 
the necessary amount to Punjab over the previous years, and unless the state 
government produced papers showing otherwise, the centre would not release more 
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money. The state government, a BJP-SAD coalition, had the reputation of being 
extraordinarily corrupt, and it was suspected that the government had misused the 
money. A more plausible explanation seems to be that the real power tussle between 
BJP and SAD at the state level prompted the centre to hit the SAD where it would 
hurt them the most – the latter’s core support comes from Jat farmers. On 5
th
 
November, a large protest (dharna) was organised in the mandi outside the Pungrain 
office and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Khanna had to come to placate the 
protesting arhtias and farmers. The arhtias leading this protest were Congress-
affiliated, and used this opportunity to mock the state government. A popular line of 
argument in the mandi, also oft-quoted in regular conversations, went along the lines 
of: ‘When the Congress was in power at the centre, the Badals [SAD leaders] said 
they meted out step-motherly [i.e. bad] treatment to Punjab. But now its mother and 
father are at the centre [i.e. BJP], so what is the problem?’ Jaspal Singh is a member 
of the SAD and I was in his shop when his pro-Congress neighbour came to call him 
to join the protest. He hesitated a lot before going because he saw it as a Congress 
protest. 
This entire episode revealed the mandi to be an important site of political 
contestation, a theme revisited in Section 7.2. Leaving the protest aside, even day-to-
day conversations about the state of affairs in the mandi would often become a 
discussion on the parties in power. Numerous arhtias and some farmers said that the 
Congress government, led by Captain Amarinder Singh, was the most beneficial for 
the mandi.81 This is not surprising since Khanna mandi was said to be dominated by 
Congress supporters. But what is relevant to this research is that this politicisation is 
only possible because paddy and wheat-growing farmers are critical of the economy 
and the politics of Punjab. In fact, the protests by arhtias in Khanna mandi and other 
places across the state were effective, and despite the complaints, most arhtias and 
their accountants seemed quite confident that sooner or later the payment would 
come; payments were eventually reinstated in instalments from 8
th
 November 
onwards. This episode also reflected the increasingly constrained federalism that 
exists in India, a relatively greater problem in Punjab owing to its troubled political 
history. While agriculture is a state subject, the states in themselves are crucially 
dependent on the centre for facilitating its development. The destiny of the farmers 
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 Captain Amarinder Singh was re-elected as the Chief Minister of Punjab in March 2017. 
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in Punjab, therefore, hangs on the balance of the centre-state relations. Additionally, 
this episode indicates how arhtias are able to leverage party politics for their own 
interests. 
Basmati: Private Procurement 
Since the effective disappearance of ‘levy’ from Khanna’s grain markets, basmati 
returned private players into the paddy market significantly. As mentioned before, 
basmati is meant mainly for the export market; the arhtias unanimously state that its 
production in and around Khanna is linked directly to the opening up of basmati 
markets in the Middle East. Moreover, since export markets and private 
agribusinesses are central to development policy under liberalisation, basmati 
purchasers/mills/firms have also been exempted from paying market fees in the grain 
mandis of Khanna. 
According to senior management of basmati companies, the industry started 
expanding in the late 1980s as many Hindu traders moved from Punjab to Delhi due 
to Sikh militancy. Many of the traders were from the traditional basmati-growing 
areas, which were also the core areas of militancy. Based in Delhi, these traders 
realized that good quality basmati were also grown in Haryana, and they started 
investing in small mills there. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Haryana 
continues to have a far greater number of, and larger, basmati mills than Punjab. 
Many traders and different kinds of mill owners I interviewed were also of the view 
that the Punjab government’s policies are not conducive to industrial development. 
There are large and small basmati mills in Punjab as well, but most of them are in 
the traditional basmati belt of the state, Amritsar, Muktsar and Tarn Taran. The main 
issue is that these firms and their owners are not native to the field area being studied 
here, a point I return to below. In 1989, the firms engaged in rice exports, a big part 
of which was basmati, organised themselves into the All India Rice Exporters 
Association, which continues to be influential in shaping relevant policy for the 
industry. Mills that existed in Punjab and Haryana continued to be largely localized 
and small-scale until the early 1990s. Finances became available in the 1990s with 
changes in credit norms (Section 3.4.2), which allowed them to expand. 
Simultaneously, new varieties started being developed (discussed earlier). 
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Interviews with pucca arhtias and mill owners revealed that some of the biggest 
basmati mills in Punjab and Haryana have at some point done custom milling of 
parmal for the government. Since custom milling was well-managed by the state and 
central governments, it allowed mills to create reserves of capital which were 
invested in the basmati trade and milling. While some mills gave up custom milling, 
others continue as it is an assured, low-risk business. A basmati mill I visited that 
had opened in 2014 in Nawanshahr, 60km north of Khanna, followed the same 
strategy of using custom milling as a buffer while finding its feet in the basmati 
market. Moreover, as indicated above, not all basmati mills are large-scale. Some 
smaller ones process paddy for some of the bigger mills. Some parmal and basmati 
mills also engage in trading and packing of basmati rice. This is because entering the 
export market requires large-scale operations, investment in branding and 
establishing trading networks abroad, not available to everyone. The establishment 
of basmati mills also requires much more capital investment than that for a regular 
rice mill, especially for storage and grading of grains, in order to process the paddy 
into rice of sufficient quality to be competitive in export and high-end domestic 
markets. Only those with already existing rice mills or other kinds of industries are 
likely to venture into this. 
a. Pucca Arhtias: 
Despite the growth of basmati production in the Khanna area, there are no 
operational basmati mills. The only one that exists never became fully operational 
and at the time of fieldwork was closed due to legal problems. The basmati 
purchasers in Khanna mandi come from elsewhere in Punjab and Haryana. Basmati 
mills/firms appoint representatives (pucca arhtias) in different mandis, who make 
purchases on their behalf for a commission of 1%. Historically, pucca arhtias in the 
mandi have worked with other crops (e.g. sunflower and maize); now pucca arhtias 
in basmati have emerged as important actors owing to the sheer volume of basmati 
that has started arriving in mandis such as Khanna in recent years. Figure 7.2 shows 
the key agents in the basmati market. 
152 
Farmer → Arhtia → Pucca Arhtia → Basmati Mill/Company 
Figure 7.2: Key agents in basmati market 
Any arhtia or trader in the mandi can be appointed as a pucca arhtia by a firm. In 
Khanna mandi, the pucca arhtias for basmati firms include arhtias, arhtia-cum-mill 
owners and brokers. The way in which traders are appointed as pucca arhtias for a 
firm is not fixed and depends on the trading networks of each trader/firm and on 
whether they have the means to manage an operation of that scale. Some of the 
pucca arhtias for big basmati firms are the biggest arhtias in the mandi or are arhtias 
with other businesses such as rice mills or distilleries. Connections play a role here: 
one brokerage firm landed the assignment from one of the biggest basmati firms 
because in the past they had managed to broker a crucial deal for the firm which 
saved the firm from a big legal problem of its own making. 
The pucca arhtia participates in the auction (boli) on behalf of the firm and makes 
the purchases. During the auctions, there are usually at least 6-7 pucca arhtias 
bidding. They can be seen on their phones, often discussing the going rates in the 
mandi with someone in the firm to confirm if it is acceptable. Once the purchase is 
made, the pucca arhtia arranges the transportation of the paddy from the mandi to the 
basmati mill at the firm’s cost. The pucca arhtia also draws up the bill for the arhtia 
and the farmers for the payment to be made by the basmati firm. However, as the 
next section shows, there have been major problems with payments for the basmati 
crop. 
b. Market Volatility and Purchasing Politics: 
The rule in the mandi is that payment for the basmati crop has to be made by the 
tenth day from when the bill is made. Any delay after that requires the purchaser to 
pay the arhtia interest of 1.5% on the amount due. A few years ago, this erupted into 
a massive problem as some firms were flouting the rule. During one of my earliest 
visits to the mandi, when the paddy procurement season of 2014 was just around the 
corner, I happened to attend a meeting of the Khanna grain mandi’s Arhtia 
Association where heated discussions were taking place about this. A prominent 
basmati firm in Punjab had made huge purchases from the mandi but, almost a year 
later, had still not paid the principal amount to most of the arhtias. The meeting was 
about boycotting that mill in the mandi in the 2014 purchase season starting in late 
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September/October. The pucca arhtia for the firm was trying to prevent the boycott 
since he had a vested interest in earning a commission from sales to this firm. 
Ultimately, the firm was boycotted in the mandi and by mid-2015, even though the 
principal amount had been paid, the interest was still owed. In such situations, pucca 
arhtias, in principle, stand as guarantor, but in reality there is no way a single pucca 
arhtia could pay tens of millions in compensation. 
It is important to understand why such delays in payment pose a problem for both 
arhtias and farmers. Arhtias usually recover their advance from the sale of the crop 
and give the balance to the farmer. At the end of a crop cycle, farmers often need 
more money than they earn from the sale of the crop. When there is a delay in 
payments by the purchaser, the arhtias nevertheless, sooner or later, have to give the 
money due to the farmer from their own coffers: this was corroborated in 
conversation with some farmers who confirmed that they had been paid for their 
basmati crop while their arhtias were yet to receive the full payment from the firm. 
Arhtias are, therefore, somewhat wary of the growth in basmati. It is a business 
where the power rests with the basmati firms, many of whom they do not know 
personally: unlike custom milling where they can manage many things based on 
their ‘relations’ with the mills, here they face the full brunt of the risk. It is in this 
context that one arhtia told me that basmati is a ‘khatre ki ghanti’ (alarm bell) for 
their business. Alluding to the declining importance of personal links and word of 
honour in trade, another commented that ‘vapaar mein vapaar wali baat nahin rahi’ 
(trade is not what it used to be). This shows both the significance of social networks 
for local market operations and the way in which non-local corporate capital is 
challenging this mode of business.  
In the 2014 purchase season, basmati paddy prices were significantly lower than the 
previous year. From a high of Rs 4,500 per quintal in 2013, in 2014 even the best 
basmati failed to achieve more than Rs 3,000 per quintal. Most farmers with whom I 
spoke about costs said rates averaged out at Rs 2,500 per quintal. The implications 
for the income of farmers are discussed later. Here it is important to note that the fall 
in prices led to reduced commission for the arhtias, as well as lower recovery of 
advances. 
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Prices were expected to recover towards the end of season; instead, they continued to 
fall. There were several reasons for this. The high prices in 2013 had led to a large 
increase in the acreage of basmati paddy cultivated by farmers across the state so 
while the supply of basmati increased, demand crashed. The major increase in 
basmati exports since 2011-12 was due to demand from Iran; it accounted for over 
one-third of India’s total basmati rice exports in 2013-14 (see Das 2014). However, 
this led to a glut and Iran stopped issuing new contracts in late 2013. Basmati mills, 
therefore, had large unsold stocks of rice and struggled to recover their costs. This 
led to a delay in payment to the arhtias, brokers and mills who worked with the 
paddy by-products creating a tense financial situation in the rice industry and, 
reportedly, many small mills closing. 
In addition, in May 2015, news came that the basmati mills would not purchase any 
basmati of the 1509 variety in the 2015 purchase season. The basmati firms stated 
this was because the high broken grain percentage after processing of 1509 made it 
an unviable investment, although this could not be verified. This is an interesting 
case where the scientific community hailed a seed variety as being economical for 
farmers but it failed the test of the market. It is possible the firms could have used it 
by mixing it with other basmati when demand was high – but since demand had 
slumped in general, they withdrew completely from purchase of this variety. 
The situation was so grim that the Arhtia Association of Punjab declared that no 
arhtia would lend money to farmers against basmati and that farmers would receive 
payment for their crop only after the arhtias had been paid by the buyers. Some of 
my key arhtia-respondents said that they were lending less or not at all against 
basmati for the next crop cycle. However, there were others who decided to lend 
nevertheless since they believed that business is about taking risk. Moreover, since 
their business depends on their credit relations with farmers, it was not always 
possible to turn away farmers who asked for loans. 
The basmati payment deadlock was ultimately broken by the state government. 
Keeping its vote bank in mind, the Punjab government ordered its state agencies to 
purchase the crop at the parmal MSP. However, the FCI, which is a central agency, 
refused. Two private agri-logistics firms were employed to store the grains on behalf 
of Pungrain. It decided to release the paddy to the rice mills for shelling before 
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delivering it to the FCI against cash security, another FCI procurement scheme.82 
This episode shows the political weight of the arhtias and farmers engaged in paddy 
in the state. For farmers, it shows their collective political weight in state level 
politics, also discussed in Chapter 4. For arhtias, it shows how the State can 
intervene to protect arhtias from the full impact of liberalisation.  
What does this volatile market mean for farmers? Firstly, there was a clear drop in 
income from basmati in 2014 due to the fall in prices. As mentioned earlier, most 
farmers agree that the cost of cultivating basmati is the same as for parmal.83 Assume 
that the cost of one acre of basmati is Rs 12,000. In the fieldwork area, the basmati 
paddy yield averages 17 quintals per acre (despite the claims of government, 
scientists and journalists that the yield can be as high as 25). At 2013 prices, 
averaging at around Rs 3500, the average profit on an acre of basmati would have 
been Rs 47,500. In 2014, at the average price of Rs 2500, it would have been Rs 
30,500, roughly the same as for parmal. At these lower rates, therefore, there is no 
advantage to growing basmati. 
Interestingly, the rates were slightly higher in Haryana than in Punjab, and I heard 
from arhtias and farmers in the mandi that some farmers were taking their crop to 
Cheeka mandi in Haryana, just across the state border and about 100km from 
Khanna. One arhtia said, ‘The rates of basmati are set from Haryana because most of 
the mills are there. The rates are Rs 100-150 less here because of the cost of 
transportation’. Another said, ‘They [the traders and mills in Cheeka] accept paddy 
with a moisture content of 30% as well. This is because they have plants over there 
for parboiled rice.84 In Khanna, there is no such plant’. If farmers sell their crops in 
another mandi, the local arhtias lose business, especially commission. The 
underlying tension this creates is captured in this exchange between an arhtia and a 
farmer sitting in his shop while in conversation with me: 
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 Cash security refers to procurement whereby ‘the paddy [is] lifted [i.e. procured] by a rice miller 
after making payment to Pungrain at the rates and norms as prescribed from time to time by the 
Government’ (Government of Punjab 2011). This is different from the procurement of parmal 
described above where the state agencies are the actual buyers of the paddy. 
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 Chaba (2015b) reports much higher production costs for basmati at Rs 1,800-2,000 per quintal for 
2014-15. At 17 quintals per acre, the cost would be Rs 30,000 per acre. However, it is unclear if this 
data was collected systematically. The discrepancy could also stem from the fact that Chaba’s report 
is based on a different region (Doaba).  
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 Parboiled rice has greater demand in international markets than raw rice (Kaur et al. 2007) and is 
one of the products produced by basmati mills.  
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Farmer: When a farmer takes his crop to Cheeka, then the arhtia also 
says to him that you might as well take the advances for your 
expenses also from the arhtia in Cheeka. We have ‘nau maas ka 
rishta’ [relation of nine months]85 with the arhtia. 
Arhtia (annoyed): Everything would have got sold here; what is the 
need to go to Cheeka? 
The 2014 price slump and the reluctance of arhtias to lend against basmati prompted 
many farmers to abandon it for the 2015 kharif season. However, there were some 
large farmers who still grew it as they believed that good quality basmati would 
fetch high prices. This is a risk only large capitalists can take. However, even in 
good years, these farmers hold some of their paddy back in small stores in their 
homes waiting for better rates. This is not an option they exercise with parmal as 
they would not get more than to the MSP in any case. This is also precisely why a 
well-administered MSP in parmal is so beneficial for small farmers; they can get the 
MSP despite bringing inferior quality paddy to the mandi. Unsurprisingly, BKU 
leaders are demanding an MSP for basmati, and some farmers and millers are asking 
for a minimum export price to be established. On the other hand, some basmati 
millers are opposed to an MSP as it would impact their claims to a premium price in 
the world market. By purchasing the 1509 crop at the MSP in 2015, however, the 
government has in some ways given in to the farmers’ demands, and an MSP is 
always beneficial for the arhtias as well. 
7.1.3 Conclusion 
Paddy, whether parmal or basmati, is a kharif crop that is labour- and water-
intensive. The market structure and dynamics for the two different kinds of paddy 
are, however, entirely different – one is dominated by the State and the other by 
private firms. The common element is that processing is essential. Since paddy needs 
to be processed to be useful as rice, rice mills are important actors in the field, 
although they function on different terms in each market. 
In the parmal paddy market, the central government holds more power than the state 
government since the procurement is carried out on its orders and behalf. But the 
state government carries greater pressure of the political exigencies. Partly due to the 
tension between the centre and the state, rice mills engaged in custom milling have 
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 Here, ‘nine months’ is a reference to giving birth and the phrase as a whole means that farmers 
have a relation with arhtia ‘from birth onwards’.  
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more power in the procurement process than is apparent. In the everyday politics of 
procurement, the rice mills have the most power. Moreover, the system is geared to 
allow mills to reap virtually pure profits from trading in the processing by-products.  
The arhtias benefit from state-led procurement since they receive a fixed commission 
on the fixed price crops they handle. 
Basmati, on the other hand, marks a resurgence of private trade in paddy in Khanna. 
Given that it only grows well in Haryana, Punjab and a few other neighbouring 
areas, it represents a kind of accumulation process specific to this region. Its export-
orientation embodies the dynamics of liberalisation. Like other export-oriented 
crops, basmati is subject to the volatility of external markets. It also threatens the 
existing exchange and credit relations in Punjab’s mandis, since arhtias have to bear 
the burden of delayed payments from basmati mills. Since the basmati mills are not 
local, the arhtias have no informal leverage with them for payment unlike the custom 
milling rice mills for parmal. 
The farmers, large and small, depend on parmal for an assured income. Wealthier 
capitalist farmers are more able to invest in production requirements in a timely 
manner than others; consequently, smaller farmers may very occasionally get rates 
below the MSP in addition to incurring further costs in the mandi. Nevertheless, all 
farmers receive a roughly similar guaranteed amount. Basmati prices, on the other 
hand, have proven to be extremely volatile and its production, therefore, involves 
greater risk. This is disadvantageous for farmers who are unable or unwilling to take 
the risk. Both for farmers and traders, basmati is in some ways an indicator of things 
to come were the FCI to withdraw from paddy procurement in Punjab in future. So 
far at least, the political clout of the state’s large farmers and arhtias has weighed 




Unlike paddy, wheat has been grown in Punjab and sold in its grain markets since 
colonial times. Wheat is the staple cereal consumed by people in north-western 
India, and the climatic conditions are well-suited to its cultivation. However, like 
paddy, its production and marketing were transformed by the Green Revolution. 
This section discusses how this food-cum-cash crop fits into the accumulation 
trajectory of farmers in contemporary Punjab. 
7.2.1 Wheat Production 
Wheat is sown by the first half of November and harvesting starts in early April. 
Around 80-90% of wheat grown in Khanna area is PBW 343, the most popular 
variety since the Green Revolution. One large farmer in Khanna said he prefers to 
cultivate this variety since it is the most disease resistant and has high demand as it 
makes good bread. However, news reports in recent years have reported that this 
variety has increasingly been affected by a disease called yellow rust and it is slowly 
being replaced by a new variety, HD 2967, which was introduced by PAU in 2011.86 
As with paddy, no major transnational or domestic corporations are involved in the 
production of wheat seeds. The seeds are bought either from the university or 
licensed seed farms. Farmers also occasionally use their own seeds. 
Grown by most farmers after the paddy crop, the sowing of wheat requires six to 
eight rounds of tillage. The sowing is done using a seed drill, a tool owned by very 
few (even large) farmers. Non-owners hire one either from other farmers or from the 
PACS in the village depending on availability. This method, including multiple 
rounds of tillage, is water- and energy-intensive, thus driving up costs. The 
Agriculture Development Officer of Moga informed me that as a result, the 
government has been subsidizing raised bed planters as a more efficient option but 
so far there has been little uptake. The sowing technique notwithstanding, wheat is 
overall a less water-intensive crop. Therefore, in contrast to paddy, the few hours of 
electricity supply is considered adequate by most farmers for its irrigation 
requirements. Application of chemicals and fertilizers is again usually done by one 
or two workers employed either by the day or on the basis of the acreage, or by 
naukars. Occasionally, farmers (with the exception of large capitalists) themselves 
might do this work. 
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As is evident from the above, none of these operations are labour-intensive. Even 
harvesting is largely done mechanically using hired combine harvesters. Some 
farmers harvest the wheat manually, employing labour gangs and sometimes even 
families, including women and children. Once the crop is harvested, the remaining 
stubs are converted into toori, a kind of fodder for cattle, using a thresher. The 
average cost of manual harvesting (Rs 3,000 per acre) is double that of mechanical 
harvesting (Rs 1,500 per acre). The cost of manually threshing the stubs of the crop 
is also more expensive. Therefore, very few farmers, and usually only large farmers, 
opt for manual harvesting. A farmer who cultivates wheat over 80 acres said, ‘It 
works out to be a lot more expensive due to the cost of labour and it takes too long 
as well’. The benefit of manual harvesting is that it results in more and cleaner 
fodder which can be used by farmers for their own cattle or sold in the market. Toori 
is sold not only within Punjab but also from Punjab to UP. It can be sold in the 
mandi or traders may come to the villages to make purchases. In 2015, untimely 
rains and hail damaged the crop, resulting in both lower wheat yield and lower 
production of toori. As a result, the price of toori increased from Rs 200-250 to Rs 
400-500 per quintal.87 
A farmer’s assessment of his own risk-bearing capacity and of the market for 
different crops weighs heavily in determining his cropping choices. Wheat is usually 
grown by farmers after their paddy crop. However, some farmers also grow wheat 
after the potato crop. This can happen if a paddy that matures faster (usually 
basmati) is cultivated. This is followed by a potato crop that is harvested in sixty 
days, i.e. by the end of November. This would then be followed by wheat. In other 
words, in the Khanna area, farmers grow wheat in the paddy-wheat cycle as well as 
the paddy-potato-wheat cycle. Moreover, a single farmer may adopt both of these 
cycles in different parts of his field. The strategy will differ from farmer to farmer 
and from year to year. 
Moreover, since wheat is a staple food crop, not all of the wheat produced is sold in 
the market as most farmers keep some back for their own consumption. There are 
also farmers, both large and small, who grow only enough wheat for their own 
consumption on one or two acres. At the same time, there are farmers who do not 
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an all-India dimension, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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grow wheat at all. In the households surveyed, there were many large farmers who 
preferred to use their entire field for a longer potato crop or a cauliflower crop. 
When small farmers did not grow wheat, it was because they preferred to grow only 
fodder for their cattle. These farmers purchased wheat on the open market for their 
consumption, at the same price or Rs 10-20 per quintal more than the the MSP, 
which was Rs 1450 per quintal in 2015. 
Costs/Profits 
Table 7.3 gives a breakdown of the costs incurred in wheat production. Although, 
during the household surveys, farmers gave estimates of production costs in the 
range of Rs 6,000-20,000 per acre, the breakdown of costs from key respondents 
indicates that a more accurate estimate is Rs 12,000 per acre.88 Wheat yield is usually 
about 20 quintals per acre. The government MSP for wheat is Rs 1,450 per quintal. 
As in the case of paddy, this was increased by only Rs 50 by the BJP and this was 
criticized by all farmers’ unions. The profit from this level of yield and this MSP 
would be Rs 17,000 per acre. However, 2015 was a bad year for wheat due to 
untimely rains and the average yield was only 17 quintals per acre. At the MSP, 
therefore, the profit per acre would have been Rs 14,650. However, as will be seen 
later, there were considerable private purchases below the MSP that year, leading to 
even lower profits. 
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Table 7.3: Costs of production and marketing of wheat per acre 
Item Cost (Rs) 
Preparation of land (bahai)* 2,500 
Seed 800 
Urea and DAP 2,935 
Crop chemicals** 700 
Labour: spraying chemicals 1,000 
i. Mechanical Harvesting (combine and thresher) 3,500 
ii. Manual Harvesting (labour and thresher) 6,500 
Total production cost mechanical/manual harvesting. 11,435/14,435 
Costs to farmer in the mandi (cleaning and drying of wheat) at Rs 5.38 
per 50kg bag 
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Total costs on wheat 11,650/14,650 
Source: Own household survey 2014-15   
*Higher than paddy because of cost of diesel used in multiple rounds of tilling 
**Includes pesticides and weedicides 
7.2.2 Wheat Markets 
Government Procurement in Punjab 
Arhtias in the grain mandi deal in all kinds of food grains, including wheat and so 
farmers deal with the same arhtia whether selling paddy or wheat; the credit relations 
discussed in the previous section carry over from one to crop to another and the same 
interest rate is applied to a farmer for both crops. This also means that if a farmer is 
unable to repay the credit through the sale of one crop, the amount owed is taken 
from the sale of the next grain crop he produces. Through this credit role of the 
arhtia, the paddy and wheat markets are connected. 
Government procurement of wheat usually starts on 1
st
 April and continues for two 
to three weeks. The arhtias begin preparing for the arrival of wheat in the mandi by 
late March. Groups of male migrant labour begin to return to the mandi by then. The 
system of wheat procurement is that all arhtia shops are assigned to a state agency or 
to the FCI. These agencies make purchases and store the wheat in their own or hired 
storage until the FCI orders them to supply a quantity for redistribution outside 
Punjab. Unlike paddy, wheat does not require any processing before redistribution 
by the FCI, therefore there are no intermediaries like rice mills involved in this 
process, and the process of government procurement is relatively more 
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straightforward. In other words, the FCI buys wheat from Punjab in order to export it 
to other states without any processing in Punjab. 
Wheat storage is a major problem. Traditional covered warehouses are limited, and 
so open plinths are a common, but unsanitary, way of storing grains. Open to insect, 
fungal and rodent attack, images of rotting grain stored on open plinths often feature 
in national media. As a remedy, the central government started the Private 
Entrepreneurs Guarantee (PEG) Scheme in 2008 whereby private entrepreneurs 
build covered warehouses under a public-private partnership model, typical of 
liberalisation, in exchange for guaranteed hiring by the state agencies. A number 
have already have been built in Punjab, and a high-ranking official of a state agency 
told me that 20,000 mt (metric tonnes) of storage under this scheme is in the process 
of being approved for Khanna – even though Khanna already has adequate covered 
storage.89 This scheme was also supported by the Shanta Kumar Committee Report 
of 2015. 
Another aspect of the PEG is the building of modern steel silos for wheat storage. 
Here I briefly diverge from Khanna to further highlight the nature of changes being 
introduced in the wheat market. Before this scheme was launched, Adani Agri-
Logistics (henceforth Adani) constructed state-of-the-art 200,000 mt capacity silos in 
Moga (and Kaithal in Haryana) in 2007 based on a contract with the FCI. Adani 
officials claim that Moga was chosen by the FCI since the storage shortage was the 
worst there. The silos are meant to store wheat for the FCI in exchange for a fixed 
rental. The idea was that farmers could come and deposit their grains at the silos 
directly, bypassing the arhtia. This would save the government having to pay 
commission to the arhtias and also reduce the hassles faced by the farmers in the 
mandi. Adani was even given a location adjoining the Dagru railway station to make 
it easy for the firm to service demand from FCI to supply wheat. 
However, things did not go as smoothly as planned. An arhtia in Moga explained: 
In the beginning, they could not even fill half their capacity because 
all the farmers used to sell through the arhtia. Adani tried to lure the 
farmers in through many ways; for example, by giving rewards like 
fridges, TVs and even tractors. However, for the first three to four 
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PPPs as it is well-connected and has high productivity.  
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years, it completely failed. Of 200,000 metric tonnes, it was only able 
to fill 75,000. The main motive was to eliminate the arhtias, eliminate 
the gunny bags, commission. The FCI wanted to use its own trucks to 
get the produce. But it did not work. But the State still had to pay Rs 
200 per quintal to Adani for the silos. So now they get the farmers 
directly to deposit grains at the silos through the arhtia. Farmers like it 
because it takes less time – they are free within 20-25 minutes, and 
they get their payment from the arhtia. 
This quote explains the liabilities that are being taken on by the State under such 
schemes. In this case, it is contracted to pay rent even when it is not using the 
storage. Some traders, however, believe that this is a risky proposition even for a 
large corporate firm like Adani. One flour mill owner stated, ‘Adani has actually 
taken a risk; if five years later the Congress government comes and says that it will 
not store wheat there, what will they do? It is a big risk.’ Most of all, however, this 
episode shows the power of the arhtias: as the key source of informal credit for 
farmers, they simply refused to lend to farmers if they deposited their grain directly 
with Adani. In other words, they marshalled their informal networks to protect their 
monopoly over mediating the sale of farmers’ produce vis-à-vis a corporate giant 
like Adani. The government was, therefore, forced to adapt the rules in a way 
whereby the grain could be physically deposited directly with Adani but still be 
considered as procured via the arhtia. Yet again, the arhtias succeeded in securing 
their commission and maintaining their power. But neither was this done at the 
expense of Adani. 
Chapter 9 shows that interest rates are applied unevenly to different farmers based on 
the arhtia’s assessment of risk. Moreover, large capitalists borrow infrequently from 
arhtias. Nevertheless, it is important for all farmers to maintain the arhtias’ goodwill 
and cultivate trust because the latter are a source of emergency credit and facilitate 
the sale of not just wheat but also of any other food grains produced. 
Private Trade in Wheat 
There were 80 flour mills in Punjab in 2015, 7 in Khanna. Unlike in parmal, private 
actors in wheat thrived in Punjab both before and after the Green Revolution. 
However, private trade has been critically shaped by government policies, especially 
the shifts to liberalised policies in recent years. Before deregulation in 1986, flour 
mills were reserved as small-scale industries, could not be set up without 
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government licenses and were supplied with wheat by the FCI at fixed prices.
 90 The 
flour produced by the mills was also bought by the FCI at fixed prices and sold to 
either consumers or mills that use flour, like bakeries. Mills and users of flour had no 
direct contact. Severe punitive measures could be applied to flour mills for not 
meeting the strict quality standards (Kapoor 2001). Given these constraints, it is not 
surprising that before deregulation, there were only 15 flour mills in the state. Post-
deregulation, the FCI is no longer involved in the flour business, and the flour mills 
are free to manage their business privately, i.e. to procure the wheat from anywhere, 
and sell it on their own terms. Licenses are still needed but have become easier to 
obtain (ibid.). The FCI, therefore, regulates neither the quality nor quantity of wheat 
traded by the mills and, as a result, more mills have opened. 
The flour mills produce atta (whole wheat flour), maida (fine milled and bleached 
flour), sooji (semolina) and choker (bran). Atta, the form in which wheat is 
consumed as a staple, is sold to wholesalers who then sell to individual retailers. 
Atta, along with maida and sooji, are also sold to large companies (e.g. Bonn and 
Cremica) that produce biscuits and other flour-based products, and to smaller biscuit 
plants. Choker is used by mills producing feed for cattle and, in the neighbouring 
hilly region of Himachal Pradesh, for horses. 
Flour mills make purchases at the same time as the FCI and the state agencies, 
buying enough for six months of their requirements, an average of 100,000 bags per 
mill. After six months, they purchase wheat from the government under the Open 
Market Sales Scheme (Domestic). Under this scheme, wheat is released by the FCI 
at fixed prices in order to stabilize the market, especially in the lean season. Though 
not mandatory, wheat is released under this scheme annually, either because there is 
a shortage in the market leading to price rises and the State has to intervene to 
increase supplies, or the FCI has a surplus which it needs to liquidate. 
According to traders, flour mills purchase 50% of the wheat arriving in the entire 
market committee of Khanna and 25% of that arriving in the main mandi. This is 
because the private buyers never go to the sub-yards in the rural areas to make 
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 Small scale industries, now renamed as Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, in manufacturing 
are defined by the Government of India as those industries where the investment in plant and 
machinery lies between Rs 2,500,000 and Rs 100,000,000 (http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/ ssiindia/ 
defination_msme.htm). 
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purchases. At the same time, these proportions can vary from year to year. Table 7.4 
shows the percentage of private and government purchases of wheat from the 
Khanna market committee as a whole over the last few years. 
Table 7.4: Percentage of private and government purchase from Khanna Market 
Committee 
 2012 2013 2014 
Private Purchases 18 20 30 
Government Purchases 82 80 70 
                Source: Market Committee Office, Khanna 2014-15 
The president of the All India Roller Flour Mills Association, who also owns one of 
the oldest flour mills in Khanna and Punjab, explained these year-to-year variations: 
When there is abundance in the market, and there is surplus, then 
wheat is sold at less than MSP in states like UP and Rajasthan. In 
Punjab, even in those situations, wheat is sold at MSP. In such a 
situation, mills in Punjab have to make purchases in these other states. 
If they do not, then the finished goods of wheat from those states will 
come into Punjab and harm us. Purchasing the wheat at MSP can 
make our processed goods more expensive comparatively. 
Therefore, in years of surplus production in neighbouring states, the mills make 
limited purchases from the Khanna mandi. It is for this reason that flour mill owners 
fully support the Shanta Kumar Committee’s recommendation of the withdrawal of 
the FCI from procurement in Punjab, believing that this would create more leeway 
for their business than they currently have. They believe that the state government 
does not give them any incentives and the overwhelming presence of the FCI stifles 
them. A mill owner said, ‘The FCI is the biggest player in the wheat market; it is the 
biggest holder of wheat and therefore the market is shaped by them’. 
But while mill owners criticize the high taxes in Punjab, market committee officials 
claimed that they, like basmati mills, are exempt from the payment of market fees. 
Overall, however, the fact that Punjab is a net importer of atta, i.e. it imports more 
atta from other states than it supplies to them, despite its high levels of production 
indicates something is amiss in the state policy for development of flour mills that 
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needs to be corrected (D. Sharma 2015).91 However, it is unclear if and how the state 
seeks to do this, and what this could mean for farmers. In terms of greater space in 
the procurement process for the private mills, the process may be detrimental for 
farmers (see below). 
In 2006, the Khanna mandi also witnessed a different kind of private trade in wheat 
in the form of commodity futures trading. Varun Seth described it: ‘That year, the 
prices used to change by the hour. We used to have buyers from Bombay who sold 
the wheat on the NCDEX. That year the government had a hard time buying wheat; 
these Bombay traders bought everything at Rs 5 above the MSP; the government 
was unable to fulfil even their quota – they only managed to buy 10% of the wheat 
brought to market. That is why the government stopped commodity trading.’ On 
inquiring if that was better for arhtias than the current system, he replied, ‘What does 
it matter to us? Our maal (commodity) should get sold and transported out of the 
mandi as soon as possible and we should get the payments.’ Indeed, futures trading 
in wheat was banned in 2007 by the central government due to rising prices of 
wheat, to the great dismay of some farmers and the NCDEX (Joshi 2007; LiveMint 
Staff 2008). The ban was lifted in 2009 by the then newly re-elected central 
government (Reuters 2009), but Khanna mandi has not witnessed such trade in 
wheat again.92 
The 2015 procurement season in Khanna 
In 2015, the official procurement season started, not on the usual date of 1
st
 April but 
on 10
th
 April, as untimely rains in February and March had led to a longer 
maturation period for the wheat. The season was inaugurated by Ajmer Singh 
Lakhowal, president of BKU (Lakhowal) and Chairman of the Punjab Mandi Board. 
However, after buying small amounts of wheat for a few days, the agencies stopped 
making purchases. The reason was that the wheat’s moisture content, extent of 
discolouration and percentage of broken grains failed to meet the FCI quality 
standards.93 Farmers had been waiting in the mandi for days and there were unsold 
heaps of wheat lying everywhere, even as new farmers continued to bring in trolleys 
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 Atta produced from wheat grown in Punjab is not considered to be particularly good quality and the 
middle classes prefer better quality atta from other states, especially Sharbati from MP (D. Sharma 
2015; interview with flour mill owner). 
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 I have been unable to explore the reasons for this as a part of this research. 
93
 The acceptable level of moisture for wheat is 12%. 
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of wheat. In fact, even before the official date for the start of procurement, a 
Pungrain official anticipated that the purchase period would be ‘very tough’. 
As government procurement remained effectively stalled for over a week, on April 
20 and 21, there were demonstrations in front of the Pungrain office in the mandi, 
attended by members and leaders of the farmers’ union, arhtia association and labour 
union in large numbers. They were also particularly upset that while the central 
government had relaxed quality standards in the states of Haryana, Gujarat and 
Rajasthan, the same had not been extended to Punjab. NH1 was blocked by the 
arhtias arguing that, ‘this is like British rule; we will not be heard unless we do 
something drastic’. A popular slogan was ‘dhakkebaazi band karo, khareed ka 
parbandh karo’ (stop swindling; make arrangements for purchase). Referencing the 
Shanta Kumar Committee Report, arhtia leaders also cited ‘the arrogance of the 
Modi [central] government’ and the particular neglect of Punjab and its farmers. Yet 
again, the mandi emerged as the platform to reference the status of centre-state 
relations with respect to Punjab and a space for arhtias to manipulate (see Section 
7.1). 
State agency officials, however, refused to make purchases and insisted that they 
would only start procurement once the central government sent a notification 
relaxing standards. One agency inspector agency explained: 
We are reluctant to buy as it would be at our own risk. There is the 
issue of ‘gain’. Wheat normally gains moisture when the monsoon 
comes, around July. [This increases the weight of the grain while the 
quantity remains the same.] As a result, any dispatch to the central 
pool after 31
st
 July involves extra dispatch, i.e. as a rule, an extra 350g 
per kg has to be given as part of the central pool. However, once rain 
falls on a full-grown standing crop, the crop does not acquire moisture 
during monsoon. But we still have to give 350g extra. That is a loss 
for the warehouse and the inspector. In any case, the quality of the 
grain has become such that there will be a problem in storage. 
In other words, in the absence of a notification lowering quality standards, the state 
agency would have bear losses. Moreover, officials would have had to procure at 
personal risk: both in the FCI and state agencies, the individual inspectors and 
officers are penalised for any loss of or damage to grain. Therefore, understandably, 
they are reluctant to make purchases that do not meet the quality standards. 
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In the end, and in another illustration of the political power of the state's farmers, the 
relaxation of standards was extended to Punjab as well. This meant that the FCI 
would procure wheat from the mandis but at a rate that was Rs 10 less than the MSP, 
i.e. Rs 1,440 per quintal, with the state government paying the difference. However, 
the relaxation order only came a fortnight after the official procurement season 
started. During this time, some farmers were forced to make distress sales to flour 
mills at Rs 20-30 per quintal below the MSP. Formal records, however, show that 
the crop was sold at the MSP since, by law, the mills cannot purchase below the 
MSP. Flour mills in Punjab buy at or above the MSP when the FCI is buying at 
MSP. If the FCI refuses to pay the MSP or declares the crop sub-standard, the flour 
mills pay less as well. The arhtias claim they have to do so in order to clear their 
phads and make space for other farmers’ crops. There were cases where farmers 
waited up to three days in the mandi for their crop to be sold, and in such 
circumstances, they were willing to accept the slightly lower rate. Every arhtia in the 
mandi facilitated such distress sales. Varun’s uncle, Kamal Seth said, ‘If it happens 
in the next shop and not in ours, our farmers will say ‘bau mein dum nahin hai’ (my 
arhtia does not have it in him to get my crop sold). These are times of competition.’ 
Again, much of this happens based on the close relations between the arhtia and the 
flour mill owner. In fact, this is true even for a ‘normal’ year. The flour mills that 
purchase from the Khanna mandi are all located in Khanna, and since they are only 
7, sales are made directly, even though in government records they are recorded as 
auctions. Different mill owners have relations with different arhtias through whom 
they source their supplies. 
7.2.3 Conclusion 
A study of wheat in Punjab has to acknowledge that it is both a food and a cash crop. 
In other words, its production and marketing by farmers involves consideration of 
household consumption as well as its returns to investment. And, in a clear 
indication of how deeply commercialized agriculture is, there are some farmers, 
large and small, who prefer to buy wheat rather than grow it. 
In the market, the arhtias continue to profit through the fixed commission on wheat 
which came about as a result of the market dynamics as defined by the central 
government through the FCI and the implementation of the MSP since the beginning 
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of the Green Revolution. This continued even after deregulation of the flour mill 
industry in the late 1980s and continues to impact the cost at which private flour 
mills procure wheat, even though deregulation has created greater space for private 
trade. Consequently, the quantity procured by mills in Punjab from Punjab depends 
on the relative prices of wheat in the neighbouring states of UP and Rajasthan. 
In 2015, an aberration in the weather exposed tensions in this seemingly 
uncomplicated process of government procurement. The constraints of the FCI and 
state agencies came to light, while private flour mills were able to benefit from the 
situation. The informal relations between arhtias and mills again proved crucial to 
managing the situation. Many wheat-producing farmers, however, had to face the 
brunt of the situation. 
There is little in the wheat market as it exists now that allows for a differentiated 
impact on the different classes of farmers, except for credit relations (see Chapter 9). 
This reflects the fact that the market does not differentiate between types of wheat 
and the MSP is well administered. That does not make it less important for 
accumulation though; in fact, like parmal, due to a guaranteed MSP, it provides a 





This section shifts from the terrain of food grains to vegetables, focusing on potato. 
As noted in Chapter 5, potato is as important for accumulation by capitalist farmers 
as wheat and paddy in the field area. It is widely referred to as a crop that can ‘make 
or break’ a farmer and this section explores how this might be the case. 
7.3.1 Potato Production 
There are three types of potato production in Punjab: seed potatoes, table varieties 
and processing varieties. Seed potatoes can be of any potato variety. Table potato 
refers to the potato ordinarily consumed in households. Processing varieties are those 
processed into chips, powder and other potato-based food products. Most of the 
farmers in Paunpura and neighbouring villages usually grow table varieties such as 
Kufri Pukhraj and Kufri Jyoti. In Rattankalan, only 50-60% of farmers cultivate 
potatoes, usually processing varieties like Lady Rosetta (LR), Chipsona 1, 2 or 3, or 
FL1533. These three types of potatoes have different markets and trading networks, 
but their production processes are similar. 
In Punjab, potato is sown in late September or early October, following the paddy 
crop. As mentioned in Section 7.1, this timing is what makes short duration paddy 
varieties important for potato. The land for the cultivation of potatoes is prepared 
mechanically, by using the leveller (‘tavi’) thrice and the disc harrow (‘suhaga’) 
multiple times in order to break up any lumped soil (‘dali’). Seeds are sown using a 
planter or sower and three to four labourers are needed. Some farmers own or hire a 
rotavator, which sows seed and levels the field at the same time. Potato seeds are 
replaced once every two to three years by farmers. Seeds are bought from the old 
and established seed farms of Jalandhar or from corporate seed companies; one acre 
of potatoes requires 15 quintals of seeds. 
The potato crop requires several rounds of application of fertilizers and crop 
chemicals which constitute a major part of the production cost. On asking farmers 
about costs, the first response invariably would be ‘aloo che dawaiyan hi inni paindi 
hain’ (potato requires so many chemicals). Care in the application of these chemicals 
was argued to be crucial for a decent potato crop. Some smaller farmers who grow 
potatoes may do some of this work themselves but mostly it is done by labourers. 
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However, farmers who grow potatoes are more likely to employ (a greater number 
of) naukars than those who cultivate only wheat and paddy (see Table 7.5). 
Table 7.5: Number of naukars employed by farmers based on different crop cycles (a) 
Crop Cycle 
No. of Naukars Employed Total 
Households None 1 2 3 or more 
Paddy-wheat only 23 5 1 1 30 
Potato included* 11 15 5 3 34 
Sample size (n)                                                                                   93 
Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
*This includes 8 households that also cultivate cauliflower which is an extremely labour-intensive 
crop (see Section 7.4). 
 
Potato harvesting is extremely labour-intensive. A reaper (either owned or hired at 
Rs 1,500 per acre) pulls the potatoes from the soil, but many labourers (Bihari male 
migrants or local SC women) are needed to pick these and put them in jute bags. The 
labour cost for this process is around Rs 3,000 per acre; there is an additional labour 
cost of Rs 15 per 50kg bag for grading the potatoes. According to Harman Singh, a 
small capitalist farmer: 
We call the labour on the phone that we are getting the potatoes 
picked. That is how they come. After that, there is work for some crop 
or the other – sowing sunflower, then harvesting wheat, transplanting 
paddy. They leave only after the paddy sowing season – they end up 
staying for 4-5 months. 
It is not surprising then that farmers themselves are quite involved in the supervision 
of this process. One of my respondents who cultivates potatoes over 60 acres worked 
on the farm from 4am to 11pm every day at harvest time and employed a total of 50 
labourers for picking, grading and storing. This was slightly more than usual since 
by this time prices were crashing and there were untimely rains, and so the process 
had to be hastened. However, it is common to have labour gangs of 6 to 10 men or 
women per acre for potato picking. 
Potatoes may be harvested at three different times, and different harvests correspond 
to different market dynamics. The first harvest is in December; this is the 60-day 
crop and is colloquially known as kacha aloo (raw potato). Processing varieties are 
never harvested at this time as they are too small and the sugar content too high for 
processing. This first harvest also does not allow seed-size potatoes to develop. Only 
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table varieties are harvested as kacha aloo. The crop yields 60 quintals per acre and 
fetches about Rs 1500 per quintal or more. 
The next harvest, in January, is the 75-80 day crop known as pakka aloo. Average 
yields are higher at 80 quintal per acre but prices are lower, ranging from Rs 700-
1,200 per quintal. So, it is possible that farmers earn more with the first harvest even 
though the yield is less. At the same time, 15 additional days implies extra costs of 
chemicals and of labour to apply them. This second harvest is also when seed 
potatoes are harvested, although the yield is somewhat lower. In order to make seed 
potatoes, the stem of crop which is full of leaves is cut, and the crop is left under the 
soil for about a fortnight. Farmers keep whatever amount they need and sell the rest 
on the open market; prices depend largely on demand-supply dynamics, i.e. the 
available stock and anticipated demand of seeds in the next season. Processing 
varieties also start being harvested at this time, and fetch an average of Rs 950 per 
quintal. 
The last harvest starts in the second half of February; this is the 90-100 day crop. By 
this time, the yield of table varieties increases to 150 quintals per acre, while that of 
processing varieties increases to around 85 quintals per acre. Both varieties have 
similar costs but the latter fetch better prices. By the time of the last harvest, 
however, the potatoes from UP, the largest potato-producing state in the country, 
have arrived on the (national) market in large quantities and prices fluctuate 
thereafter depending on the yield in UP and the country overall in that particular 
year. Table 7.6 summarizes the harvest cycles and processes for the different types 
of potatoes in the field region described above.94 
Not only are the prices of potatoes uncertain, they are also quite volatile. One farmer 
lamented, ‘Once it rained and the trader called for 200 katte [bags] of potatoes and 
offered Rs 160 per bag. Usually the rate is about Rs 100-110. Then the trader called 
from Malerkotla and said that the rate in the mandi is Rs 200. By the time we took 
the aloo to the mandi the rate had fallen to Rs 140. There was a loss of Rs 20 [per 
quintal].’ This volatility leads many farmers to describe potato farming as ‘satte 
waali kheti’ (farming which is like gambling). Moreover, since potatoes require 
more care in the production process as well as in terms of mapping the market, 
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 All figures are estimates derived from interviews with several farmers and traders. 
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potato-growing farmers often refer to farmers who grow only wheat and paddy as 
‘vehle’ (lazy and free). Decisions on how much potato to grow, which one(s) and 
when to harvest depend crucially on considerations of income as well as the 
cropping schedule as a whole. Note that the first harvest is followed by wheat, the 
second by maize, the third by sunflower and, if the harvest is further delayed, by 
moongi (a kind of pulse). 
Table 7.6: Harvesting cycles and prices for different types of potatoes 
Type of potato Harvest Yield (per acre) Prices (Rs per quintal) 
Table 
December 60 >1500 
January 80 700-1,200 
February 150 As low as 150-200 
Seed 






December N/A N/A 
January 75-80 
Average 950 
Range 400-3,000 February 85-90 
Source: Own fieldwork 2014-15 
Costs/Profits 
So far we have seen that the income a farmer may earn from potatoes can vary 
greatly depending upon the choice of crop and harvesting decision. At the same time, 
a farmer who grows potato one year might reduce or stop cultivation the next year, 
or simply change the combination of varieties grown. Nevertheless, here an attempt 
has been made to estimate the profit from potatoes in an average year. 
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 The second and third harvest cycles are merged into one for seed potatoes as they are harvested 
within a certain time so that they do not do increase too much in size, even though there are variations 
of days and weeks among individual farmers based on when they have sowed the crop, weather and 
soil conditions etc. 
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Table 7.7: Costs of production of potato per acre 
Item Cost (Rs) 
Preparation of land (bahai) 5,000 
Seed* 25,500 
Labour: sowing 2,000 
Urea and DAP 5,900 
Pesticides 7,800 
Labour: spraying chemicals 2,000 
Labour: harvesting 3,000 
Total production cost 51,200 
Total production cost if potato reaper hired at Rs 1500 per acre 52,700 
       Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
       *Average rate x 15 as one acre needs an average of 15 quintals of seeds 
Costs of cultivating potatoes are extremely high; as one farmer put it, ‘aloo par toh 
kharche hi kharche hain’ (there are countless expenses on potatoes). Costs vary by 
duration of crop or timing of harvest, but the major determinant is the cost of seed 
potatoes which can change significantly from one year to the next. So, while the 
average rate is Rs 1,700-1,800 per quintal, in 2014-15, it was Rs 2,200 per quintal. 
Many farmers argued that their annual cultivation cost per acre lay in the range of Rs 
30,000-50,000. However, a breakdown of the average costs puts this rate at closer to 
Rs 50,000 (Table 7.7). To some extent, this is towards the higher end of the range 
because the seeds were more expensive in 2014-15 as indicated above. This 
breakdown of costs excludes estimation of grading costs as these would vary by 
yields. Similarly, marketing costs vary depending on the sale channel (discussed 
below). It should also be noted that potato cultivation intersects in important ways 
with land-lease dynamics in the villages (see Chapter 8). 
2014-15 was not a good year for potato-growers in Punjab. Untimely rains in 
February and March delayed the harvest of the fully mature crop and ruined acres of 
potatoes, thereby limiting supply. However, this did not prevent a drop in prices 
because there was a bumper crop across other potato-growing states in the country 
(partly due to the large area under cultivation and partly due to an adequately cold 
winter). Production was also very high in 2013-14 but the crop in Pakistan had not 
done well and it imported potatoes from India in large quantities. In 2014-15, 
however, there was a bumper crop in Pakistan. The government gave some tax 
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rebates to those exporting potatoes but there were no buyers; farmers had to sell at 
distress rates, if at all. Cold stores were full to the brim and there were heaps of 
potatoes lying everywhere, getting closer to rotting as summer approached. 
Admittedly, in 2014-15 some farmers who sold their crop after the first harvest 
received as much as Rs 1,400 per quintal. But, by mid-December, farmers were only 
getting Rs 750 per quintal for table varieties. If we assume that in 2014-15 the total 
production costs until the last harvest were higher at Rs 60,000 due to higher seed 
potato prices. Now, assuming the cost incurred on the first harvest to be Rs 50,000 
(owing to less crop chemicals applied) and the yield to be 60 quintals, this would 
mean a decline per acre from a profit of Rs 34,000 to a loss of Rs 5,000 in just a 
fortnight. Prices continued to fall and by the last harvest, were as low as Rs 200 per 
quintal for table varieties and Rs 400 per quintal for processing. With yields at 150 
and 85 quintals per acre respectively, and costs at Rs 60,000, this meant per acre 
losses of Rs 30,000 and Rs 26,000 respectively. However, the previous years had 
been quite profitable. Prices for table and processing varieties in 2013-14 averaged 
around Rs 1,100 per quintal, or per acre profits of Rs 115,000 and Rs 43,500 
respectively (at costs of Rs 50,000 per acre). 
This, many say, is a regular cycle with potato. Once every 3-4 years there is a drastic 
drop in prices. In my understanding, because in some years potato-growers, 
especially the large ones, are able to make such large profits, they can sustain the 
shock of a bad year. Smaller growers may or may not be able to do so. Indeed, 
smaller farmers are less likely to grow potatoes since the costs of cultivation are very 
high. They can do so only on the back of considerable amounts of credit, which 
exposes them to indebtedness and I heard of many cases where small farmers had to 
sell their land due to losses from the potato crop. Table 7.8, based on data from the 
household survey, shows that none of the potato-growing farmers are petty 
producers. 
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Table 7.8: Potato-growing farmers by class 
Class Number 
Petty Producer 0 
Small Capitalist 6 
Large Capitalist 25 
Total 31 
n 93 
                                Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
Large capitalists, on the other hand, can incur these expenses, take risks and manage 
them in a way that this becomes a crucial pillar of their accumulation strategies. In a 
strategy that is as much about maximising profit as it is about minimizing risk, no 
large farmer grows only one kind of potato over his entire farm or harvests them at 
the same time. If they grow only one kind, they will grow it only on part of their 
land, leaving the rest to wheat-paddy rotation. As the wife of a large farmer once 
poignantly remarked, while looking at their impressive farmhouse at the edge of the 
village, ‘asi ta alooan te hi aa ghar khada kitta hai’ (we have built this house on 
potatoes). Farmers with smaller holdings, for the obvious constraints of land, are less 
able to exercise these different options.96  
7.3.2 Potato Markets 
The foregoing section has already given a glimpse into the complexities of potato 
markets. Here, the markets for the three different types of potatoes will be 
delineated. It should be recalled here that that the wholesale market for potatoes and 
other vegetables is different from that for grains; it is the sabzi mandi, described in 
Chapter 6. 
Table Potatoes 
Table potatoes have a large domestic market and they are sometimes also exported to 
countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Russia. Punjab, however, is argued to 
suffer compared to states like Gujarat and West Bengal where they are exported 
through ports since it does not have a coastline.  
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 This reference to building houses points towards an interesting question about whether it should 
count as a productive or unproductive investment. Suffice it to say that it is difficult to judge 
empirically when some investments should count as ‘accumulation’ and when they should not. 
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In Khanna, table potato production started four decades ago when two families from 
Jalandhar district, famous for its potato cultivation, moved to a village close to 
Khanna town and started growing them. One of these families has now sold off its 
land and moved to Chandigarh while the other continues to live there. Other farmers, 
large and small, followed suit. Today, a handful of adjoining villages lying between 
Khanna, Samrala and Khamanon are the hub of table potato cultivation in the area. 
Farmers and traders argue that this consistent increase in the volume of production 
has been a result of farmers emulating their neighbours in pursuit of higher profits. 
The increase may also be a function of increased demand, but this could not be 
verified. 
Until fifteen to twenty years ago, table potato farmers in Khanna went to the mandi 
in Delhi to sell their produce; today, however, the entire produce is sold from the 
field itself. The crop is sold to the vapaari (trader) who is usually an arhtia in the 
sabzi mandi at Khanna or elsewhere in Punjab. These traders may sell the potatoes 
on to traders in even larger mandis or at their own shop. Over the past decade or so, 
a handful of farmers in some of the villages have also become traders. They connect 
farmers with arhtias in various mandis and take a commission, although they are not 
licensed. Sometimes, in order to lock-in the supply, they purchase the produce at 
their own expense and then sell it when prices are better or when the demand arises. 
The arhtias who buy directly from the farm and the farmer-cum-traders basically 
work as brokers for a commission of Rs 5-10 per bag. 
Purchasing directly from the farm also saves traders having to pay the market fee 
due from the buyer when the crop is sold in the mandi but means a loss of revenue 
for the Market Committee. For farmers, even though this mode of sale means that 
they get slightly lower rates than in the mandi, it saves them time and the costs of 
transportation, as well as the hassles of selling in the mandi and dealing with the 
arhtias. A farmer complained: ‘In the sabzi mandi, there are supposed to be 50kg of 
potatoes in every bag. But the arhtias make us put 51kg in every bag and only pay us 
for 50kg because they say that the bag weighs 2kg. They send the extra potatoes to 
Delhi and get the full rate from the trader.’ 
It is understandable then that farmers prefer to sell directly from the farm. The 
farmers contact traders/arhtias agents in various mandis at harvest time and sell 
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wherever they get the best price. The expansion of cell phone connectivity has, 
needless to say, played an instrumental role in shaping the marketing process in this 
way. 
Traders argue that the production of table potatoes in this area is so high that if the 
whole crop arrived in the mandi at the same time, prices would drop drastically. The 
increase in the number of large sabzi mandis in north Indian states such as UP and 
Rajasthan and the expansion of cold storage facilities across all states are closely 
related to these changes as there are now many markets to which the produce can be 
channelled. The cold storage sector was also deregulated by the central government 
in 1997 (Minten et al. 2014).97 Notably, most cold stores in the area are owned by 
wealthy, capitalist farmers who have diversified into this business. This is 
particularly true of newer cold stores as land is so prohibitively expensive that even 
most traders cannot take the risk of making such investments. 
Farmers and traders explained that there was no difference between the prices given 
to small and large farmers in this market, as long as the quality of the crop was the 
same. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the former are disadvantaged in these 
markets owing to a lower capacity to hold stocks, negotiate better prices, and access 
to fewer marketing networks. 
Seed Potatoes 
Punjab dominates the national market for seed potatoes; the agro-climatic conditions 
of the state are such that there are certain pockets where disease-free seed potatoes 
can be grown. In fact, seed potatoes for the entire country are grown in Punjab. The 
Doaba region, i.e. the area between the Rivers Beas and Sutlej, especially the 
districts of Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur, have conditions that are ideal for this and 
some farmers refer to seed potatoes as being ‘God’s gift’ to this region. 
Seed potatoes were originally grown in Himachal Pradesh and the Doaba farmers 
bought their foundation seeds from there in the 1960s. However, the enterprising 
Doaba farmers soon overtook Himachal and the area has been the leading seed 
potato producer since the early 1970s. In this, they had systematic support from the 
Central Potato Research Institute which has a regional station in Jalandhar. 
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 They also argue that this has allowed farmers in Bihar, especially large farmers, to negotiate potato 
markets more effectively. 
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Today, seed potato is grown by almost every farmer, big and small, in Doaba; 
around 90% of potato grown in this area is said to be seed potato. However, there are 
about 15-20 farmers in the region known as ‘the potato kings’. These potato kings 
own and lease-in thousands of acres of land in the region on a yearly basis and 
conduct their operations like corporations, although they continue to call themselves 
‘farmers’. They have their own cold stores, tractors, and combine harvesters, etc., all 
of which are stationed at different locations adjoining their lands (also see S. Singh 
2012). Since seed potato is only a three month crop, they also variously grow paddy, 
maize seeds and/or sunflower seeds and market them either in the APMC mandi or 
through their own company networks. Key to their expansion has been their 
organisation into associations which have been able to negotiate benefits from the 
State and from private companies. 
Even though the Doaba region dominates this market within Punjab, disease-free 
potato can also be grown in Khanna. The most important consequence of this has 
been the entry of agribusinesses in the region for seed-to-seed contract farming, 
especially of processing varieties. This is another very clear post-liberalisation 
development. There are several stages of seed development, namely, Gen0 to Gen3. 
Under seed-to-seed contract farming, companies develop the seeds until Gen2 and 
then pass it to the farmer to cultivate to Gen3. Contract farming of this kind is 
especially widespread in the villages around Amloh, a town only 10km from 
Khanna. Three big companies are involved in this: PepsiCo, Mahindra & Mahindra, 
and Technico. The latter two do it only for selling the seeds; they companies grow 
seed for table and processing varieties, and have their own marketing system that 
reaches out to traders and farmers. However, PepsiCo does it for its own potato-
processing requirements. It gets the seed grown in Punjab and then sends it to other 
states such as Gujarat or West Bengal where they have different types of contracts 
with farmers to convert the seeds into fully-grown processing potatoes with certain 
quality criteria. The seed-to-chip form of contract farming, i.e. where the final 
product is a fully mature processing potato, is not done in Punjab since its extreme 
winters makes the crop more vulnerable to frost and thus rotting.98 
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 In the Doaba region, the potato kings have also started contract farming with smaller farmers in the 
past four to five years. 
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The exact terms of contract farming vary from one company to another. However, 
the broad contours in each case are as follows: the farmer purchases the requisite 
amount of seeds from the company – the company takes a signed cheque for this 
amount at the time the contract is finalized (although it is unwritten); it then sells a 
package of pesticides and fungicides to be applied to the crop or recommends 
specific brands to the farmer; the farms are regularly visited (without charge) by 
agronomists from the company to assess how the crop is developing; once the crop is 
harvested, it is quality-graded by the company into four types and payment is made 
accordingly. 
Notably, at least two of the three companies have a clear preference of working with 
medium to large farmers. One highly placed official explained: 
Small farmers work very hard but find it very difficult to survive. If 
there is even one shock, they are easily affected. The big farmers can 
cope with shocks. So, we try to work as much as possible with big 
farmers; we prefer not to work with anything less than five acres. 
Sometimes we make an exception if the farmer is very sincere and 
keen. 
Many farmers have poor experiences with contract farming, after which they 
discontinue it. One farmer explained: 
These companies are not for farmers; contract farming has many 
problems. The company sees its own profit. It takes a blank cheque in 
advance from the farmer. The seed is sold to the farmer. If the farmer 
does not make payment, the blank cheque is used by the company. 
When grading happens, they do not take the smallest and biggest 
potatoes [the company wants ‘standard’ sized potatoes] but they write 
the full amount for the seeds sold on the blank cheque anyway. If 
there is a problem with the seed, they do not lift the crop but take 
payment for the seed anyway and say that you can sell the crop on 
your own. This has actually happened to me with one of the 
companies. With another – there is a disease called late blight which 
was not there on our farm; but their doctor came and said that it is 
there. Pepsi refused to make payments for our crop; it said it will do 
so after a year. We had to store it and I had to bear the cost of the 
potatoes that were ruined; the potatoes that were okay were bought by 
the company. Another company also works in this area but after 
having a bad experience with two companies, I did not want to try a 
third one. 
Further research showed, however, that the story is more complex. Although 
companies sometimes dishonour contracts, so do farmers, both usually in response to 
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open market prices. Companies may do so when prices are considerably lower than 
the contracted rate, farmers when the prices are higher. According to a key farmer-
respondent, Gurjeet Singh, who had done contract farming for two years before 
leaving it: 
Our experience was okay. There is both benefit and loss in it. The 
couple of times we did it the market rate was higher than the contract 
rate so it was a loss for us. The main thing with potatoes is demand. If 
the price in the market is lower, the company also says this and that – 
sugar is not okay, grading is not okay – and buys less from the 
farmers. 
A similar assessment came from a respondent who is a farmer as well as trader and 
cold store owner: 
The thing with contract farming is that it gives you a limited margin, 
unless nature is too unkind. Last year the profits in the open market 
were much higher than what people who grew on contract got but it is 
not that they did not make any profit. So many people left contract 
farming because of a lower level of profit, but this year there was a 
manda (recession) and those doing contract farming at least got a 
secured rate; the others had to experience high levels of losses. 
These testimonies show that contract farming is one of many cropping strategies 
farmers use to accumulate, each farmer having his own assessment of what would 
work best for him.99 As a result, every year there are some farmers who leave 
contract farming, and others who join. In the words of one, ‘bas topi ghoomti rehti 
hai’ (the circle keeps rotating, that’s all). But contract farming can also be unstable 
due to reduced disease resistance in some areas. PepsiCo, for example, moved much 
of its contract farming work from the villages around Khanna and Amloh to those 
around Nabha in Patiala district. 
An important development in the Amloh region in recent years has been the 
establishment of seed farms by large potato-growing farmers. These seed farms 
spread over 100-150 acres and, like their much larger counterparts in Doaba, they 
specialize in seed potato cultivation and trading. Often they grow seeds patented by 
the agribusinesses. The story of how these farmers acquired the seeds to start their 
business is usually along the lines of they do contract farming with the companies 
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 One large farmer who does both contract farming of seed potatoes and cultivation of processing 
varieties said that he continues with a small acreage of contract farming for PepsiCo because the 
company prioritizes contracted farmers when purchasing processing varieties. 
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but retain some seeds illegally, using them to grow their own seeds in subsequent 
years. Developing seed farms necessarily entails marketing and trading in seeds as 
well because seeds of different potatoes are required in different states at different 
times. Some respondents said that these farms were running losses but I was unable 
to verify this. On the other hand, it is clear that huge profits can be made in this 
business. Seeds like FL1533, for example, fetched as much Rs 200,000 per acre even 
in 2014-15 when prices in the potato market were crashing. Some large farmers who 
do not have seed farms per se also produce these owing to the profits to be made. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the development of seed farms and potato trading 
of this type is crucially linked to the growth of the potato-processing industry in 
India. Moreover, the success and growth of seed farming in Punjab is tied to the 
production schedule in different parts of the country. The cold store owner quoted 
above also owns a seed farm. He explained: 
The point is where is it that seeds grow into potatoes out of which 
good quality chips can be made. LR works very well in Punjab. But if 
we grow FL1533 here then it will have a very high sugar content. But 
it grows very well in Maharashtra. FC3 is grown a lot in Una. 
Chipsona grows well in UP and MP. Seeds are sold to these areas 
accordingly. There is another thing; when the potato crop is harvested 
in Maharashtra, there is no potato in the cold stores or in the farms 
here. 
[And when is that?] 
In Bangalore, the sowing of the potato crop has already started [i.e. in 
May]. In Maharashtra, sowing will start in June and the yield will 
come in October/November. By then our stores will be empty or the 
stocks that will be there will not be fit for making chips. The 
companies, therefore, buy the potatoes from them at a good rate, and 
the farmers in turn take the seeds from us at high rates as well. 
These seed potato farmers may not be as big or as powerful or even as numerous as 
their counterparts in Doaba but they have displayed remarkable enterprise in 
accumulating through new opportunities presented by liberalisation. Companies also 
recognize this potential, as evidenced by the ‘service model’ of procurement started 
by Mahindra about four years ago. Under this model, farmers growing seeds on a 
minimum of 50 acres can choose whether or not to sell their produce to the company 
(assuming it meets their quality requirements) and are free to source their breeder 
183 
seed from wherever they like. Jagjit Gill, a farmer who engaged in this and found it 
quite profitable, said: 
See, 10,000 pieces of mother seed or mini-tubers [of seed potatoes] 
costs Rs 9,000; these can be sown over 3 kanals [0.375 acre]. The 
next year these seeds will multiply and we can use the same to expand 
the area, and some extra seeds can be bought; the seed has to be given 
to the company only in the fourth year [which is when the big harvest 
is taken]. Because the seed can multiply over a large area, the cost of 
seeds comes to only Rs 12,000-13,000 per acre. Then, if the seed is 
sent by the company to southern states or MP or Maharashtra, our 
seeds are filled in their bags and packed directly from the field. If it is 
sold at Rs 20 per kg or Rs 200 per quintal, then the company takes Rs 
40 as commission and gives Rs 160 to us; if we consider that Rs 20 is 
the storage rent or miscellaneous charges we pay, we get Rs 140 per 
quintal [which is more than the average market rate]. So there is more 
earning. Also, if we do not like the company rates, then we can simply 
sell it in the open market; we are not bound. 
Again, it is evident that for large capitalist farmers, such arrangements with 
agribusiness firms are one of many channels they use in order to maximize their 
profits. 
Processing Potatoes 
Not all processing varieties are grown only as seeds in Punjab, or in the Khanna 
region. Varieties such as LR and Chipsona are also cultivated as fully mature 
potatoes by farmers, especially by farmers in Rattankalan. These are sold to large 
potato-processing companies as well as on the open market which then sells on to 
smaller potato-processing firms. 
Earlier I mentioned that companies do not procure processing varieties from Punjab 
through contract farming. However, they have other kinds of arrangements. PepsiCo, 
for example, declares the average rates that it will give for the season; the company 
also sends agronomical assistance to any farmer if it knows that the latter could be a 
potential seller but this is not a binding contract for either party. Once harvested, the 
company buys the produce only if it meets its quality standards and the farmer sells 
it only if he feels the price is better than that on the open market. However, the 
farmer first needs to get the potato sampled and approved by the company’s local 
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test centre and then take it to the processing plant located in Channo (over 50km 
from Khanna city) where the crop is tested again before being bought.100 
Most farmers who sell through this channel argue that the prices are good. In 2014-
15, even though prices on the open market had crashed to Rs 400-500 per quintal, 
the company was still paying Rs 700-800 per quintal. At the same time, it gives 
farmers the option to sell the crop on the open market when prices are higher. 
According to Kulwinder Singh, a farmer who has been cultivating processing 
varieties for the past 15-20 years, ‘Usually we sell the processing variety to Pepsi at 
Channo. The company declares season-wise rates. But this time the company got the 
potato cheaper on the open market so they did not buy ours. But we also do the 
same; if we get higher rates on the open market, we do not go to Channo’. 
It is clear though that this marketing channel involves logistics that work as a 
deterrent. A large capitalist farmer in Paunpura did it for a few years and stopped. He 
said, ‘Earlier, for a couple of years, I used to take my Chipsona crop all the way to 
Channo. Whatever they found acceptable, they took and paid the money. But then a 
few years ago, I had to bring back my entire crop from the factory after waiting at 
the gate for five days. Farmers did not know but they [PepsiCo] suddenly declared 
that the last day for accepting potatoes was 31
st
 March. I arrived on 1
st
 April. They 
had closed the gate and I waited outside for four days and then returned on the fifth 
with my entire crop. Now they ask me to grow it again for them but I do not; I do not 
wish to go to Channo to sell.’ Clearly, something that is a disincentive even for large 
farmers would be even more inaccessible to smaller farmers. 
Other processing companies, large and small, within and outside Punjab, also 
procure processing varieties from the farmers. They do this through arhtias-cum-
traders, as in the case of table potatoes. In this, the arhtias of Khanna sabzi mandi are 
not in direct contact with companies as their operations and scale of work is much 
too small for companies to deal with them directly. Companies have direct contact 
with larger vegetable arhtias in larger mandis (e.g. Delhi, Chandigarh or Ludhiana), 
and give them orders for certain amounts. These arhtias then contact traders in 
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 PepsiCo calls this system ‘forward contract’. However, this is a colloquial use of the term, the 
more widely accepted meaning of which is akin to the system of contract farming practised in the 
region. 
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smaller mandis such as Khanna to send smaller amounts. Arhtias in Khanna in turn 
could source the consignment on their own or by partnering with other arhtias. 
Farmers who sell processing varieties in this way find it very convenient, although 
there is a risk of an arhtia not paying them on time or in full. This is not very 
common as arhtias and traders need to build a reputation in order to remain in 
business, but it certainly happens. In Rattankalan, three farmers sold their processing 
varieties, together worth Rs 1,600,000, to the same trader. One of them had to cut 
short one of our scheduled meetings because he and the two other farmers had to 
meet the trader in question. My respondent’s share of the sale was Rs 600,000. His 
mother said, ‘The sale happened one month ago but the vapaari (trader) has still not 
paid them. Whenever they call him, he says he is not there or he is in Gujarat. Today, 
he said “Call me at 11.30 am”, but he is not picking up the call’. His wife added: 
The trader has sold their potatoes for a profit and instead of paying 
them, he has used the money to buy a plot for Rs 6,000,000… We 
hope we get the money. We had to pay Rs 4,500 per acre as labour 
expenses even though we have not yet received the money from the 
crop. 
The risk lies in the fact that when the trader buys from farmers in the field, he only 
gives the farmer a kacha (informal) receipt. The only pucca (formal) receipt the 
farmers have is from the kanda (weighing station) where they get their crop 
weighed. There is no formal or legal proof that the crop has been sold to a particular 
trader. Nevertheless, that this is probably a one-off incident is testified to by the fact 
that most farmers growing processing varieties in Rattankalan and the handful who 
do the same in Paunpura prefer this channel to sell their crop. 
7.3.3 Conclusion 
This section has shown that cultivation of potatoes is extremely capital-intensive. 
This serves as a disincentive to petty producers and, to a lesser degree, for small 
capitalist farmers to invest in the crop. It is not just the production cost but also the 
nature of the potato market that contributes to the class specificity of this crop. 
Unlike wheat and paddy, potato is a strictly ‘market-driven’ crop, i.e. the State plays 
no role in either setting its prices or in its procurement. Different types of potatoes 
have different markets which have different channels for sale. Corporate 
agribusinesses are closely involved in the market for seed potato and processing 
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varieties. In fact, in many ways, they have created these markets. But these 
complexities make it more time- and resource-intensive for farmers to navigate 
them. Even the production process, especially in terms of harvesting schedules, has 
to be geared to these multiple market variables. In a further difference vis-à-vis 
paddy and wheat, the sale of potato is not tied to a particular trader through credit of 
any kind, except in the case of contract farming. This leaves farmers free to negotiate 
market processes on their own. 
For petty producers, it is nearly impossible to make a profit on this crop. Smaller 
capitalist farmers are able to take the risks but are vulnerable to heavy losses and 
indebtedness. On the other hand, many large capitalist farmers have succeeded in 
using the crop as a route to accumulation. The evidence presented here suggests that 
some kinds of seed potato farming may be more profitable than other kinds of potato 
farming.101 These farmers have also profited from diversifying into non-farming 
businesses linked to the crop such as trading and cold storage. This is not to discount 
the risks involved in such investments, but they are certainly better equipped to cope 
with these risks if they incur losses. 
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7.4 Cauliflower 
Cauliflower is the second most widely produced vegetable in the fieldwork area after 
potato and farmers who grow it consider it to be a more ‘legitimate’ vegetable than 
potato due to its faster perishability. The section is structured as the previous ones 
were: a discussion on aspects of production followed by those of the market. 
7.4.1 Cauliflower Production 
Cauliflower is traditionally a winter crop, but in some Khanna villages it has been 
grown year-round for the past 15-20 years. Moreover, the scale of production has 
increased considerably during this time. The change has been made possible due to 
seed development and changes in the seed market (see below). 
The process of cauliflower production starts with the preparation, done mechanically 
by a tractor, plough (hal) and land-leveller (suhaga). Everything else is done 
manually, i.e. through labour. Seeds are sown in a ‘nursery’ field; 30 days later the 
seedlings (paneeri) are transplanted to other fields, a process called labayi. Until the 
crop ripens, some rounds of godayi or weeding and loosening the soil around 
individual plants has to be done. Harvest involves picking the crop and loading it on 
trolleys. 
After transplantation, cauliflowers can either be roughly 90 or 70 day crops, 
including a couple of weeks of harvest, since all curds do not mature simultaneously. 
If a farmer is using only 90-day crops, he can reliably take only two cauliflower 
crops from the same land per year since there would not be enough time to take a 
third one of cauliflower. The farmers then grow a different third crop for example, 
paddy, maize or a different vegetable. With a 70-day crop, on the other hand, 
farmers can grow three crops on the same piece of land in one agricultural year. 
These three crops are transplanted in mid-June, mid-November and mid-February; in 
local parlance, the first of these is referred to as the ‘haadu’ (summer) crop and the 
latter two as ‘siyaalu’ (winter) crops.102 This is popular with farmers in Uchakhurd. 
But equally, farmers who grow cauliflower may choose any combination of short 
and/or long duration cauliflower and/or one or more other crop on different plots of 
their operational holding. Mostly, however, the crop cycles are of the kind described 
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 In colloquial terms, there are actually six seasons for growing cauliflowers: ‘haadu’ (harvested in 
roughly August-September), ‘katki’ (October-November), ‘magri’ (December-January), ‘poos’ 
(February-March), ‘cheeni’ (March-April) and ‘kala patta’ (May-June). 
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in Table 6.2. This implies that these villages supply cauliflower to the market 
throughout the entire agricultural year. 
All operations other than the land preparation are done with the help of hired labour. 
In other words, cauliflower, like other vegetables, is extremely labour-intensive. 
Consequently, cauliflower farmers employ more naukars than either paddy/wheat or 
even potato-growing farmers (Table 7.9). As one farmer said, ‘One acre of 
vegetables is equal to five acres of wheat/paddy, with respect to labour, expenses, 
income, everything. One naukar can take care of ten acres of wheat and paddy but in 
vegetables, one acre of cauliflower requires one naukar’. 
Table 7.9: Number of naukars employed by farmers based on different crop cycles (b) 
Crop Cycle 
No. of Naukars Employed Total 
Households 
None 1 2 3 or more 
Paddy and wheat 23 5 1 1 30 
Potato included 10 14 3 1 28 
Cauliflower 5 4 5 6 20 
Potato and cauliflower 1 1 2 2 6 
Total 39 24 11 10 84 
n                                                                     93 
      Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
 
One farmer, Sunny, who grows 50 acres of cauliflower almost year round, routinely 
employs 15 naukars. A few others who cultivate it on similar scales have other 
strategies. They employ around 5 naukars on an annual basis, and then five more for 
harvesting. It is not unusual for large farmers to employ one or two extra naukars on 
a seasonal basis during the harvest of cauliflowers (and potatoes). 
So intense is the labour requirement throughout the production process that some 
large farmers engage in adh-batai with the labour gangs. Adh-batai is a system 
whereby the farmer contributes the land, the tractor and machines for land 
preparation and irrigation costs (if diesel pumps are needed). The cost of seeds and 
crop chemicals is shared equally (sanjha) between farmers and labour. The latter are 
responsible for all the labouring operations and the sale of crop.103 The income from 
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the sale is divided equally between farmer and labour gang. Usually these gangs are 
composed of Biharis, and only occasionally of local SC labour. 
Only very large farmers opt for this on a part of their land. Sunny has a total 
operational holding of 50 acres on which he cultivates 30 acres of cauliflower under 
his supervision and 20 acres under adh-batai. Another farmer with an operational 
holding of 32 acres cultivates 24 acres under his supervision and 8 acres under adh-
batai. These farmers argue that the income for them is the same with or without adh-
batai but they opt for it since it is not possible for them to manage the labour 
involved in cultivation of cauliflower on such a large scale. In the words of one such 
farmer, ‘Aap karaange tab toh saanu beeh sanjhi rakhne payenge; phir do sau 
rotiyaan keemein bana lengi timiyaan’ (If we cultivate on our own, we will have to 
keep 20 sanjhis; then how will the women make 200 rotis [traditional wheat bread] 
for them). Some such farmers employ local SC women only to make rotis for the 
naukars. The amount of land under adh-batai also depends on the number of male 
members in a family who can contribute to farming. 
Seeds 
The Rajdeb and Chandradeb varieties from Hajipur in Bihar dominated the market 
for cauliflower seeds in the area for around thirty years until the turn of the century. 
Seeds also came from Solan in Himachal Pradesh. While they may have been the 
best option at the time, these seeds were of inferior quality; their germination rate 
was low and they could not withstand any amount of rain. The liberalisation of the 
seed market allowed corporations to capture this market with better quality products, 
especially hybrid seeds. Two companies, one domestic (Doctor) and one TNC 
(Syngenta), dominate this market now. 
Hybrid seeds are used mainly for crops grown in the winter months. Seeds from both 
companies are used, but the TNC brands are preferred. The domestic company 
claims that their seeds are not inferior and the preference is purely due to branding. 
Farmers, on the other hand, state quite clearly that there is a difference in quality. In 
the words of Amandeep Singh, ‘The thing with the baaharli [foreign/TNC] seeds is 
that if they say that the crop comes after 20 days, then it comes after 20 days, no 
matter what. Desi [local] seeds will not germinate if it gets too cold; they only grow 
well in the summer’. 
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Indeed, in the summer, the farmers do not use hybrid seeds but open pollination (OP) 
varieties mostly from Doctor and other domestic companies. Many TNCs tried to 
promote hybrids for the summer months but they failed. A manager at Doctor 
explained: 
Naturally, the way God or nature has made it, cauliflower is actually 
supposed to be grown in autumn/winter. When OP is sown in 
April/May, sometimes as much as 500g of seeds per acre is required. 
It is so hot that many seeds die. In fact, due to the loo [hot dry winds], 
some farmers sow as much as 1kg of seeds per acre. For one acre of 
fully grown crop [after transplanting], 22,000 seedlings are required. 
Whereas 200-250gm of seeds are used to grow 22,000 seedlings in 
other seasons, at this time of the year, 1kg is being used for the same 
number. The seedlings can die during sowing, during transplanting 
and even soon after transplanting. If this is done with OP, the cost 
[which may translate into a loss to the farmer] is Rs 1,600 per acre, 
but if hybrids are used at this time, the risk increases to Rs 48,000. In 
other words, the increase in risk is about 40 times. This is why hybrids 
in haadu [summer] were not successful. So, what I had told you 
earlier about farmers preferring hybrids does not apply in this season. 
In this season, even progressive farmers usually prefer OP. 
This reveals the differences in the agronomical suitability of different kinds of seeds, 
and the calculated choices made by farmers in using them. It also indicates the 
significantly higher costs of hybrid seeds. This and other aspects of costs of 
production are discussed next. 
Costs/Profits 
TNC hybrid seeds cost as much as Rs 40,000-48,000 per kg, although there are also 
hybrids in the range of Rs 12,000-20,000 per kg. OP seeds usually range from Rs 
1,200-4,000 per kg. All farmers buy new seeds each season. Despite the high costs, 
large farmers prefer to use hybrids in the winter seasons since they are reliable and 
fetch a good price. The manager quoted above continued: 
200-250 g of seeds is required per acre. The hybrid seeds may cost 
more but other costs [e.g. fertilizer, irrigation, etc.] are the same. So if 
you calculate – say OP worth Rs 1,600 is used – the seed cost for one 
acre will be Rs 400; at Rs 10 per kg [with an average yield of 100kg 
per acre], the income from one acre will be Rs 100,000. If hybrid seed 
costs Rs 16,000, the seed cost for one acre will be Rs 4,000. At Rs 10 
per kg [average yield 130kg per acre], the income will be Rs 130,000. 
So the farmer might spend Rs 3,600 more per acre but [after 
deducting the seed cost] he earns Rs 26,400 more. 
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Small farmers may prefer OP but in any case, they rarely grow cauliflower because 
of the prohibitive costs and labour requirements (see Table 7.10). 
Table 7.10: Costs of production of cauliflower per acre 
     Source: Own fieldwork 2014-15 
      *Chemicals include pesticides and weedicides. The cost of chemicals and godayi is higher for the 
summer crop since cauliflower is not naturally a summer crop, is more susceptible to diseases at the 
time, and needs more care. 
      **Farmers gave rough figures for the labour used in harvesting one acre. It is higher in summer 
because sometimes the timing coincides with the wheat harvest, causing a labour shortage. It is also 
difficult to give an exact figure since this is done with the help of naukars and casual workers (paid 
Rs 200-250 per day) over a period of many days and several acres. 
 
Even though a winter crop of cauliflower needs less care than a summer crop, the 
costs are roughly the same because of the more expensive hybrid seeds used in the 
former. Nevertheless, at almost Rs 40,000 per acre, the cost of cultivating 
cauliflower is much higher than wheat or paddy. Moreover, the State does not 
support the crop in any way. Prices can therefore fluctuate considerably during a 
single day, not to mention over an entire season, and more so than potatoes. Here 
also, farmers like to use the phrase ‘sattebaazi’ or gambling to indicate market 
volatility. Table 7.11 shows the yield levels and price range for the summer and 
winter crops. 
Due to the intense variation in prices, it was not possible within the limits of this 
research to estimate profit figures. Many farmers were also reluctant or unable to 
give an estimate of profit per acre per season. However, many stated that they earn 






Land preparation (bahai) 3000 3000 
Seed  16000 (250g) 4000 (1kg) 
Labour: sowing (bijayi) 2000 2000 
Labour : transplanting seedlings (labayi) 2000 2000 
Fertilizers and crop chemicals* 7000 11000 
Labour: weeding and soil loosening (godayi)* 4000 12000 
Labour: harvesting** (katayi) 2000 2000 
Irrigation 3000 3000 
Total production cost  39,000 39,000 
192 
both the summer and the winter crop because the former has relatively lower yields 
but higher prices while the latter has higher yields but lower prices.  
Table 7.11: Yields and price range of winter and summer crops of cauliflower 
 Winter Summer 
Yields (quintals per acre) 150 100 
Price range (Rs per kg) 2-15 15-30 
                      Source: Own fieldwork 2014-15 
Like potato, the high costs of production combined with market volatility and lack of 
State support means that this is not a crop commonly grown by small farmers. But 
unlike potatoes, it is possible for small farmers to profit from it if they also 
contribute to the labour in these operations. Table 7.12 shows the class positions of 
farmers who cultivate cauliflower. The three petty producers who cultivate this crop 
employ labour gangs for the major operations, such as transplanting, weeding and 
picking, but usually spray the chemicals and irrigate the fields themselves. One of 
these farmers, in fact, owns only half an acre and is cultivating another farmer’s two 
acres for six months under the adh-batai arrangement described above. Moreover, 
since harvesting is spread out over a period of time, sales are also spread out, 
creating the possibility of getting higher prices for at least a part of the crop. 
Table 7.12: Cauliflower-growing farmers by class 
Class Number 
Petty Producer 3 
Small Capitalist 4 
Large Capitalist 22 
Total 29 
n 93 
                                 Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
 
For large farmers, on the contrary, the crop is a serious money-spinner. Due to the 
extreme variation in prices and the nature of the study, it was difficult to calculate 
profits for each harvest, but by their own admission they ranged between Rs 70,000 
to Rs 150,000 per acre. At an average of Rs 100,000 per acre per harvest then, a 
large farmer growing only two crops of cauliflower over 10 acres would earn Rs 
2,000,000 in a year. In other words, for large farmers cultivating two to three crops 
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of cauliflower over several acres, this profit would be very large. As a result, even in 
seasons when they make some losses, they are well-cushioned to invest on the same 
scale the next season. Among other things, their profits are reflected in the houses 
some of these farmers have built for themselves – large and imposing, complete with 
the most modern furnishings. Popular in Punjabi cuisine, cauliflower’s importance 
for accumulation was suggested when, in a lighter vein, the young son of Karnail 
Singh, a large capitalist cauliflower-growing farmer, commented, ‘You know, 
Madamji, how long it has been since I ate gobhi [cauliflower]? I cannot even 
remember! The prices are so high that we prefer to sell everything we grow, not 
cook it at home, and do something else with the money’. 
7.4.2 Cauliflower Markets 
There are two main channels through which farmers sell the cauliflower they grow. 
Via the Arhtia-Trader 
In Uchakhurd, cauliflower production started fifty years ago with a single farmer, 
after which others followed suit. Referencing the long-term and large-scale 
production of cauliflower there, a farmer from Rattankalan said, ‘Even forty years 
ago, all of Uchakhurd were growing vegetables, especially cauliflower. Their land 
has become so poisonous [because of the alleged build-up of chemicals used on the 
crops]. Actually all their food is so poisonous. I think if someone tastes their soil, 
they will die.’ 
Some farmers in Uchakhurd argue that their cauliflower production is so high 
because agronomy of the village and neighbouring ones is particularly well-suited to 
its production. One farmer said that it is ‘God's gift’ to them, similar to the Doaba 
potato kings’ sentiment. Farmers in the other villages, however, argue that this is not 
true at all, and the crop can grow well anywhere. Another argument for the spread of 
the crop has to do with Uchakhurd’s proximity to Khanna: cauliflower has to be sold 
on a daily basis at the mandi and Uchakhurd is only 3km from the centre of town. 
This may well have contributed to the expansion of cauliflower cultivation in this 
village, but the phenomenal increase in the volume of production over the past two 
decades was due to the introduction of improved seeds. 
Before this increase, farmers would take their crop to an arhtia in the Khanna sabzi 
mandi where it would be auctioned. To reiterate, the arhtias in the sabzi mandi do 
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not extend any advances to the farmers. With the dramatic increase in the volume of 
cauliflower produced in the village, as with table potatoes, the traders-cum-arhtias 
from mandis across the state, including Ludhiana, Jalandhar and Chandigarh, as well 
as smaller places like Jagraon, Kapurthala and Ropar, contact the farmers at harvest 
time and vice versa, and the farmer sells where he gets the best price: in the words of 
one farmer, ‘Our village has become a mandi’. This works well for farmers since 
they receive higher prices and is also more convenient, especially given the logistics 
involved in managing the sheer volume of crop produced. They may also sell at the 
Khanna sabzi mandi but that is rare. 
Direct Sales by Farmers 
A different marketing channel is used by farmers who grow cauliflower in 
Rattankalan. These farmers sell their produce in the Ludhiana sabzi mandi. Located 
on NH1 on the way to Jalandhar, Ludhiana sabzi mandi is enormous, and has a large 
area specifically designated for direct sales by farmers, the Jat mandi. Khanna sabzi 
mandi also has an area designated for farmers to sell their produce but, since it caters 
to a much smaller market, the prices are not as high as in Ludhiana. In Ludhiana, 
farmers sell to bulk purchasers who buy 4-5 quintals each daily and supply smaller 
middlemen, colloquially referred to as ‘retailers’, who buy around 20-30kg each. 
These retailers then usually sell to even smaller vendors (rediwallahs) who have a 
daily maximum capacity of 1-1.5kg; they sell directly to the customers. Figure 7.4.1 
shows this network. 
Farmers → Bulk Purchasers → Retailers → Small Vendors → Consumers 
Figure 7.3: Direct sale of vegetables by farmers at Ludhiana sabzi mandi 
For farmers who sell their crop in this way, it is hard work. They have to travel over 
40km with their produce to the mandi in Ludhiana, arriving by 4am. There they have 
to haggle with individual bulk purchasers before returning home at noon or later, 
after which they catch up with their sleep. And during the harvest period this is 
repeated every 2-3 days. Those who depend on this channel usually plan their 
production so that they have cauliflower harvests over the whole year. Karnail 
Singh, for example, has an operational holding of 20 acres and cultivates eight 
harvests of roughly two acres each on different plots of his land each year. 
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These farmers believe that the effort is worthwhile and that this way they get better 
prices compared to selling it through the traders. Karnail Singh said: 
We take the cauliflower without packing and with the leaves to the Jat 
mandi in Ludhiana; we have been doing this for the past 2-3 years. If 
we sell through traders, then there are losses. Traders do not give the 
correct price and the consumer also gets a higher price and lower 
quality. We go to Ludhiana and not Khanna because Khanna mandi is 
too small and it cannot absorb as much quantity so the retail price 
declines. The mandi in Ludhiana is like an international market; the 
prices get updated on the computer and there are five different 
markets. My brother who takes the cauliflower to the mandi deals 
with 200 people in one day. 
Another farmer who has an operational holding of 20 acres and cultivates seasonal 
vegetables including tomatoes and gourds, but only occasionally cauliflower, also 
sells his produce in the Ludhiana mandi. According to him: 
This way we [the farmers and buyers] also save on 9% taxes [5% 
commission of arhtias and 4% mandi fees]. We also develop one-to-
one relations with the buyers. We do good grading and charge more 
money for good quality produce. In the auction, the arhtia auctions off 
a heap and then the quality is not his responsibility. As a result, even 
these buyers do not mind paying us more. In Ludhiana mandi, we get 
prices that are 15-20% higher than what we would get in Khanna 
mandi or direct from the farm. But then again, only those who have 
vehicle loads, i.e. bulk supply, can go that far to sell because 
otherwise, the price will not cover the costs. 
Pointing to the highly competitive nature of this work, he added: 
There is great competition among vegetable farmers. It is a very 
personalized business. If I have good results from, say, a pesticide, 
then I will never tell that to a fellow vegetable farmer, and vice-versa. 
I learnt everything in bits and pieces from here and there, including 
employees of agro-chemical companies. But mainly I learnt from 
experience. The reason for so much competition is that the good 
quality stuff is sold at higher prices and also faster. At any point in the 
mandi, for example, brinjal [aubergine] is sold from Rs 5 per kg to Rs 
12 per kg. 
The above quote points clearly to the benefits of using this marketing channel. 
However, it also suggests that is not suited to small scale production. Indeed, small 
farmers do not consider this to be an option. They either sell their produce through 
the arhtia-trader or in the area designated for direct sales by farmers in the Khanna 
sabzi mandi. But in the latter, the arhtias unlawfully take commission from these 
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farmers. Another option for small farmers is the Apni Mandi (see Chapter 3). Apni 
Mandis are small, open retail markets where both farmers and non-farmer vendors 
can sell fruit and vegetables to consumers. In Khanna, the Apni Mandi has been in 
place since 1988 and takes place at different places on different days of the week. 
On the profitability and viability of Ludhiana mandi as an option for large farmers, 
however, a farmer in Uchakhurd said: 
Those farmers do more work but earn less. They grow only two acres, 
say even four acres, of cauliflower at a time, so it is possible to do that 
[sell in Ludhiana]. We grow much more so we cannot sell on our own; 
we have to spend time taking care of the crop as well. Also, we earn 
more for a smaller family; they earn less than us in a bigger family. 
The above shows that, as in the case of potatoes, large farmers are making clear 
choices in accumulating through cauliflower. At the same time, these choices are 
also shaped by the accepted norm (rivaaz) of marketing in different villages. 
Uchakhurd and Rattankalan are less than 10km from each other. Cauliflower is a 
much older crop in the former, cultivated on a much larger scale, and almost all large 
capitalists cultivate it. Therefore, farmers in this village have extensive networks 
with traders. In Rattankalan, on the other hand, cauliflower farming only started 
twenty years ago and is relatively less widespread. Moreover, rather than growing 
cauliflower over large areas over one or more season, Rattankalan farmers grow it 
over smaller areas throughout the year. Therefore, they do not have comparable 
networks of traders. Ludhiana mandi, therefore, presented them with a profitable 
alternative. 
New Directions: Contract Farming 
A couple of large cauliflower farmers in Uchakhurd have diversified into other high-
value vegetables through contract farming of seeds. One of them has been doing this 
for Doctor for fourteen years, and has cultivated seeds for cauliflower, carrots, 
muskmelon and peas. Contracts are written. During fieldwork, he was cultivating 50 
acres of pea seeds for the company. He said, ‘They fix the rate of the seeds in 
advance. They take everything and what is rejected is given back to the farmer. Peas 
are beneficial for us as they leave nitrogen in the soil and that is good for 
cauliflower’. He also said that the company does contract farming for seeds in many 
other states, yet is still not able to meet the demand for its products. He added, ‘In 
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general, companies make a lot of profit in seeds. They give us Rs 50 per kg for peas 
but they sell it at Rs 150 per kg and all that they do is branding and packing.’ Even 
though the company takes much higher profits than the farmers, this farmer finds it 
to be profitable enough to continue. Sunny (mentioned earlier) has been doing 
contract farming with the same company for radish seeds for 5-6 years. In 2014-15, 
he was growing around 10 acres under this arrangement. 
It is probably not a coincidence that two of the largest cauliflower-growing farmers 
in the villages surveyed have taken up contract farming. Admittedly, two is a very 
small number to draw any broad conclusions about contract farming in seeds, or 
reflect on how it compares with contract farming for seed potatoes; nevertheless, it 
shows a new avenue through which large cauliflower-growing farmers in the area 
are expanding their scope of work. 
7.4.3 Conclusion 
Amandeep Singh once said, ‘There are savings in vegetables but there is also risk. 
Also, more work and more samajh [understanding] is required. Those growing 
wheat and paddy only have to work ten days in each season; after that they do not 
have a lot of work’. But farmers do not only require a samajh of production and 
marketing to be successful in this complex vegetable economy; success also requires 
capital and risk-taking ability. This is also indicative of the kind of effort and 
resources required on the part of small and large farmers to move beyond the wheat-
paddy cycle, i.e. for crop diversification, which is considered urgent for Punjab’s 
economy and ecology. 
While this kind of cultivation may not be particularly suited to small farmers, large 
capitalists have been able to profit immensely from it. In this, they have benefitted 
from and readily adapted to the new cauliflower seeds developed by domestic and 
multinational corporates in the wake of liberalisation. While the prices of some of 
these are extremely high, so are the returns to their investment. Cauliflower 
production also requires a lot of labour and different kinds of labour arrangements 
suited to this economy have evolved in these areas. The fieldwork area presents two 
main channels through which the crop may be sold. It is on the back of the large 
numbers of labourers these farmers command and their adept navigation of the 
markets that these large capitalist farmers have created a different pattern of 
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accumulation. Some of them have started expanding the scope of this pattern by 
diversifying into other vegetables and contract farming for vegetable seeds. 
7.5 Conclusion to Chapter 7 
Some broad conclusions can be drawn from the discussion in the foregoing sections 
on the production and marketing of different crops. Firstly, all crop production is 
capital-intensive, although to varying extents. The vegetable crops (potato and 
cauliflower) are more expensive than the food grains (paddy and wheat). This could 
be due to the costs of seeds, irrigation, inputs and/or need for machines for some 
operations. In each of these crops, some operations in particular also involve 
substantial expenses on labour, e.g. paddy transplanting, wheat harvesting (although 
not commonly done manually), potato harvesting, and almost every aspect of 
cauliflower cultivation. Importantly, different kinds of inputs are also time-sensitive. 
These factors taken together mean that there is an in-built bias in the production 
process against farmers who cannot muster adequate resources, i.e. petty producers. 
Capitalist farmers, on the other hand, and especially the larger among them, are able 
to reap large profits from these crops and may even increase the investment they 
make in the production process over a period of time. 
Secondly, the materiality of the crop matters not only to the production process but 
also to the structure of the markets. For example, since paddy needs to be processed 
– cleaned, shelled and graded – for sale as rice, mills gain importance. Wheat, on the 
other hand, can be stored, sold and consumed without major processing 
requirements. While flour mills are important players in the wheat market, they are 
not part of the government procurement process as rice mills are for paddy. 
Similarly, that potato can be stored (in the case of seed potatoes, they need to be 
stored) implies not only that cold stores are important, but that the crop itself can be 
sold at different times of the year at different rates and thus varying rates of profit. 
The perishability of cauliflower, on the other hand, means that its market is geared 
towards daily sales and consumption by consumers. 
Thirdly, agricultural markets are constituted by different kinds of traders, or actors 
and entities embodying some kind of merchant’s capital. This is obviously the case 
between different crop markets, but also within the market for the same crop. 
Markets for paddy have arhtias, pucca arhtias, rice mills, exporters and brokers. In 
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wheat, there are arhtias, flour mills and brokers. Potato has sabzi mandi arhtias, 
arhtias-cum-traders, farmers who also work as traders, and agribusiness companies. 
Cauliflower markets are home to sabzi mandi arhtias, arhtias-cum-traders, bulk 
purchasers and petty vendors. Moreover, the interests of different kinds of traders are 
aligned with different kinds of processes. For instance, arhtias in the grain mandi are 
dependent on state procurement, while basmati rice exporters benefit from lack of 
State regulation. Similarly, agribusinesses dealing in potatoes have benefitted from a 
liberalised policy regime. These traders maintain their local dominance by variously 
using informal social networks, collective organising and leveraging State policies.  
Fourthly, the relations of different farmers with different kinds of traders vary. 
All farmers, for example, are dependent on the arhtias in the grain mandi by virtue of 
their licensed role in procurement but also because they provide credit. Here, the 
dependence of small farmers is greater than that of large ones. Next, there are hardly 
any farmers with small operational holdings that cultivate potatoes. Production costs 
are a major reason but it is also true that contract farming models and other kinds of 
production followed by agribusinesses actively exclude such farmers. It is the larger 
capitalists then that are better integrated with such capital. Similarly, arhtias-cum-
traders only purchase cauliflower directly from the farms when large-scale 
production is involved. This locates farmers cultivating cauliflower over large and 
small areas quite differently in the vegetable market, even if both kinds are capitalist. 
Finally, State procurement of paddy and wheat continues to be crucial to the profits 
made by farmers through agriculture in Punjab. These profits may not be adequate 
for small farmers to sustain themselves but they are certainly remunerative on a large 
scale. Especially for farmers cultivating other crops where there is no State support 
like potato, cauliflower or even others like sunflower or maize, the prices of which 
can be fairly volatile, the income from paddy and wheat works as an assured buffer. 
Finally, State regulations for these commodity markets are distorted in many ways 
(summarized in Table 7.13).  
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Table 7.13: Distortions to regulative law in different commodity markets 
Commodity Rule  Distortion 
Paddy 
Parmal paddy to be purchased by 
state agencies from farmers 
Decisions on purchases taken by mill  
Moisture levels in parmal paddy 
should not be more than 17% 
Mills accept parmal paddy with 
slightly higher moisture   
Attaching of arhtias with agencies 
(and thus to rice mills) to be done 
row-wise 
Often done on the basis of the 
existing informal relations between 
arhtias and mills  
Timely payments to be made by the 
state agencies to the arhtias and 
farmers 
Delayed ostensibly due to conflict in 
centre-state relations  
Rice mills to deliver 67% rice of 
specified quality from the paddy 
procured 
Rice mills using paddy from other 
sources to meet quality specifications 
No State procurement of basmati 
paddy or guaranteed MSP 
Basmati procured by state agencies in 
2015-16 at MSP 
Wheat 
State procurement based on quality 
standards approved by the centre 
Delay in approving quality standards 
leads to distress sales to private mills 
Sale of wheat by auction 
Sales to private flour mills done on 
the basis of informal relations 
between arhtias and mill owners 
Potato/ 
cauliflower 
Licensed arhtias to facilitate sale of 
potatoes in mandis 
Unlicensed brokers or licensed arhtias 
working as brokers to facilitate sales 




Chapter 8.  Equations of Land 
 
In this chapter, landholdings and land markets are at the centre of the analysis. I 
show how the dynamics of the land market impacts farmers’ agricultural decisions 
and landowners’ use of land as an asset, thus adding further layers to our 
understanding of agrarian accumulation in Punjab’s countryside. 
8.1 Landholdings 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show the findings of the household survey on owned and operated 
landholding. The former shows that over 65% of all respondents own less than 10 
acres of land. Farmers said that fragmentation of landholdings over time was a major 
cause of this. The survey recorded the amount of land owned by every respondent’s 
grandfather, and the distribution of the inherited land thereby. In most cases, there 
has been considerable fragmentation of landholdings due to distribution of land 
between several sons over different generations. In some cases, the respondent’s 
father and/or uncles had succeeded in purchasing some land, which increased the 
amount available to be distributed amongst the next generation. Nevertheless, small 
landholdings form the largest proportion of all the categories. 
Table 8.1: Total land owned by farmers 
Land (acres) No. of Farmers % of Farmers 
0 1 1.1 
0.1 – 4.9 35 37.6 
5 – 9.9 27 29.0 
10 or more 30 32.3 
Total 93 100 
 
Table 8.2: Total operational holding categories 
Land (acres) No. of Farmers % of Farmers 
0 5 5.4 
0.1 – 4.9 16 17.2 
5 – 9.9 13 14.0 
10 or more 59 63.4 
Total 93 100 
         Source for tables: Own household survey 2014-15 
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On the other hand, only about 30% of the respondents have an operational holding of 
less than 10 acres. This is partly due to the biased composition of the sample for the 
survey, but it clearly establishes the importance of land-leasing in agriculture in the 
fieldwork area. It shows that around half the ‘large capitalist farmers’ in this sample 
only qualify as such because of the land they are leasing-in. It also shows that some 
farmers are leasing-out their entire holding. 
The landholdings may be owned and operated quite differently by different 
households. Land could be owned and operated by an individual farmer. It may also 
be held in the name of the respondent’s father, if still alive, and operated effectively 
by one or more sons.
104
 In some cases, brothers conducted their operations jointly, 
and in such cases also lived together in a joint family. In other cases, the brothers 
may operate their share of the land separately even though the land is legally owned 
jointly or sanjha, making them effectively different operational holdings (such cases 
were recorded in the data as different).
105
 When land is sanjha between two farmers, 
it means that legally they are co-owners of 100% of the property. However, in 
practice, each person will have actual control over 50% of the land. This means, in 
the words of a farmer, ‘If I sell my share to a third person, then the remaining 50% 
will still have my name but I will have no control over it’. Land ownership and 
control is, therefore, governed as much by customary rules within the community as 
they are by land laws. 
8.2 The Land-Lease Market 
The land-lease market around Khanna is very dynamic. The most common form of 
lease arrangement, usually called theka but sometimes zabti or mamla, is when a 
landowner leases-out his land to another farmer for 12 months, from 1
st
 June of one 
year to 31
st
 May of the next. The agreement for this deal is made many months in 
advance in the previous agricultural year. Which farmers are willing to lease-out 
land and which are willing to lease-in is learnt through word of mouth within the 
village and sometimes also in other villages. The deals are usually made through an 
oral agreement between the two sides. Sometimes this involves a farmer known to 
both sides who facilitates the deal, a dalal, who is paid a commission of Rs 1000; 
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 There was only one case in the survey where the land was in the name of the respondent whilst the 
father was still alive. This is considered exceptional. 
105
 Occasionally, such brothers may share the tube well or some implements between them. 
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sometimes the deals are struck directly between the two sides. Occasionally, there 
may be a rough written agreement which is done in front of the middleman or an 
official of the Block administration. When the deal is struck, the lessee has to give a 
shahi or symbolic amount, e.g. Rs 1000 or Rs 5000, to seal the deal (later deducted 
from the lease cost). Half of the lease rent has to be paid at the beginning of the lease 
period (by 1
st
 June) and the other half after six months (by 1
st
 December). 
In my survey sample, there was only one case where land was leased-out for six 
months. This was a small farmer owning 2 acres, the only landowner belonging to 
the Tarkhan (carpenter) caste that I met, who leased-out his land during the summer 
season. With his meagre resources, it made economic sense for him to grow only 
wheat for self-consumption during winter. Another kind of lease is the adh-batai 
discussed in Section 7.4 on cauliflower. This is also commonly done in Paunpura for 
okra which is a five-month crop cultivated usually between February-March and 
July-August. 
It should be noted that leasing of agricultural land is not illegal in Punjab but ‘the 
tenant... acquires the right to purchase the leased land from the owner after a 
specified period of creation of tenancy’ (Niti Aayog 2016, 6): this is why the lease 
agreements are not made through the legal route. In further evidence of the 
importance of customary rules in access to land, these ‘illegal’ agreements are the 
accepted norm and upheld by all due to the values of honour and reciprocity within 
the village and within known personal networks, an issue revisited below. 
The rates for leasing-in land have been increasing continuously and stood at Rs 
40,000-50,000 per acre p.a. at the time of fieldwork.
106
 Different farmers used 
different reference points to emphasise how high lease rates are now. One farmer 
said it was Rs 20 per acre before the Green Revolution, another that it was Rs 700 in 
1984 and yet another that it was Rs 12,500 in 2000. To some extent, this increase 
could be explained as a function of inflation. However, it is closely linked to the 
increase in major crop prices. This is a discursive argument made generally by 
farmers and is difficult to establish scientifically. But the evidence below suggests 
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 The rates are lower when there is no tube well on the farm, and could be as low as Rs 30,000 per 
acre p.a. 
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that it is reasonable to argue for a rough correlation between people’s claims about 
the prices of lead crops and the land lease and sale values.  
The Congress-led central government, which was in power between 2004 and 2014, 
increased the MSP for wheat and paddy considerably: wheat increased from Rs 640 
per quintal in 2004-05 to Rs 1,400 in 2014-15, and paddy from Rs 590 to Rs 1345 
per quintal (Directorate of Economics and Statistics 2004a, 2004b, 2014). Corrected 
for inflation, the 2014-15 prices for wheat and paddy are actually much lower at Rs 
772.6 and Rs 742.3 per quintal, respectively.
107
 Nevertheless, they reflect a real 
increase of approximately 26% and 21%, respectively.  
As mentioned earlier, recent years also witnessed a price boom for basmati. Potatoes 
are also profitable in most years and agribusinesses have expanded the market in 
new ways. 
Many farmers argue for a close correspondence between lease rates and crop prices. 
One said, ‘If two crops have done well, then those leasing land out will increase the 
land-lease rate’. Another told me, ‘Where there is potato or three crops are 
commonly grown, there the lease rates are higher. Where less potato is cultivated, 
the lease rates are lower, between Rs 30,000 and Rs 50,000’. Yet another said,  
The emergence of commercial crops is the main reason. Between 
Khanna and Doraha, there is a belt of eight to ten villages where 
potato is grown and where farmers have earned good money in potato 
in the past two to three years. There the lease rates increased and as a 
result, there was a ripple effect and the lease rates for other villages 
also increased. 
It is clear that the cultivation of potato and its prices is considered an important 
factor causing the increase in lease rates. The assumption in this causality is that land 
is being leased-in to cultivate potatoes. This is not an invalid assumption. In fact, 
Section 7.3 showed that potato cultivation is beneficial when done on a large scale. 
Given that the owned landholdings of many farmers are small, it is only logical that 
many of the ‘large’ farmers would be leasing-in land. The data from the household 
survey reinforces this. Table 8.3 shows that an overwhelming majority of potato-
growing farmers lease-in some land. 
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Table 8.3: Land leased-in by potato-growing farmers 






           Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
Here, however, a distinction needs to be noted between different kinds of lessees, 
perhaps best described as more or less successful potato farmers. For example, 
Kulwinder Singh cultivates potatoes over 60 acres but owns only 5 acres. He has 
been leasing around 50 acres annually for at least the past decade. On the other hand, 
there is a farmer in the same village who grew potatoes over 2 acres in 2014-15 and 
has been cultivating the crop for around seven years. He owns only 2.25 acres and 
leased-in 3 acres. Since this study could not capture the work histories of the farmers 
included in the survey, it is not possible to give a clear explanation for the difference 
between such farmers today, even though both have been cultivating the crop for 
many years now. Nevertheless, such differences in the scale of cultivation and the 
capacity to lease-in are important to bear in mind. 
The causality between potato cultivation and leasing-in of land made above can also 
perhaps be reversed. It may be said that in the case of some farmers, especially the 
kind of smaller farmer described in the above paragraph, potatoes are cultivated 
because there is a need to lease-in land.
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 The previous chapters on crops 
established that small-scale farming can only provide small profits and limited scope 
for expansion: this is one of the reasons that leasing-in land is so popular. At the 
same time, the lease rates are so high that producing only two crops (excluding 
cauliflower) does not make economic sense. The returns on paddy and wheat are 
declining, and a third major crop is required to cover these costs. This third crop is 
potato. Harman Singh, who owns two acres and leased-in seven more in 2014-15 
said, ‘On lease, sometimes we are able to save, at other times, we make a loss. That 
                                                          
108
 One farmer argued that sometimes farmers lease-in land in order to cover the losses they might 
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is why we take three crops from the land. If the price of potato increases, only then 
can we save a lot’. 
This can be better illustrated using some profit estimates from the previous chapters. 
The profit per acre from wheat and paddy was calculated as roughly Rs 30,000 and 
Rs 15,000 respectively, i.e. Rs 45,000 in total. Given that the average lease rate is Rs 
45,000, paddy and wheat cultivation on leased land would leave a farmer with no 
profit. It is clear then why cultivation of a crop like potato is closely tied to the 
dynamics of land-lease.  
Some argue that land-leasing, especially for small farmers, is actually counter-
productive and is bound to lead to indebtedness. The way the deal is done is 
pertinent to this. I mentioned earlier that half of the total lease amount has to be paid 
to the lessor at the beginning of the contract period, i.e. by 1
st
 June; for nearly all 
small farmers the amount is so large that they have to get a loan from the arhtia. For 
example, if a farmer leases-in five acres at an average of Rs 45,000 per acre, he will 
have to deposit Rs 112,500 at the beginning of the agricultural year. A farmer may or 
may not have this lump sum amount available with them to make the payment, 
forcing them to take a loan. Jaspal Singh, the farmer-arhtia mentioned in Section 7.1, 
thinks of lease rates as one of the banes of farming. Referring to a farmer sitting in 
his shop at the time he said,  
He has eight acres of his own and his son leases-in eight acres. He has 
implements worth Rs 1,000,000; they borrow the lease amount from 
us and he has to pay interest on it. They should do apni kheti [farming 
on own land] and then they will save. If he leases-in land, he will 
bring two trolleys instead of one trolley. He should do some dairy 
work instead. If he farms eight acres, there will be no need for a 
naukar as well. If he farms only eight acres, then they can do time-
pass comfortably. 
Even though leasing-in land is considered harmful to farmers, the high demand for 
the same implies that there are profits to be made through it. The real issue then is 
the impact of high land-lease rates on profits more generally. The average lease rates 
are equivalent to the cost of cultivating an acre of potato or cauliflower, one that is 
excessive for many. 
Thus, to understand accumulation by different farmers it is important to account for 
the size of operational holding as well as the proportion of leased-in land. In fact, a 
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major grievance of farmer leaders is that the CACP grossly underestimates the actual 
lease rates when calculating the cost of cultivation to determine the MSP.
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8.2.1 The Lessors and the Lessees 
For a better sociological understanding of the lease market, it is important to identify 
those who are engaged in leasing-in and leasing-out land. It should be noted at the 
outset that those who are leasing-out today may not be next year and vice versa for 
the lessees. Similarly, the amount of land leased-in by a farmer may vary 
considerably from one year to another. This could be due to deals falling through or 
financial considerations, a point I return to below. 
The phenomenon of reverse tenancy mentioned in Chapter 4 is confirmed by the 
data. Farmers with small landholdings often choose to lease-out their land as they are 
unable to afford the high investments and risks involved in farming profitably. 
Several farmers in the sample lease small landholdings, ranging from two to five 
acres, from such landowners. The survey sample also reported a couple of small 
landowners who lease-out their land for this reason. Moreover, the survey shows that 
many farmers have leased-in large landholdings, anywhere between 10 to 25 acres, 
from individual landowners. Many factors can lead large landowners to lease-out 
their holdings, despite the profits to be made from such land. Gurjeet Singh, the 
young son of a large capitalist farmer, in one of the survey villages explained this: 
Land is leased-out by NRIs [Non Resident Indians]. There are NRIs in 
Paunpura who have leased-out 35-40 acres; there are in general many 
NRIs from Paunpura. Then, if someone has a good job, they do not 
have the time so they lease-out their land. Then if someone does not 
have sons, the farmer thinks ‘I will lease-out land, get a neat income 
of Rs 500,000 annually, manage within that and marry off my 
daughters properly’. Then, if there is no manpower to do farming, 
then also people have no choice but to lease-out the land. See, my 
father manages farming on 20 acres now. Once he gets a bit older and 
cannot do so much work, then it is not that I will start farming. I do 
not know any farming. I will do some other business. We will also 
lease it out eventually. Of course, there are also people who lease-out 
land simply because they want to sit at home. 
A slightly different argument was made by Karnail Singh: 
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but it is clear from this that lease rates have been underestimated by the CACP at least until very 
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It is definitely easier to earn money [by leasing-out land]. Also, some 
farmers do not have ‘tajurba’ [experience] of farming; you can also 
call it ‘tareeka’ [proper way] or ‘samajh’ [understanding]. Some 
know exactly how to do it well. The difference is like between a 
farmer who goes from shop to shop to get the exact chemical and one 
who asks the shopkeeper and takes anything that the shopkeeper 
gives. 
Here the decision to lease-out land is related to the ability to farm well. While this 
was not an argument made often, it is a factor referred to indirectly in the previous 
quote as well where Gurjeet Singh states that he simply does not know any farming 
and would have to lease-out his land eventually. This raises some important issues 
about diversification among farmers and disenchantment of the youth from farming, 
to be explored in Chapter 10. 
Another aspect that needs to be highlighted in terms of who is leasing-out and 
leasing-in the land is a regional one. There are far more NRIs from the Doaba region 
than from the Malwa region. Further, the land in Doaba is also argued to be retli or 
sandy, and therefore, less suited to paddy production than the land in Malwa. This 
means that in Doaba there is more land available to be leased-out and relatively 
fewer people wanting to lease it in; accordingly, the lease rates are much lower than 
in the Malwa region, i.e. Rs 30,000-35,000 per acre p.a. This was, and is, a key 
factor in enabling the ‘potato kings’ of Doaba to expand the area of their work over 
thousands of acres. 
On the other hand, in eastern Malwa, where Khanna is located, the demand for 
leasing-in land is much higher than the supply. All my respondents, including those 
from other parts of the state, unequivocally asserted that this area is the most fertile 
part of the state; it is, therefore, no surprise that its lease rates are among the highest. 
Even within this fertile region, rates vary geographically. In the villages that are very 
close to Ludhiana, i.e. in Sahnewal and some parts of the Doraha sub-division, lease 
rates are much lower at Rs 35,000. This is because more people in those areas have 
jobs or businesses in the massive industrial centre that is Ludhiana. Then, for 
example, there are a handful of farmers from Malerkotla (Sangrur district), 45km 
209 
from Khanna, who have leased-in agricultural land very close to Khanna town, as the 
prices received for vegetables in Khanna are higher than in Malerkotla.
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There could also be differences between villages. Earlier it was mentioned that 
potato cultivation impacts lease rates due to the high rates of profits to be earned. In 
villages where potato cultivation becomes popular, there is a higher demand for 
leasing-in land. In Amloh, one such area, the land-lease rate was as high as Rs 
60,000 per acre in 2014-15. The demand for leasing-in land is also high among 
farmers in villages like Uchakhurd where cauliflower production has proved to be so 
profitable that not a single large landowner has leased-out his land. It is common 
among farmers in this village but also in others to lease-in small and large holdings 
in other villages. Some respondents argued that some villages have more land than 
others and that determines whether or not farmers are able to lease-in land within the 
village. 
There are indications of subtle but significant social changes as a result of the 
importance of land-leasing, although this research could not study this in detail. For 
example, one farmer said: 
Earlier, there were five to seven people in the village who leased their 
land to those they were related to. Now, they see relations as well as 
money. They take money also and they do not let you feel that you are 
being pinched also. They will say, ‘I can give it to you, but an outsider 
came and offered Rs 40,000’. So, I will also have to give that much 
money. Then they get a lot of work done for free. For instance, if I am 
doing something on the leased-out land with a trolley or a tractor, the 
lessor will say, ‘You are doing it on the leased-out land anyway, do it 
on mine as well’. 
Yet another farmer said: 
The person who takes [land on] lease becomes like a ‘free naukar’ 
[servant with no payment] for two people – he becomes the naukar for 
the lessor who gets the money for his land but also gets his land 
cultivated, plus any odd jobs; then he becomes the naukar for the 
arhtia to whom he takes the crop. That is it – the lessee is a ‘free 
naukar’ for two people. 
The two quotes above point to two issues. Firstly, there is an increasing monetary 
consideration in leasing-out land. This would not be surprising for smallholders for 
whom the rent may be an essential element of their meagre income. This could also 
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be a social consequence of the high level of commercialization of agriculture. But as 
the quote above also indicates, it is not that ‘relations’ have become unimportant. A 
few farmers included in the survey lease-in land from their brother(s). While in some 
cases, the lessor brother clearly demands the ‘market rate’, in at least one case he 
accepts any reasonable amount paid by the lessee brother for the sake of safe custody 
of the land. 
The second issue that emerges is the ‘free work’ that the lessee has to do for the 
lessor. In many cases, the farmers, small and large, who lease-out their landholdings, 
continue to rear cattle to produce milk for household consumption and/or for sale. 
The farmers need fodder for their cattle and it is common for the lessors to demand 
some of this fodder (especially ‘toori’, made from the wheat crop residues) from the 
lessee. The lessee may also have to sell some milk from his cattle to the lessor. 
These kinds of exchanges would be important when the lessor and lessee come from 
the same village, and if the latter wants to continue leasing-in the same land. Farmers 
usually want to lease-in land that adjoins their own, as it makes irrigation and other 
operations easier to manage. Such farmers would want to oblige their lessees and 
quite commonly pay a few thousand more than the prevailing rate to secure their 
tenancy. ‘Free naukar’-type relations may also be more likely when a large farmer 
leases-in land from a smaller landowner, but I was unable to verify this. 
8.2.2 Fissures in the Lease Market 
In the chapters on paddy, wheat and potato, I showed that farmers faced some 
difficulties with each crop in 2014-15. The prices of basmati and potato fell 
considerably. Wheat and potato also suffered due to untimely rains. The wheat yield 
was also affected and this was followed by problems in government procurement.
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While individually some farmers may have managed to get adequate returns, overall 
this was an exceptionally bad agricultural year. As land-lease deals are made well in 
advance of the beginning of the next agricultural year, many deals for 2015-16 had 
already been made before the problems with potato and wheat emerged. Further, 
some of these deals had been made at similar or even higher rates than the previous 
year. 
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In early May 2015, however, local newspapers started reporting that lessees were 
refusing to pay the high lease rents. This was the first time that such a thing had 
happened in the area. Lessees and lessors began mobilising collectively to secure 
their different interests with respect to land-leasing. In several villages, lessees 
formed committees which declared they would not pay more than Rs 35,000 per acre 
for land with a tube well and Rs 30,000 or less for other land. Lessors asking for 
more money and lessees offering more money would be penalised by the 
committee.
112
 Lessors, who in turn would suffer from such a decline in rates, were 
also reported to have come together at some locations, arguing that lease rates are 
decided by mutual agreement between lessor and lessee and the former are not the 
exorbitant rent extractors they were being made out to be (Iqbal 2015). There is 
certainly some truth to that. 
The issue here was not just that lessees had suffered losses. For smallholder lessors 
who depended on lease rent for their subsistence, the decline in rent would be a big 
blow. According to Karnail Singh: 
If you ask me, it [the formation of committees and reducing lease 
rates] is not a good thing. They have reduced the lease rates from Rs 
45,000 to Rs 25,000-30,000. Those leasing-out land are also not big 
farmers; they are kamzor zimidars [weak farmers]. The strong farmers 
can even farm on their own land, or if they have less manpower, then 
can lease it out. 
It is not clear if these committees had any legal standing, and it is more likely that 
they represent a kind of moral force of the ‘community’. The community itself is, 
needless to say, not homogenous. On following up with my respondents on this 
issue, it emerged that while some farmers were abiding by the rules of the 
committee, many others were not. Jagjit Gill commented on the situation: 
There are two kinds of people. There are those who have turned away 
from the deal entirely – they have said that you can keep our shahi 
[payment] but we will not take the land; the others are zabaan ke log 
[people who honour their word] – they have given their word so they 
lease the land in after negotiating Rs 4,000-5,000 less than what was 
decided. 
Another farmer who leases-in a large area said: 
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What will the committees do? If we have given someone our word 
[zabaan] earlier, then how can we retract? Then people will not rent 
us land in future; tomorrow we have to show our face in the 
community also. If sometimes the profits are very high, it is not that 
we share the profits with the landowner. I am leasing land, so is he 
[pointing to someone sitting next to him]; V Singh did not even come 
to the committee meeting precisely for this reason. The land-lease 
rates also increased because many farmers leased-in land to grow 
basmati and potato because there was profit in it last year; now that 
there is manda [recession], those people have also left and do not want 
to do farming on lease.’ 
This episode showed the repercussions of problems in the crop markets for village-
level land dynamics and revealed the strains created in the social fabric of the village 
by the nature of agrarian development in the area. 
8.3 The Market for Land Sales 
Around the mid-2000s there was a huge growth in urbanisation around Chandigarh 
and Mohali; these cities were stretching out, as cities do, into the hinterland. Private 
property developers acquired large swathes of land in the villages on the Punjab side 
of the tri-city area (Chandigarh, Mohali (Punjab) and Panchkula (Haryana)). These 
developers are said to have bought the land from the farmers in these areas at rates as 
high as tens of millions per acre. Many of these farmers, locally known as 
Chandigarhiyas (people from Chandigarh), used this money to purchase land in 
other parts of Punjab (also see V. Sharma 2012). 
The boom in land sales in the field area between 2007-08 and 2011-12 was a direct 
result of the same phenomenon. At a rough estimate, agricultural land was being 
sold for anywhere between Rs 5,000,000-8,000,000 per acre and in some cases Rs 
10,000,000 per acre. It should be noted that these are not the government rates at 
which land is sold. By law, land has to be sold at the government rate which is 
usually less than the ‘market rate’ and the income from the sale is taxed. By 
declaring the sale of land at the lower, government rate, the farmers evade taxes and 
administrative fees that they would otherwise have to pay.
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 A few farmers also 
reported that they purchased some land in the name of their mothers or wives as 
women are taxed 2% less than men. 
Jagjit Gill told me: 
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Ninety per cent of all land sold was bought by people from the 
Chandigarh-Mohali area; and the first preference of these people is 
Amloh because it is only 65-70km from Chandigarh and the soil is 
good enough to support three crops. Only if they were not able to 
work out deals in this area, did they go to Sangrur or any other place. 
If you go, for example, to the area between Sirhind and Rajpura, the 
land there is daakad [hard and lumpy] and one can only take two 
crops there – wheat and paddy – they do not grow potato there. 
Indeed, not just Amloh, but Khanna and Ludhiana district more generally were also 
preferred destinations for such land purchases. Yet again, we find the agricultural 
productivity playing an important role in determining the value of the land. While 
the Chandigarhiyas sometimes settled and farmed in the villages where they bought 
land, they usually leased the land out. 
In a village near Paunpura, this development in the land market had some interesting 
consequences. This village is particularly famous for the cultivation of potatoes in 
Khanna, and a vast expanse of the crop can be seen across this village during the 
growing season. Many farmers in this village had suffered losses in the risky 
business that potato farming can be. These farmers, including large farmers, sold part 
or all of their land to these new purchasers, used the money to pay off their debts, 
and now lease-in what was their own land for cultivation at high rates. Unlike other 
villages around Khanna where there are normally no more than five landholding 
Chandigarhiya families, in this village there are around twenty-five such families. A 
farmer from Paunpura told me, 
You will not able to figure out there whether people have sold their 
land or still own it. The landowners who live outside the village keep 
increasing the lease rates and charge exorbitantly [the rate there is 
about Rs 65,000] and because the tagde [strong] farmers sold their 
land and pocketed the money, they have the extra money to pay the 
higher lease rates. As a result, the small farmers, who cannot pay such 
rates, suffer. 
The purchases by the Chandigarhiyas certainly injected money into the economy of 
the fieldwork area and increased land prices across the state. Reportedly, many 
farmers in the area sold some or all of their land during the boom years, and either 
entered a different business and/or invested in land elsewhere. Farmers with enough 
surplus money, with or without making any land sales, invested in agricultural land 
in areas where prices were cheaper than in Ludhiana district, such as Sangrur or 
Hoshiarpur. A chain of land transactions and a hierarchy of demand for land in 
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different areas developed. As one farmer said, ‘People sell more expensive land from 
Chandigarh and buy it in this area; they sell more expensive land here and buy land 
in Barnala and so on’. These transactions are undertaken as speculative investment, 
and the land sold off when the need arises. In the interim, the owners pocket the 
lease rents on these plots.
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In the survey data, only nine farmers had sold any land in the ten years before 2014-
15, though it is not known if it was sold to Chandigarhiyas. On the other hand, 20 
had bought some land over the same period. This again could be explained by the 
predominance of large farmers in the sample. Those who sold land almost always 
sold agricultural land. Among those who bought land, some bought agricultural land, 
while others bought land within the village for residential or dairy purposes. 
Technically, nobody has malkiyat (legal individual ownership) over any land within 
the abadi (residential) area of the village. However, transactions over residential 
plots happen and plots can be quite expensive at Rs 100,000 for one bigha (0.2 acre) 
or Rs 500,000 for one acre. In a couple of cases, small plots of non-agricultural land 
were also reported to have been bought. 
Some large farmers buy small parcels of land almost every year. Sunny, for example, 
who owns 38 acres in total, has bought 10-12 acres of land in the last 10 years. 
Another who owns 10 acres said, ‘I bought 6 bighas [1.2 acres] in instalments of 3 
bighas [0.6 acres] each in Ladmajri two to three years ago at Rs 400,000 per bigha 
(Rs 2,000,000 per acre). I also sold 5 acres of my land to someone from Chandigarh 
and bought 5 acres adjoining our existing land so that all our land is together. Now 
we lease-in the land that we sold and farm it’. Another farmer who owns 12 acres 
said that he bought 3 acres in a neighbouring village at Rs 3,700,000 per acre from a 
landowner who is a doctor residing in Amloh. He also bought 2.5 acres in 
Uchakhurd from two people at Rs 3,000,000 per acre. In fact, small plots of land 
fetch lower rates per acre than a large plot. This, again, has implications for the 
money that smallholders would be able to get by selling their land. Most sales by 
smallholders were distress sales. One farmer who owns 3 acres reported that he sold 
3 bigha (0.6 acre) in 2013 at Rs 400,000 per bigha as he had suffered a major loss as 
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a result of land-leasing. Another farmer who owns only 0.5 acres sold 0.2 acres as he 
needed money for his wife’s medical treatment. 
Starting in 2012/13, the price of land across the state fell drastically.
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 Land that 
was being sold at Rs 8,000,000 per acre until the beginning of this decade was 
fetching barely Rs 2,000,000 per acre at the time of fieldwork. Large amounts of 
money are said to be locked in such speculative investments. This is true not only for 
investments made by large farmers but also for urban traders and residents. For 
example, a former partner in the feed mill of one of my key respondents (Ashok 
Bahl) in the mandi had turned to property dealing; he had bought some property 
intending to sell it on once prices had risen a certain amount – but the prices crashed. 
In fact, apart from the money crunch due to the crash in basmati prices, the decline 
in property and land prices is also argued to have contributed to the difficult 
financial situation in the local agricultural market. During our meeting, this person 
said: 
It was because of Chandigarh sales that the rates in the rest of the state 
also shot up; now there is manda [recession] in Chandigarh so what 
can one say about the rest of the state? The situation is so bad that the 
rates of cement have decreased from Rs 345 to Rs 250 per bag; it’s the 
same with bricks. 
He and Bahl went on to talk about a feed mill in Khanna that had apparently gone 
bankrupt due to its large losses; they also mentioned a prominent businessman in a 
neighbouring town who had recently committed suicide for similar reasons. They 
commented that people who are ‘in a hurry and do wrong things’ are bound to end 
up like this. Rumour also had it that in one of the up-market housing colonies being 
developed on the outskirts of Khanna town, the banks had to take possession of 
every single house due to loan defaults. Ascertaining the veracity of these claims or 
drawing empirical connections between these different aspects was well beyond the 
scope of this research, but they helped to paint a picture of the kind of repercussions 
the property market slump had for less obvious aspects and actors of local, small 
town economies. 
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Farmers, too, were disappointed by the drastic drop in the price of land. This was 
particularly true for farmers with small landholdings and meagre resources who were 
counting on the sale of land for important personal or economic concerns such as 
indebtedness. One farmer said 
Until two years ago, the [sale] rate of land was Rs 10 million an acre. 
But now the rate is Rs 4.5-5 million. That is also the case only when 
4-5 acres are being sold together. If someone needs money and wants 
to sell a single acre, he will find it difficult to sell it for Rs 2-2.5 
million. 
Another told me, ‘In 2011-12-13, it [land prices] went as high as Rs 7 million per 
acre; now it is Rs 2-2.5 million per acre – actually, nobody wants to buy it even at 
that much. But those who need the money will sell their land at this rate’. Indeed, 
one of the survey respondents, who owned 3.5 acres and had been leasing it out for 
two years, was planning to sell two acres in 2015 as he needed the money for his two 
daughters’ weddings. 
In understanding the land market, it should also be recalled that successful capitalist 
farmers in Punjab have been buying land outside the state, especially in UP, at least 
since the early years of the Green Revolution (Chapters 4, 6): such land in Punjab 
was more expensive and rarely available. I met two farmers with some land in UP. 
There are also exceptional cases where a farmer holds land in partnership abroad, for 
example, in Italy. While in my survey, no farmer reported having land in another 
state, I was informed that this trend continues, although perhaps less so than before. 
One farmer said, ‘People are still buying land in other states. The price of land in UP 
is Rs 1-1.2 million and here it is Rs 5 million. They sell some here and buy land in 
other places. But there is firqaparasti [sectarianism] in India. People are also scared 
that 1984
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 will happen again’. However, some argue that now the lease and sale 
rates in states like UP have also increased considerably. This implies that the 
possibilities of expanding land ownership both within Punjab and outside it are 
limited and it is an option accessible only to fairly rich farmers. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter centred land in the analysis of agrarian change and accumulation. Land-
leasing is crucial to this, and both small and large landowners constitute the supply 
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and the demand side of the land-lease market in the fieldwork area. Lease rates are 
tied closely to crop prices, and the fall in prices of several crops in 2014-15 led to an 
unprecedented response by the ‘community’ in an attempt to reduce lease rates. This 
exposed the strains and contradictions underlying the market, especially because 
high lease rates are important for smallholder lessors. It also brought to the fore the 
tensions in the way inter-personal relations are implicated in land-lease deals. In 
other words, land use, control and access are mediated by law, economy and custom. 
Land is not only an asset when cropped, leased-in or leased-out, but also in terms of 
its sale value. Sale of land is an easy, though not always desirable, way of obtaining 
cash. The property boom in Chandigarh had a huge impact on the value of land in 
the field area; larger farmers used this as an opportunity to accumulate and smaller 
ones to alleviate distress. The crash in prices has, therefore, reduced the value of land 
as an economic ‘safety valve’ and has been met with considerable disappointment 
and increased the immediate pressure on even successful farmers. This dynamics of 
the land market also brought to light the, perhaps unanticipated, links between 
different aspects of the regional economy. 
Finally, the lens of land allows us to see some of the ways in which the dynamics in 
the economy outside of agriculture is relevant to accumulation within agriculture. 
The value of land, both in terms of sale and lease, has been found to be dependent 
not only on crop profitability but also developments in the wider economy, for 
example, property prices. Moreover, diversification by farmers to include other 
economic activities or migration to other areas creates the opportunities for other 
farmers to expand their area of cultivation. In other words, in land-leases and land 
sales, the accumulation strategies of different farmers often intersect. I also showed 
that a focus on the local area or village alone would render the understanding of both 
land dynamics and accumulation incomplete, since leasing and purchase/sale of land 
is often done across villages and regions. 
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Chapter 9.  Circuits of Credit 
 
Credit relations have been a reoccurring issue throughout the foregoing discussion. 
Here it becomes the centre of analysis, with the aim of understanding the different 
types of credit available as well as the ways in which credit structures power 
relations among farmers and traders. Table 9.1 below gives a snapshot of the key 
credit relations in the field that impact agrarian accumulation. In what follows, I 
explore the politics involved in each of them. 
Table 9.1: Key sources of credit for farmers 
Source of 






Cash – both 
with the 
cropping cycle 
and through the 
year. 
18-36% p.a.; 
interest applied on 
interest if not 
repaid on time. 
To be repaid at the 
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credit – 50% in 
cash, 50% as 
fertilizers. 
7% p.a. with 3% 
subsidy if the 
money is repaid on 
time. 
Cash to be paid at the 
















to as ‘limit’). 
7% p.a. with 3% 
subsidy if the 
money is repaid on 
time on the first Rs 
300,000; 12-13% 
p.a. on any amount 
over Rs 300,000. 
Cash to be paid at the 
time of sale of crop 
(bi-annually). The 
principal amount can 









Source: Own fieldwork 2014-15 
9.1 Cooperative Societies 
Village-level PACS have existed in Punjab since before Independence; one survey 
village PACS, for example, was established in 1923. The Government of India took 
over most of these societies after Independence. Chapter 3 revealed that cooperative 
credit was particularly encouraged in the Green Revolution period, although it has 
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had limited success in the state and benefitted large farmers much more than the 
smaller ones. This research sought to understand how the system of cooperative 
credit works and how is it used by farmers.
117
 
All villages are served by one society, either based in their own village or in a 
neighbouring one. One society can apply to serve two villages. The societies in two 
of the survey villages served two villages. Cooperatives extend short-term credit to 
farmers twice a year for the production of the rabi and kharif crops. They also extend 
other kinds of credit for large agricultural or other social and economic expenses.
118
 
The money for this credit comes from the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development which forwards the money to the Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., 
which then forwards it to district-level cooperative banks and from there to the 
PACS. 
Short-term credit is the most common form of credit taken by farmers.
119
 Most 
farmers had an account (khaata) in the society, commonly referred to as a ‘copy’. 
The credit extended by the society to farmers varies by both landholding and scale of 
investment. In the survey, I found that farmers’ credit accounts with the PACS 
extended over a wide range (from Rs 2,000 per acre of land owned to Rs 30,000 per 
acre land owned p.a.). Interest is charged at 7% p.a. and a 3% subsidy is given if the 
money is repaid on time.
120
 About half the amount is given as cash and half as 
fertilizers supplied by the cooperative itself. 
Most farmers find the amount extended by the cooperative woefully inadequate for 
their needs.
121
 A farmer who has an operational holding of nearly 50 acres said, 
The limit given by the cooperative society is not enough, it does not 
even cover the costs of our fertilizers; the amount of farming I do, I 
should get at least Rs 1,000,000. We can get more from banks, but 
they charge higher interest. So if you ask me, the limit in cooperative 
societies should be increased. 
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 It does not study the detailed profiles of different societies, their successes and failures, or even the 
politics of their administration. 
118
 Cooperative societies may also rent out implements (sand). In this, some societies are better than 
others inasmuch as some have more and many different kinds of implements than others. 
119
 However, one farmer reported that he had taken a long-term loan of Rs 80,000 from the 
cooperative to buy a tractor. 
120
 Interest rates barely keep up with inflation. Such low interest rates may be linked to the fact that 
cooperatives in India were formed to provide an accessible alternative to the exploitative 
moneylender (Bell 1990).  
121
 The central government has further reduced the funds allocated for this (Dhaliwal 2015). 
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This is understandable. The combined cost of producing paddy and wheat alone 
comes to at least Rs 25,000 per acre. The credit from the society may, at best, be just 
enough for these expenses but with nothing left over for cultivating any other crop – 
especially more cost-intensive crops like potato and cauliflower. In the household 
survey, excluding those who leased-out their land, 12 farmers, 5 small and 7 large, 
reported that they did not have an account with the cooperative (Table 9.2). Some 
farmers also noted that they had set up an account for a certain amount but never or 
rarely used it. Apart from the money being inadequate, the societies simply do not 
have many of the fertilizers and chemicals that the farmers use. The ‘basic’ ones like 
urea and DAP are more commonly available than ‘special’ ones, especially those 
produced by corporates.
122
 Consequently, most farmers rely on private shops to 
purchase fertilizers and on other formal and informal sources for agricultural credit. 
Nevertheless, most farmers do have a credit account at the cooperative society 
because it counts for something; and for those who have it but do not use it, it serves 
as a potential emergency reserve. 
Table 9.2: Farmers who have accounts with the PACS 
 No Yes Total 
Land leased-out  1 4 5 
Petty producer 5 11 16 
Small capitalist 0 13 13 
Large capitalist  7 52 59 
Total 13 80 93 
            Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
9.2 Arhtias 
In Section 7.1, the arhtias in the grain mandi were described as the chief source of 
informal credit for farmers across classes. Here this function is discussed in detail. 
The greater part of the credit extended by the arhtia follows the agricultural cycle. 
Farmers mostly borrow before the production of major crops, i.e. paddy, wheat, and 
even non-grain crops like potato. Arhtias also extend credit for the large amounts of 
money required as land-lease rent, which have to be paid twice a year. Apart from 
these lump sum expenses, farmers may turn up at the arhtia’s door for a variety of 
                                                          
122
 One farmer reported that chemicals produced by a TNC have started being sourced at the 
cooperative in his village. 
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other expenses, big or small; for example, for agricultural use, children’s education 
or weddings, buying cattle, house repairs, etc. 
Arhtias charge interest at 18-36% p.a. or 1.5-3% per month on the money that they 
lend to farmers at any time of the year. Until 10-15 years ago, the most commonly 
applied interest rates used to be 2-2.5% per month, but this has come down to around 
1.5%. This is due to the expansion of banks and the increasing competition between 
arhtias (see below). The money has to be returned with interest once payment is 
made by the crop purchaser. 
While most farmers return the money, in part or full, after the sale of the crop, some 
also repay small instalments before sale. The arhtia’s ledger records the same.
123
 If 
the farmer is unable to repay the loan through his crop, then the arhtia applies 
interest on the interest on the outstanding debt. For the next cropping season, the 
arhtia will still lend money, albeit a lesser amount. This is because he knows that the 
principal can only be returned when a farmer earns that money from the sale of his 
crop. In the meanwhile, he continues to apply, and potentially earn, a higher interest 
on the old principal. So, the credit carries over from one crop to another and even 
from one year to another. The amount of credit extended by the arhtia to a farmer 
and the interest applied depends on the former’s assessment, at the very least, of the 
farmer’s cropping area, the crops grown and previous repayment record. A higher 
interest rate is charged against greater risk. 
It is obvious that the risks are higher for smaller farmers who, as seen in previous 
chapters, do not make substantial profits even on crops like wheat and paddy where 
an assured MSP is provided: small farmers are thus more vulnerable to arhtias and 
their exorbitant interest rates. Some farmers stated that smaller farmers are 
commonly charged 2% per month unless they have a good repayment record. But in 
the light of inadequate alternatives, farmers continue to rely on arhtias. As a farmer 
stated, ‘without arhtias, zimidaraan da kaam nahin chalega [the needs of farmers 
will not be met]. Yes, the arhtias charge interest, but money for use is more 
important than the interest that will be charged; when you need money, you do not 
care how you get it if it is the only way.’ On the other hand, in a telling commentary 
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 In the ledger, the index page has the page numbers and the names of the clients (farmers). On 
every farmer’s page, there are columns for: the name of the farmer and his father’s name, amount 
loaned and date, repayment made and date, and the mode of repayment. 
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on the attitude of arhtias towards farmers, one arhtia quoted a popular saying among 
traders, ‘Jatt aur barseen kadi vi nahi marde’ (Jat and barseen are never ruined). 
Barseen is a kind of fodder that once planted needs no work or inputs and can be 
harvested for several months; ‘the more you cut it, the more it grows’. Jats, meaning 
farmers, he said, are just the same. 
9.2.1 The Wasteful Farmer 
Many arhtias state that it is not only small farmers that have poor repayment records; 
large farmers often do, as well. Arhtias argue that the main reason for this is that 
farmers engage in wasteful expenditure and no longer do any work manually. Jaspal 
Singh said, ‘Things are difficult for small farmers but... If you spend beyond your 
means, then you will be indebted. If you have the money, buy a five-wheeler. But if 
you do not have the money, then why are you buying a two-wheeler even?’ 
Many farmers also subscribe to these views but Amandeep Singh, a large capitalist 
farmer who cultivates cauliflowers, strongly disagreed: 
I do not agree that farmers waste money. A farmer who has less land 
also has household expenses. He also has to educate his children or 
marry them. That is why there is a cycle of credit with the arhtia. They 
spend what is supposed to be spent. A bania’s [trader’s] shop is 
merely 2-4 biswa [0.01-0.02 acres] but he still has big cars and big 
houses. But if a farmer who has 100 biswa [just over an acre] of land 
buys a motorcycle also, they say he is wasting money. This thinking is 
wrong. Farmers are also humans. Their children also have aspirations 
and desires; they also want to want to wear good clothes like their 
friends or have the same things that others in their circle have. If you 
go to our village, every farmer who has 2-4 acres has leased-in 20 
acres; he owns a tractor and has all means [mod-cons] in his house. 
These have been acquired through honest means; there is no cheating 
in what the farmer does. 
It is clear from the above that farmers are often blamed for their problems, and this 
also raises the obvious issue of whether it is legitimate to dismiss the social or 
consumption expenses of farmers as ‘wasteful’. I do not dwell on such questions, but 
rather note that these expenses constitute a substantial expense for farmers and 
generate a demand for credit. 
The survey data shows that different farmers spent anywhere between Rs 300,000-
800,000 on the weddings of sons or brothers. For daughters or sisters, the reported 
range was Rs 800,000-1,800,000. Similarly, on building new houses, the reported 
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range of expenditure for large farmers was anywhere between Rs 1,000,000-
6,000,000. Smaller farmers rarely reported building new houses; in the few cases 
that they did the expenditure was Rs 300,000-500,000.
124
 Expenses on house repairs 
were mostly around Rs 50,000. Evidently, these are large expenditures to make, even 
if those on houses are spread over several months. 
Another oft-cited ‘unnecessary’ expenditure is that on tractors. Several respondents 
argued that these tractors are under-utilized and farms are said to be over-capitalized. 
They said this was partly because banks very willing to make loans for this and 
partly because Jats are under the grip of the sentiment of rees or comparison with 
others, i.e. will spend beyond their means to match what is spent by another Jat. One 
farmer commented, 
There is a saying in Punjabi – ‘Chuhde laye le gohe ne, Jatt laye le 
lohe ne’. The saying means that the Dalits could not develop because 
they were stuck working with cow-dung; the Jat could not develop 
because they did not stop buying machinery. First they bought two-
cylinder tractors, then four-cylinder ones. The small tractor can also 
do the same work. But people want something because their 
neighbour has it, whether they need it or not. In this way, the Jat is 
simply giving his money to companies. They buy trucks, tractors, 
combines – loans are easy to get. 
While it is beyond the scope of this research to challenge the framing of expenditure 
on tractors in this way, it should be noted that the literature points to the time-bound 
nature of Green Revolution technologies (see Byres 1981). This means that farmers 
with different landholdings also needed these machines for timely completion of 
agricultural operations and to remain competitive. Moreover, tractors are used not 
only for farm operations but also for transportation, especially of crops. 
Farmers may also turn to arhtias for other large or small expenses, as mentioned 
earlier. Such is the dependence of farmers on arhtias that their relation was described 
by one farmer as that of ‘nails and fingers’. A former arhtia said, ‘When the farmer’s 
buffalo dies you must understand that it is the arhtia’s buffalo that dies’. But this 
kind of dependence is crucial to the success of the arht business. While the arhtias 
commonly criticize the ‘wastefulness’ of farmers, it is what they feed on for their 
own business interests. 
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 This is most likely for building an extension to or up-grading an existing house, rather than 
building a whole new house which would cost much more even at its most basic. 
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Of course, there is also some risk in extending credit. As the former arhtia quoted 
above said, ‘It is not a stable business; you are trying to make money out of someone 
who does not have any money. Farmers live hand to mouth’. This is truer of smaller 
farmers than larger ones.
125
 Farmers unequivocally argue, however, that arhtias 
hedge the risks of their moneylending very well and claim that they do not incur any 
losses, or at least any major losses. More importantly, the arhtias’ self-representation 
of vulnerability is a gross overstatement due to the way government support works. 
Since the government is the main buyer of wheat and paddy in the market, the 
arhtias know that farmers are guaranteed an MSP payment. In fact, it is precisely 
because of the absence of such an assured buyer and assured prices that the arhtias in 
the sabzi mandi do not extend credit to farmers, or only in exceptional 
circumstances. 
In other words, the arhtias hedge their risk of extending credit against the assured 
role played by the governments in the wheat and paddy markets. Sharmaji, an 
accountant at one of the arhtia shops in the grain mandi, captured this dynamic quite 
succinctly when he said, ‘Jis din Sarkar ne haath kheencha, yeh khatam hai [the day 
the government pulls out from this, this will be over]. This arht work will last only 
two to three more years’. Many arhtias fear the decline of this business because of 
the central government’s efforts to introduce direct payments to farmers and the 
recommendations of the Shanta Kumar Committee Report which makes a case for 
the central government to withdraw from procurement in Punjab. The repercussions 
of such a policy have been anticipated through the experience of basmati sales, 
discussed in Section 7.1. 
Moreover, even though farmers’ extreme dependence on the arhtia forms the 
dominant narrative, the household survey revealed a counter-intuitive result. Figures 
in Table 9.3 show that 58% of all farmers in the survey do not take any loans from 
arhtias. Indeed, many of the large expenses identified above were serviced by 
farmers through savings and/or formal credit (see below). This is again partly a bias 
of the sample towards large capitalists and partly the fact that the revival of rural 
credit in the post-liberalisation period (Section 9.3) has made a difference to farmers, 
especially large capitalist ones. Even though the sample of petty producers and small 
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 I found two cases where small farmers had not paid the principal and/or interest to the arhtia. 
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capitalist farmers is smaller, it is notable that 13 out of a total of 29 households 
(approximately 45%) in these categories also reported that they did not borrow from 
arhtias. However, Section 9.3 shows that that arhtias continue to be important 
indirectly for servicing formal credit, and overall, they continue to be the banker of 
the last resort for farmers. 
Table 9.3: Number of farmers borrowing from arhtias 
 N/A* No Sometimes Yes Total 
Land leased-out  5 0 0 0 5 
Petty producer 3 7 1 5 16 
Small capitalist 0 6 2 5 13 
Large capitalist  2 39 5 13 59 
Total 8 54 8 23 93 
           Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
           *N/A either because they have leased-out their land or they do not cultivate any food grains. 
 
Before moving on to the next section it should be highlighted that yet another source 
of informal credit for farmers, albeit in kind, is the input supplier. Many farmers 
purchase inputs from dealers on credit, i.e. they take the seeds and chemicals 
required for a crop and pay when the crop is harvested and sold. The input dealers 
often charge a discretionary interest amount on the total cost of the inputs. Such 
relations are more likely when the farmer is a regular client of the input dealer and/or 
the input dealer has a particularly good reputation in terms of his expertise in the 
business. Some farmers also make upfront purchases of the inputs, either with their 
own money or that they have borrowed from the arhtias. Further nuances about the 
credit relations between different kinds of farmers and input dealers could not be 
explored in this research. 
9.2.2 Financing the Financers 
The scale of an arhtia’s moneylending operation determines the amount of crops that 
arrives at his shop. However, moneylending is contingent on how effectively he can 
mobilize finance. This is important to understand to gauge the constraints of the 
arhtia’s work. 
One source is obviously the arhtia’s own capital. This may be inherited from family 
and/or acquired through other business interests. Apart from this, the oldest and most 
popular way of financing the moneylending operations is through dasti. Dasti is 
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commonly described as ‘do number’, which means illegal money or monetary 
transactions. An arhtia-cum-rice and feed mill owner, Vinay Gupta, said, ‘It refers to 
lending between friends and relatives. We note it in our kacha books [informal 
ledgers]. It is very prevalent in all these mills also [in addition to among arhtias]. 
The reputation of the debtor also matters while lending’. 
The concept also extends to non-monetary transactions. Ashok Bahl, a broker-cum-
rice mill owner, told me, 
It includes advances, payments, everything. If an arhtia sells paddy 
without a receipt, then it is dasti. Then it goes to the mill owner, he 
has no bill for it; there will be no bill on the by-products either. All 
this is dasti. All payments in cash without bill are also dasti. 
[So what if someone does not return it?] 
Of course they return it, don’t they have to survive in the business?!... 
[And what proportion of the business of mills, brokers, traders, etc. is 
done in dasti?] 
At least 50%, even 80%... 
[What about arhtias in the mandi?] 
Among them also at least 10-15% of the work is done like that. 
Arhtias may finance their lending operations through dasti by borrowing from other 
arhtias, mill owners, relatives or families that are solely in the business of 
moneylending, all based on ‘good faith’.
126
 Arhtias usually borrow at 1% per month, 
sometimes 1.25% or 1.5%; the rate may vary as a function of the relations between 
the lender and the borrower, the timing of the loan or the result of negotiation.
127
 
According to Vinay Gupta, ‘For example, at the start of the season, when paddy has 
to be sown, there is more demand; in that case more interest can be charged. But 
then someone might say that even the bank is lending at this interest rate, reduce it; 
this is how it happens’. In general, there is no date to return the principal amount but 
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 One arhtia said, ‘We take only Rs. 500,000-1,000,000 from financers and friends. Nobody will 
lend Rs 5,000,000. Then we have to pay to interest on that.’ 
127
 I received quite different responses about how the credit has to be returned when borrowed from a 
mill owner. In the case of arhtias, one said, ‘What is given in cash has to be returned in cash. What 
they buy from us is different from the financial relationship. But this may also depend on trust; if the 
flour mill, for example, has advanced some money and has also bought something, then if for some 
reason he feels that he will not get his money back, then he will naturally deduct some money from 
the payment’. Between mills and brokers, one mill owner explained that the repayments are more 
commonly made in kind, although not always. 
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there are dates for the payment of interest, corresponding to the time when in the 
crop cycle the farmers are supposed to repay the arhtia. Therefore, delays in payment 
for crops strains the flow of cash in the entire agricultural economy. In general, 




A relatively more recent source of dasti is credit from large farmers.
129
 A few arhtias 
and a few large farmers admitted to this and most of them agreed that only a very 
small proportion of farmers did this. Sharmaji, an arhtia’s accountant, said, ‘There 
are only 5% of farmers who even have the ability to lend money to us, but when they 
do, we give them an interest rate of 12% p.a.’ In the survey, six large farmers 
admitted to lending money to the arhtia either regularly or occasionally, though they 
did not give details of the amounts. Sunny is one of them: 
If we have a lot of savings, then we lend money at 1.5% per month 
interest to an uncle who is an arhtia in Machhiwara. The return of the 
principal is done in season, when the crop comes – that is the cycle of 
the arhtias. The payment of interest depends on the deal we have with 
them; if there is a deal of one year then the interest will be paid after 
one year; if there is a deal for six months, then the interest will be paid 
after six months – if the interest is not paid in six months then there is 
interest charged on the interest. 
A farmer-cum-seed and chemical shop owner in Doraha explained: 
Arhtias convince the rich farmers that do not keep their money in the 
bank to lend to them. In the bank, the interest is 8% + TDS [Tax 
Deducted at Source]. With the arhtias, they get an interest rate of 18%, 
which is almost double. In this way, arhtias lend more than their 
capacity. Then when bad debt happens they have to run. Every year, 
one or two such cases happen in Khanna. In Doraha also, there have 
been a few cases and there will be more – we live here, we know what 
is going on. When these arhtias cannot return the money of those from 
whom they have taken the advance, the latter naturally come after 
them. 
For farmers who do this, it could be considered as a kind of diversification. But in 
terms of credit relations, it is the opposite of the exploitative farmer-arhtia relation 
                                                          
128
 Given the significance of such ‘illegal’ money in agricultural markets, cash flows were extremely 
important and are likely to have been impacted by demonetisation in 2016 (see Madras Courier 2017).  
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 This is not commonly admitted to by arhtias, perhaps because they consider farmers to be beneath 
them in status and do not want to be known to be borrowing from them. Rich farmers, on their part, 
are also reluctant to admit to this because it is illegal. Some farmers and arhtias also say that they 
leave their earnings with the arhtia without charging interest sometimes, but others say nobody would 
leave their money anywhere without interest. 
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discussed in the literature; here the arhtias’ business depends on such farmers taking 
out loans. Presumably, such farmers, if they grow any food grains at all,
130
 would 
have more leverage with the arhtias for the timely sale of their crops at MSP or good 
market rates, whichever is applicable.  
Another source of credit are loans (called ‘limits’) extended by commercial banks at 
an interest rate of around 10-11% p.a. to arhtias for lending to farmers. Several 
arhtias said that all but a few arhtias in the mandi have limits with commercial 
banks, ranging from Rs 2,000,000 to a few tens of millions. Such a scheme has 
existed as a part of priority lending for many decades now. It could not be 
ascertained if the arhtias’ uptake of this has changed, although two associated it with 
the strain on cash flow in the economy as a result of the crash in basmati prices.
131
 
Jaspal Singh, however, is completely against making such a limit: 
If we make a limit, then we will spend it. Our own money doubles in 
about three years; we earn Rs 1,000-1,500 on each trolley that comes 
in. Similarly, someone else’s money will also double and we will have 
to pay it. The HDFC [a bank] people keep telling us to make limits of 
Rs 2,000,000 or Rs 2,500,000 and so on. If we give one indication, 
they will arrange everything in one day. It is not about making a bank 
limit, it is about creating a relationship. Now this farmer needed Rs 
50,000 but I did not have that much with me. I just had to go to the 
bank manager and he gave me the amount in cash, no questions 
asked… If I give someone a loan of Rs 100,000 and he has crops 
worth Rs 2,000,000, then he may or may not return Rs 100,000 in full. 
But I will have to return the amount in full with interest to the bank 
every six months. 
[Then how do the other arhtias pay the bank?] 
Suppose I have a limit of Rs 5,000,000 and I get [crop sales] payments 
of Rs 1,000,000 during the season. The arhtia will not pay the farmer 
for his crop – he will make the farmer wait – ‘abhi bahut tight hai, 
abhi payment nahin aayi hai’ [now is a very difficult time, the 
payment has not come yet]. He will collect the money and then give it 
to the bank with the interest and only then will he start making 
payments to the farmers.
132
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 Two of the four in the survey who admitted to lending to arhtias do not grow any food grains, only 
cauliflower and other vegetables. 
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 One of these two arhtias, among the largest in the mandi, said he only arranged this particular bank 
loan only after the delays in payments for basmati. 
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 In reality, different banks have different terms for lending to arhtias. Nevertheless, this 
conversation shows why some arhtias are wary of borrowing from banks or avoided it as long as they 
could. Moreover, during fieldwork, I witnessed arhtias making farmers wait for money. 
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Overall, this discussion shows that having a wide trading network and building 
relations of trust are crucial for mobilizing the capital required for the arhtia’s 
moneylending operations.  
9.3 Commercial Banks 
Commercial banks have been extending short-term production credit and loans for 
large production expenses such as purchasing a tractor or installing a tube well since 
the early years of the Green Revolution. However, their form and scale has changed 
considerably under liberalisation. 
Short-term production credit is determined by multiplying the number of acres a 
farmer proposes to cultivate by the standard per acre rate for the crop. Previously, 
the money would not be released directly to the farmer, apart from a small 
component for labour. Instead, the money was released to suppliers of agricultural 
inputs. Karnail Singh explained: 
Before, there were agricultural loans, like car loans; farmers took out a 
loan for a trolley or something else, did not buy the trolley but got a 
‘pre-sale’ [i.e., intention to purchase] slip made from the dealer and 
gave it to the bank… The cheque is given to the seller of the product 
which is supposed to have been purchased. But the responsibility of 
repaying the loan is that of the farmer. 
Loans of this kind continue to exist for the large production expenses mentioned 
above. However, as part of the financial reforms under liberalisation, the form of 
short-term production credit was changed in 1998 by the central government with 
the introduction of the KCC, also commonly referred to as ‘limit’. The earlier system 
was thought to be too cumbersome and also did not allow farmers direct access to 
the funds or discretion over how they wished to use the money. 
In the words of the branch manager of a public sector bank, KCC is ‘the working 
capital or a crop loan. It is an overdraft limit which has to be renewed annually; it 
increases 10% due to inflation every year’. While the initial KCC did not have a 
consumption loan component, in its current form it works as both production and 
consumption credit for the individual needs of the farmer. Under the KCC, farmers 
are given money based on their landholding (including leased-in land) and their 
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cropping history. This is assessed by looking at past records of cultivation
133
 and the 
farmer’s PACS repayment record. Interest on the first Rs 300,000 is 7% p.a., which 
is subsidized by the government by 4% in case of prompt repayment. On any amount 
over Rs 300,000 an interest rate of 12-13% p.a. is applied. 
The limits have to be rotated every six months. This means that the principal plus 
interest have to be returned to the bank every six months, once after the sale of the 
kharif and rabi crops each. The farmer can get the principal or the limit amount back 
from the bank the very next day. Conditional on the limit being rotated, the farmer 
can continue to use the limits indefinitely. Land worth more than the value of the 
principal extended (in the case of one private bank worth 200% of the loan) is 
mortgaged with the bank as collateral for the KCC and the crop is hypothecated. 
Farmers accept that bank limits have been hugely enabling for them. One remarked, 
The hard-working farmers are coming out of arhtias’ loans. The bank 
limit has been like oxygen for them. They are able to apply crop 
chemicals at the correct time. Earlier, the arhtia would say ‘come on 
another day’. Even a delay of a couple of days badly affects the crop. 
Now they can withdraw money from the bank and make the payment. 
This is substantiated by the results of the household survey. While only around 30% 
of the large farmers in the survey reported that they take credit from the arhtia (Table 
9.3), 83% of large farmers reported that they have a bank limit (Table 9.4). Among 
small capitalist farmers too, a large majority had a bank limit. Interestingly, 
however, a majority of the petty producers in the sample did not have a bank 
account. The latter could be explained by a perception among some petty producers 
of limits being riskier than other forms of available credit and the bias of at least 
some banks against lending to farmers with small operational holdings, as will be 
seen below. 
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 The cultivation on every plot is recorded through a survey or ‘girdawri’, conducted by the patwari 
or revenue officer. 
231 
Table 9.4: Number of farmers with a KCC account 
 No Yes Total 
Land leased-out
134
 3 2 5 
Petty producers 10 6 16 
Small capitalist farmers 3 10 13 
Large capitalist farmers 10 49 59 
Total 26 67 93 
             Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
 
The fact that arhtias feel threatened by limits is evident in their determined criticism 
of banks. In the early 1990s, many new private sector banks were allowed into the 
banking sector and their permitted scope of work was expanded. Chapter 3 noted 
how the bank licensing policy was changed to depend more on profitability than on 
social and developmental goals; this engineered huge competition between the 
commercial banks, both private and public. 
Arhtias argue that banks, especially private banks, give large loans to farmers as part 
of their aggressive market strategy. Kamal Seth: 
Private sector banks compete with each other for market share and 
give large loans at low rates. The newspapers keep printing that the 
farmers are in a bad situation because of the arhtias, but actually the 
private banks are ruining the farmers. The day is not far off when 
there will be boards of banks on the agricultural land of farmers. 
The branch manager of a private sector bank, however, insisted that they are better 
lenders than public banks whose managers have less discretionary power and lending 
guidelines prefer farmers that are well-resourced. This private bank, for example, 
made limits only for landowners with a minimum of 5 acres of owned land. A retired 
senior official of a public sector bank disagreed, arguing that there is no significant 
difference between them. 
Nevertheless, the point about competition was borne out by my experience. On one 
of my visits to a survey village on a Sunday, I found employees of a public sector 
bank conducting a meeting with farmers, trying to persuade them to take loans. The 
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 Since the land-lease is informal, it is possible for those who lease-out their landholding to obtain 
credit against their agricultural land, and use it for consumption purposes or as an emergency fund. 
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private bank mentioned above also admitted that it had goals to increase its business 
to a certain level within a given timeline. 
The criticisms of the KCC by arhtias certainly represent a perceived vulnerability of 
their historically powerful position. However, there is also some truth to their 
argument that the KCC has not necessarily been a boon for farmers. This, in my 
opinion, is less about the increased competition between private and public banks 
and more about the actual working of the scheme, to which I now turn. 
9.3.1 Rotating the Limit 
The KCC limit reported by farmers in the survey ranged from Rs 100,000-4,000,000. 
Table 9.5 shows some examples of limits of farmers with different operational 
holdings. It is clear from these that many farmers, especially smaller ones, but also 
large capitalists, would be unable to save such large amounts over the course of six 
months. Some large farmers said that they do not actually use the limit at all, and a 
number of small and medium farmers reported that they had no bank limits. Table 
9.4 shows that a large majority of farmers (over 70%) had KCC accounts. 




Bank Limit (Rs) 
A 1.75 400,000 
B 2.5 300,000 
C 6 500,000 
D 8 1,800,000 
E 10 300,000 
F 14 400,000 
G 19 1,000,000 
H 21 1,600,000 
I 60 200,000 
J 80 3,000,000 
                Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
 
To prevent defaulting, the arhtia gives the limit amount to the farmer to return to the 
bank while the farmer pays the interest. The bank gives the limit amount back to the 
farmer the next day and the farmer returns it to the arhtia. This means that the farmer 
continues to be indebted to the bank, and unable to repay the money, but does not 
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default. As the retired bank official quoted above put it, ‘A farmer can, practically 
speaking, never actually pay the principal and still remain a good borrower if he 
channels his earnings through the KCC account and pays interest every six months’. 
This shows how the formal and informal credit systems intertwine in unexpected 
ways. In this case, formal credit relies on the much-maligned informal credit sources 
to service its loans. 
That the system works in this way also enables the farmers to use the money in quite 
diverse ways, to, in the words of some arhtias, ‘misuse’ and ‘waste’ it. It is, at least 
to an extent, in the words of one of the bank officials quoted above, ‘easy cash at low 
rates’. As one farmer said, ‘For routine expenses, farmers take money from the 
arhtia. But the limit is used for one-time expenses like buying a vehicle or marriage, 
etc. Someone in the village has a limit of Rs 1,800,000 and he used this money to 
buy vehicles when he already has three scooters and motorcycles’. The farmer 
quoted has an operational holding of 14 acres, and borrowed Rs 1,200,000 for his 
sister’s marriage. A farmer with an operational holding of 10.5 acres used his limit 
of Rs 2,000,000 to build a new house. Another who farms over 80 acres of his own 
has a bank limit of a whopping Rs 30,000,000 which, over the past 15 years, he has 
used to buy 33 acres of land. 
As some farmers may not be able to repay the principal to the bank from their own 
savings the system, therefore, at least partially relies on the ability of the arhtia to 
mobilize the limit amount for all his clients (farmers) every six months. Arhtias do 
this by using their own savings and borrowing from different sources; but they also 
rely on regular payments and a decent cash flow in the economy in order to be able 
to do so. So when during the fieldwork year, 2014-15, prices of basmati and potato 
crashed, wheat yields dropped, and the cash flow was strained, there was a crisis in 
repayments of bank limits.
135
 
Therefore, it is not just small but also some large farmers who are dependent on the 
arhtias. It is this kind of dependence which prompted one to state, ‘If arhtias are done 
away with, kheti khatam ho jayegi [farming will be over]. The cycle with the arhtias 
is like an addiction. If arhtias are done away with, our limits will not be complete 
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 A local newspaper reported that banks in Punjab had started putting photographs of large farmers 
who had defaulted in their branches and other public places, because of the effect on the individual 
branches (Sohal 2015). 
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[i.e. we will default]. Over and above that, day-to-day expenses will not be met by 
most farmers’. In the same vein, an arhtia said: 
We not only get the credit filled up of the farmers, but we take care of 
them from birth and their entire life, for weddings, illnesses, 
everything. Bank loans are there but there is a limit to how much 
banks give. They may lend Rs 2,000,000 but I loan up to Rs 
8,000,000. Some even owe me Rs 10,000,000. 
All farmers who find themselves in this situation feel the pressure in different ways. 
It should be noted that all these loans – cooperative, KCC and arhtia – are to be 
repaid from the income from the same piece of land. The land (or the crops it 
produces) has to bear the burden of two or three different kinds of credit, even if it is 
not explicitly the collateral. Some argue that farmers are forced to lease-in land in 
order to repay the different debts they acquire. One said, 
These people [large farmers] have bought tractors worth Rs 700,000 
and acquired all the implements. If you buy, you also have to pay 
interest on that loan and that money has to be earned. People have to 
farm to make sense of all the implements and machines they have 
acquired. The other thing is that they have made bank limits of Rs 
2,500,000-3,000,000 and if they stop farming on that scale, the arhtia 
will not lend them money. You cannot do two acres of farming and 
expect the arhtia to give you Rs 2,000,000. 
Another said, ‘The only thing with vegetables is that the income is continuous and 
the household expenses get taken care of. But repayment of loans and interest can 
only be done with a badi fasl [bulk crop].’ Badi fasl here refers to crops like wheat, 
paddy and potato through which a lot of money can be earned at one time; however, 
this is not guaranteed. As I pointed out in the earlier chapters, land, capital 
investment and market dynamics interact in complex ways to determine what profits 
may be earned from this. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has brought out the complexity of agricultural credit for farmers, the 
roles played by different credit institutions and actors, and the ways in which farmers 
navigate them. Informal credit, from arhtias, has commonly been vilified as 
exploitative, and rightly so. However, in the absence of adequate alternatives and as 
the bankers of last resort, they play an important role in keeping the agricultural 
economy afloat. The ways in which they finance their moneylending operations, 
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especially through dasti, means that a large part of the credit economy and the wider 
agricultural economy depends on smooth cash flow to and from the arhtias. Their 
power continues due to the need of the farmers and assured government procurement 
of wheat and paddy. However, as competition increases among arhtias and with the 
reconfiguration of formal agricultural credit, they, too, are feeling the heat. They 
have even started accepting finance from large capitalist farmers, although that is 
also a statement of the growing power of some of the latter. 
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Chapter 10.  Beyond Farming 
 
This chapter focuses on accumulation by capitalist farmers outside farming. It 
attempts to draw out diversification trends among farmers and reflects on what 
matters for different kinds of diversification.  
Most farmers agree that farming is no longer as productive or profitable as it was 
until the 1980s. This makes venturing into a ‘side-business’ or other economic 
activity important, although it is commonly argued that only a small proportion of 
farmers have achieved success in another line of work. For some farmers, this 
success may lead them to leasing-out their land entirely. In the survey, around 63% 
of all households (over 50% of the large and small capitalists and over 80% of petty 
producers) reported that they had a source of income other than farming (Table 
10.1). It is notable that a majority of farmers across different classes have another 
source of income. The relative proportion of diversified households is much higher 
in the case of petty producers than in the other classes. This suggests that they have a 
greater need to diversify than other classes. For the latter, especially the large 
capitalists, diversification would be linked less to the need to survive and more to the 
desire to expand their base for accumulation. 
Table 10.1: Number of households with some form of diversification 
 No Yes (% of total) Total 
Land leased-out  0 5 (100) 5 
Petty producer 3 13 (81) 16 
Small capitalist 4 9 (69) 13 
Large capitalist  27 32 (54) 59 
Total 34 59 (63) 93 
         Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
 
This diversification includes many different kinds of economic activity – 
businesses
136
, services, jobs, and migration. Not all are equally accessible and/or 
remunerative, and the success varies across households and classes. In what follows, 
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 ‘Business’ refers to an enterprise owned and operated by the farmer with the aim of realizing a 
sustained income.  
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different kinds of diversification strategies are described and some cross-cutting 
themes discussed.  
This chapter could not be very in-depth due to the methodological challenges 
discussed earlier. It describes the different areas of diversification, the conditions 
that allow for such diversification, and the factors that may lead to its success and 
failure. It is not able to establish the exact capital invested by households or the 
returns to investment from different kinds of non-farm activities. Therefore, the 
classification of types of diversification is made on a general assessment of the levels 
of investments required and the potential income to be derived from each source. 
10.1 Agriculture-Based Business 
This section discusses businesses that are related to agriculture, capital-intensive and 
accessible most easily to large capitalist farmers (although there are exceptions 
among smaller farmers). This is the most common type of business set up by the 
Jats. 
10.1.1 Arht Business 
Within agriculture-related businesses, the most common is the arht business. At least 
half, if not more, arhtia shops in the grain mandi are now owned by Jat 
landowners/farmers.
137
 This is a huge shift given the historical domination of the 
Mahajan castes in this business. The trend started in the 1980s and gained 
momentum in the 2000s. Many respondents argued that the boom in land prices (see 
Section 8.3) enabled many Jats to set up their businesses by selling small portions of 
their land. Other Jat arhtias used savings from (large-scale) agriculture, partnerships 
with friends or family members (commonly splitting up after some years), and/or by 
moving from one business to another. But while the Mahajan castes have lost 
monopoly over this business, arhtias as a whole have continued to retain their 
importance in Punjab’s agrarian landscape, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 9.  
Nevertheless, Mahajans feel threatened by Jat arhtias, manifested most clearly in 
statements alluding to the particular temperament of Jats, their ‘Jatt buddhi’ which, 
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 A relatively new part of the main grain mandi is called Sardar Mandi. Sardar is the word for male 
Sikhs, and this yard has been termed as such as many of the newer Jat Sikh arhtias have been allotted 
shops in that yard. 
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the Mahajans claim, makes them unsuitable to do business. Kamal Seth once 
remarked, quite bitterly, 
The food grain business is the kind of business where one can never 
know who is in what condition; you can never know whether there is 
any money in that locker or not. … This is the kind of business that a 
decision I make now may prove to be wrong in two hours’ time. Jats 
think it is only about money in and money out. But it also requires a 
lot of diplomacy. 
Mahajans argue that Jat arhtias lend too much and, along with private banks, they 
have caused excessive indebtedness of farmers; many farmers concur, though not all. 
It is also argued that Jat arhtias have an interest in over-lending since they can then 
lay claim to the farmer’s land. One farmer explained: 
Earlier, Mahajans used to come to see the fields of the farmers and 
check what the farmers were growing. They would lend the money 
accordingly. The thinking of the Jat arhtias is that if we give more 
credit to the weak farmer, then we can take control of his land once he 
cannot repay. 
Jat arhtias, unsurprisingly, disagree with this assessment; they say it is obvious that 
Jats would have come into this business, one insisting, ‘This is our line. This is 
agriculture. We know it’. 
While the interest in land may be true of some Jats, though I have no evidence of the 
same, the real issue is of competition in the mandi.
138
 Jats who establish their arht 
businesses gather clients from among their relatives, friends and neighbours. 
Needless to say, they have large networks of farmers they can tap into to expand 
their business. Some farmers indicated that their arhtia was a relative or a neighbour, 
or told how they changed from their Mahajan to a Jat arhtia due to a disagreement 
with the former. Mahajan arhtias, of course, also have a historical base among 
farmers, but with Jats coming into the business, they face stiff competition. As a 
farmer-cum-inputs dealer said, 
In any business, if the market is the same but the shops increase, there 
is bound to be competition. Otherwise, the Mahajan arhtias behave 
like Mahajans but the Jat arhtias also function like Mahajans. The 
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 Competition between merchants-moneylenders determining market dynamics has also been 
pointed out by Olsen (1996). She argues that such competition is one of the main reasons why 
merchants do not foreclose against farmer’s unpaid loans as it would imply losing the farmer's 
business.  
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thing about advances is just that the Mahajan will think ‘Oh, what if 
my advance gets ‘stuck’?’ but the Jat will think danda maar ke 
nikalwa lenge [we will use force to get the money back]. 
Jaspal Singh also pointed out that Jat arhtias have an advantage in terms of capital: 
It is true that Jats lend more money. Jats are more big-hearted. But the 
thing is that we also have more money. Even if I do not do this 
business, I get Rs 2,500,000 from the paddy I produce on my farm. 
That becomes my limit to lend. Even if I do not do anything with that 
money, I still have that income. The Mahajans do not have this, so 
they resent us. But they can manipulate numbers to make a profit. 
Despite the odd loss-making firm, the fact that it is a profitable business is 
undoubtable. Sharmaji, the accountant quoted earlier, explained: 
Even the smallest arhtia, who only gets 2,500-5,000 bags of wheat and 
paddy and does not have any employees, will have a profit of Rs 
150,000 in a year. The biggest ones, who get 100,000 bags of paddy 
and 30,000-32,000 bags of wheat, will earn at least Rs 2,000,000 per 
annum. If you take Rs 300,000 to be their expenses on employees, 
they will earn Rs 1,700,000 in a year. 
By this account, even a small arhtia’s income is more than that of a small farmer 
cultivating only wheat and paddy. 
Some of these Jat arhtias, like the Mahajan arhtias, have become pucca arhtias for 
basmati. The pucca arhtias for some of the largest basmati purchasers in the mandi 
were Jats. However, it is a difficult and risky business. Technically, all arhtias are 
licensed to do the work of a pucca arhtia or other kinds of trading in food grains. 
Kamal Seth who also trades in some food grains said, ‘the trading license for sale of 
wheat/paddy and purchase of soybean is the same. It is not kacha or pucca. It is 
purchase ka kaam [purchase work]. It requires knowledge. To get this knowledge, 
one has to move around in the market.’ However, many choose not to do it while 
others do not have the knowledge or capital required. Jaspal Singh, for example, told 
me that he does not want to become a pucca arhtia because ‘what if it sinks this 
business [kacha arht] along with itself? What if the payment stops? Then what will 
happen?’ There is also the issue of the scale of investment such activities require. As 
per one estimate, starting work as a trader requires an investment of at least Rs 
10,000,000. 
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Compared with the grain mandi, Jat arhtias are not as numerous in the vegetable 
mandi. Only 4 or 5 of around 50 arhtias are Jats. Business in the grain mandi is 
secure due to government support, a major incentive for farmers to join the grain arht 
business. This is not the case for the vegetable mandi, where there is a lot more risk. 
As an official of the Market Committee said, ‘In the grain mandi, the government is 
the trader; here the traders are different. In the grain mandi, purchases are made by 
wholesalers; in the sabzi mandi, purchases are made by the retailers. Yeh Jatton wala 
kaam nahin hai [this is not work that can be done by Jats].’ 
However, it is not only about acumen and risk; it is also about networks. Chapter 6 
discussed the fact that the majority of arhtia shops specialised in either fruit or 
vegetables, but very few sold both. It is telling then that, with one exception, the few 
Jat arhtias in this mandi all trade in vegetables. The same official stated, ‘Fruit 
comes from Delhi and they [Jats] have not developed these networks. There is one 
Jat who has started dealing in fruit but he is very new in the mandi’.
139
 The Jat 
arhtias in the sabzi mandi are themselves vegetable farmers; they have the 
experience and the networks – with farmers and traders even in other cities – to 
develop this business. 
10.1.2 Input Suppliers 
A related business is that of seeds and chemicals input dealerships. Some arhtias also 
have input shops but it is not very common. Jaspal Singh is one such farmer-cum-
arhtia whose input shop in the mandi is managed by his son. I came across two 
others farmers, one included in the survey, who had input shops in their villages. 
One of them took out a bank limit to start the shop. 
As in the arht business, maintaining relations with farmers is crucial. Moreover, 
because farmers look to these dealers for advice on which and how much seeds and 
chemicals to use, having know-how is essential for success. However, the amount of 
profit earned also depends on how chemicals are priced. Gurjeet Singh, a large 
cauliflower capitalist who also owns an inputs shop: ‘We get up to 10% margin from 
the Indian companies and only 1-5% in the case of the TNCs but we have to sell 
what the farmers demand. Both work equally well but we get less margin from 
TNCs.’ Another respondent explained, 
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 Interestingly, it was a Bihari trio, former petty vendors that managed to break the monopoly of the 
‘Bahawalpurias’ in the fruit trade in Khanna mandi. 
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There is a lot of margin in chemicals – ‘ola’ or ‘back’ profits are high, 
like in garments. This sodic oil has a profit of Rs 30 per bag; there are 
some chemicals where the profit is only Re 1 and some where the 
profit is Rs 200. There is also one chemical which is produced by 
different companies at different prices – Rs 200, Rs 300 and Rs 625. 
Farmers buy according to what they can afford; but even if things are 
expensive, if the chemical is effective, then the farmer has no choice 
but to buy it. 
10.1.3 Mills 
For the Jats who have capacity to set up industries, rice mills are the most attractive 
option. Kaur et al. (2007) argue that deregulation of the rice mill sector and credit 
reforms incentivized investments in rice mills in Punjab. During 2014-15, Khanna 
had 55 rice mills, of which 11 were owned by Jats (one in partnership with a 
Mahajan). As per one estimate, it would cost at least Rs 15,000,000-20,000,000 to 
set up a rice mill that can process government quality paddy.
140
 All mills, old and 
new, now have a sortex machine for sorting grains whose shell has been removed; 
these cost anywhere between Rs 2,000,000-5,000,000. 
Even though rice mills are not subject to the reoccurring expense of raw materials 
purchasing (see Section 7.1), this is a large investment that is inaccessible to even 
many well-off farmers and established arhtias. In addition, due to the mismatch 
between government specifications and current average crop quality, mills have to 
spend time, energy and resources in producing, and sometimes buying in, rice that 
meets the government’s standards. Jaspal Singh said it was ‘jhanjhat wala kaam’ 
[hassling work]. Ashok Bahl, a Mahajan broker-cum-rice mill owner, explained how 
he had suffered a large loss in his mill business, and it is a misconception that rice 
mills are always profitable. 
Despite the hassles and the odd case of major losses, the fact that new mills are being 
set up almost every year indicates that there are large profits to be made. Sharmaji 
emphasized this: 
Shellers have had no major losses in this area in the last two to three 
years. If they cannot make a profit, why do they lease the mill for Rs 
1,400,000?! The rate of bran in the market right now is Rs 1,350 per 
quintal, and the rate of paddy was also Rs 1,350 – naturally they make 
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 One estimate for the initial investment for establishing a basmati mill was Rs 500,000,000. This 
includes the costs of the physical infrastructure and raw material stock. 
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a profit. Shellers are left with the entire by-product of paddy – how 
can they be loss-making? 
Indeed, through my fieldwork I gathered that at least four mills had been leased-out 
during 2014-15. The annual cost for a one tonne mill was Rs 1,200,000-1,900,000; 
for a two tonne mill it was Rs 1,800,000-2,000,000.
141
  
Flour mills are generally accepted to be more expensive to establish (although I was 
not able to obtain an estimate) as the owner also has to incur the cost of stocking the 
raw material. Of the seven flour mills in Khanna, only one is owned by a Jat, and it 
is leased-out to another trader. The lease rate of these mills is also much higher at 
around Rs 2,500,000-3,000,000 p.a.  
Jats are similarly under-represented in other kinds of mills in Khanna. There are four 
‘solvex’ plants (for oil extraction from food grains and their by-products) in Khanna, 
none of which are Jat-owned. Similarly, of the roughly 30 or so feed mills, very few 
are said to be Jat-owned. Overall, therefore, Mahajans have been more successful in 
diversifying from trading-moneylending to setting up industrial units than Jats, 
especially beyond rice mills.
142
 This supports the arguments made by Damodaran 
(2008), discussed in Chapter 3.  
10.1.4 Potato Trade 
Section 7.3 examined those farmers who had entered into potato trading. Here, some 
examples and illustrations of how diversification into this business came about are 
given. 
Contract farming in the Amloh area was promoted by the agribusiness companies 
through a joint family of five brothers (the Gill brothers).
143
 The Gills had a large 
landholding and had started growing potatoes on a small scale in the early 1990s. 
Their initial association was with PepsiCo but eventually they expanded their range 
of work considerably. The five brothers now conduct their businesses separately, 
with three of them having their own cold stores. It is common practice for contract 
farming companies to rent all or part of the cold stores in areas where they have 
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operating costs of these mills was considered of less interest here. Lease rates are given as an 
approximate indicator of the potential profitability of rice mills. 
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 Diversification strategies of Mahajans were not studied systematically.  
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 I conducted separate interviews with two brothers; Jagjit Gill, quoted in previous chapters, was one 
of them. 
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contract farming operations in order to store their seeds. Two of the brothers have 
rented out their stores to two different companies while one operates his 
independently.
144
 They also have other businesses among them including arht and 
input dealership. These businesses are in addition to an average of 100 acres being 
cultivated by each brother. At least two of them also have land in other parts of the 
state and/or urban property. The case of these brothers shows the role of the family 
in enabling successful diversification. 
As in the case of potato production, the establishment of new cold stores under 
liberalisation was driven by the demand generated by contract farming and seed 
companies. They were set up with subsidies extended to farmers under the National 
Horticultural Mission. Notably, most of the new cold stores were built by large 
farmers and not traders. The phenomenal increase in the price of land in recent years 
(Chapter 8) has made land unaffordable even for established traders. According to an 
employee of PepsiCo who works at one of the rented cold stores, ‘To make a cold 
store for 100,000 bags, it costs Rs 30,000,000. The government gives a Rs 
10,000,000-2,500,000 subsidy. PepsiCo pays Rs 1/1.5 per kg (Rs 50-75 per bag) 
while the regular stores were charging Rs 90 per bag’.
145
 One cold store owner who 
rents out half the storage space to a company said that it would be more profitable to 
run the store without renting to the big companies, but the guaranteed rent works as a 
security. He explained: 
It is like insurance; we have taken loans to build the cold stores; this 
store has a capacity of 100,000 bags and the loan repayment interest 
comes to Rs 6,500,000. If we rent it out at least 50% of this instalment 
gets insured; the rest we can pay on our own. For the years when 
potato production is lower, we are insured for that much money. 
As in contract farming, corporates here are both exploiters, paying less than market 
rates, and enablers, providing security to an upcoming business. 
Many of the new cold store owners also have seed farms and are engaged in potato, 
specifically seed potato, trading (see Section 7.3). This is the most capital-intensive 
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 Another cold store owner explained, ‘The National Horticultural Mission gives subsidies under 
certain conditions, like x area should be buildings, x should be coverage, etc. In category 1 – where 
the capacity is 250mt – they give 35% of Rs 50 million; in category 2 – the capacity of 1250mt, there 
are four chambers of 250mt each; here the subsidy is 35% of Rs 40 million per chamber; even in 
category 2, subsidies for panel-storage (like this one) and brick stores are different.’ 
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diversification portfolio within the potato trade. At a relatively lower level of 
investment, some farmers in villages near Paunpura engage in trading only. These 
table potato farmers-cum-traders connect other farmers with arhtias in various 
mandis and take a commission, although they are not licensed. In order to lock-in the 
supply, they also sometimes purchase the produce at their own expense, selling on to 
the arhtias when prices are higher or when demand rises. Thus they might be 
working sometimes as traders and/or what is known as ‘stockists’, a euphemism for 
hoarders. Typically, this also involves training with a more experienced person for a 
few years. 
One such farmer-cum-trader explained: 
In 2009, when I was training, the commission was Rs 5 per bag. Now 
the commission has increased to Rs 10 per bag. But there is also risk. 
If the market goes down, like it is now, the traders at the other end 
may reject the stock on flimsy grounds. They can become be-imaan 
[dishonest]. Rejected stock can lead to losses worth Rs 100,000 even. 
[So this commission work is actually also like being a type of trader?] 
Yes. A lot of times we actually make payments to the farmer and then 
sell the stock on. 
Expanding the scope of this work requires deep pockets, networking with traders and 
the possibility of both big profit and big loss, an option available to only a handful of 
farmers. Overall, in different kinds of potato trading, the nature of the market for the 
crop itself is crucial for diversification. 
10.1.5 Dairy Farming 
Almost all farmers and landowners, including those who have leased-out their land 
keep some cattle (dangad). Any milk remaining after household needs is sold on a 
daily basis to the village-level milk cooperatives (run by Verka in this part of 
Punjab) or private dairies, run usually by another farmer/landowner. The money 
from this is used for daily household expenses. Some farmers also do dairy farming 
on a much larger scale. These dairy farms can have anywhere between 15-50 
animals,
146
 and constitute a business enterprise in themselves. 
The price of an animal depends on the quality, species and breed, and ranges 
between Rs 20,000-100,000. Most farmers, however, do not regularly purchase new 
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 At any given point of time, some of these animals will be calves (katti) and some will be pregnant. 
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animals but breed their own. Prices depend on the fat content of the milk: buffalo 
milk can fetch Rs 40-45 per litre and cow’s milk Rs 20-25 per litre. The average 
milk yields are 10 and 30 litres per day, respectively; the average daily income from 
one buffalo is Rs 400-450 and from one cow Rs 600-650. Despite the difference, 
buffaloes are preferred to cows since the former’s milk is preferred for self-
consumption and they are lower maintenance. The survey included one large farmer 
who also owned a dairy farm with 25 buffaloes who sold about 45 litres of milk a 
day, producing a daily income of at least Rs 1,800. A small farmer with 2 acres of 
land cultivated only fodder and had a dairy farm of 20 cows: he sold 60-70 litres per 
day at Rs 25; his estimated daily earning would be Rs 1500-1,750. 
This indicates that there is scope for profit in this business but I also heard from 
some farmers that they had suffered major losses in this business and abandoned it. 
Ranjit Singh, a young farmer from a large capitalist household told me: 
Eleven years ago, we started doing dairy farming. We had 15 
buffaloes and a dairy in the city. But we sold everything. The feed 
became very expensive. Nobody grows feed here at home – who 
grows makki [maize], bajra, chaara [fodder], etc. here? Dairy had 
picked up about a decade ago and did well for four to five years, but 
that did not continue. 
Those running successful dairy farms claim that people fail because they do not put 
in their own labour, and employ workers for everything. A single naukar employed 
to look after cattle can cost Rs 3000-7000 per month plus food; a casual labourer’s 
wage is Rs 300 per day. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that dairy farms have 




Some large farmers also own combine harvesters that are rented out during the 
harvest season. It may be rented out in its home and neighbouring villages, other 
parts of the state, or even other states such as UP. At the beginning of the wheat 
harvest in the north-western belt of India, it is common to see many combines being 
driven along the highway. I came across three farmers who owned combines, one of 
whom had two combines permanently stationed in a village in UP. 
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 Cooperatives, like Verka, which are crucial to dairy-based income, are also under strain under 
liberalisation (Ramdas et al. 2016). 
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A combine costs around Rs 1,500,000. Chapters 7.1 and 7.2 noted that harvesting 
paddy and wheat by combine costs Rs 2,000 per acre. One of my survey 
respondents, Rajdeep Singh, a small capitalist farmer, explained how he once spent a 
week in a village near Yamuna helping his uncle’s son with the combine they 
operate there. He said, 
There is a total income of Rs 300,000 including costs; if one includes 
costs – driver (Rs 20,000), helper (Rs 12,000), diesel (Rs 110,000-
115,000), and any maintenance expenses – the actual profit in one 
season is not more than Rs 70,000-100,000. That way combine 
owners earn a big amount at once. 
However, some farmers argue that there are too many combines in the state now and 
it is no longer remunerative. One farmer stopped renting out his combine because he 
thought it was not worth it given the costs. Rajdep Singh went on: 
The wheat grown in our village, for example, has gone down from 
400 acres to 60 acres [due to the increase in potato production]. And 
where there were only 10-20 combines in the entire state in the 1980s, 
now there are hundreds of thousands. The company Kartar sells 
60,000 combines every season – imagine how many combines there 
are! 
10.2 Non-Agricultural Business 
Transport, especially truck transport, is said to have been among the first non-
agricultural businesses that Jat farmers from Punjab diversified into. One farmer-
cum-input supplier even claimed that ‘at one point 50% of truck transport in India 
was owned by farmers here’. I met five farmers (three part of the household survey) 
who were involved in this business at the time of fieldwork or earlier – one had 
moved to Madhya Pradesh in 1981 to learn how to drive from a relative who had a 
truck business there while another owned and operated two buses between Khanna 
and Morinda. 
It is argued that this was a huge success until 15-20 years ago, but has now fizzled 
out. Some disruption was caused during and in the aftermath of the anti-Sikh riots 
across north India in the mid-1980s. One farmer who used to have a transport 
business explained, 
I had a truck business for 10 years. But I had to sell everything three 
or four years ago. I made a loss because the diesel expenditure and the 
toll tax were too high. You see, usually one is able to get goods worth 
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of Rs 100,000 for one side [of the travel]. But we spend about Rs 
30,000 on diesel; then the toll taxes one way comes to Rs 6,000-7,000; 
then there are other types of expenditure, like maintenance. The total 
profit was reduced to Rs 10,000-20,000 and that is not enough. If I 
had made Rs 50,000, then it would be different. 
This farmer has returned to farming only; he has 2.5 acres of his own and was 
leasing-in 13 acres at the time of the interview. 
Tractor dealerships are another kind of diversification; during fieldwork, three 
farmers said they were involved in this business, one of whom was also an arhtia. 
Two had established their businesses in partnership with relatives or friends, and one 
had invested in someone else’s dealership for some time (as well as his own). The 
latter is Amandeep Singh, the large cauliflower farmer mentioned in previous 
chapters. He argued that tractor dealerships were no longer as profitable as they used 
to be: 
I have had a tractor agency since 2006; the money in the business 
depends on how much you can save – the companies sell the tractor to 
the agency and then we can negotiate a price with farmers which is Rs 
5000-10,000 more than our purchase price. Sometimes one has to sell 
them at a loss as well. Before 2000, all companies worked on a 
commission basis but now that has changed. [Jokingly] This job is 
simply about wearing good clothes and sitting in the shop. I used to 
have employees but they ran away, and since there has not been a lot 
of new work, I have not employed anyone else. I have just kept an old 
man from the village to guard the shop when I am not there. 
Some large farmers have also set up private schools and, more rarely, colleges. 
Jaspal Singh’s daughter, for example, married into a family that owns a private, 
‘English-medium’ school in their village. His daughter and son-in-law both teach in 
the school. Harman Singh described this phenomenon: 
There are many private English-medium schools around here. These 
schools are mostly 10-15 years old and were opened by farmers who 
have some education but did not get a job; but they have some money. 
They open a school and employ five or six girls like you as teachers. 
They induct three-year-old children and keep them for three years 
until 1st standard age and make money. 
Another capital-intensive business is setting up ‘marriage palaces’, or banquet halls 
for weddings or other social functions. Jaspal Singh’s son and nephews want to open 
a palace but he and his brothers are not keen. He told me, ‘One needs at least two 
acres for a palace plus at least Rs 10,000,000 on construction; this means in Khanna 
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we are looking at a minimum of Rs 20,000,000 investment’. While nobody in the 
household survey owned one, there were many marriage palaces around Khanna 
(and everywhere else I travelled in Punjab), many of which were said to have been 
established over the past twenty years or so by rich farmers. A prominent Jat arhtia, 
for example, owns an expensive establishment near Khanna. 
Finally, a kind of non-agricultural work that became more popular in the years when 
land prices spiked is property dealership, though it existed before that as well. Since 
many of the transactions are done on the ‘black market’, little was disclosed by the 
two survey respondents who claimed to be involved with this. 
10.3 Education-Based Diversification 
Education has been yet another way in which farmers have diversified. In the survey, 
26 households reported at least one member who was in salaried employment during 
fieldwork or earlier. The types of this employment, however, varied considerably. 
Within this, 16 households reported government jobs held (including military 
service) while 13 households reported private jobs. Note that some of the households 
had both which is why the numbers do not add up to 26. 
Punjabis, especially Jat Sikhs, have a long history of military service (see Chapter 4). 
Most are employed as soldiers, while a fewer number are officers. Both are 
considered honourable careers, not least because of the starting salary of Rs 22,000 
per month. Some survey respondents were pensioners receiving a military pension of 
a minimum of Rs 12,000 per month. Non-military government service involved 
employment as patwaris and kanungos (revenue and land records officers at the 
block or district level) and government school teachers. These jobs also pay at least 
Rs 30,000-40,000 per month. 
Of the private jobs reported, eight households across different classes had members 
employed in relatively well-paying positions. Some were accountants or supervisors 
at the factories in and around Khanna. Others included women of the household, 
including daughters-in-law, who worked as teachers in private schools or colleges. 
Three households, all petty producers, in the survey reported that a member of the 
household did a labouring job, as a worker in a factory (Rs 4,000-7,000 per month), 
a mechanic (Rs 10,000 per month) and a driver for a rice mill (Rs 7,000 per month, 
only for six months a year). 
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One large farmer, Narinder Bajwa, had retired from the military; his three brothers 
were also either in or retired from government service. Their children were also in 
respectable salaried employment. He said: 
People are often surprised about how uneducated parents could teach 
us so much that we all got government jobs. But they did. We have 
built these houses, educated our children. This would not have been 
possible for someone only farming over four acres. This was possible 
because of our jobs. 
He now leases-in his brothers’ share of land as well and cultivates a total of 24 acres. 
However, education diversification is not only for large farmers; smaller farmers 
also follow this path. An uneducated small farmer sharing four acres with two 
brothers claimed that he manages well because his two brothers had the opportunity 
to study and gain jobs. Through farming and help from his brothers, this farmer 
educated his two sons in government schools and colleges, eventually becoming 
engineers who work in corporate firms in Ludhiana and Chandigarh, respectively. 
10.3.1 Skills-Based Businesses/Jobs 
Those who cannot afford the education that would lead to good, salaried jobs 
encourage other kinds of skill-based training. Harman Singh, a small capitalist 
farmer quoted several times earlier, funded a laboratory course for his son (he did a 
BA from a government college but did not get a job). Now the son runs a small 
laboratory in a village where he conducts health-related tests. Training as a mechanic 
is another skill that young men from these households learn. Two sons of a petty 
producer work as mechanics. One works for a company in Gujarat that pays him Rs 
10,000 per month and the other has a mechanic-cum-spare parts shop in Khanna that 
employs three or four people. This farmer claimed that ‘there is no fixed income [in 
the shop]. Sometimes there is more; sometimes there are losses’. Similarly, two 
brothers in a joint small capitalist household run an electrical works shop in the 
village, while another petty producer owned a shuttering business (earning Rs 7,000-
8,000 per month). While I do not have evidence of the same, it would be reasonable 
to assume that they would have had some prior training in these works. 
Much of the above would qualify as ‘petty businesses’. Petty business here includes 
small shops or services that involve limited investment and generate limited income. 
In the survey, only one farmer among the petty producers was involved in the kind 
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of big businesses described earlier. Of the 59 large farmers included in this survey, 
15 were involved in such a business either at the time of fieldwork or at some point 
earlier. In contrast, six farmers with smaller operational holdings and three large 
farmers were involved in petty businesses.
148
 Even outside the survey, I met farmers 
who made a small income from shops such as these. 
In terms of skill-based services, two tractor-owning farmers (one with six acres and 
one with four) in one of the villages did ‘bahai’ or preparation of land before crop 
sowing for petty producers. While bahai is something that all farmers know how to 
do, the point here is that these farmers used these skills (and their tractors) to 
generate some additional income.
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 They charged Rs 2,500 per acre, but it was not 
possible to estimate how much they would earn in one season. The one non-Jat 
landowner in my sample worked as a carpenter (also his caste) and earned about Rs 
7,000 per month on average. 
10.4 Migration 
Jat farmers in Punjab have had a long history of migration to ‘the West’, especially 
the USA, Canada and the UK. This is particularly the case in the Doaba region (see 
Chapter 8). In the Malwa region, it has been less prominent historically, but gained 
momentum because of the widespread everyday violence of the 1980s disturbances. 
With many experiencing declining fortunes in agriculture, even in Khanna which is 
one of the most prosperous areas in Punjab, migrating to settle abroad is a goal that 
many aspire to and work towards.
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 ‘Baaharle desh’ or foreign, especially Western, 
countries are imagined as the key to a better life, and there is more than one route to 
this. In the survey, a total of 18 households reported that a member of their family 
had migrated (9), failed in their attempt at migration (4), or abandoned the attempt 
(5). In interviews with farmers who were not part of the survey, many also shared 
stories of family members who had migrated to another country. 
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 Other kinds of non-agricultural petty businesses were also reported, which were not skills-based 
per se. The son of a large capitalist farmer owns a garment shop in Khanna town which, he said, 
brought in Rs 4,000-6,000 per month. Another household in the same class category had a grocery 
shop in the village. This suggests that large farmers also invest in these businesses, although as a 
supplementary income source and not as a means of moving out of agriculture. 
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 This is not classified as an agriculture-based business in Section 10.1 as that only covered 
strategies involving high capital investments and with potentially high returns. 
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 This is true not only of Jat farmers, but also of Dalits and, to a lesser extent, of Mahajans. 
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10.4.1 Stories of Success 
A major factor in successful migration to another country involves access to 
networks that can help in both migration and settling down. Maninder Singh who 
leases-out his land and has been a resident of the US for over 30 years told me: 
I left for the US mainly due to terrorism. After that I took many others 
along; I took about 83 members of my family abroad. I have taken 
another 2,000 people also – there were times when entire flights were 
full of people going from here to Canada or the US. If you are not into 
crimes, they will not give you any problem. 
While it is no longer as easy to migrate to other countries, this quote shows how 
individuals can enable others to migrate successfully. In a joint farming household of 
five brothers, for example, eight family members had migrated to the USA or 
Canada. Another young farmer said, ‘My papers are being processed for going 
abroad. I will go for farming. My mama [maternal uncle] has land in Roma, near the 
airport. We have also put money in it. We have had that land for 10-12 years’. 
Farmers, or their sons, also migrate through marriage with a woman who is a 
resident of another country. In some cases, the marriage is solely for the purpose of 
migration and once the farmer receives citizenship, the couple gets divorced. This is 
not always considered respectable but is accepted nevertheless. 
Successful migrants do different kinds of work in their new places of residence. 
Several respondents, especially members of large capitalist households, had their 
own businesses in these countries, such as transport, wood works, construction 
contractor, liquor shops and grocery stores. Many also drive their own taxis or 
trucks. As the quote above indicates, they may also continue to farm; agricultural 
areas in Rome and Brescia in Italy, for example, are known to rely heavily on the 
labour of Punjabi migrants. Only very few Jat farmers own any land in these 
countries, and many of them, including some from large capitalist backgrounds, 
work as labourers on farms. Some also do labouring jobs in industries. 
Some survey respondents disclosed the fact that they receive remittances from the 
family members who had migrated and although they mentioned it was occasional, 
they did not give an amount. One large capitalist farmer, both of whose brothers had 
migrated said that the remittances were occasional because ‘what will a daily wage 
earner send?’ Nevertheless, remittances are considered legitimate and important as 
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the migrant member also has a share in the land and status of his family in the 
village. Many who are abroad seek marriage alliances for their children in Punjab, 
and in such situations, both their profile in the other country and their status locally 
is considered important. 
There were also a number of respondents who asserted that they never received 
money from their migrated relatives. One large farmer, both of whose sons have 
successfully migrated to the US said, 
We do not need it [the money]. In general, they want to invest in land 
but I tell them that they should invest in expanding their business in 
the US only. They are not here and in their absence, there can be 
disputes and it can be a risky investment. 
Indeed, investments in land and building houses are among the most preferred ways 
of re-investing. Maninder Singh, for instance, explained how he had bought 5 acres 
20 years ago using his earnings in the US. Further, he and his brother (also in the 
US) both built separate houses in the village. 
10.4.2 Disappointment in Migration 
Not all experiences of migration are pleasant or successful.
151
 Nevertheless, greener 
pastures continue to be sought. For those without personal networks enabling 
migration, ‘visa agents’ are employed. These are private firms in the business of 
enabling locals to migrate abroad. However, the kinds of jobs arranged by agents are 
not always satisfactory and many spoke of frauds committed by such agents. 
Harman Singh trained his younger son to drive a construction machine and an agent 
found him a job in Dubai. The farmer’s wife, however, lamented: 
We have been trying to find a good agent for our son. He is a JCB 
driver in Dubai. The agent took Rs 300,000. But he finds the work 
very hard and they do not give leave. They will give him a driving 
license in one year, then he will get to drive a truck and that will make 
it easier. He has to buy everything from the market – here we have 
everything. 
Another small capitalist farmer told me: 
I sent my son to Italy but the agent did not find any work for him and 
so he returned. Earlier, I had sent him to Kenya but to get a job there, 
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 There were also some cases where the brother or son who migrated simply disappeared and there 
had been no contact for several years. 
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one had to pay Rs 5,000,000 which I did not have. So he had to come 
back from there also. 
Others were disappointed and returned home not due to problems with their agent 
but because their own expectations were not met. Rajdeep Singh, the young small 
capitalist farmer who worked on a combine had also worked as a driver in Dubai for 
four or five years; he returned as he thought neither the pay nor the life was good 
there. Since then, however, he has continued to try to migrate elsewhere. He took the 
risk of going to Mexico without a visa and was deported at the airport. He is now 
trying to go to the USA with the help of someone in his village. 
Sunny, the young, cauliflower-growing large capitalist farmer oft-mentioned earlier, 
had worked in a factory in Venice for a time, but he decided the pay was too low and 
returned. Others in the village point to how he wasted money, but given his earnings 
from cauliflower production, his decision seems logical. His experience in Italy has 
not put him off: he is now trying to migrate to Canada. 
I have put in an application for PR [Permanent Residency] for Canada 
[he said]. My friend left last week. I have also applied; it will take 
three to four years. The investment is Rs 10,000,000 but we will get 
PR. The government in Canada wants us to invest and settle there. 
[But why do you want to go there? Your farming is going so well 
here.] 
It is going well, but I have to manage 70 labourers on a daily basis. It 
is too much hassle.
152
 
This shows that it is not just migration but migration of a certain kind that is aspired 
to. Admittedly, there are a few who returned and do not wish to go again. One such 
small capitalist farmer returned after a personal tragedy where he lost his wife while 
he was working in Italy as a dairy farmer. He said, ‘There is nothing abroad – one is 
simply a servant of the owner; one minute they would be smiling and another minute 
they would tell you to leave.’ This feeling of working under someone else is found 
degrading by the reasonably well-off Jats. Therefore, it may be argued that 
households aspire ideally to a kind of migration where they can have a business of 
their own, whether large or small. But that requires investment and networks of a 
kind not available to everyone. 
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 Karnail Singh also tried to send his son to Canada through this route and made a KCC account of 
Rs 1,600,000 to fund the application cost. His application was, however, rejected and they were 
considering re-applying. 
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10.4.3 ‘Study Basis’ 
I mentioned above that it has become more difficult over the years to migrate 
successfully to Western countries. Over the past decade or so, a new route for 
migration has emerged, migration through ‘study basis’. ‘Study basis’ is shorthand 
for when migration takes place by obtaining a study visa to a country and the 
person(s) stays on by finding employment there. Every city I visited in Punjab 
during my fieldwork, even the highway, was brimming with hoardings advertising 
coaching for IELTS classes and study visa agents. Several respondents, especially 
younger people, both within and outside the survey sample, reported that they were 
trying to get a study visa. 
The young farmer quoted above who owns some land in Rome, for example, also 
said he would migrate using this route. He said, ‘I will go on study basis but once I 
go there, I will do farming. The paperwork is needed here, but when you go there 
everything is taken care of’. The following is an excerpt from an interview with 
Ranjit Singh and his mother: 
Mother: He is getting married on January 25th. His wife is taking the IELTS 
exam. If she clears it, then both of them will go abroad. If her score-
band is 7, then they can go to Canada. If it is less, then they will go 
to a smaller country, like Australia. Her parents have given Rs 
13,000 as the tuition fees for the coaching. 
Ranjit: The total package of going abroad costs Rs 1,500,000, including 
spouse. Her tuition fee is Rs 1,100,000. Then one has to carry some 
cash also. They must be charging Rs 50,000 or Rs 100,000 as cash. 
[Will you study there too?] 
Ranjit: No, I will not study there. She will study, I will work. 
Mother: What do sons of Jats do? He will drive a trolley. Some of his friends 
do that there. 
I came across a few other cases where the wives of the young farmers were studying 
for IELTS and the farmer-husband planned to migrate through her. This could partly 
explain why young girls in the family were usually more educated than the young 
men; it is potentially a way of finding a suitable match for daughters and socio-
economic mobility for the family. The above conversation also shows how 
expensive going abroad on ‘study basis’ can be. Again, this is something that is 
inaccessible to poorer farmers. 
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10.5 Notes on Politics 
Before moving on to a discussion of wider trends, I would like to reflect on some 
important observations on the role of politics in enabling diversification of different 
kinds.
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 In the survey sample, at least 12 large capitalists and 2 landowners (with 13 
and 7.5 acres each) who had leased-out their land either had a political position in 
the village or were associated with one or the other political party factions.
154
 
Not surprisingly, many of the large farmers who had diversified into major 
businesses were also affiliated with a political party (either SAD or Congress), or 
closely aligned with someone politically powerful in the village. In the grain mandi, 
too, Jat arhtias had strong political affiliations (referred to in Chapters 7.1 and 7.2 
discussing the arhtias’ protests). In fact, the two presidents of the Arhtia Association 
(the incumbent changed during fieldwork) were both Jat farmers, as were some other 
office-holding members. One of the arhtia shops in the mandi is, in fact, in 
partnership with the leader of one of the BKU factions. The president of the Punjab 
Rice Millers Association is also a Jat. 
Given the literature discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, it would only be reasonable to 
expect that political affiliations or alignment play an important role in accumulation 
by such farmers, either by accessing networks, mobilising resources or avoiding 
legal problems.
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 For example, Rajdeep Singh, a small capitalist farmer said, ‘The 
big people do not let subsidies reach the small farmers. People with connections, 
they take everything... Narinder Bajwa and I are from the same family, the same 
gotra [clan], but see the difference between us.’ Jaspal Singh is also an active 
member of a political party; he explained his involvement in politics:  
See, we do this work [arht] – there are 50-60 farmers who come to 
me. If there is any problem regarding them, we will get help to solve it 
only when we invest somewhere (‘agar hum payr kahin par 
rakhenge’). Our participation is motivated by that and limited to that. 
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 The design of this research precluded mapping farmers’ political activities in detail (see Chapter 
5). 
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 By political position I mean that they are current or former members of the village panchayat, 
member of the cooperative society, or of the village gurdwara management, all of which are informed 
by village level politics. I also included households where someone had held a panchayat position in 
the recent past. 
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 One of my key contacts (not a respondent) in Khanna was affiliated to an important political party 
and routinely helped such traders and mill-owners with their problems. 
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This limited evidence appears to corroborate the argument of Martin (2015) that 
despite the decline of the traditional basis of caste-class dominance of wealthy Jat 
landowners, the latter continue to be dominant as they have access to powerful 
‘networks of influence’ (43) in local and state-level politics.
156
  
10.6 The Wider Economy 
Chapter 4 discussed the fact that Punjab is a leader agriculturally but lags far behind 
other states in terms of industrial development. A senior official of an agribusiness 
company stated, 
Punjab has good roads, power and some other facilities and so it has a 
production advantage. This is what drives investment of companies 
and not government policy. But one natural disadvantage of Punjab is 
that it is land-locked. Policy-driven investment would require tax 
initiatives, facilitation, state-of-art industrial facilities – this has been 
done very well by Uttarakhand. 
Another senior personnel of a large rice by-product industry in the state said, 
The Punjab government has no funds even to pay salaries. So it blocks 
our [tax] refund, which in any case is non-interest bearable. Also, if 
some other party like another state government makes a mistake, it 
puts the blame on us. Electricity rates increase frequently. The general 
atmosphere here is not good for industry. 
The inertia, and even deterioration, of the industrial profile of the state was visible 
close to the fieldwork site. Mandi Gobindgarh used to employ many people from in 
and around Khanna as well. Several (and different kinds of) steel mills in the town 
have shut down, with a large number of businessmen having suffered losses and 
workers losing their jobs. Overall, many of Punjab’s famous industries, like bicycles 
and sports goods, are known to be moving to other states.
157
 
Punjab’s non-agricultural economy, then, is not a robust one. Even established 
traders, mill owners and industrialists are finding it hard to continue doing business. 
In such a situation, farmers, including large capitalists, face serious limits in 
diversifying into industrial activity within the state. While large farmers have land to 
spare, there are many other barriers to entry and success in business that they have to 
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 On associative politics of traders and dominant castes facilitating capital accumulation in Tamil 
Nadu, see Harriss-White (2003) and Basile (2016). 
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 See Rajshekhar (2015). 
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surmount. This is probably why Jats have a limited presence in capital-intensive 
non-agricultural businesses (there were none in my survey sample). 
Small and large capitalist farmers, therefore, diversify into small non-agricultural 
activities such as the ones mentioned above. When unsuccessful, this can also be 
temporary. A small capitalist farmer said, 
I also had a restaurant in Khanna for one year, Samosa Junction. We 
sold all kinds of samosas there. But then I left it. If one owns the 
building, then it is okay. There, I had to pay Rs 40,000 rent, plus AC 
charges; the fryer was also running. The cost came to Rs 100,000; 
only after that one could think of an income from it. I also ran it in 
Ucha Mandi for five years but left that also. 
A farmer with 10 acres of his own worked as a bus driver for a private college for 7 
years, while leasing-out his land until he decided that it did not pay enough and 
returned to farming. Others left dairy farming and transport businesses, and 
abandoned migration. These examples show that the continuation of any kind of 
diversification depends on how it compares to returns from farming. At least in the 
case of some (large and small capitalist) farmers and some kinds of work, farming 
comes out stronger. 
Table 10.2 gives rough incomes from agricultural and non-agricultural activities 
based on estimates gathered by some respondents and those given earlier in the 
thesis. It shows that there are wide variations in income from different kinds of non-
agricultural activities and, depending on the kind of migration, incomes abroad may 
be even lower than some types of local non-agricultural work. To reiterate, as these 
are not accompanied by data on assets or operational costs, these figures are tentative 
and cannot be used to extrapolate to accumulation. My objective in making this table 
is limited to providing a sense of the relative incomes from agriculture and non-
agricultural businesses, and of the possibilities for accumulation beyond agriculture 
by farmers.  
The annual income from paddy-wheat farming for a petty producer (Rs 112,500) 
could be more than that from petty jobs like driving and factory work, and perhaps 
comparable to them if the burdens of loans are taken into account. Given the risks 
and investments involved in farming, especially on such a small scale, it is not 
surprising that there is a trend among petty farming households to diversify towards 
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other kinds of occupations that are seemingly more secure and stable. The small 
capitalist agricultural income (Rs 337,500) is comparable to government civil service 
and military salaries; in fact, these figures are comparable to salaries of good private 
urban jobs in India. However, very few respondents had any relatives in such jobs. 
Inasmuch as large capitalist farmers (Rs 675,000) can earn much more from 
agriculture than from many private or government jobs and petty businesses, they 
have an incentive to continue to invest in agriculture. This is confirmed by the 
dynamic land-lease market. On the other hand, to the extent that many such farmers 
are looking to move out of agriculture while they are still working or by the time 
their sons are old enough to take charge of the household, diversification is a 
function of multiple factors such as increasing risks in agriculture, disdain for 
farming among the younger generation and the perception of more prosperity and 
stability in certain non-agricultural avenues. 
Therefore, on the one hand, diversification into business can be difficult. On the 
other, government and well-paid private jobs have become increasingly difficult to 
get, even for well-qualified youth. The combination of these two things generates 
cynicism and powers the drive to migrate to other countries, something that requires 
resources and luck. In such a situation, most middle-aged and older farmers also 
expressed their extreme concern about the male youth. 
Young boys and men do not wish to farm. To most, farming is an unglamorous life 
of struggle. For those belonging to small farming families, this is also the hard truth, 
i.e. farming is an unrewarded struggle. For those belonging to large capitalist 
households, however, this disdain to work on the farm also relates to the complete 
lack of any need to work, since much is mechanized or done by hired labour. The 
parents of these young boys and men expressed disappointment, both that their sons 
are not interested in farming and that they have not been able to find work outside of 
farming. 
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Table 10.2: Agricultural and non-agricultural incomes 




Grain mandi arhtia 150,000 – 1,700,000  
Dairy farm  547,500 – 657,000 




140,000 – 200,000 70,000 – 100,000 per season *2 
Military soldier 264,000 22,000 per month 
Military soldier pension 144,000 12,000 per month 
Government civil job 360,000 – 480,000 30,000-40,000 per month 
Private school teacher  108,000 9,000 per month 
Factory worker 48,000 – 84,000 4,000 – 7,000 per month  
Factory foreman  240,000 – 600,00 20,000 – 50,000 per month  
Factory accountant 420,000 – 480,000 35,000 – 40,000 per month  
Arhtia accountant 180,000 15,000 per month  
Mechanic 120,000 10,000 per month  
Government Bus Driver 300,000 25,000 per month  
Private Bus/Truck Driver 84,000 7000 per month  
Petty business 48,000 – 96,000 
4000 – 8000 per month (taken 
from information on shuttering 
and garment business of different 
respondents) 
Migration – labour in Gulf 
countries 
180,000 – 240,000 15,000 – 20,000 per month  
Migration – driver in Gulf 
countries 
600,000 
50,000 per month 
Note: similar jobs in European or 
North American countries would 











Paddy-wheat farming  
(15 acres) 
675,000 
Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
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 The choice of acreage is somewhat arbitrary but corresponds to the average operational 
landholding of the first two classes (petty producer – 2.5 acres, small capitalist – 7.5 acres). For large 
capitalists, I have chosen an arbitrary figure over the minimum operational holding. It should also be 
noted that paddy and wheat were selected for estimating income because of their stable prices and 
their significance in the economy. 
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Earlier the case of Jaspal Singh, who set up an inputs shop for his son, was 
mentioned. His son has two post-graduate degrees from Patiala University and 
wanted to do a PhD but could not gain admission. Therefore, his father set up the 
shop for him. On being asked if his son helps him in farming, he said, ‘No, bache 
toh kaam karke raazi nahin hain [children are not willing to work]. If they come to 
the shop before 11am that will be more than enough’. Jagjit of the Gill brothers also 
said, 
Children do not want to do this anymore; my children study right now 
but they do not even know what variety of potato I have sown in my 
field. They will just take the car, roam the city and then come home.  
[May be not agriculture, but they must be interested in the arht 
business, right?] 
Well, we will not be here forever; if they do not join us, then at some 
point we will have to shut it. 
The wife of Kulwinder Singh, a large potato farmer, lamented that her highly-
qualified son (also with two post-graduate degrees) could not find a job but at least 
he helped a lot on the farm. Overall, in keeping with trends across the country, 
smartphones, ‘urban’ clothing and a general consumerist culture dominated the 
aspirations of many young men. 
There were certainly a few respondents in their late twenties who farmed actively, 
but this was not common. Many young men sought non-agricultural work and those 
belonging to smaller landholding and less well-connected households found it 
harder. Unemployed male youth loitering in villages and becoming addicted to drugs 
and gambling was a common lament of respondents. 
10.7 Patterns of Accumulation 
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to reflect on the implications of forms 
of diversification for patterns of agrarian accumulation and differentiation in the 
region more widely. We know that within Marxist political economy classes are 
defined on the basis of labour relations and reinvestment of surplus capital. I now 
analyse these aspects of the classes identified and combine insights from the 
diversification to arrive at a better understanding of the class dynamics. For the 
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Table 10.3: Number of households employing a naukar(s)* 
 No Yes 
Petty producer 14 2 
Small capitalist 12 1 
Large capitalist 16 43 
Total 42 46 
            Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
       *excludes households in the total survey that lease-out their landholding 
I begin with labour relations. As discussed in Chapter 7, gangs of labourers are hired 
by all farmers for some operations such as paddy transplanting, potato picking, 
cauliflower transplanting, weeding and picking. Hired labour of this kind is the norm 
and therefore this cannot be used as a device to classify farming households. The 
difference was found to lie in terms of whether naukars were being used for 
agricultural (farming and/or cattle-rearing) activities outside of the operations listed 
above or if own or daily hired labour were used. These activities could include 
spraying chemicals, administering the irrigation water supply, feeding cattle, etc. 
Table 10.3 shows the number of households employing naukars either on a yearly or 
seasonal basis. The overwhelming proportion of households (93%) that employ a 
naukar are large capitalist households. At the same time, of the 16 large capitalist 
households that did not have a naukar, 13 had an operational holding of less than 15 
acres.
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 So, while in previous chapters I argued that the employment of naukars is 
linked to the cropping pattern and the availability of (willing) male family male 
workers, this shows that it is also linked to scale; of course, previously it was also 
been discussed that cropping pattern itself is scale specific. The significance of 
employing a naukar lies in the fact that those who do are more likely to be doing no 
manual labour at all and to be working only as farm managers. 
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 Colatei and Harriss-White (2004) have highlighted the challenges in incorporating diversification 
into efforts to stratify households. Using cluster analysis and drawing on ‘several contested theories 
of mobility and differentiation’ (158), they create the following stratification: elites; middle peasants 
with land, and without land; and, poor peasants with land, and without land.  
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 A handful of farmers with operational holdings of less than 15 acres did employ naukars, but most 
did not. 
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As a proxy for capital investments in agriculture, I used ownership of machines that 
are commonly used in the field for preparation of land for cultivation. Table 10.4 
shows the number of households that own one or more tractors, ploughs and 
levellers each.
161
 This shows clearly that all the large capitalists own at least one of 
each machine, as do most small capitalist farmers.
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 The majority of petty 
producers, however, do not own these machines and are, therefore, a distinct class in 
terms of capital investments. This, of course, does not imply that these households 
conduct agricultural operations without machines. Rather, there is a vibrant rental 
market in almost all machines in the area; they can be rented either from the PACS 
or from other farmers. Earlier, combines being rented out and farmers preparing land 
for others for an income was discussed. These rental markets compensate for petty 
producers not owning machines. So the difference in terms of capital investments 
lies not in how they do agricultural operations but rather in the ownership of 
machines. In other words, everybody will plough, sow and reap a crop in the same 
way but some will use their own machines for this while others will use rented ones. 
In this, the petty producers are distinct. 
Table 10.4: Ownership of agricultural machinery by class* 
 Tractor Plough Leveller 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Petty producer 9 7 10 6 9 7 
Small capitalist 2 11 2 11 2 11 
Large capitalist 0 59 0 59 0 59 
Total 11 77 12 76 11 77 
     Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
     *excludes households in the total survey that lease-out their landholding 
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 There are many other machines used in the field such as combines, seed drills, potato reapers, disc 
harrows, rotavators and cultivators. However, these are not always owned and used by all farmers and 
so there are even wider rental markets in these implements. Capital investments are also made in the 
form of submersible tube wells. Apart from a few petty producers, all farmers have at least one on 
their land which they use independently or share with a neighbour. Whether sharing involves rents 
was beyond the scope of this study. 
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 The two small capitalists who do not own any machines have similar profiles. Their operational 
holdings are 8.5 and 7.5 acres respectively; they cultivate only wheat and paddy, and have a young 
adult son to help on the farm. 
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0 0 4 2 5 
Petty 
producer 
1 1 11 2 16 
Small 
capitalist 
0 0 6 4 13 
Large 
capitalist 
9 11 11 9 59 
Total 10 12 32 17  
Source: Own household survey 2014-15 
The above discussion reaffirms the utility of the exploratory class categories used in 
this study. But what does economic diversification mean for this pattern of class 
differentiation? Previously I discussed the patterns of diversification and their 
relative accessibility across different classes. Table 10.5 shows the kinds of 
diversification undertaken by households in the sample survey.
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 The data clearly 
shows that businesses involving considerable amounts of capital are a near 
monopoly of large capitalists, even though none of them include industrial 
enterprises. The lone petty producer who I interviewed (not part of the survey) who 
had diversified into such a business had established a successful inputs shop in a 
village, sustained at least in part by his reputation of being knowledgeable and 
reliable.  
Education and skills-based diversification is more evenly spread, and even appears 
to be over-represented among petty producers given their total sample. But we 
should remember that some of this reflects a record of military service, quite 
prevalent in this region. Also, jobs like bank manager, school teacher or mill 
accountant are not comparable in terms of income to those of a driver or mechanic. 
There are also differences between private sector and government jobs (see Table 
10.2).  
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 Some households have diversified through more than one type of activity and have been counted 
twice. Appendix IV lists the activities included in each type. Note that 'non-agricultural business’ 
includes four households engaged in petty businesses (grocery, garment and spare parts shops). 
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In at least one case, however, the diversification represents the early success of 
education in enabling and sustaining diversification. The grandfather of a farmer, 
Kulwant Singh, worked only seven acres in the years just before Independence. 
However, his father became a government school teacher. Subsequently, Kulwant 
and his two brothers managed to obtain government jobs – he as a kanungo or 
revenue officer in the district, and his brothers as a doctor and teacher, respectively. 
As their father's landholding was divided between them, the brothers are petty 
producers in strictly agricultural terms. But they are much better-off economically 
when their non-agricultural income is taken into account. 
Therefore, I would argue that economic diversification is an additional axis (to 
labour relations, capital investments and market dynamics) along which agrarian 
class dynamics may be understood. In fact, it is the element that upsets neat class 
categorizations. However, given the complicated ways in which attempts at 
economic diversification culminate in success or failure, trying to create a hierarchy 
of classes based on diversification would not only be difficult but also unhelpful in 
trying to understand the dynamic processes underlying agrarian change. Therefore, 
alternatively, I would suggest that economic diversification allows us to identify 
three broad patterns of agrarian accumulation in the area. These patterns have been 
identified with a specific temporality in mind, i.e. the time of fieldwork and the 
immediate short term (roughly five years) from then. It is important to identify this 
temporality because in the long term the aspiration of an overwhelming majority of 
households across different classes is to diversify into profitable non-agricultural 
economic work. The patterns are as follows: 
1. Households that are investing in agriculture alone: these can be small or large 
capitalists. The survey results (Table 10.1) show that a large proportion of the 
latter fall in this category. This is understandable given their relative income 
from agriculture vis-à-vis non-agricultural income. 
2. Households that are investing in agriculture but also simultaneously in the 
educational qualifications or migration of their children or themselves in the 
short term: these include both small and large capitalists. When successful, in 
some cases, this could also add to the number of households leasing-out their 
landholdings. 
265 
3. Households that have already diversified into well-paying economic avenues: 
these include lessors as well as those who continue to invest in farming. 
Again, while a majority of these would be large capitalists, it could also 
include families like those of Kulwant Singh (see above) who retain small 
holdings but earn high incomes from non-agricultural sources. 
Capitalist agriculture in the area then encompasses a spectrum whereby at one end 
profits, employment of attached labour and investment in machinery are likely to rise 
with scale and the chances of succeeding at economic diversification are greater. At 
the other end of the spectrum, smaller capitalists may sometimes (and petty 
producers even more occasionally) be able to climb up the ladder through profits 
from using family labour when available, by diversifying the cropping pattern and/or 
by succeeding in economic diversification. In this flux, while some may succeed and 
consolidate their status as accumulators, others may be reduced to petty producers or 
continue to struggle at the same level. 
10.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has brought out the broad patterns in diversification or attempts towards 
diversification among farmers in Khanna. The first of these patterns is agriculture-
based diversification, which is the most common. Within this, working as arhtias 
was the most common path, followed by dairy farming and potato trading. These 
options, let alone those involving mills, require a substantial amount of investment 
and are inaccessible to many, even to large capitalists. Within the pattern of non-
agricultural businesses I came across no evidence of major industrial investment. 
This could be explained by the overall industrial conditions prevailing in the state, 
but non-agricultural businesses such as transport, dealerships and private schools are 
also fairly capital-intensive. The third kind of diversification was through education 
and skills training. Here, too, there was a difference between higher and lower levels 
of salaried employment (and businesses). Given the dearth of government and 
private jobs, education can also be a frustrating endeavour. In this context and set 
against a long history of such, migration remains one of the most sought after ways 
of diversifying. Again, some kinds of migration are considered better than others and 
there is no guaranteed route to success. 
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A very small proportion of farmers, even large capitalists, are able to diversify into a 
remunerative business such that they can consolidate themselves in that field. 
Several of the histories related above highlighted the importance of the family in 
this; this can manifest in combined strategies of joint families (that may or may not 
stay together in the future) and/or strategies within a family for the next generation. 
Similarly, social networks in the form of extended families, village-based, political 
and economic relations can be crucial to success in diversification. To the extent that 
this success is being achieved, it is polarizing agrarian society further. 
Simultaneously, the frustrated attempts of many others to do so are a statement on 
the larger economy and polity of the state, and can be expected to ruffle the social 
fabric of rural Punjab in future in ways that are beyond the scope of this research to 
explore. It also throws the relative position of Punjab’s economy vis-à-vis other 
states in sharp relief, a theme that I return to in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 11.  Conclusion 
 
This research investigated how liberalisation has shaped agrarian accumulation in 
India, with an empirical focus on the state of Punjab. It was conducted within the 
framework of critical agrarian political economy whereby historically developed 
class relations are given analytical priority. Accordingly, class differentiation among 
farmers was the starting point of the research, and it was assumed (though also 
probed) that capitalist farmers would be accumulating. Their strategies of 
accumulation and changes in them as a result of liberalisation formed the main area 
of enquiry. Following Bernstein (2010), capitalist agriculture was conceptualized to 
include both farming and related activities upstream and downstream of the actual 
production. Therefore, the significance of agricultural markets for accumulation was 
also studied intensively. 
The core fieldwork was conducted in Khanna town in Ludhiana district and four 
villages around it. Production and marketing of a set of individual crops, namely, 
paddy, wheat, potato and cauliflower, were studied in depth in order to understand 
the constraints on and possibilities for accumulation by farmers across different 
classes. Crop dynamics were examined in relation to other important aspects 
including landholdings and land-leasing, credit relations and economic 
diversification. An initial period of mapping important actors, events and processes 
was followed by farmer household surveys and more focused investigation into 
specific issues. Heuristic class categories of farmers were created for fieldwork and 
analysis. 
This approach allowed me to map and analyse a wide cross-section of issues that 
shape agrarian accumulation in Punjab and to study the strategies that capitalist 
farmers make in order to accumulate. It also allowed me to identify the underlying 
forces of change in Punjab’s agriculture in the 21
st
 century, including potential 
sources of instability. Further, taking liberalisation as a reference point allowed a 
glimpse into how its many parts manifest in a specific context and to what effect. 
However, this approach is limited in terms of explaining the predicament of petty 
producers and, even more so, of the labouring classes. My methods also precluded 
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an understanding of how village dynamics and issues of caste, gender relations and 
politics influence the divergent fates of different agrarian classes. A study of these 
aspects would have also given a better understanding of collective class action by 
capitalist farmers. It is also limited in terms of comparing productive investment in 
agriculture with other kinds of investment portfolios.   
The most important shortcoming of this study, however, is the limited data on petty 
producers, as it prevents an understanding of the full range of accumulators. This 
also prevents a proper understanding of how much better off large capitalists are. 
Further, as petty producers constitute the largest proportion of agricultural producers 
in India, in-depth study of them would have made this research more relevant for 
country-wide analyses.  
In retrospect, the understanding of the predicament of petty producers may have 
been partially addressed by obtaining a separate cost of production estimate. Ideally, 
this research could also have been made stronger if I was able to record life histories 
of farmers and study non-agricultural investments in greater depth.  
This chapter explains how this research contributes to the questions raised at the start 
of the thesis and identifies contributions to specific debates raised in Part I. 
11.1 Revisiting the Research Questions 
Like Lerche (2013), I argue that agrarian accumulation is continuing under 
liberalisation. The findings of this research challenge the argument that there is an 
overall agrarian crisis in the country and that accumulation within agriculture has 
ceased (Patnaik 2006, 2011). However, I also show that it has become more 
precarious in this period. 
In classical Marxist political economy debates, accumulation by capitalist farmers is 
understood through labour relations as it is the site of creation and appropriation of 
surplus value (Thorner 1982a, 1982b, 1982c). This research shows that the dynamics 
of agricultural markets and land, and possibilities of accumulation outside 
agriculture are also decisive in whether farmers are accumulating or not. 
Many liberalisation reforms were found to have had an impact on agrarian 
accumulation. Most farmers claimed that costs have increased over time, not least 
due to reduced subsidies on fertilizers and crop chemicals. The export-orientation of 
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the economy allowed for the expansion of basmati cultivation in the field area. 
Sectors such as flour mills and cold stores were deregulated, and credit was extended 
to these and similar enterprises on a priority basis resulting in an increase in the 
number of private actors operating in these fields. Promotion of agribusinesses has 
also led to the widespread production of and trading in different potato varieties, 
especially processing varieties. Changes in seed policies have allowed domestic and 
transnational agribusinesses to invest in new seeds, and expanded the production and 
scope of marketing for cauliflower. One of the ways in which agricultural credit has 
been revamped is in the form of the KCC which has altered the credit dynamics in 
the field. These reforms have created both profitable opportunities for large 
capitalists and further sources of vulnerability. 
An important factor contributing to the continued accumulation by capitalist farmers 
in Punjab is the State-led procurement of wheat and paddy and guaranteed payment 
of the MSP. This also allows for a minimum subsistence income for petty producers. 
Large capitalists have also benefitted from selective engagement with corporate 
strategies. They may do this either through the selective use of hybrid seeds in the 
case of cauliflower, by the decision to commit to or leave contract farming, or 
varying the acreage of basmati they grow based on anticipated prices offered by 
basmati firms. These options have been shown to be less easily available to petty 
producers who are thus disadvantaged as a result of these changes. The fact that 
many capitalist farmers are able to use the presence of corporate agribusinesses to 
their advantage indicates that there is no general exploitative relation between 
corporates and farmers as argued by Weis (2007), McMichael (2005), van der Ploeg 
(2009) and Patnaik (2011). I have shown that these relations are contingent on the 
class position of farmers, the nature of corporate intervention and the wider structure 
of the market. 
At the same time, this form of accumulation is also vulnerable. Crops other than 
parmal and wheat are subject to extreme price volatility, as seen with basmati, potato 
and cauliflower. Even for large capitalists, agricultural income may not be enough 
for their expenses, ‘wasteful’ or otherwise and, as a result, they may be drawn into 
complex circuits of credit and indebtedness. The successes of capitalist farmers that 
seem to be ‘apparent’ by their crop incomes or their landholdings instead may rest on 
thin ground. For instance, leasing-in large areas of land does not necessarily result in 
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financial sustainability. Similarly, high crop incomes in one annual cycle may not be 
enough to rid a farmer of debt accumulated over one or multiple years. Finally, as 
liberalisation continues to unfold, the State now proposes to withdraw its support 
from parmal and wheat procurement; if this comes to pass, the agrarian landscape in 
Punjab can be expected to change radically. 
Social relations between farmers and traders, under-researched in Punjab, were 
found to shape accumulation in important ways. Different kinds of traders mediated 
the sale of crops in different ways and, therefore, were crucial to the profits realized 
by farmers. Grain mandi arhtias had particular significance as they were the main 
source of informal credit for farmers. Under liberalisation, there were subtle but 
significant changes in these relations. The expanded production of potatoes, for 
example, has led local and non-local traders to purchase crops directly from the 
farms, allowing farmers to bypass the arhtias in the sabzi mandi. Similarly, the 
volatility in basmati prices disrupted the credit relations between arhtias and traders. 
Further, the KCC has led to a considerable decline in the dependence of large 
capitalists on arhtias. This differs from Chavan (2005) and Ramakumar and Chavan 
(2011) who argue that credit reforms have strengthened informal sources. 
Nevertheless, arhtias continue to retain power as the lender of last resort. Where 
limits have been used up by other expenses and savings are inadequate, arhtias can 
aid with production or consumption expenses. Often they are also crucial in helping 
farmers, especially smaller farmers, rotate their limit and remain solvent in the 
banks’ records. 
Finally, different capitalist farmers are negotiating these changes in different ways. 
Some are diversifying their crop profile from parmal and wheat to vegetable crops 
such as potato and cauliflower. Moreover, farmers make different decisions about 
acreage and variety of crop to cultivate. For example, some large farmers may 
cultivate basmati across their entire paddy acreage while others do it only in part in 
order to secure a guaranteed profit from parmal. The same applies to cauliflower 
which may be cultivated year round by some farmers on all of their land, while 
others may also intermittently grow wheat or paddy. Some choose to forego 
cultivation of wheat, the main food crop, entirely. Smaller farmers, on the other 
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hand, are likely to continue with cultivating wheat and paddy that give assured 
returns. 
Scale was found to be an important factor in negotiating the possibilities of 
accumulation within agriculture successfully. For example, land-lease rates were so 
high and markets so volatile that petty producers or small capitalist farmers might 
not be able to offset the costs of leasing-in land, even after cultivating three crops a 
year. In the credit market, arhtias charge higher interest rates to small farmers, 
making them more vulnerable. On the other hand, banks tend to lend only limited 
amounts to such farmers, which they may not be able to repay either. Categories 
created on the basis of land were also found to have differences in terms of patterns 
of labour hiring and capital investment within agriculture. Therefore, it has been 
shown that in conditions of capitalized agriculture in Punjab, land size matters for 
class position. This substantiates findings by Rakshit (2011) and Rangarajan (2013). 
Economic diversification is another strategy used by capitalist farmers to both 
manage vulnerabilities in agriculture and expand the scope of accumulation. 
However, this is a wider trend within agrarian capitalism in Punjab and elsewhere, 
and no clear link could be established between these strategies and liberalisation. 
The case of seed potato trading and establishment of cold stores is an exception; this 
is a direct consequence of the entry of corporate agribusinesses in the production and 
marketing of this crop. The strategies used for diversification can vary on the basis 
of several factors: available capital, family dynamics, access to education and 
political networks, among others. 
Additionally, the research recognizes that there are elements of both compulsion and 
choice in the form that agrarian accumulation takes. Scale and the need for credit can 
be considered structural compulsions. The research findings, for example, establish 
that large-scale production is an important factor contributing to successful 
accumulation. This in turn requires large capital investments in leasing-in land, 
renting/purchasing machinery, employing labour, etc. that usually require credit. On 
the other hand, large capitalists choose to invest in different crop combinations, and 
may invest in quite different diversification strategies, reflecting elements of agency 
in the process of accumulation. 
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Collective strategies of accumulation included, firstly, mobilisation through the 
farmers’ union and pulling their political weight, seen in the State procurement of 
basmati and relaxation of norms of wheat procurement. Many large capitalists hold 
positions of power locally, which is arguably one of the reasons they have a strong 
voice in state politics. Farmers may also mobilize around specific interests; this was 
seen in the case of village level committees that were formed to reduce lease rates. 
Family and community networks too were crucial for accumulation through 
economic diversification.  
While different kinds of capitalist farmers were negotiating – individually and 
collectively – the changed policy context, this was situated within the context of 
competition between capitals. Capitalist farmers choose different strategies in order 
to maximize income from agriculture. In this, some succeed more than others, 
signalling that competition exists. Multiple factors set the terms of this competition; 
they include the size of operational holdings, and any costs of leasing-in land, access 
to credit, labour use patterns, and marketing networks. This research indicates (well 
within limitations of its data) that in this competition, large capitalists are more likely 
to succeed than smaller capitalists.   
The findings indicate that petty producers, and even small capitalists, are structurally 
disadvantaged in a number of ways both within and outside agriculture. At the same 
time, however, accumulation has also become riskier under liberalisation. While 
large capitalists are better placed to survive and benefit from the changes, many 
among them are also unable to invest in land or capital-intensive non-agricultural 
businesses to expand their basis of accumulation. This means that there is a 
‘continuum of tendencies’ (Oya 2004, 309) of class differentiation in Punjab’s 
countryside and the social base for accumulation will potentially narrow in future. 
Competition between capitals, however, also takes place across sectors, whereby 
the question is how profit is distributed between them. In this research, such 
competition is reflected in the relations between productive agrarian capital and 
mercantile capital. The main aspect of this relation studied here is that between 
farmers and arhtias. In principle, even though the arhtia’s commission is paid as a 
percentage of the price received by the farmer, the source of the commission is the 
State. The arthia is not meant to take a ‘cut’ of the farmers’ profit, and the 
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relationship between them is not designed to be competitive. However, in practice, 
there are different ways in which this competition is manifested.  
Firstly, Chapter 4 noted how arhtias in the grain mandi had succeeded in increasing 
the rate of commission permitted by the State over the years. Therefore, the 
commission takes the form of profit that the arhtias claim from the society at large 
through the State’s mediation. Secondly, due to the moneylending role of arhtias, the 
prices received by farmers are dependent on the interest they need to pay the arhtia 
against any outstanding loan. Therefore, informal credit does indeed enable the latter 
to appropriate a share of the farmers’ profits.  
At the same time, this research shows that productive agrarian capital and mercantile 
capital are not water-tight categories, corresponding empirically to farmers and 
arthias, respectively. For example, some large capitalist famers also give credit to the 
arhtia on interest. In such cases, the farmers can be thought of as appropriating a 
share of the arhtia's profit in addition to the profits they may earn through 
agricultural production. Moreover, farmers embody both forms of capital when they 
become arhtias as well. 
In the market for vegetables studied here, such competition may play out differently. 
For example, the fact that over the years, farmers have obtained access to multiple 
channels of sale can be thought of as undermining the profit of arhtias in the 
vegetable mandi compared to when they were the only channel. The complex nature 
of these relations, therefore, shows that competition between capitals does not 
necessarily benefit one or the other type of capital and is difficult to map concretely. 
11.2 Further Contributions 
11.2.1 Agricultural Liberalisation in India 
This research has studied the impact of liberalisation on accumulation through the 
dynamics of production, agricultural markets, and land and credit relations. This 
allows liberalisation to be understood as more than a proxy for the expansion of 
corporate capital, although that is an important aspect. Rather, it situates 
liberalisation firmly within a broad canvas of conditions that together shape agrarian 
change. While liberalisation is about a shift in the balance of power in favour of the 
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private sector, the processes through which this may take place are complex, diverse 
and locally rooted. 
This research has also contributed to an understanding of the balance between the 
State and the market under liberalisation. The private sector has come to occupy a 
greater space in the agrarian economy; for instance, in the form of corporate 
agribusinesses and private commercial banks. At the same time, local private capital 
in the form of arhtias, pucca arhtias, mills, etc. existed and thrived in the economy 
well before liberalisation. Moreover, by continuing to procure parmal and wheat 
from the mandis of Punjab, the State continues to be the all-important actor in 
agriculture. So, like Richa Kumar (2016), this research finds that the boundaries 
between State- and market-led development in the period before and after 
liberalisation are messy. More generally, it is also difficult to maintain a dichotomy 
between State and market when empirical realities are considered.  
Admittedly, the State is keen on withdrawing from the market and on ensuring that 
crops other than parmal and wheat are produced and sold according to the rule of the 
market. Yet it intervened to procure basmati from the mandis when the basmati firms 
pulled out. This raises two issues. Firstly, the State is forced to act against its own 
policy prescriptions due to political exigencies, which is crucial in determining the 
form and content of liberalisation. Not only does such intervention undermine the 
State-market dichotomy in the mainstream understanding of liberalisation, it is also 
contingent on, among other things, the particular balance of power between different 
classes in a region and thereby leads to context-specific manifestation of 
liberalisation reforms. Secondly, there is a difference between the compulsions and 
actions of the central and state governments and their significance for the agrarian 
fortunes of different regions and the classes in them. Both these issues, emerging 
from the research, have only been surveyed cursorily here and have scope for further 
enquiry. 
Another issue is that while in the literature, formal and informal credit are presented 
in opposition to each other, this research has found that they can also support each 
other. Moneylending by arhtias in the current form is dependent on State 
procurement and supported by priority sector lending norms which finance their 
moneylending operations. This further implies that the State itself creates the 
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conditions for the informal economy to thrive. This supports Harriss-White’s (2003) 
argument that the State is deeply implicated in the black and informal economy of 
India. This, too, raises the issue of the forces that enable such State involvement and 
how they might be changing under liberalisation, an area for potential further study. 
11.2.2 Traders and Agricultural Markets 
Another major argument and finding of this research is that agricultural markets and 
farmer-trader relations are crucial factors shaping the process of agrarian 
accumulation. This research, therefore, builds on and substantiates the arguments of 
Harriss-White (1996, 2008, 2010) and Banaji (2016). Like Harriss-White (1996), 
this research studies farmer-trader relations and the links between production and the 
market structure. But, while in her study farmers are studied in relation to traders 
who are the focus, this research is original in keeping farmers at the centre of 
analysis even when studying the markets; in other words, as mentioned in Chapter 1, 
it is a study of traders in relation to farmers. 
In mapping different commodities that farming households cultivate over a single 
year, I confirmed Harriss-White’s (ibid.; also Harriss-White and Ali Jan 2012) 
argument that traders are a heterogeneous category. They perform many different 
functions and have diverse portfolios both within and across different commodity 
markets. But in addition to this, this research was able to understand the relative 
significance of these commodities for farmers. For example, potato and cauliflower 
present the opportunity to earn large profits but also involve significant risks of 
losses. Paddy and wheat, on the other hand, provide guaranteed income and link 
them to grain arhtias who can extend credit for any production and consumption 
purpose. 
I have argued that there is a difference between arhtias in the grain mandi and those 
in the sabzi mandi in terms of extending credit. This is at least partly a function of 
the fact that the former are assured of the sale of crop at a known MSP and can 
anticipate the returns from moneylending. This indicates two things. First, markets 
constitute an independent system with their own constraints, an argument made by 
Harriss-White (ibid.). Markets are also structured independently and differently 
depending on the materiality of the commodity in question as discussed in Section 
7.5. 
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Second, it indicates that arhtias in the sabzi mandi do not wish to bear the price risk 
involved in inter-linking credit, produce and marketing, something which the arhtias 
in the grain mandi are able to do. This is a concrete illustration of Bell and 
Srinivisan’s (1989) abstract argument about the peculiarity of this kind of inter-
linking as compared to credit-tenancy transactions. 
The research also found that credit relations between farmers and arhtias are not 
always exploitative, or equally exploitative, for all farmers. Interest rates charged by 
arhtias are much higher than those charged by commercial banks and cooperatives. 
However, even within that, the rates are usually relatively higher for smaller farmers 
than for large capitalists. Some among the latter also lend to arhtias to support their 
credit operations, indicating a kind of role reversal. This argument is then different 
from that of Bhaduri (1983); it supports the position of Bharadwaj (1985), Srivastava 
(1989b) and Crow and Murshid (1994) that credit relations are dependent on 
production structures. To the extent that large, wealthy capitalist farmers cultivate 
relations with arhtias, it is reflective of the arhtias’ ability to withhold ‘selective 
extension of privileges’ (Hart 1989) in case of an emergency, thereby indicative of 
some of the basis of the arhtias’ social power. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that Marx’s category of ‘merchant’s capital’ is abstract and it 
hardly ever exists in the real world in a pure form. The findings of this research 
support this. For example, even though rice mills and potato-processing companies 
operate in the ‘market’, they embody elements of productive industrial capital. Grain 
arhtias, on the other hand, represent a form of merchant’s capital, although they 
perform some necessary productive functions such as the cleaning and drying of 
grains, and packing and loading for transportation and storage. 
This implies that the categorization between productive and merchant’s capital is 
relevant only to a point, and its significance in determining the relation between 
traders and farmers, often assumed to be exploitative, needs to be understood 
empirically. This research shows that the nature of these relations depends on three 
issues. 
1. Whether credit is involved and the terms of the same: this makes the relation 
between the farmer and the arhtia in the grain mandi distinct from other 
farmer-trader links in the area; 
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2. Position of the trader/agro-commercial firm in the market: basmati mills are 
the only buyers of the crop in the market, so shifts in their strategies can 
seriously impact farmers. On the other hand, flour mills compete with the 
State for wheat and this determines the prices they pay to farmers. Similarly, 
both large capitalist farmers and agribusiness firms may renege from the 
contract under contract farming for seed potatoes as the crop has a vibrant 
open market; and, 
3. Materiality of the commodity: the requirement for paddy to be processed 
places farmers’ fortunes at the mercy of the mills. Similarly, farmers 
cultivating cauliflower on a large scale chose to sell to traders who come to 
their fields rather than sell directly in the mandi at least partly due to time 
constraints emerging from the heavy labour supervision requirements of 
cauliflower production and the volume of the produce. The different 
temporalities involved in the harvest of potato compel farmers to potentially 
engage with different kinds of traders and in different spatial locations. 
On traders under liberalisation, Harriss-White (2003) argues that the intermediate 
classes were able to retain their power in the economy in the first decade of 
liberalisation. Rakshit (2011), on the other hand, argues that the new traders, 
represented by the corporates or those who have links to them, are more exploitative 
than the old. Alongside Kaur et al. (2007), Harriss-White (2008) and Krishnamurthy 
(2011), this study is among the very few to provide a detailed analysis of traders 
under liberalisation.  
Building on the work of Harriss-White (2003), I have shown that the politics of the 
market allows the intermediate classes to maintain their power even as they negotiate 
policies introduced by liberalisation and the entry of national or international 
corporate capital. Informal social relations and business networks were found to be 
crucial for various aspects of arhtias’ market operation in grain mandis, e.g. the real 
procurement process of paddy and wheat, mobilisation of finances for moneylending 
and building a farmer-client base. They also use collective mobilisation and invoke 
party politics in order to protect their interests. In the potato and cauliflower markets, 
farmers also need to proactively build reliable relations with traders across multiple 
markets to ensure that they receive the best price for their produce.  
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At the same time, these classes may succeed in retaining power without necessarily 
stifling the interests of corporate capital, as seen in the case of the wheat silos in 
Moga. I have argued in fact that there are elements of both conflict and cooperation 
between old and new traders. For example, in the basmati market, basmati mills 
work via the arhtias to procure supplies, but the dependence of mills on world 
market prices and their delayed payments jeopardize the arhtias’ credit operations. 
Similarly, the arhtias in the sabzi mandis, both in Khanna and elsewhere, worked in 
cooperation with processing firms to procure supplies and, therefore, added 
occasional trading to their portfolio. Agribusinesses dealing in seed potatoes also 
leased newly-built cold store space from (usually) Jat owners. In this sense, 
corporates were integrated with the local economy and became one of many actors in 
the agro-commercial landscape of the field area. Moreover, as in the case of 
corporates and farmers, we cannot say that there is a singular relation between 
corporates and traders. The State plays a crucial role in maintaining this balance 
between old and new trading and agribusiness capital, and there is scope for further 
study of this aspect.  
In fact, liberalisation might be bringing out the different interests of the constituents 
of the intermediate classes. For example, while arhtias are apprehensive about the 
increase in basmati trade, the same trade has allowed for the emergence of pucca 
arhtias (who are also arhtias and/or brokers) who have a vested interest in its 
expansion. Similarly, the interests of rice mills and flour mills are completely 
different with respect to the withdrawal of State-led procurement from Punjab. Any 
study that focuses on traders and markets per se and not only in relation to farmers 
can be expected to reveal further changes of this kind under liberalisation as well as 
changes in the wider politics of the market à la Harriss-White. 
Finally, as Harriss-White (2008, 2010) has for West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, this 
research has shown that agro-commercial classes should be considered integral to 
Punjab’s agrarian capitalism. Capitalist agriculture in Punjab is often referenced only 
through the dynamics at the farm level. While the State procurement of paddy and 
wheat is recognized as supporting capitalist farming, it is still considered external to 
agriculture. My contention is that agrarian capitalism in Punjab could not have taken 
the form it has without State-supported procurement. Moreover, this system has 
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created agro-commercial classes such as arhtias and rice mill owners that have a 
vested interest in the perpetuation of the system. 
11.2.3 Punjab in India 
This brings us to the final rubric of contributions made by this research, i.e. how do 
developments in Punjab’s agriculture relate to all-India developments? 
Punjab is at the extreme end of the model pursued across India for agricultural 
growth. It is also unique in terms of the landholding pattern and the consolidation of 
large capitalist farmers. Therefore, it provides an excellent showcase of the ways in 
which accumulation under agrarian capitalism so developed is vulnerable. 
Agriculture in Punjab shows signs of cyclical crises typical of capitalism 
everywhere: one major sign is ecological distress, discussed in Chapter 4; another is 
the credit complex where debt is transferred from one social actor to another rather 
than being repaid, which is unsustainable. 
In Section 11.1 I discussed how accumulation has become more precarious under 
liberalisation. However, not all the sources of risk are directly linked to liberalisation 
reforms. The form that vulnerability takes is shaped by both macro-economic issues 
and the local or regional context. For example, the stagnation of Green Revolution 
technologies due to ecological constraints, and fragmentation of landholdings (which 
then creates the demand to lease land) are linked to the longer agrarian history of the 
region. Similarly, the shift away from State-supported paddy and wheat procurement 
would not be an issue in regions of the country where this kind of support has never 
been made available. In fact, accumulation in other regions might be more 
precarious than in Punjab precisely because of the absence of similar forms of State 
support. 
Regions are also different in terms of commodity-specific risks and opportunities. 
With respect to this research, it should be noted that high-quality basmati can only 
be cultivated in a few states in north-west India, Punjab being one of them. The field 
area per se was also unique in terms of being extremely fertile even for Punjab and 
therefore able to support a wide range of crops. It is also among the few areas in the 
state and in India where disease-free seed potatoes can be cultivated. Other high-
value crops (such as pepper and ginger) cultivated in other regions of India might 
bring different conditions to bear on processes of agrarian change. 
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On the issue of economic diversification, an important all-India trend, this research 
supports the position of Upadhya (1988a) that investment outside agriculture is 
motivated by different factors, such as the need to invest surpluses, to escape distress 
within agriculture, the desire to avoid anticipated distress within agriculture and the 
unwillingness of younger males in the household to engage in farming. Therefore, 
diversification is not undertaken only as a desperate act, as argued by Rangarajan 
(2013) and, even among large capitalist farmers, availability of surplus is not the 
only reason for diversification, something missed out in the analyses of Damodaran 
(2008) and Lerche (2014). 
However, unlike in AP, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, diversification by capitalist 
farmers is not leading to wider industrial development. A broad overview indicates 
that this could be due to the power of the Mahajan castes (ibid.; Damodaran 2008). 
This research found, for instance, that Jats were less likely to invest in industrial 
ventures where they did not have prior experience and State support (unlike rice 
mills). Similarly, although this is not industrial activity, Jats were also less likely to 
become arhtias dealing in fruit as they had no experience or trading networks in this 
business. Another reason for the inability of accumulation to facilitate industrial 
development in the state could be that Punjab’s economy is generally not considered 
to be conducive to industrial development, which in turn could be a consequence of 
the nature of federalism (as argued by Singh 2009). The logic of investments across 
economic sectors is certainly an area that requires further investigation. 
I have also shown how agrarian accumulation links to the wider economy. The 
property boom and bust created a temporarily vibrant land sales market within 
agriculture which was used by both small and large farmers in different ways. The 
issues in other economic areas, such as manufacturing, transport or education, also 
influenced whether farmers would succeed in diversifying their income. Land-
leasing is also impacted by trends in the wider economy, as it is usually those who 
are able to find relatively more rewarding work outside agriculture – either for 
subsistence or accumulation – who lease-out their land. On the other hand, the 
decline in crop prices in the fieldwork year led to a ripple effect of cash constraints 
in all agriculture-linked trades and industries. Overall, I have identified new ways in 
which boundaries between agriculture and non-agriculture are dissolved. Similar 
phenomena in other places can be investigated. 
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This research also enables us to reflect on how agrarian capitalism has evolved in 
India. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the ‘mode of production’ debate took 
place, capitalism in the Indian countryside was understood as being in its nascent 
stages, even in the extreme case of a state like Punjab. Agrarian capitalism has 
consolidated itself in most parts of the country now. Accordingly, a significant 
change has been in terms of the nature of agrarian classes: if they ever were, classes 
are no longer purely ‘agrarian’. Both labour and capital are widely involved and 
invested in the non-agricultural sector, presenting analytical challenges in studying 
class differentiation. 
In terms of the place of Punjab in India, it is worth noting that while it was an 
exception within India in the 1970s, it is less so now. The difference between Punjab 
and other regions now is not one of capitalism versus non-capitalism, but how 
capitalism has developed differently in different places. A more tentative conclusion 
is that within the state, possibilities of high returns from capital intensification in 
paddy and wheat production look increasingly unlikely due to ecological limits. 
Further, high value crops present a greater possibility of high returns but on riskier 
terms. On the other hand, an element of Punjab’s agrarian capitalism that has not 
changed is the supportive role of the State, which, as mentioned earlier, undermines 
the claim of the decreased role of the State under neoliberalism.  
Overall, with respect to the trajectory of agrarian development in India as a whole, 
this research has shown that highly capitalised, relatively large-scale farming can be 
both profitable and vulnerable under conditions of State support and vibrant 
agricultural markets. Secondly, it has established that traders and ‘middlemen’ 
should not be portrayed as necessarily obstructive to economic growth. Finally, if 
anywhere, one would expect agriculture to be profitable in Punjab given its agrarian 
history. The same cannot be said for other areas of the country. However, it can be 
argued that in areas of highly capitalised agriculture, it is likely that agribusinesses 
(global and domestic) and local traders would want to carve space. When this 
happens, it cannot be assumed that this would be disruptive to the profitability of 
capitalist agriculture. 
This research centred the capitalist farmer in its analysis, something that is 
uncommon in studies on Indian agriculture. By focusing on capital, I have been able 
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to explore the source of dynamism in the agricultural sector as well as the nature of 
the challenges that confront it. I have also argued that liberalisation has taken shape 
through close interaction with the local political economy. In bringing out the ability 
of capitalist farmers to build on historical advantages and negotiate new changes, 
this research has established that agriculture in India is far from destroyed under 
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Appendix I: Ranking tables of districts for site selection for fieldwork 
Table A 
% Operational Holdings Average Yield per Hectare 
Marginal Small Semi-med Medium Large Rice Wheat Mustard/Rapeseed Sugarcane Potato 
Gurdaspur 3 2 6 19 20 18 18 7 6 15 
Amritsar 14 4 1 16 16 20 13 3 9 2 
Tarn Taran 12 6 2 13 15 19 16 #N/A 14 12 
Kapurthala 8 10 5 11 9 12 15 4 7 4 
Jalandhar 19 16 8 4 5 15 9 7 11 1 
S.B.S. Nagar 4 3 11 17 14 8 8 12 10 8 
Hoshiarpur 2 5 15 18 17 13 20 13 13 9 
Rupnagar 1 1 20 20 19 17 19 11 5 14 
S.A.S. Nagar 9 7 4 14 18 11 17 14 12 11 
Ludhiana 13 13 13 9 6 4 4 1 3 3 
Firozpur 18 19 17 2 2 16 12 2 8 16 
Faridkot 10 12 14 5 11 7 7 #N/A #N/A 18 
Muktsar 20 20 18 1 1 14 10 10 #N/A 19 
Moga 5 8 10 12 13 2 3 #N/A #N/A 5 
Bathinda 16 18 16 3 3 6 11 9 #N/A 10 
Mansa 17 17 12 7 4 9 14 5 #N/A 17 
Sangrur 7 9 3 15 12 3 1 6 2 13 
Barnala 6 15 19 6 7 1 5 #N/A #N/A 20 
Patiala 15 11 9 10 8 10 2 #N/A 1 7 
Fatehgarh Sahib 11 14 7 8 10 5 6 #N/A 4 6 
Notes: 1. All the ranks are based on the data from the Statistical Abstract of Punjab (Government of Punjab 2012b). 






1000 ha. NAS 
% NAI to 
NAS 
Tractors per 
ha. of NAS 
Threshers per 
ha. of NAS 
Reapers per 
ha. of NAS 
Combine Harvesters 
per ha. of NAS 
Combine tractors 
per ha. of NAS 
Gurdaspur 18 13 85-90 15 18 12 8 16 
Pathankot 
 
22 >99      
Amritsar 7 20 >99 19 11 17 16 12 
Tarn Taran 16 16 >99 18 12 19 13 11 
Kapurthala 2 10 >99 10 10 20 11 15 
Jalandhar 19 12 >99 9 8 16 10 14 
S.B.S. Nagar 11 9 90-95 8 7 13 6 13 
Hoshiarpur 17 17 90-95 17 5 18 20 19 
Rupnagar 14 2 85-90 3 3 7 15 17 
S.A.S. Nagar 20 8 85-90 11 6 14 19 18 
Ludhiana 4 5 >99 6 2 9 4 7 
Firozpur 13 19 >99 20 20 15 8 8 
Fazilka 
 
21 >99      
Faridkot 3 3 >99 4 19 10 5 2 
Muktsar 9 13 >99 13 14 11 12 9 
Moga 8 4 >99 5 17 5 2 1 
Bathinda 12 11 >99 12 16 6 14 5 
Mansa 10 17 >99 16 1 8 18 6 
Sangrur 5 6 >99 7 13 1 17 10 
Barnala 1 15 >99 14 9 3 7 4 
Patiala 6 7 >99 1 15 2 1 3 
Fatehgarh Sahib 15 1 >99 2 4 4 3 20 
Notes: 1. NAS is Net Area Sown; NAI is Net Area Irrigated; Cropping Intensity is calculated by dividing Total Cropped Area by Net Area Sown. 
2. All figures are ranks, except NAI to NAS which is a proportion expressed as a percentage. 
3. Data on NAS, NAI and No. of Tractors per 1000 ha. NAS is from the Statistical Abstract 2012; data on tractors, threshers, reapers and combines is from Village 
Directories 2011-12 (Government of Punjab 2012a) but the NAS used to calculate their figures per hectare of NAS for the purpose of ranking is from the Statistical Abstract 
2012.  
312 
Appendix II: Farmer Household Survey Questionnaire 
1. RESPONDENT PROFILE 
Village...........................................................      Residence……………………..  Interview Date …………………………….  
Name of Respondent……………………….. Religion……………………….  Official Caste category………………Caste/Subcaste……………… 
 
 
2. HOUSEHOLD PROFILE 














 Other Notes 
1           
2           
3           
4            
5           
6           
7           
8           
  
                                                          
164
 Indicate whether illiterate (1); literate but without formal schooling (2), less than Primary (3), Primary (4), Middle (5), Matriculate (6), Intermediate (7), Graduation or 
above (8), Professional degree/diploma (9). 
165
 Indicate whether local government, private school (which one), or outside area (where?) 
166
 Indicate which languages are spoken by each: English, Hindi, State language (specify), Regional Language (specify), Local Dialect (specify) 
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Household Members Who Have Left in Last 20 Years  
(to other houses in settlement or nearby, or migrated away and maybe sending remittances back or forth, or 
married out) 
Why Left? 





1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
 
3. HOUSE OCCUPATION/CONSTRUCTION HISTORY 
When was this house built? Since when are you living in this house?  
 
In whose name is the name of the land? 
 
4. GENEALOGY (TO BE OUTLINED AT NEXT PAGE) 
- Follow to as many generations back as you can go 
- What kind of work did your parents, grand parents, great grand parents do? (point is to trace any changes across generations)  
- What kind of education did your parents, grand parents, great grand parents have? Who were the first person in the genealogy to get educated to the following levels: 








5. ASSETS  
(details on the number owned, when and how acquired, if any are leased-in or leased-out + the terms, how many days used, who pays for the diesel) 
Vehicles: 
 























 Homestead Land Own land cultivated  Land leased-in Land leased-out Land in ‘adh-batai’ 
Area      
Where      
In whose name/whose 
land/leased to whom 
     
Crops produced      
Since when      
Rent/sharing terms (if 
applicable) 
     




7. LIVESTOCK  
Which livestock do you own (oxen, buffalo, cows, goats, horses) and how many?      
How many give milk? What is the milk yield of the animals? 
Do you grow or buy their feed or both? 




Type How many? Who? (gender, caste, 
region) 
For what activities? On what terms & conditions? (payment in cash 
or kind, for how long etc.) 
Domestic Servants     
Hired Agricultural Labour     
    
    
    
    
    
Naukar     











Cost per acre (w/o lease rate) Cost per acre (w/ lease rate) Income/Profit per acre Yield per acre Other notes (incl. 
sale channel) 
Paddy       
Basmati       
Wheat       
       
       
       
 
9.2 History/profile of diversification 
(To trace and document whether anyone tried something different in relation to agriculture in the past and succeeded/failed) 







10. CREDIT AND DEBT 
10.1 Large one-off expenditures in last 5 years? Health/ illness; Wedding; Dowry; Brideprice; Funerals, puja/pilgrimage;crop failure; private education; machinery 
 
What for When Cost How did you get the money (sources, terms and conditions) Paid back/how? 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
10.2 Present credit/debt situation 
Details may include interest rate, how much is monthly pay, how long do you have to pay back, is there any security –eg land, labour, family member given creditor for work; 












11. GOVERNMENT/NON GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMMES. Government or NGO programmes household has benefited from in past five years. 
 
Life Insurances or other policies? If so, who and what type? 
 
Agricultural loans/subsidies:  
 




12. OTHER NOTES 
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Appendix III: Glossary 
Adh-batai A form of sharecropping whereby farmers and labour gangs 
contribute a share of inputs towards production and share the 
profits 
Arhtia Commission agent 
Custom milling The process through which the rice mills process paddy and 
deliver rice to the FCI 
Dasti Informal transactions between traders, mill owners and/or 
farmers to finance trading and/or moneylending activities 
Jat Dominant agrarian caste  
Kanungo Revenue officer in the district 
Kharif Summer crop 
Mahajan Mercantile castes 
Mandi Regulated wholesale market 
Naukar Attached farm labour, employed on monthly or annual 
contracts 
Parmal 'Government quality' paddy or paddy procured by government 
Pucca arhtia Traders in the wholesale market who make purchases on their 
own behalf or on behalf of other persons/firms in exchange for 
a commission 
Rabi Winter crop 
Sheller Rice mill 
Theka Land leasing arrangement 






Appendix IV: Types of Diversification Recorded in the Household Survey 
This appendix disaggregates the data given in Table 10.5 for the types of 
diversification across classes in the household survey. This includes all past or 
present, successful or unsuccessful attempts at diversification by these households.  
Agriculture-based business 
Arhtia – 2 
Potato trade - 1 
Dairy Farm – 2 
Input dealership – 1 
Renting out combine – 3 
Cattle trade – 1  




Transport business – 3 
Tractor agency – 2  
Property dealer – 2  
Owned shop space on rent – 1 
Grocery shop – 2 
Garment shop – 1  
Mechanical spare parts shop – 1 
Total – 12 
 
 
Education or Skills-based diversification 
A few households are involved in more than one type of education or skills-based 
diversification, and they have been counted twice here. The total here, therefore, 
does not tally with the figure given in Table 10.5  
Military service – 8 
Bank employee – 2 
Government or private school/college teacher – 7 
Government civil job – 2 
Police – 1  
Inspector in a state procurement agency – 1 
Unknown – 1 
Electricals shop – 1 
Shuttering shop – 1  
Mechanic – 3 
Mill Accountant – 2 
Mill supervisor – 1 
Mill labour – 1 
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Mill driver – 1 
Bahai – 2 
Carpenter – 1 




One household had members doing different things in different countries, and they 
have been counted twice. The total here, therefore, does not tally with the figure 
given in Table 10.5  
Labour job in Italy – 6 
Labouring job in Middle East (including driving, carpentry in Dubai) – 5 
Business in UK, US, Belgium – 4 
Driving in US (taxi or trolley) – 2   
Study in UK – 1  
Total – 18  
 
 
